The Ethics of Animal Advocacy: Towards Biocentric Individualism by Reardon, Mark
ITEM NO: 1992770
floundby
ABBEY BOOKBINDING & PRINTING
Unit 3 Gabalfa Workshops Excelsior Ind. Est. Cardiff CF14 3AY 
Tel; (029) 2062 3290 Fax. (029) 2062 5420 
Email: info@abbeybookbinding.co.uk 
Web: www abbey bookbinding.co uh
NOT TO BE 
TAKEN AWAY




University of Wales, Newport
PhD
2011
The Ethics of Animal Advocacy: Towards Biocentric Individualism
I, Mark Reardon, declare that the work presented in this thesis is, to the 
best of my knowledge and belief, original, except as acknowledged in 
the text, and that the material has not been submitted, either in whole or 
in part, for a degree at this or any other university.
Signed...............................................Date.
The Ethics of Animal Advocacy: Towards Biocentric Individualism
Abstract
The contemporary animal rights movement, in extending moral consideration to 
nonhuman animals, has in diverse ways already contributed to an expansion of the 
boundaries of the ethical community and what that may constitute. However, many 
environmentalists argue there is a failure within animal ethics to adequately address 
wider animal advocacy concerns, and that consideration of broader ecosystemic 
challenges elicit at best moot response from mainstream animal rights advocates. In 
taking an individualistically based biocentric approach, the essential aims of animal 
ethics can, I argue, be readily embraced into a theory of value that can address this 
wider remit. In aligning the applicability of a developed form of biocentric 
individualism with the ethical underpinning of notions of the 'illegitimacy of animal 
use' extrapolated from normative animal advocacy perspectives, my proposition is 
that these shortcomings can be ameliorated and that such an alignment forms a 
complimentary and useful fusion. Biocentrism as a value theory asks for moral 
considerability to be centred upon a respect for individual nonhuman (and human) 
life and the possession/continuation of a flourishing individual life - neither of which, I 
contend, is at odds with the essential spirit of animal ethics. In this sense, I submit 
that a developed biocentric individualism 'bridges the gap' between animal ethics 
and environmental ethics.
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Introduction
Intent
The broad aim of this thesis is twofold:
1. To critique contemporary perceptions of animal advocacy from an 
individualistically based perspective, arguing that dominant understandings 
and practices of animal advocacy limit our full moral obligations to individual 
nonhumans.
2. Further, to argue that these limitations are endemic to wider environmental 
policy and practice concerning nonhuman animals. I will contend that these 
constraints have their basis in an accepted 'legitimacy of animal use', and I 
will offer a challenge to this assumption of legitimacy of use through a critique 
of ecocentric thought and development of a form of biocentric individualism.
This thesis, then, will defend a particular, individualised biocentric notion of animal 
rights against (a) 'welfarist', (b) 'paternalistic', and (c) holistic approaches which have 
tended to dominate amid the recent flourishing of debates in the fields of 
environmental and animal ethics. The concept of animal rights, in extending moral 
consideration to nonhuman animals, has already contributed to an expansion of the 
boundaries of the ethical community and what that may constitute. This widening of 
scope raises questions about where the treatment of nonhuman animals fits within 
wider ethical issues concerning the environment in general.
Despite the contributions from animal rights advocates and environmentalists, 
I contend that an axiological problem remains in that animal protectionist arguments 
do not construct a comprehensive animal advocacy approach that adequately 
addresses the centrality of individual members of animal species. 1 This thesis will 
develop the argument that notions of the 'individual' are in fact central to a human 
understanding of our moral obligations to nonhuman animals. I further submit that 
the systemic view of nature at large is unavoidably hierarchical in structure, and that
1 See Glossary for my working definition of what constitutes animal advocacy in the context of 
this work.
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consequently the nonhuman individual is 'lost' in the dominant belief that hierarchy 
between groups forms the 'natural' order of nature. In order to properly fulfil the 
radical promise of an individualistically based animal rights position, I will argue that 
'doing justice' to the individualism that is pivotal to this stance requires an elementary 
re-examining of the established hierarchical view in order to properly locate the 
nonhuman individual within the moral landscape. In achieving this, I will critique 
welfarist, paternalistic and holistic accounts of our obligations to the natural world, 
and propose that a developed rights-based position - one that fundamentally 
challenges the legitimacy of animal use as 'natural' - may indeed be conceived of as 
a justifiable and viable environmental ethic for the challenges of the twenty first 
century. This framework will develop through a six chapter analysis of the 
deontological foundations of animal rights, animal welfare approaches, the 
consequences of paternalism, a critique of holistic alternatives, construction of a 
conceptual foundation for a 'biocentric individualism' which will propose that concern 
for individuals and concern for the 'whole' need not be counterposed, and conclude 
with a discussion of the practical implications for a developed biocentric approach.
Despite developments in reassessing the boundaries of moral consideration 
to the nonhuman animal, there remains much tension within environmental thought 
and practice on where, and what, it is that merits such moral consideration, and 
furthermore how we distinguish our moral duties between individual nonhumans, 
groups and species. For example, animal rightists such as Tom Regan, argue that 
given a choice between saving one hundred of a common species and a few, say 
five, of an endangered species, we should choose the former as the number of 
'rights to life' affected is greater (2004). Typically, many environmental ethicists 
disagree with this approach and would save the endangered few - as their focus 
centres on 'collectives' and the perceived importance of the aggregated group to 
wider ecological interdependencies, rather than concern for the moral status of the 
individual lives in question. It is this category of problem that makes rapprochement 
between animal rights positions and environmental ethics at large conceptually (and 
practically) complex.
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A substantial body of work has been accrued on the viability, political 
structure, policy and central aims of diverse 'ecocentric' perspectives. 2 However, 
despite agendas for a greater integration of the human into nature, much 
contemporary critique has remained fundamentally anthropocentric3 in essence - 
customarily concerning itself in the final analysis with the human benefit from a so- 
called 'reading off' of nature. 4 Much 'holism' in environmental ethics thus contains a 
human bias at its very foundation that seeks to 'recreate' nature, but in highly 
selective terms. This in turn fosters tacit protectionist presumptions of the legitimacy 
of paternalistic worldviews which frequently enthusiastically embrace a systemic 
approach to animal advocacy. 5 Problematically for a rights-based view, such aims 
often stand in direct conflict with contemporary 'individualistic' ideas of animal rights: 
in short, there would seem to be a gulf between the metaphysics of 'care' for the 
nonhuman advocated in many ecocentric arguments, and notions of 'discrete' value 
for individual nonhumans. In exploring the viability of such a project through the 
prism of an individualistically-based position, I hope to offer a unique perspective and 
critique on The Ethics of Animal Advocacy', and the possible limitations of, and the 
potential opportunities for, interspecies relationships. It is important at the outset 
however, to clarify that green 'moral' thought is not green political theory. I do not 
wish to suggest in the body of this work that contemporary green political theory is 
essentially indistinguishable from environmental ethics. As Alan Carter notes in 
discussion of green political theory, such obfuscation makes green political theory all 
too vulnerable to the disagreements within the 'moral' debate - the subject matter of 
which is the very lifeblood of this thesis (1999, p. 197).
In synthesis, I will argue that the current 'institutionalized' principles and 
practices of holistically based attitudes toward nonhumans, and likewise mainstream 
animal welfare policy that professes to work 'within' normative boundaries, have
2 Some pivotal examples are Murray Bookchin's The Ecology of Freedom (1982), J.B. Callicot's, 
The Intrinsic Value of Nature in Public Policy ( 2005), Alan Carter's, A Radical Green Political 
Theory (1999), Anvar De-Shalit's The Environment: Between Theory and Practice (2000), Alan 
Dobson, Green Political Thought (2007), Tim Hayward's Political Theory and Ecological Values 
(1998) and John O'Neill., A Holland and A Light, Environmental Values (2008). 
3 See the Glossary for my general use of anthropocentrism in this work and the important 
distinction to be made between anthropogenic provenance and anthropocentric ways of thinking.
4 Here I refer to the attempt to read off moral strictures from our perception of nature itself. 
Typically, this takes the form of arguments that nature is red in fang and claw and thus many of 
our practices towards nonhumans such as meat eating or sport hunting merely naturalistically 
reflect 'nature's way'.
5 See Glossary for working definitions of holism and paternalism in the context of this work.
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embedded within them serious theoretical anomalies that, subsequently, colour 
wider animal advocacy in subtle, yet decisive ways. This, I will argue, chiefly takes 
the form of an illegitimacy of use arising from a failure to recognise or acknowledge 
the presumptive utilisation of individual nonhumans that I argue throughout, is 
endemic to contemporary animal advocacy. I start out therefore by proposing two 
distinct classes of moral concern in broad terms: Firstly, what I am calling 'animals in 
human servitude' - and begin to argue for radical change in our welfare-based moral 
responses. And secondly, so-called 'wild' animals, and argue in the body of my work 
that conventional paternalistic attitudes are deeply problematic in that the 
presumption of the legitimacy of our 'use' of nonhumans identified in welfarism subtly 
carries over to holistically based conservation principles and practices.
I will argue that current (and arguably limited) 'paternalistic' approaches 
continue in large part to inform the wider debate within environmental ethics at large, 
and that the contemporary notions of animal advocacy may in fact stultify, restrict 
and confine our understanding of our full moral obligations to nonhuman individuals. 
Within this framework, this thesis will then explore the points of intersection between 
the firm ecocentric bedrock of valuing the intrinsic nature of 'nature', the concern for 
nonhuman welfare, and contemporary individualistic animal rights-based arguments. 
My contention is that there are principal points of intersection between an animal 
rights-based position and appropriate wider animal advocacy which require 
fundamental re-examination of our theoretical and applied interspecies moral 
concepts. Exploring wider animal advocacy theory and practice ('beyond' the central 
animal ethics debate) will, I believe, create a space for reconsideration of 
contemporary animal advocacy theory and practice and its place within this distinct 
paradigm. There are, broadly speaking, three theoretical approaches that form the 
framework for this exploration: Animal Rights, Animal Welfare and 
Environmentalism. If we are to formulate a simplistic distinction, then each tends to 
differ primarily in their criteria of intrinsic value - and each draw lines of moral 
considerability in different places:
11
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1. For animal rights advocates the criterion is essentially subjecthood. We may 
say then that the animal rights perspective originates in our respect for the 
'independent' perspectives of animals.6
2. For defenders of animal welfare the criteria are sentience and/or the capacity 
to suffer. In this sense, animal welfare perspectives originate in our 
sympathetic reactions to nonhuman animals. 7
3. For many environmentalists the criterion is in essence the 'contribution' as 
part of a system of life that individuals and groups make. Thusly, 
environmentalist perspectives originate in our wonder at the awe of 'nature' 
and those animals within it. 8
Chapter One is entitled 'Rights and Animals: An Overview', and will form a 
platform for my thesis. I will outline my interpretation of the theoretical, political and 
social construction of what I consider constitutes an animal rights-based ethic and 
the place that this currently occupies in contemporary ethical thought. Primarily this 
sketch will afford the opportunity to contextualize a broad animal rights perspective 
for the reader, and ground subsequent argument for an individualistic and biocentric 
approach. Despite the modern 'willingness' to engage with debate on the moral 
status of the nonhuman within ethical discourse, it is my contention that the case for 
animal rights, as presented here, remains to greater or lesser extent predominately 
within the domain of theoretical discourse. Indeed, in starkly realistic terms it is clear 
that we remain very far from fostering a culture that routinely respects the rights of
6 Chiefly see Tom Regan The Case for Animal Rights (2004) and Regan and Carl Cohen discuss the 
nuances of both sides of the debate in the seminal work The Animal Rights Debate (2001). For 
further discussion on the theme of'rights' - especially in relation to 'animal rights', see Mary 
Anne Warren, Moral Status: Obligations to persons and other living things (1997), J Wiener, 
'Perspectives: Animal rights, human rights, public rights' (1989), T Sprigge, 'Interests and 
Rights: The Case against Animals' (1981), J Smith, 'Morals, Reason and Animals' (1991), Roger 
Scruton, Animal Rights and Wrongs (2000), D Porter, 'Our philosophy concerning animal rights' 
(1991), Onora O'Neill, Kantian Ethics (1993), Thomas Nagel, Moral Questions (1979), A 
McKay, 'Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things' (1998) and J Hamil, 
'Humankind's uses of animals' (1995).
7 Famously Peter Singer defends the animal liberation position in Animal Liberation (1995) and 
Practical Ethics. (1993).
8 Key theorists include Baird Callicott in 'Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair' (1979), Arne 
Naess'The Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects (1986), Bill Devall and 
George Sessions, Deep Ecology: Living As If Nature Mattered (1985), and Warwick Fox in A 
Theory of General Ethics: Human Relationships, Nature and the Built Environment (2006), also 
for a broader perspective see an earlier paper entitled, 'Deep Ecology: A New Philosophy of Our 
Time?' (1984).
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animals. Despite the daily industrial scale (ab)use of animals before us, it would 
seem that the ever-present gulf between ethical theory and practice has rarely been 
so vast in expanse than in our daily dealings with nonhuman animals.
This is not of course to ignore the very real and laudable advances in recent 
times in animal welfare (at least in some parts of the world), due in no small part to 
selective animal rights and welfare issues entering the public arena - high profile 
examples of which include issues around battery farming, the use of veal cages, 
organic production and 'free range' initiatives. Nevertheless, as I will discuss in 
chapter two, clear distinctions need to be made between (i) the fundamental case for 
ascribing a framework of rights to nonhuman animals and the far reaching 
implications thereof, and (ii) what generally is understood in the contemporary 
mindset to be 'animal welfare' advances in broader terms. 9 I will follow with a 
discussion of perceptions of animal rights in public discourse and the challenges of 
the rights view, and go on to further speculate on the future of a contemporary 
reading of a rights-based standpoint whilst contrasting this with themes endemic to 
the wider debate on animal rights and welfare within the broader ecological 
landscape.
Chapter Two, 'Welfarism and Animals: The Limits of Animal Advocacy' will 
discuss our duties and obligations to the nonhuman animal in the context of a 
welfarist position and contrast this with a rights-based view. Both positions are 
clearly in support of animal interests, but have at their core conceptually diverse and 
far-reaching theoretical divergence. I contend that notwithstanding the expedient 
benefits that the professed safeguards of welfarism affords and the cumulative 
lessening of suffering for some 'farmed' animals, the idea of 'animal rights' has 
deeper meaning and sense of permanency than contemporary protectionist 
viewpoints might suggest. I argue, for example, that viewing rights as equating 
primarily to welfarist aims ranging from education to legal protection does not 
encompass the 'spirit' of what it is to be attributed rights in general. Furthermore, the 
welfarist concept of 'rights' leaves the welfare of nonhuman animals arbitrarily open 
to interpretation according to politics, period and place. Those who would voice 
concern for the welfare of nonhuman animals need, I submit, to truly understand
9 Gary Francione makes plain this dichotomy of thought within the debate as a starting point for 
his animal rights theory in Rain without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement 
(1996).
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what it is that is being asserted in advocacy of animal welfare. Focusing firstly on 
welfare theories, I will critique the validity of forms of welfarism within the current 
animal welfare debate. Subsequently, I will explore dominant strands of welfarist 
thought and practice and assess their limitations in a tripartite discussion of the hope 
of welfarism, the problem of welfarism and welfare in practice in the light of a rights- 
based perspective.
Further, in Chapter Three, headed 'Paternalism and Animals: Protectionism 
and Environmental Ethics' I argue that the central problems of welfarism identified in 
chapter two, persist in our '(mis)management' of nonhumans, and serve to shore up 
the paternalistic underpinnings of conservation and preservation principles and 
practices. A paradigmatic problem for the rights view for many who would ascribe to 
protectionist credentials in this respect is discussed: namely, given its individually 
centred ethic, how might an individualistic rights-based position provide a credible 
basis for our 'obligations' to systemic environmental management, preservation of 
ecosystems and conservation of endangered species? If any sense is to be made of 
such a question, this category of enquiry must presuppose an implicit acceptance of 
some form of 'obligation' to the nonhuman world. Ideas of obligation and duties to 
others of course can take many forms other than general prima facie duties of 
kindness or beneficence. In a wider sense, within the human sphere, if we are to 
acknowledge the uncontroversial proposition that there exist meaningful incumbent 
duties to one another - which evidentially in our daily interactions exist in diverse 
manner frequently independent of formal frameworks of justice - then it is probable 
that similar kinds of obligations and duties will be occasioned in our interrelations 
with other-than-human animals. In addressing this broad claim, concepts of 
'stewardship' will be evaluated through an analysis of current normative practices in 
environmental management. In exploring how conservation and preservation theory 
and practice impacts upon our ideas of moral considerability to nonhuman animals, I 
question the validity of our moral responses to the concept of 'managed' nature, and 
the place of the individual animal within it. 10
Chapter Four, entitled 'Ecocentric Ethics and Animals: The New Stewardship 
Creed' considers the synthesis of a rights-based view with ecocentric environmental 
perspectives. Given that it is the self-same rights and welfare of animals discussed in
10 For further insight, see Joan Dunayer's discussion of these themes in Speciesism (2004).
14
The Ethics of Animal Advocacy: Towards Bioccntric Individualism
chapters one and two that remain at stake in innumerable human interactions with 
'wild' nonhumans, I critique the claim of ecocentrism to provide the basis for a wholly 
sufficient and appropriate animal advocacy. Although discourse on animal rights and 
welfare issues may be seen to be increasingly legitimate in mainstream debate, 
those who actively seek to ground a framework of workable rights for the nonhuman 
animal are nevertheless frequently viewed as radicals. In analysing the theoretical 
foundations of 'radical' ecocentric positions, I will focus in on the points of 
intersection and departure between a broad holistic perspective and an individualistic 
rights-based stance. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of 
contemporary holism in relation to animal rights advocacy within the UK, speculating 
on future developments and their significance for our moral responses to the 
nonhuman individual.
Following on from the discussion of holism, Chapter Five, 'Biocentrism and 
Animals: A Fresh Perspective', will explore the potentialities for the individualistic 
model developed in the body of this work and the application of this suggested 
individualistically based framework. I will discuss the reductionist views that tend to 
dominate environmental ethical thinking, and question the dominant view that there 
are extant 'two movements' that consider humankind's 'place' in nature and our 
subsequent moral responsibilities to the nonhuman world. In synthesis, I will 
develop a version of an individualistic 'biocentric individualism' as a suggested 
framework for my arguments, substantiating the illegitimacy of use arising from the 
normative positions of the animal ethics debate. This posits, in essence, that it is 
only individual living organisms that have interests and not aggregate groups such 
as species, ecosystems, or biotic communities, and central to this claim is the idea 
that the biocentric view (at least my interpretation of such), accords no automatic 
priority to beings that are deemed to be more sophisticated (and pointedly, this 
includes human beings). In this respect I will argue that biocentric individualism may 
indeed form a legitimate animal advocacy ethic for the twenty first century (Varner, 
2004).
In what will form the conclusion for this work, in Chapter Six entitled 
'Biocentric Individualism and Animals: From Theory to Practice', I will explore the 
practical implications in matters of conflict of interests, and as to what contextual 
factors may have relevance in relation to each other in adoption of the biocentric 
approach to animal advocacy developed within this work. After an introduction to the
15
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principal issues that a biocentric view likely needs to consider in practical application, 
the tripartite central themes of this thesis will be 'revisited' in discussion of their 
functional implications for a developed biocentric and individualistic account. This re- 
examination will begin with an exploration arising from the critique of welfarism in 
chapter two. Following on from this evaluation a central problem drawn out from 
discussion of paternalism in chapter three will be examined in the context of the 
assumptions of the legitimacy of selective value hierarchies, and how these 
assumptions colour actual practice. Lastly, holistic approaches to animal advocacy 
arising from an ecocentric perspective discussed in chapter four will then be re- 
examined in the light of the practical implications for the developed individualistic and 
biocentric position advanced in chapter 5. In conclusion, an exploration of the 
broader themes that application of theory to practice must inevitably encounter will 
be undertaken in respect to the development of the individualistic account suggested 
in this work.
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1. Rights and Animals: An Overview
It will not do to ignore moral argument just because it has always been
ignored. Immorality sanctified by tradition is still immorality. Bernard E. 
Rollin, Animal Rights and Human Morality. 1
In this opening chapter my intention is not to attempt a protracted defence of animal 
advocacy, but rather to endeavour to draw an outline of contemporary interpretations 
of an animal rights-based position in order to contextualize a broader animal 
advocacy perspective for the reader. As prerequisite to the later development of 
arguments for a rapprochement between animal ethics and environmental ethics, 
this preamble will afford the opportunity to delineate my interpretation of the 
theoretical and applied construction of a rights-based ethic, and the place that this 
currently occupies within contemporary ethical thought.
At the outset a somewhat obvious observation needs to be made explicit: that 
the case for animal rights, put forward here, is not conceived of in a vacuum. It 
stands firmly upon the rich and diverse foundations of liberal thought that seeks to 
interpret and administer a broad liberal agenda. Clearly then for many, at the 
conceptual outset the prospect of animal rights makes little sense without some 
commitment to extant liberal principles. Simply put, in a peculiar sense, everyone 
who believes in human rights believes in animal rights - since humans are animals. 2 
Arguably, in practice, the case for animal rights is largely negated if one entirely 
refutes the liberal case for human rights. 3 However, despite this correlation, I in no 
way wish to imply that ideas of animal rights necessarily conflate with contemporary 
liberal notions of human rights. Although the case for animal rights frequently 
overlaps, interlinks and draws upon the philosophical and theoretical foundations of 
human rights, the fact that they arise from the same cultural stable does not equate 
to a mere extension of what may represent human rights to the nonhuman. In this
1 Quoted from Bernard Rollin's comprehensive work on animal ethics, (2006), p. 169.
2 See the Glossary for my general use of anthropocentrism in this work and the important 
distinction to be made between anthropogenic provenance and anthropocentric ways of thinking. 
3 1 do not imply here that one must or indeed should hold to the concepts of human rights before 
agreement upon a conceptual model of animal rights. Rather, I merely suggest that assent to the 
'spirit' of what 'rights' represent (in its most basic form 'the 'right to be considered as a moral 
subject by any person who has moral principles'), is likely to be a shared assent to the liberal 
'principle' of the protection that rights assign.
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sense, the kinds of presuppositions that foment the case for human rights are, for 
many, absent in application to nonhumans. Indeed, it is the very difficulty of ascribing 
meaningful moral status to nonhumans that tends to shape much of the debate 
within the animal ethics discourse.
In both cases however, it is my contention throughout this work that although 
rights may frequently be conferred upon groups and aggregated categories - such as 
for example, women's rights - the notion of rights and the moral considerability it 
engenders can derive meaning in recognition of discrete individual preferences or 
interests, and not merely in abstract ideas of aggregate identity. Importantly for an 
understanding of the use of the term 'animal rights' as used throughout this work is 
acknowledgement that animal rights, as interpreted and used here, does not seek as 
a primary goal a structured, literalised and legalistic 'pantheon of rights', but 
endeavours to readdress, redefine and reassess what may constitute our moral 
obligations to nonhuman beings.4 Broadly expressed then, 'right' in this context is to 
be viewed in broader perspective as the 'right' to be considered as moral subjects by 
any person who has moral principles, regardless of what those moral principles may 
be. It is this expansive interpretation of animal rights that is to be adumbrated here 
for the reader as an introductory text prior to discussion of wider animal advocacy 
issues in the subsequent chapters.
1.1 The animal rights view today
Before drawing upon the salient themes within contemporary animal rights theory, it 
is initially worthwhile acknowledging that the very notion of rights - in its widest 
sense - is itself by no means self-evident, and can have many connotations in
4 See Glossary for a working definition of rights in this context and its general usage within this 
work. Further, it is noteworthy that the debate within and without animal ethics is generally 
termed the 'animal rights' debate. This is somewhat of a misnomer however, as this encompasses 
diverse theoretical and practical interpretations such as welfarism, abolitionism and various 
positions juxtaposed between these - and not necessarily strictly rights-based ascriptions. In this 
nominal sense, I believe the 'language' of rights cannot rightly be ignored entirely in a work on 
'animal rights'. Please see note 4 below, and Glossary for further explanation of my usage.
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commonplace assumptions as well as in theoretical discourse and legislation. 5 
'Animal rights' is no exception. On a straightforward interpretation, the idea of animal 
rights may enjoy widespread consensus, with many agreeing that animals 'have 
rights' - at least in the sense that we humans may not treat them in any way we 
wish. 6 This assertion does not however adequately encapsulate the animal rightist 
viewpoint to be outlined here. Individuals are frequently (and often happily) 
responsible for the welfare of animals in their care, but this is plainly not the same as 
universally bestowing certain rights on animals. We therefore need to distinguish 
between what may constitute animal welfare in its many forms, and the divergent 
animal rights position - both in theoretical and practical terms. This divergence in 
ways of thinking about interspecies relationships is fundamental to an understanding 
of our treatment of other animals and, by extension nature at large - and indeed to 
my thesis here. The issues surrounding these deep-seated views are complex and 
polemic, and in chapter two I address some of the salient contemporary arguments 
that form the basis for the schism. In this introductory chapter to contemporary 
animal rights arguments however, it is sufficient to note that this distinction remains 
crucial to societal attitudes to 'animal rights' issues and the broader ethical context 
regarding the moral status of the nonhuman animal. 7
Respectful Treatment and the Subject-of-a-Life
At this early stage, let us start with a brief outline of a central tenet of the ostensible 
rights view. Tom Regan formulates this precept as 'both human and nonhuman 
subjects-of-a-life have a basic moral right to respectful treatment'. 8 An initial remark
5 It should be noted at the outset that ascribing 'rights' is not of course the only medium for being 
humane. Various forms of virtue ethics, consequentialist theories, ethics of care and even religious 
edict also frequently proclaim duties of care to nonhumans. For further insight see, James Sterba ( 
2000,2006), David Styzbel (2006,2007), Marti Kheel (2000, 2008), Peter Singer (1995,2006) and 
Mary Anne Warren (1997,2000) for some notable contextual alternatives to a rights-based view. 
6 1 am referring here primarily to those animals that humans have direct interaction with - these 
may include companion animals, farmed animals and some wild animals. See chapters 2 and 3 for 
discussion of those animals deemed 'deserving' of some form of protectionism.
7 The use of the term 'nonhuman animal' is now commonplace within animal ethics. Clearly, the 
conventional language that sets mankind apart from all other animals presents a linguistic 
dichotomy (human/animal) that permeates our cultural understanding of humankind and its place 
in nature. The adage that not every animal is a man; but every man is an animal is apt. 
See Dinesh Wadiwel for an interesting discussion of Aristotlian logic in this context, (2008).
8 This for Regan forms a cornerstone of his theory (2004), p.xvii. Regan himself defines such 
beings as those who possess beliefs, desires, perceptions, memories, a sense of their own future, 
an emotional life, preference interests and sensations of pain and pleasure and as such "the value
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is worth noting here: Regan tends towards defining subjects-of-a-life as mentally 
normal mammals of a year or more. Of course any 'line drawing' is arguably 
dependent upon ones criteria for inclusion or exclusion, and indeed the argument 
from marginal cases - what (who) does or does not 'deserve' moral status - remains 
open to lively debate within ethical discourse. Typically, it is straightforward to assign 
attributes to the human that fall well beyond the scope of the nonhuman - such as 
the ability to perform advanced mathematics as one obvious example, but much 
more difficult to locate any supposed border itself. Notwithstanding, at the very least 
Regan's delimitation of what constitutes a subject-of-a-life remains a useful yardstick 
for wide-ranging contemporary debate around diverse issues of animal rights - most 
crucially in its pragmatic capacity to set the ball rolling on current public debate 
around issues of animal advocacy.
Within contemporary discourse, a well rehearsed rebuff against ascribing 
(some) animals moral standing turns upon what is often premised to be an 'intuitive' 
acknowledgment of our superior capabilities over the nonhuman. 9 It would seem for 
many that it is little short of substantive 'fact' that the life of a human individual is (but 
of course not always) enriched with complex cognitive abilities that seem not to be 
found in the animal world in such richness. These dynamic human abilities foster a 
plethora of advanced problem solving skills, diverse aesthetic appreciation, a 
capacity for 'spiritual' awareness and seed ever expanding technological 
development. However, irrespective of these observations, animal rights advocates 
forward a stark observation: that the mere 'fact' of difference provides no firm moral 
basis for arbitrary exploitation. This thought is crucial to the rights view. Indeed, this 
pivotal notion, when viewed together with the mandate for respectful treatment of 
subjects-of-a-life, clearly calls into question hitherto commonplace assumptions 
concerning our relationships with nonhuman animals. It may of course not be 
enough merely to rest upon these general principles of respectful treatment and 
ideas of difference as providing no moral basis for arbitrary exploitation. We 
inevitably find in the everyday causally complex interrelationships that compose the 
lives of all life on earth a seemingly constant theme - that of endemic conflict. This
of those individuals who satisfy these criteria have a distinct kind of value - inherent value - and 
are not to be viewed or treated as mere receptacles' (2004), p.243. This then constitutes the 
broad working definition of the term in the context of this work.
9 See Roger Scruton (2000) for a good example of ethical argument grounded in a presumption of 
the legitimacy of such an 'intuitive', and for Scruton, persuasive view.
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necessarily gives rise to an 'unavoidable' array of choices arising from specific 
divergent needs that - due to the very nature of complexity - cannot always easily be 
subsumed within generalized categories. For example, even when humans decide to 
'do nothing' and take no direct action in a specific case, the inherent complexity of 
interrelations may, in reality, mean that animals are nevertheless indirectly harmed. 10 
Given such complexity, recourse to general principles in interspecies relationships 
may not necessarily adequately inform us on how to act in specific conflicts of 
interest. Naturally, it is less difficult to 'second guess' what other humans may wish 
to avoid or pursue and generalize to intraspecies ethical principles and practice, than 
it is to attempt to formulate 'interspecies' ethical principles. This is of course a 
recurrent problem with application of 'theory-to-practice' that all ethical systems face, 
and by no means unique to moral deliberation on species' interrelationships. I 
submit, however, that greater caution must nevertheless be exercised in presuming 
to comprehend the interests of other-than-human animals - a theme discussed at 
length in chapter three. 11
Nonetheless, what constitutes the general in the case of respectful treatment 
is not merely theoretical, but can usefully be weighed against the rigorous and 
comprehensive tradition of broader applied ethics within the human domain. In a 
nutshell, if we are to treat subjects-of-a-life with respectful treatment as a general 
principle, but necessarily concede that in specific instances there will be a conflict of 
interests that may in practice 'cause' harm, then, as Regan points out, these 
instances should be viewed as 'exceptional cases' and that 'exceptional cases 
cannot fairly be generalized to unexceptional cases' (2004, p.xxx). This idea is not 
new and variations on this principle are found in much established moral theory, and 
have historical credence in diverse philosophical traditions. What is illuminating here 
however is how this principle relates to our concepts of value - and specifically in 
this instance - the value humans give to nonhuman animals. Plainly, when one 
conveys concepts of value within any ethical theory such notions are notoriously 
open to wide interpretation, ambiguity and at minimum call for precision of definition.
10 We might think here of the plethora of 'omissions' of moral action in cases of potential animal 
advocacy - the things that may well have far reaching moral import that we simply neglect 'to do'. 
11 1 use the phrase 'other-than-human animals' sporadically throughout this work and alternate it 
with the term 'nonhuman animals'. Although seemingly somewhat grammatically cumbersome, it 
nevertheless avoids the linguistic bias built into the human/animal dichotomy (humans are after all 
'animals'). See Joan Dunayer (2004) who coins and uses this phrase repeatedly.
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For example, within the animal rights debate at large, there are several forms of 
adversarial appeals to exceptional cases in order to argue against the rights position. 
These frequently place much emphasis on exceptional circumstance, and thus - 
from Regan's perspective at least - recurrently commit the offense of unfairly 
generalizing to unexceptional cases.
A contemporary reading of the rights-based view does not however propose 
that the value of the life that subjects lead need to be seen as intrinsically 'equal'. As 
Regan's view posits, the inherent value of a given subject-of-a-life is no more or less 
than the inherent value of any other subject-of-a-life - but in the normative sense of 
the theory this does not mean therefore that all have lives are equal in value. A 
human life may entail many more potentialities for satisfaction and thus to this 
degree (greater possible sources of satisfaction) is - at least from this perspective - 
more Valuable'. Crucially however, the rights view is decisive in its denial that this 
sort of value judgment should permit exploitation on these grounds alone. Whilst 
Regan himself concedes that 'real' lifeboat scenarios (as opposed to the purely - 
and often ingenious - hypothetical) may indeed call for the nonhuman to be 
'sacrificed' before the human - the rights view, at least as propounded by Regan, is 
nevertheless clear in its strict insistence on delimitation of the specific (and relatively 
rare) and the general (relatively commonplace interactions). Ideas of this 'sacrificial' 
kind are discussed (and critically questioned) in greater depth in chapter three in the 
context of conservation and preservation practice.
So much for a need to define specific and exceptional cases; but how might 
then the rights-based view address ideas of a general (universal) nature - what we 
may term the 'categorical imperatives' for interspecies relationships? To reiterate, 
animal rights-based positions in ethics ascribe to human and nonhuman animals 
alike a basic right to respectful treatment, moreover, as such it further attributes 
moral standing to many nonhuman animals. Indeed, the concept of moral standing - 
the 'who' or 'what' is to count, and how they count, in our moral deliberations - 
remains one of the most basic tenets of ethical thought. Simply put, for any being to 
be ascribed moral standing is to be recognised as the kind of being whose interests 
are to be considered when the actions of others will impinge upon it. As Daniel 
Berthold-Bond puts it, 'Moral standing is thus a sort of moral (and certainly cultural, 
social and political) space in which one is located or is seen to stand' (2000, p.8). 
Therefore, in short, the rights view deems the instrumental 'use' of the nonhuman
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animal as intrinsically immoral - in that it violates the moral standing of an individual 
nonhuman. 12 It is this standpoint, above all else, that for many bestows the rights 
view with an undeniably radical agenda, and it is this inherently radical perception 
that I wish to recurrently address throughout this thesis.
John O'Neill highlights two possible approaches to such 'categorical' ethical 
questions over the moral standing of animals: firstly, those that concern the 'class of 
beings' who deserve moral consideration, and secondly, those that concern the 
'domain' of beings or states of affairs that have intrinsic value (2008). In either case, a 
distinction must be made between ideas of moral agency and what it is exactly that 
may sufficiently warrant moral consideration™ Assigning 'supremely human' traits to 
our species has, for many, fomented in the modern psyche a deeply anthropocentric 
bias14 - and, at worst, has been the cornerstone for exclusion and 'rational' 
legitimisation of the power and the privilege of our own species over the nonhuman 
(Warren, 1997, p. 10).
Questioning animal rights
In more pragmatic terms, whether animals can be attributed moral status and 
therefore be attributed some form of rights cannot be properly considered without 
brief mention of some further positions within current discourse upon the status of 
the nonhuman animal that attempt wholly to deny the nonhuman animal the 
protection that ascribing moral standing may afford. 15 For example, contractarianism 
broadly claims that any duties to animals are 'indirect' in nature and necessarily
12 Defined here in broad terms as the valuing of things as a means of achieving something else. 
Using nonhuman animals in this respect ignores any value that the individual animal may possess 
in and of itself. The 'use' of such is therefore legitimised on this view in that it simply fulfils an 
instrumental need or want for human beings. What this 'use' may entail for animal ethical theory is 
the central theme of chapter two in discussion of animal welfare theory and practice.
13 The idea of sufficiency is the life-blood of animal ethics of course. Normatively, moral agency 
(loosely, defined as responsibility for making moral judgments and taking actions that comport 
with morality) is normatively attributed to human persons.
14 Throughout this work I use the term in the commonplace understanding that broadly defined 
constitutes the tendency for humans to regard themselves as the central and most significant 
entities in the universe and thus recurrently tend towards an unreflective assessment of'reality' 
through an exclusively human perspective. See also the footnote page 30 for a distinction between 
anthropogenic origin and developed anthropocentric attitudes. Also see the Glossary for my 
general use of anthropocentrism in this work and the important distinction to be made between 
anthropogenic provenance and anthropocentric ways of thinking.
15 1 merely mention these positions, suggesting further references for each view and leave the 
reader to interpret the views mentioned - as an extended explanation of each is clearly extraneous 
to my central arguments here.
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secondary to human needs and development. 16 Further, what Richard Ryder coined 
as 'speciesism' has at its core intrinsic species prejudices and thus places human 
interests paramount in its moral deliberations. 17 Although advocated within a broad 
animal welfare position, preference utilitarianism is strictly consequentialist in its 
utilitarian calculus of harm and good and as such does not directly ascribe 'rights' to 
nonhuman animals. 18 In addition, Kantian thought clearly demarcates ideas of what 
constitutes a person, and subsequently assigns rights only to this category. 19 More 
contemporary notions that fall under the category of 'limited inherent value' posit that 
all have value, but only humans have intrinsic value. 20
Notwithstanding these general themes of the ongoing theoretical debate 
within animal ethics, there is for many, in the final analysis, an empirical dimension 
embedded within much debate as to whether humans occupy a 'special' moral place 
in nature. 'Evidence' here can only be accrued by comparison to human cognitive 
capacities and must therefore be assessed in human terms and within human 
definitions. In this limited sense the postulate that human beings are of an entirely 
special moral order, by its utter subjectivity (we decide what we are based upon our 
assessment of ourselves), arguably dilutes any faithful substantive findings regarding 
the moral status of other beings. Underlying these concerns about subjective bias is 
perhaps a more fundamental epistemological problem regarding how we view the 
natural world in general. There is what Andrew Collier terms an 'epistemic fallacy' 
that underlies much of our deep anthropocentrism: namely, the transposition of
16 The chief proponent may fairly be said to be John Rawls who explicitly draws a distinction 
between those owed direct duties and indirect duties, for an early critique see The sense of Justice, 
Philosophical Review72 (1963), p.284 and his pivotal A Theory of Justice (1971). However, there 
have belatedly been attempts to extend contract theory directly to animal ethics in general. See in 
particular Mark Rowlands' work Animal Rights: Moral Theory and Practice (2009), pp. 118-176 for 
an incisive contemporary example. Although a thought-provoking alternative to utilitarian and 
rights orientated views, I do not pursue Rowlands view - which is based upon a form of Kantian 
contractarianism - in this work as my development of a biocentric outlook, I believe, takes the 
challenge 'further' than contemporary animal ethics arguments into wider animal advocacy 
domains. In this sense, to critique at length diverse 'alternative' animal ethics stances is unhelpful, 
and I feel serves to largely detract from my central aim - that of'broadening' the remit of animal 
advocacy at large. See chapters five and six for development of my particular view in this regard.
17 For an extended discussion see Richard Ryder, Speciesism in the Laboratory (2006). 
'Speciesism' in its simplistic form, is the assigning of different values or rights to beings on the 
basis of their species membership
18 Famously Peter Singer defends the animal liberation position in Animal Liberation (1995) and 
Practical Ethics. (1993).
19 For Kantian discussion specifically relating to the moral status of nonhumans see Kant's Critique 
of Teleological Judgment (1928).
20 For a contemporary view see John O'Neill et al (2008).
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questions about what there 'is' into questions about what we can 'know' (1999, p.80). 
Effectively, according to Collier, our ideas are in this sense 'reflections' of reality in 
us - and thus, knowledge is the 'human representation of reality', it would seem 
therefore that in consideration of the moral status of the nonhuman this transposition 
of the concrete to our ideas of what constitutes 'knowledge' only serves to further 
confound any hope of irrefutably conferring 'empirically' based moral (or indeed 'non- 
moral') status to the nonhuman.
Despite the difficulties of identifying any falsifiable substantive grounding for 
assigning or not assigning moral standing to the non human, there is for many critics 
of a rights-based view a more pragmatic problem in any practical attempt to confer 
ideas of a moral status on some (or all) animals: that, in so doing, our ideas of moral 
worth would (in a strict interpretation) require that we confer burdens upon the 
'voiceless' in expectations of reciprocal rights and responsibilities. Thus, for many, 
practical application of any (systematic) conferring of rights to the wider nonhuman 
world would seem at best plainly unworkable within this framework. Some of these 
recurrent themes are extrapolated in chapters five and six in discussion of biocentric 
individualism and what this may mean for interspecies interrelationships.
At minimum however, we may say that to attempt to comprehend any 
'genuine' right fully - regardless of intraspecies (human domain) or interspecies 
(human to nonhuman animal) determinates - we need to establish three factors: who 
holds the right; to what it is a right; and against whom it is held. 21 In one way or 
another, much of the debate within the contemporary animal rights arena turns upon 
defining and refining these three categories. However, this prerequisite task in itself 
raises an issue central to the animal rights debate: even if we are sufficiently 
convinced that these categories can, in any given judgment, be adequately and 
conclusively satisfied in ascribing protectionist safeguards, does our conferring moral 
standing upon nonhumans necessarily have to carry with it reciprocal duties and 
responsibilities? If rights are conferred upon human individuals - and must carry 
inherent burdens - surely such constraints must properly be viewed as uniquely 
human. Indeed, germane to the conferring of rights in human terms, much state 
legislation within contemporary society turns, in large part, upon ideas of
21 Tom Regan and Carl Cohen discuss the nuances of both sides of the debate in the seminal work 
The Animal Rights Debate (2001).
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reciprocity. 22 But this is by no means exclusively the case. Many human rights - 
such as the rights conferred upon the severely disabled embodied in various 
disability rights legislation - are evidently not dependent on clear concepts of 
reciprocal relations. In this way animal advocates frequently point out that society 
already assents to moral patients being legitimately entitled to the same 
consideration and respect as moral agents. 23 The more general point being 
suggested here is that it is because animals can be conceived of as moral patients 
that humans have duties against cruelty, and not merely because they are animals 
per se. This distinction, although at face value somewhat apparent, is nevertheless 
an important one for a contemporary rights position in that it opens up the likelihood 
that we may owe some duties to nonhuman 'patients' in much the same manner as 
those owed to human patients. Some further thoughts on reciprocity and direct 
duties are explored in greater depth later in this chapter in discussion of 
commonplace challenges to the rights view.
The weak animal rights claim
The claim that we may owe 'direct' negative and positive duties to nonhuman 
'patients' in much the same manner as those owed to human patients is by no 
means uncontested. A strong rights view is indeed problematic for many that argue 
its instigation would unavoidably generate sundry 'unacceptable' consequences that 
would adversely impinge upon human flourishing - and therefore must be rejected. 
Given then, that the rights view turns in large part upon ideas of the 'worth' of 
subjects-of-a-life, an initial distinction needs to be drawn here between what may be 
characterised as subjects-of-a-life and others. As noted previously, Regan himself 
defines such beings as those who possess beliefs, desires, perceptions, memories, 
a sense of their own future, an emotional life, preference interests and sensations of 
pain and pleasure.24 Such subjects-of-a-life may further be divided into two broad 
classes: those that are deemed to be moral agents and those defined as moral
22 In its simplest form, this constitutes the claim that there exists some expectation of response v in 
kind' - in returning benefits for benefits, or indeed responding with either indifference or hostility 
to harms.
23 Moral patients in this sense may be viewed as things towards which moral agents can have 
moral responsibilities. On this definition, all moral agents are also moral patients, but importantly 
for our argument here, moral patients need not be moral agents. Only moral agents can function 
as the bearers of moral obligations towards others, while moral patients can be the objects of the 
moral obligations of others, but need not themselves be capable of moral agency.
24 Regan (2004), p.243.
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patients. Roughly, we may say that moral agents are those whom may be held 
morally accountable for their unconstrained actions, whilst moral patients on the 
other hand lack the full capacity to reason morally, or to act for moral reasons.25 
However, moral patients as subjects-of-a-life nevertheless possess desires and 
beliefs, enjoy an individual emotional life and likely have some sense of the future. 
Regan's argument therefore runs that it is because all subjects-of-a-life possess 
such attributes that they have 'inherent value', and in order to properly respect an 
individual's inherent value it follows that they are owed direct duties of justice. Regan 
outlines three 'basic' rights in this context: the right not to be harmed; the right to aid 
when our rights are being violated; and the right of innocents to self-defence. 26
Aside from those who would take the out-and-out position that 'rights' that 
seek to assign moral status to nonhumans are simply not applicable in any terms to 
nonhumans, there is the view that although animals (at least some animals at any 
rate) may be entitled to have some moral rights, their rights are however much 
'weaker' in strength than the rights of humans - who possess rights in the 'strongest' 
sense. Among contemporary ethicists, Mary Anne Warren is well known for 
advocating a 'weaker' rights stance (1997). In defending a comprehensive theory of 
the moral standing of various entities she ultimately concludes, in respect to 
nonhuman animals, that it is frequently permissible for humans to end the lives of 
such animals in order to consume their flesh for food. In short, this notion clearly 
holds that animals do not have an equal right to life. This view is of course 
widespread and forms a taken-for-granted worldview for many. However, the claim 
although common, certainly needs to be substantiated. The expectation arising from 
this perception is that in some way it can be conclusively established that 
nonhumans have less value than humans in substantive and irreducible ways. To 
use the language of Warren, that some animals may have 'weak' rights (which may 
or may not include a weak right to life itself), but our moral duties to them are not as 
'strong' as those that we owe to humans. On this view, it is precisely this disparity in 
obligatory 'strength' between (some) animals and (all) humans that makes it morally
25 In discussion of our responsibilities to future generations, Alan Carter points out those utilitarian 
based arguments that we cannot have responsibilities to future generations hold only if we fail to 
view moral agents as individuals with agency-based responsibilities to the unborn. Parallels can be 
drawn in this respect with the welfare of the Voiceless' unborn and the welfare of countless 
Voiceless' nonhumans.
26 Regan (2004), pp.276-80.
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legitimate to kill animals in a number of situations, whilst in similar situations it is 
deemed morally forbidden to kill humans.
What then might be the practical criteria for such an assessment? A recurrent 
argument - and one that Warren herself uses - is what may be termed the 'conflicts 
of interest' line of reasoning. Here it is generally argued that when the 'vital' interests 
of humans and nonhumans come into direct conflict, killing may be the only 
'legitimate' option left. Warren gives the example of rodents overrunning the home 
and the possibility of spread of disease as reason for the need for control (and the 
necessity of usually lethal control) in instances of such conflicts of interest. 27 This 
idea of 'lethal self defence' largely turns upon the 'common sense' notion (and 
Warren uses this term) that no worthwhile moral theory can be 'a serious candidate 
for general acceptance....if its implementation would severely jeopardize human lives 
and health.' 28 This assumption would indeed seem, to most, a reasonable maxim - 
certainly when applied to what may be seen to be (human) life-threatening 
circumstances. However, positing self-defence in specific circumstances as the 
criterion for justifying unequal treatment is not the same as believing that an animal's 
life does not merit equal moral consideration generally. Moreover, and more 
troubling for this view, is that the 'right' to lethal self defence is not of necessity then 
limited to human/animal resource conflicts, and the very same argument can readily 
be extended to imagined (and actual) intraspecies conflicts (human to human). The 
evident problem for this view then, is that it will need to be proven that in analogous 
conflicts with other humans, it would not be justifiable to kill them.
As Aaron Simmons points out, Warren's position pivots on the thesis that 
there exist circumstances in which it is justifiable to kill animals but not justifiable to 
kill humans'. 29 Simmons himself focuses the thrust of this conjecture upon our ability 
to communicate with humans and so (hopefully) reason with them with the hope of 
reaching some mutual agreement - and possibly averting direct (mortal) conflict. 
Obviously, this option of verbal communication is not open to us when confronted 
with direct animal/human mortal conflicts of interest. There are problems with this
27 Warren does concede that there may be non-lethal controls that we should pursue regarding 
such conflicts of interest, but goes on to argue that such non-lethal means of control are not in 
many instances 'practically feasible'.
28 Warren (1997), p. 117.
29 Aaron Simmons discusses Warren's weak animal rights view arguing that Warren fails to justify 
unequal rights to nonhumans, in 'A Critique of Mary Anne Warren's Weak Animal Rights View' 
(2007).
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presumption however. Firstly, a cursory glance at the 'rich' history of human conflict 
brings into question the efficacy of communication as a key tool in averting violent 
outcome. If, as Warren herself suggests, this singular ability to verbally communicate 
with our own species equates to assigning a 'privileged' position to humans over 
nonhumans in matters of resource conflict, then this uniquely human 'tool' has (and 
continues) to sadly fail us time and again. Moreover, many human conflicts are not 
merely fought on ideological grounds (about 'ideas') whereby the possibility of some 
compromise of viewpoints may be reached, but constitute a life or death struggle for 
scarce resources - the hard logistics of which cannot readily be resolved by 
application of reason or debate. In such circumstances, communication may fail as 
spectacularly between humans as it must between humans and nonhumans. There 
would then seem little substantive reason to consistently assert that it is justifiable to 
kill animals, but not justifiable to kill humans in circumstances of life threatening 
resource scarcity. In order to be consistent, Warren's acceptance of 'lethal self- 
defence' as a legitimate response to life threatening peril would, I suggest, need to 
apply equally in all cases of 'communication failure'.
Secondly, Simmons invites us to imagine a scenario in which other humans 
pose a serious but non-urgent threat (possibly exposure to a virulent disease - 
conceivably much like Warren's rodent example). These unfortunate diseased 
individuals are resource poor and have had no choice but to leave their infected 
territory and impinge upon lands anew. They feel there is little point in dialogue as 
their negotiation choices are extremely limited. The dilemma for the inhabitants of 
the occupied land that the foreigners are about to ingress is that given the 'right' of 
lethal self defence, then in this particular circumstance they must exercise this 
prerogative in order to survive - albeit perhaps reluctantly - or by an act of 'omission' 
fall prey to infection. The question therefore is would it be justifiable in this situation 
to kill other humans - and thus transgress Warren's species exclusivity? Given that 
most would defend their lives in this sort of situation, it would seem to be the case 
that contrary to Warren's claim, in this case it effectively matters not whether the 
threatening being is human or nonhuman - as both, it is concluded here, must meet 
the same end.
There is an important observation to be noted from this line of reasoning and 
one that permeates much of our wider thinking regarding nonhuman animals. In 
cases of conflicts of interests between human and nonhuman animals it is all too
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frequently the case that the justification for the sort of action carried out is more 
about the practical parsimonious implications and circumstances (what 'works') of 
the given conflict that determines our judgments as to whether it is justifiable to kill 
nonhumans, rather than any qualities of the nonhuman (what 'value') that may 
justifiably make them less worthy of equal consideration of interests per se. For 
Warren, the justification for disparate treatment is not forthrightly a measurable 
qualitative difference in moral worth that must determine our actions in such 
circumstance; rather she presents the more pedestrian claim that we are simply 
unable to reason with them - and therefore left with few functional choices. 30 At least 
this view, on a cursory reading, is somewhat more straightforward in essence 
concerning the legitimacy of unequal treatment of nonhuman animals than many of 
the mainstream arguments against animal rights discussed later in this chapter. 
However, in emphasising the practical implications and costs to humans in pursuing, 
for example, the non lethal trapping of rodents, a clear distinction in value between 
human and nonhuman subjects is strongly implied. In short, given that we cannot 
strike up a dialogue with these creatures, then it is suggested that this curtails lateral 
thinking regarding our options. Notwithstanding this, we may of course in the rodent 
example for instance, consider the use of non lethal traps and piecemeal means of 
removal as acceptable on a cost/benefit basis, or even as a final resort consider 
moving house as a credible course of action - or we may indeed simply learn to live 
with the situation. But for Warren (and many others), this may simply present an 
unacceptable human cost, and therefore it follows (often construed as conceded 
'reluctantly') that there is no moral obligation to pursue these sorts of actions.
Those who subscribe to this view however need to show why (other than 
because of simple inconvenience alone) we should not pursue these options. Or to 
put it another way, we need to know why we hold that the inconvenience of not 
harming animals outweighs the 'worth' of those animals. This draw towards what I 
would like to call 'chauvinistic expediency' in our dealings with other-than-human 
animals all too often takes on a moralistic tone. What is at root a straightforward 
unequal value judgement based upon human convenience, is variously posited as
30 In the context of interspecies understanding that Warren is tenuously attempting to advance 
here brings to mind David Hume's famous observation that, "All that animals need and all that men 
need most of the time is an association of ideas based on custom. This enables them to know what 
to expect in the world and to learn from experience. They do not need reasoning, in any stronger 
sense', in A treatise of Human Nature 1.3.16 (reprinted 2007).
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morally legitimate, morally unavoidable, morally justifiable or just morally 'expedient'. 
It is the significant distinction between the functional considerations and the 
principled considerations towards nonhuman animals drawn out here that will form a 
recurrent theme throughout this work. The rights-based view is further frequently 
challenged by what trade as 'traditional' and commonplace assertions. By way of 
introduction to the wider themes discussed later, a brief outline of some of the more 
pertinent contentions may help in contextualizing several of these commonplace 
claims.
The Argument from Absurdity
Firstly, what may be called the 'argument from absurdity' broadly claims that if all 
sentient beings are to be assigned categorical and individual value, then conflict 
resolution between groups and individuals would necessarily lapse into absurdity. 
Elisa Aaltola notes that the absurdity argument generally takes two forms: one that 
emphasises human-animal conflicts and one that stresses animal-animal conflicts 
(2010, pp.79-98). Taking the former emphasis on human-animal conflicts, many have 
argued that we would effectively have to renounce many everyday practices if we 
were to attribute categorical and individual value to all sentient beings. 31 Conflict 
resolution, they argue, would require 'arbitrary' choices between human life and 
interests and nonhuman life and interests. This in turn may questionably demand 
that in various cases we favour nonhumans - for example, in situations where some 
harm was unavoidable we would have an obligation to inflict the harm on humans if 
animals would otherwise suffer greater pain, or if indeed animal numbers were 
superior to human numbers. However, before we can consider such claims we firstly 
need to acknowledge that frequently there is embedded within these arguments a 
now familiar presupposition - that humans have greater value. Problematically, this 
assumption then repeatedly serves as both the premise and the conclusion within 
these arguments. As Aaltola points out, the reasoning follows thusly: 1) humans are 
of greater value, 2) therefore, human-animal equality is absurd 3) therefore, humans 
are of greater value 32
31 Again, Mary Ann Warren argues that farming would be impossible as the mere act of harvesting 
would destroy many thousands of small animals in the process (1997). Likewise, Eric Moore 
contends that there would be no nonarbitrary way of choosing between, for example, a hiker and a 
wolf, (2002), pp.295-312.
32 Aaltola (2010), p.82.
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Commonplace criticism against the rights-based view tends to adopt this kind 
of circularity in its deeply rooted and implicit anthropocentric bias. In short, it is a 
taken-for- granted sense of anthropocentric legitimacy that forms the predilection for 
what it is that constitutes 'normality' or 'absurdity' in human-animal conflicts. This is 
clearly problematic for the rights view: as such pro-animal arguments - no matter 
how ethically rigorous and well constituted - simply go against embedded 
anthropocentric value structures. A common strand of argument frequently arising 
from within such a constituted anthropocentric framework is what may be best 
described as a hierarchical dualism. This fabricated taxonomy tends to present us 
with an 'unavoidable' choice - namely, we have to choose between human animals 
ornonhuman animals. I personally know of no animal rights advocates who see such 
a stark dichotomy as necessarily presenting itself in our everyday moral obligations. 
Indeed, arguably it is only within a restricted and unconsidered anthropocentric value 
system that such a blinkered either/or dichotomy has any normative moral meaning 
or force.
These observations should not however be taken to mean that an 
anthropocentric viewpoint is entirely wrongheaded. It is incontrovertible that we see 
the world from an anthropocentric standpoint - after all, as human beings, the 
meaning we give to the world around us is necessarily and avoidably 'anthro- 
centred'. Anthropocentrism, per se, likely does not deserve the 'dirty word' status 
endorsed by some animal and environmental ethicists. Likewise, simply because we 
see the world from an unavoidable human perspective - and subsequently construct 
values from this anthropogenic standpoint, does not in and of itself necessarily infer 
that such values need to remain singularly human-centred in outlook. In short, there 
is a distinction to be noted between the 'fact' that our derived values are 
anthropogenic in origin, and the actual content of what those values may or may not 
include.33 I contend that it is not the provenance of our anthropocentrism that is at 
stake here, but rather the value we attribute to our take on the world arising from our 
human-centred view, and, importantly, the assumptions that follow from this value
33 Anthropogenic here denotes the commonplace meaning relating primarily to the origin and 
development of modern human constructs - in essence, that which is 'created' by man. In this 
sense, our actions and subsequent impact upon the world around are 'man-made'. Nevertheless, I 
argue that anthropogenic provenance does not 'fix' our worldview as delimited exclusively and 
necessarily by rigid and inflexible forms of human-centrism. See also Glossary for and 
extrapolation of this distinction.
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judgment. For example, if our assumptions presume a legitimate hierarchy of nature 
with humankind atop this ladder, then likely we will struggle with any perceived 
attempt to 'level' the moral landscape in favour of greater species egalitarianism.
Of course it may be countered that in order to give meaning to the world 
around us we cannot avoid cultural and linguistic constraints and the meanings 
derived from them, but as Aaltola notes, there is available to us a plethora of 
reflective choice within the meanings we ascribe (2010, p.90). The spectre of the 
either human/or animal dichotomy need not logically arise here. The argument from 
absurdity, in this sense at least, seems on face value to imply a stringent formal logic 
- a reductio ad absurdum - one capable of logically producing a contradiction from 
its premise. Rather, the argument when used to refute animal rights bases its logic 
upon the decidedly shaky premise that human beings 'just have' more value than 
nonhuman beings. In doing so, the argument ignores individual conceptions of value 
and the pluralistic reflective choices available to us within ascribed meaning. These 
choices may well refute the starting premise entirely - and simply go against strong 
anthropocentric value structures.
The Argument from Capacity
A further contention turns less upon metaphysical argument and more upon the 'fact' 
that animals cannot use complex language and therefore cannot form any 
meaningful moral communities - at least in the sense that they do not have the 
capacity to 'supplement or contravene the promptings of instinct by reasoning from 
moral principles'. 34 In support of this view, the degree of complex cultural 
development required in multifaceted social interaction would arguably seem to 
require prerequisite complex language and reasoning capacities. In a general sense 
this claim would seem uncontroversial. The political act of voting within a democratic 
society is an overt example often given as evidence of such capacities - animals 
obviously do not do this and it would be 'absurd' to envisage this - so, it follows, they 
cannot therefore significantly possess any meaningful moral status. However, the 
rights-based view openly maintains that animals need not engage in such uniquely 
human activities to preserve a right to be treated with respect. For example, it is 
evident that a child is deemed (by this same multifaceted society) to have a
34 See Mary Ann Warren (1997) for a protracted discussion on the moral status of the nonhuman.
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developmental^ insufficient capacity to engage in considered political voting - but 
clearly enjoys the full protection of a well defined set of rights.
Similarly, the problem of language acquisition and use permeates much 
traditional and contemporary argument within ethical deliberation on the moral status 
of the nonhuman animal. Although argument is diverse and inter-disciplinary, much 
of this argument asserts that if nonhuman animals are unable to use language they 
must, in any meaningful sense, lack (our idea of what constitutes) full 
consciousness. The long-standing connection between language and rationality - 
and therefore the thesis that non-linguistic animals cannot count as rational beings - 
is however increasingly being challenged, not least from empirical studies on 
language use in chimpanzees.35 Precluding a convoluted exploration of such 
empirical findings here, it is, at the very least, reasonable to assert that even if the 
ability for language acquisition amongst, for example, primates, does not equal that 
of human adolescents, it certainly does not follow that they have none at all. The 
research and controversy continues, but the overriding issue is not necessarily a 
quantitative one (how many animals 'use' language), but rather we may need to 
pose a qualitative question: is in fact the use of language a sufficient basis for 
determining which individuals possess consciousness? Ultimately, how we define 
language use is of course directly related to our own current understanding of 
complex communication, and theoretical argument here can again frequently tend to 
take on a circular quality in its predicates. Irrespective of the 'degree' of verbal (and 
of course the frequently ignored use of 'nonverbal') expression, the mere assertion 
that human-like language use in and of itself directly equates to questions of 
ascribing moral standing remains highly questionable.
The Argument from Anthropomorphism
This observation brings into sharp focus a yet further recurrent difficulty that 
pervades much theoretical and commonplace talk of animal rights and the moral 
status of nonhuman animals - the tendency to anthropomorphise. Simply put, this is 
the predisposition to imbue an object with attributes that it may not possess and to 
speak of it as if it were humanlike. Anthropomorphic sentiment can manifest itself 
both in subtle and more obvious ways. For example, the 'pet' owner who attributes
35 See an extraordinary empirical account in J Randerson, Chimps Beat People in Memory Tasks. 
(2007) for an interesting comparison of memory and language abilities in primates and children.
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perceived stress in a companion animal as a possible symptom of concern for a 
global economic downturn may fairly be said to be overlaying a human centred 
worldview upon the animal's behaviour. As disquieting as this image may be, such 
anthropomorphic attitudes are by no means rare. It is, in part, perhaps somewhat 
understandable that adults at times adopt such a view (although usually not as 
contrived as our example of course). One has only to observe a great deal of 
contemporary media entertainment aimed at the very young in their impressionable 
and formative years to note that it is routinely permeated with a vast array of 
anthropomorphic images and characters - from talking bears to eloquent lions.
A more subtle form of anthropomorphism is at work however in certain 
theoretical arguments against animal rights. If indeed it is seen to be 
anthropomorphic to assign certain human attributes to other animals, then, what 
Regan calls 'human chauvinism' is equally prevalent in our attitudes to animals 
(2004, p.30). 36 This view, conversely, posits that it is 'chauvinistic' not to attribute like 
characteristics to those nonhumans who actually have them, and thus continue in 
the conceit that only humans may possess such traits. This, like other forms of 
chauvinism, rejects the concept that characteristics (and interestingly, almost always 
in the form of 'positive' traits and habits and not our more so-called 'animalistic' 
tendencies) may be freely extant in others. The above example of the straightforward 
denial of 'full' consciousness and language in mammalian animals is a patent 
illustration of this manner of duplicitous thinking, and how the debate around broader 
issues of animal rights frequently have at their heart much deeply seated prejudice 
and bias.
The Argument from Reciprocity
Another perspective, briefly alluded to earlier, that stands in perennial opposition to 
the animal rights view is closely aligned to the absurdity claim and has come to be 
termed the 'non-reciprocity' argument. This posits that as animals cannot engage in 
morally reciprocal relationships they cannot therefore be ascribed meaningful moral 
standing. However, once again, using the example of the immature human, it is clear 
that a young child is ascribed moral status but is not expected to respect our rights 
(as adults) before we respect theirs. Contained in the germ of these arguments
36 Human chauvinism meaning here essentially that both value and morality can ultimately be 
reduced to matters of interest or concern exclusively to the class of humans.
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would seem to me to be a chronic and persistent underlying bias toward the human, 
and arguments of this type expose a core and unrelenting objection to animal rights: 
namely, the bare assertion that only humans have inherent value. 37 Naturally, 
human individuals inevitably vary in capacities of reason and autonomy, and some 
unfortunate humans lack these - in short, where we draw the line is not as 
straightforward as this inherent value view suggests. Indeed, the persistent question 
remains within current debate as to why the 'moral' line should be drawn at species 
and not for example at genus, subspecies or other arbitrary boundary. Such 
complexity is all too evident when attempts are made at determining unambiguous 
human to animal (and indeed animal to animal) demarcation. For example, in 
drawing such boundaries should the human infant, the brain damaged, and the 
vegetative patient be excluded, whilst dolphins, apes, pigs and other 'higher' 
mammals are included? In no small way, this developing category of enquiry 
continues to pervade the debate on animal rights - and indeed many of the 
arguments presented within this thesis.
It is not merely these 'traditional' and commonplace assertions that challenge 
the normative animal rights view. 38 For example, Carl Cohen's claim that animals 
cannot in fact rightly be attributed liberty rights at all is a significant assertion that, 
whilst accepting that many obligations are owed by humans to animals, nevertheless 
argues that rights must entail obligations. 39 He therefore asserts that 'Animals cannot 
be bearers of rights because the concept of rights is human: it is rooted in, and has 
force within, a human moral world' (1997, p.95). Irrespective of the form that the 
challenges to a rights-based animal advocacy take, what is certain is that objections 
to the rights-based view are multifaceted and broad in scope; and it is to the 
'language' of rights and its understanding for contemporary interpretation that we 
must initially turn.
37 For some pivotal arguments that differentiate between conceptions of intrinsic, inherent and 
instrumental values see Mary Ann Warren (1997); J O'Neill, A Holland and A Light (2008); and 
Mary Midgley (1996).
38 For selected influential contemporary arguments against ascribing liberty rights see T Sprigge, 
'Interests and Rights: The Case against Animals' (1981), J Smith, 'Morals, Reason and Animals' 
(1991), Roger Scruton, Animal Rights and Wrongs (2000), Carl Cohen, Do Animals Have Rights? 
(1997), and D Porter, 'Our philosophy concerning animal rights' (1991).
39 Briefly, a liberty right is a right which does not necessarily entail obligations on other parties, 
but rather only freedom or permission for the right-holder. Cohen of course argues that animals 
cannot be rights bearers at all, primarily because it is essentially a human concept.
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1.2 The scope of the animal rights view
Relatively recent discourse has begun to see further transmutation of the very 
meaning and scope of the term 'rights'. 40 There are of course diverse accounts of the 
functions of rights in general, and depending on whether one grounds this in will or 
interest, it will have a bearing on how we perceive the tenability and function of 
animal rights in particular. 41 Will theorists assert that the function of a right is to give 
its holder control over another's duty. So for example, will theorists generally believe 
that rights confer control over others' duties to act in particular ways. 42 Conversely, 
interest theorists maintain that the function of a right is to further the right-holder's 
interests. So this account can accept 'as rights', the rights of incompetents (who 
have interests that rights can protect). In this respect interest theory constructs a 
plausible connection between holding rights and being better off. Given that 
nonhuman animals can be seen to be incompetents in the right-holding respect (as 
moral patients with interests), it is in the protection (and advocacy) of such 
'incompetents' that 'rights' are generally to be understood within the body of this 
work. 43 In this respect, Paul Taylor in development of his biocentric position 
observes, 'that I have a valid moral claim which other moral agents have a duty to 
acknowledge and respect does not entail anything about how I should treat, or be 
treated by, animals and plants. Since they are not moral agents it is nonsense to talk 
about their respecting or not respecting my right'(1986, p. 151). It is furthermore 
noteworthy that the term is frequently - and increasingly - applied in circumstances 
where the rights attributed to individuals are, in fact, rights that those individuals are 
not necessarily in a position to exercise. Proclaiming that, for example, a human 
individual has an entitlement to practice their religion is not synonymous with stating 
that the individual, in actuality, enjoys that freedom. The sentiment is one of what
40 The meaning and scope of the notion of rights' has of course always been contested and I 
merely suggest that latterly further transmutations are inevitably taking place - not least within 
the arena of'animal rights'. See note 43 below for further references on the theme of rights.
41 For in-depth critique of these notions and other forms of rights, see Kramer, Simmonds, and 
Steiner (1998). For more general distinctions also, Sreenivasan (2005) who attempts a hybrid 
analysis; Cruft (2004) proposes that all rights are "of value" in securing the right-holder's 
autonomy or interests; and Wenar (2005) who abandons the notion that all rights have any single 
function at all.
42 1 return to this idea within the context of animal advocacy and the argued limitations of 
obligation towards nonhumans in chapter three in discussion of the illegitimacy of paternalism. 
43 See also Glossary for further general usage in this work.
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ought to happen and not necessarily what does happen in practice; in this sense this 
form of right may be seen to be effectively 'empty', as it cannot be claimed and may 
not be enforced.44 This sentiment of what ought to be does however affirm an 
important aspect of a contemporary reading of rights in its assertion of certain moral 
principles. In this latter sense, it is the proclamation of an absolute and binding set of 
moral principles that gives the idea of 'rights' its force in wider debate. As Catherine 
Osborne puts it, rights viewed in this context are
...statements of moral commitment made on behalf of those who are unjustly 
treated, and they express, in legal language, the moral values of the onlooker, 
to explain the principles on which they campaign against perceived injustices 
(2007, p. 190).
These commitments then are frequently proclaimed on behalf of the voiceless and 
oppressed - those who cannot defend themselves - and thus, I argue, fairly and 
rightly encompass animal advocacy,45 the proponents of which after all primarily 
seek to protect 'dumb 1 and 'defenceless' animals. 'Rights', understood in this way, 
therefore necessitate privileged 'third party advocates' to defend the voiceless and 
protest against perceived maltreatment. 46 In contemporary usage this form of 
remonstration does not properly inhabit a legal or political space, but finds its efficacy 
in what may be termed 'moral space'. This is not to ignore that in order for any right 
to be recognised within society (and subsequently enforced) there is a prerequisite 
requirement for political will and possible legislative responses, but rather that both 
must necessarily nevertheless operate within a moral space if they are to be little 
more than arbitrary legal sanction (changes in 'hearts and minds' and not just 
procedural nuance). In like manner, when animal rights advocates call for 
recognition of the rights of animals in, for example, factory farm animal husbandry 
practices, they are asserting the straightforward claim that the perpetrator of these 
practices has no right - or more precisely, no moral right - to act in certain 
presumptive ways toward the defenceless and vulnerable.
44 Catherine Osborne makes this distinction from a historical perspective (2007), pp. 184-196.
45 See Glossary for a definition of this term as used throughout this work.
46 It is worth noting here that my use of the term animal rights throughout is forwarded in the 
general sense of animal advocacy and does not imply an implementation of a convoluted, 
structured, literalised and legalistic pantheon of rights, but rather one that calls for readdress, 
redefinition and reassessment of the moral status - and our subsequent moral obligations - to 
other than human beings (please see glossary definition for further qualification).
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The Language of Rights
If talk of rights necessarily inhabits a moral space in contemporary culture, then how 
might this space be best understood? The 'language' of animal rights (and indeed 
talk of rights at large) can be viewed as, ultimately, metaphorical in nature. What I 
simply mean here by metaphorical is that individuals sharing a deep respect for a 
(shared) moral value express this through the 'language' of metaphor in order to 
capture the fundamental nature of that value.47 This metaphor can properly embrace 
anything that one cares for, but herein is a problem. It would seem to most, 
nonsensical to ascribe rights to whatsoever one sincerely cares for. For example, to 
speak in terms of the rights of inanimate objects, possessions, ideas and 'nature', is, 
I believe, to overwork the metaphor. We may indeed greatly cherish such things (for 
example, an awe-inspiring landscape), but the language of rights is, on this account, 
the language of imagery, as demonstrably nothing 'has' requisite rights without the 
assigning thereof (simply, that bestowed rights do not exist 'in nature' without human 
designation). In this sense then, 'animal rights' do not exist in concrete terms. It may 
on a face value reading seem controversial for many to state that such rights do not 
effectively exist, but I believe this understanding of the nature of rights is 
fundamental to our ascribing (or not ascribing) moral standing to the (vulnerable) 
nonhuman animal. In recognising then that only declarations of rights exist, we 
recognise both the power of this imagery for change, and at once the fragility of the 
metaphor in the face of pragmatic intransigence. Within the animal rights debate 
such pragmatism is routinely exemplified in the many forms of anthropocentric bias 
for our own species discussed earlier.
47 This is of course not to suggest in any way that this is the primary or indeed the only expression 
of rights. In matter of fact, the 'language' of rights is deeply problematic and can carry with it 
ambiguity, bias and complex questions over the very existence of'rights' in certain contexts. As I 
use rights here in the principally general sense of protection of the vulnerable, I do not wish to 
enter into extensive conceptual argument on the nuances of the' meaning' of rights in the wider 
sense, which likely constitutes a voluminous tome in its own right. For interesting and further 
discussion on the theme of'rights' - especially in relation to 'animal rights', see Mary Anne Warren, 
Moral Status: Obligations to persons and other living things (1997), J Wiener, 'Perspectives: 
Animal rights, human rights, public rights' (1989), T Sprigge, 'Interests and Rights: The Case 
against Animals' (1981), J Smith, 'Morals, Reason and Animals' (1991), Roger Scruton, Animal 
Rights and Wrongs (2000), D Porter, 'Our philosophy concerning animal rights' (1991), Onora 
O'Neill, Kantian Ethics (1993), Thomas Nagel, Moral Questions (1979), A McKay, 'Moral Status: 
Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things' (1998) and J Hamil, 'Humankind's uses of animals' 
(1995).
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In our treatise thus far of contemporary discourse around the ethics of animal 
advocacy, it is likely by now clear that the diverse theoretical and practical issues 
surrounding notions of ascribing moral standing to nonhuman animals are complex, 
convoluted, and remain, at this point, controversial in scope. Nevertheless, 
analogous to other issues that are advanced under the general banner of 
'environmental ethics' in contemporary ethical thought (and 'animal rights' is 
normatively subsumed under this remit), it is established that arguments concerning 
the moral status of the nonhuman are, at minimum, acknowledged as legitimate 
within mainstream contemporary ethical debate. It is fair to say however that the 
ethical platform for serious consideration of animal rights is of comparatively recent 
creation, the framework of which is, in many respects, still under construction. There 
is a key question arising from this ongoing construction that has relevance to the 
wider debate that queries whether humans - defined as moral beings - can in fact 
truly take an 'outsider' position in the 'order of nature' and as such meaningfully 
detach themselves as arbiter of the natural world?48 Discourse tends to take one of 
three general forms in contemporary society concerning this question: the 
'pessimistic' which sees the treatment of animals by humans as cause for deep 
pessimism; conversely, the 'optimistic' view which may recognise diverse problems, 
but asserts that we can humanely manage the natural world; and thirdly, so-called 
'realistic' notions which principally concede to life as a natural struggle in which 
animal and human conflicts will 'find' an innate balance (Walker, 2000, pp.60-61).
Despite the modern 'willingness' to engage with some form of debate on the 
moral status of the nonhuman within ethical discourse, it is my contention that the 
case for animal advocacy, as presented here - that deems the instrumental 'use' of 
the nonhuman animal as intrinsically immoral - remains to greater or lesser extent 
predominately within the confines of 'theoretical' discourse. Indeed, in starkly realistic 
terms it is clear that we remain very far from constructing a culture that routinely 
respects the rights of animals. Despite the daily industrial scale (ab)use of animals 
before us, it would seem that the ever present gulf between ethical theory and ethical 
practice has rarely been so vast in expanse than in our dealings with nonhuman 
animals. This is not of course to ignore the very real and laudable advances in recent 
times in animal welfare (at least in some parts of the world), due in no small part to
48 This idea is the central theme of chapter three in discussion of paternalism.
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'selective' animal rights and welfare issues entering the public arena -high profile 
examples of which include issues around battery farming, the use of veal cages, 
animal experimentation, and 'free range' initiatives.49 Nevertheless, as I will explore 
in chapter two, clear distinctions need to be made between the fundamental case for 
ascribing rights to nonhuman animals and the far reaching implications thereof, and 
what generally is understood in the contemporary mindset to be 'animal welfare' 
advances in broader terms.
Whilst it is certainly true that topical theoretical debate on diverse animal 
advocacy views is both rigorous and challenging, I nevertheless submit, as a central 
tenet of this thesis, that the primary underlying and disquieting factor that is a cause 
for disconcertion for a great many individuals is the 'inescapable' radical 
underpinning of the animal rights case. Indeed, I readily concede that if the case is 
successfully made for accepting that arbitrary instrumental use of nonhuman 'moral 
beings' is effectively immoral, then, the practical real-world implications are nothing 
short of revolutionary in scope. If there is indeed any 'intuitive' aspect to our feelings 
toward other beings and our subsequent treatment of nonhuman animals, then it 
may well transpire that it is, in part at least, a deep-seated apprehension to embrace 
the seismic changes that must ensue in our everyday treatment of animals. 
However, my persistent contention throughout this thesis is that the brevity of the 
challenge is no reason to assign this undertaking to the defeated ranks of 'utopian' 
imaginings. The challenges in formulating a possible rapprochement of this radical 
position into a broader environmental ethic forms the nucleus of this work, and will 
be discussed in the context of contemporary perspectives within animal advocacy in 
the subsequent chapters.
A 'special' moral category
In a broader context we may say then, that a traditional interpretation of human 
morality is grounded upon the presumption that human beings are in a 'special' 
moral category. Morally speaking, there is an implicit (and frequently explicit) value 
judgement made about the relative worth of human beings and nonhuman beings. 
From this traditional conception of value, it is, I think, explicable that the core
49 For some recent high profile examples see the literature from organisations such as People for 
the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) http://www.peta.org/ and the Royal Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) http://www.rspca.orq.uk/home_.
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'purpose' of morality is therefore conceived to be the protection of human beings and 
their rights and interests. In chapter five I question the validity of an automatically 
designated special moral category, and argue in favour of a 'biocentric individualism' 
to better represent the human and nonhuman place in nature. The idea of a special 
moral category assigned to the human race in Western thought, largely historically 
arises from a theistic belief in the uniqueness of man under a supreme God (or 
Gods) on the one hand, and the uniqueness of man under a rational mind on the 
other. 50 However, as James Rachels observes, religious and selective cognitive 
justifications for the God-given 'dignity of man' may, in the modern era, be little more 
the 'moral effluvium of a discredited metaphysics' (1990, p.5.). Can, therefore, 
traditional value judgements that either demand consensual obeisance to the 'ideals' 
of post-enlightenment human rational capacities, or conversely perpetuate a 
superstitious awe of man 'sanctified' as the very image of the divine, be perceived as 
wholly and sufficiently convincing today? Moreover, does Rollin's quote that forms 
the epigraph for this chapter - that, 'It will not do to ignore moral argument just 
because it has always been ignored. Immorality sanctified by tradition is still 
immorality', stand? Certainly, these worldviews are widespread, and for many are 
core to an understanding of their place in nature. Often viewed as mutually 
exclusive, the exhaustive - and regularly vehement - dichotomous debate between 
the aims, purposes, validity and importance of 'faith' or 'science', 'experiment' or 
'experience', 'feeling' or'fact', and the 'natural' orthe 'supernatural' continues without 
abeyance.
It is not however the diverse virtues or vices of these dualisms that are of 
primary concern in the context of the central themes of this thesis. It is that, despite 
the arguably fundamental divergences inherent in these views, they frequently share 
a common ground: namely, to varying degree each, I argue, set humankind 'apart' 
from nature. For example, the secular notion of the uniqueness of man under a 
rational mind promulgates a staunch 'scientific' worldview. However, such a view 
draws immensely upon conceptual theories of Darwinian natural selection that 
paradoxically solicits us to perceive of our species as one among countless others
50 1 use the term 'man' in the context of this discussion to confer the wider meaning of 
'humankind'. I trust the reader will indulge my persistent use of the archaic term here, as I use it 
only to emphasis the patriarchal relationships that reflect the traditional forms of thinking under 
discussion.
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and certainly not unique in kind. 51 In short, an unquestioning assent to scientific 
explanations of existence, whilst enlightening us on our biological provenance, 
understood merely as an explanation of processes of natural selection the facts 
alone do little to explicate an incisive 'moral' understanding of man in nature. James 
Rachels argues, I think largely convincingly, that Darwin's groundbreaking and 
scientifically validated knowledge of our evolutionary provenance in fact should do 
just this. 52 But, if such a 'moral epiphany' has taken place in the hearts and minds of 
modern man, there certainly does not seem to be extensive evidence for this in our 
everyday attitudes, policies and practices toward nonhuman animals. Indeed, 
serious moral consideration for other species evidently did not follow widespread 
acceptance of the 'scientific' theory of natural selection and the empirically revealed 
origins of humankind, and to be sure, theoretical debate has only relatively recently 
began to conceptually embrace the discipline of Animal Ethics. The Darwinian 
worldview alluded to here takes a nonhierarchical view of life on Earth, and plainly 
(and certainly for Darwin) natural selection does not move towards any defined goal, 
but (in principle at least) goes on changing indefinitely - moving in no particular 
direction, and definitely not towards some idea of its pinnacle as instantiated in 
human perfection or perfectibility. In its denial of a teleological, static and hierarchical 
framework as a basis for moral deliberation, the rights-based view as presented here 
is entirely compatible with this scientific nonhierarchical and nonteleological view of 
nature.
Some however, have construed something more here than a strictly 
biologically founded explanation of natural selection and evolutionary processes. 
Beginning with Herbert Spencer's 'evolutionary ethics' take on Darwin's thought 
(1879), and later 'scientific' reinterpretations of morality in the guise of sociobiology, 53 
the morally dubious leap from evolved species to evolved conduct was made. This 
'moral theory' with its popularized and infamous maxim of 'survival of the fittest' - a 
creed eagerly adopted by industrialists of the time and revitalized sporadically since 
to justify free market ideology - is at best a misinterpretation of Darwin, at worst a
51 See Charles Darwin's The Descent of Man, and the Selection in Relation to Sex (1981 reprint) 
for a thorough exposition of this theme.
52 Darwin himself certainly saw his theory in this light, arguing that differences in nature are of 
degree and not of kind. See Charles Darwin's The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex 
(1981 reprint) for further clarification of his broad theory.
53 See Edward O. Wilson for a systematic dissemination of the nascent ideas of Sociobiology and 
fora modern reworking of this persistent theme (1975).
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harbinger of overt mass oppression and genocide. I believe that the problem for our 
central argument here is not one of arguably mere erroneous social theory, but 
rather a false teleologically based understanding of evolution itself - and by 
extension, of the structure of animal life (including human animal life). Such a leap 
from biological fact to sociological fiction fails to distinguish the plausible idea of 
biological potentiality from the deeply disconcerting notion of biological determinism. 
54 It is this blind leap into the sociological imagination, that has I argue, fomented and 
inculcated the 'otherness' of humankind in the modern mindset as standing apart 
from nature - if not in its descent (shared genetic provenance), then certainly in its 
teleological 'ascent' (atop the 'food-chain'). A powerful example of the theoretical 
consequences of this perceived 'apartness' from nature latterly finds its culmination 
in 'rational' variations of the Anthropic Cosmological Principle.55 This idea regards 
the development of (ultimately of course human) intelligent life as the very pinnacle 
of the evolutionary process of the entire universe itself. 56 This view exemplifies 
human chauvinism, I contend, at its paradigmatic preeminent.
The problem of Human Dignity
It is not difficult to imagine then, that humankind self-elevated to nothing less than 
the supreme 'purpose' of the universe, may view itself in a special moral category, 
and ascribe to itself alone ideas of worth above and beyond the rest of the animal 
domain. The idea of a unique form of 'dignity', unsurprisingly, is a descriptive 
category doggedly reserved for homo-sapiens. In this selective respect, we may say 
then that human dignity is forwarded as the moral doctrine that places humans and 
all other animals in different moral categories. For the rights-based view, this idea is 
evidently problematic in that it assigns a pseudo-class of exclusivity to human 
beings. This view, as aforementioned, is not the Darwinian view of our provenance. 
Darwin himself seemed to suggest that humankind is, in truth, arrogant to infer that it 
is any 'great work', and in discussion of Darwin's ethics James Rachels argues that
54 Rachels (1990) presents a full and illuminating discussion of the pitfalls of sociobiology in the 
context of Darwin's theory.
55 For a tour de force of the variations of the scientific principles forwarded see John D Barrow and 
Frank J Tipler's, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (1986)
55 Very loosely, that in the development of human consciousness the universe for the first time 
'knows' itself and therefore consciousness (and again of course 'human' consciousness) is the 
teleological 'aim' of the creative and destructive processes of the universe itself (to be self-aware 
in and through the human mind alone).
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discrediting ideas of 'human dignity' is one of the most important implications of 
Darwinism - a fact that contemporary philosophy has not, to date, taken very 
seriously (1990, p.79). However, as a platform for the development of a biocentric 
individually based environmental ethic, I believe that the implications of this concept 
should not be underestimated, and will be revisited in chapters four and five in 
discussion of the possible necessary constituents of such a framework.
So, why then might ideas of human dignity be so problematic for a rights- 
based view? After all, if dignity is seen to be something noble - and by and large a 
positive attribute that can potentially compel the human spirit toward greater 
empathic moral sentiment, could not then human dignity be construed as a 
necessary condition for assent to the central tenets of animal rights? Unfortunately, 
though a provocative thought, I think not. Certainly, 'Human Dignity' is a term 
frequently used (and overused?) in discourse within the human rights arena, often to 
portray a prima facie concept of human intrinsic worth and inviolability. However, 
although latterly regularly expressed in secular terms, the idea of human dignity is 
deeply- perhaps irrevocably - entwined in religious myth. The large scale, sweeping 
and formulaic explanations of the nature of 'nature' and the nature of man that the 
'great' religions perpetually tout, continue to deeply influence countless modern 
humans, and in turn the shape of modern culture. It is therefore within the doctrinal 
strictures of religious dogma that the preeminent understanding of human dignity 
historically foments. This is a dignity not earned by man through hard won 
development of moral sentiment, but one bestowed upon him by an omniscient God. 
This 'intrinsic' form of dignity finds its significance in the 'sacredness' of the 
God/human relationship - and, 'God forbid', that any other animal should accede to 
this elevated semi-divine state. It is therefore the sacredness imbued in the religious 
concept of human dignity that necessarily defines mankind as separate and above 
all other of 'God's creatures'. With man as the very image of the divine, the fate of 
countless species is sealed. The obvious problem here for a developed animal 
advocacy is that the elevation of the human, 'demands' the denigration of the 
nonhuman, and with human life promoted to the inviolable, nonhuman life is thusly 
relegated to the insignificant. From the rationality thesis of St. Thomas Aquinas 
holding that intellectual creatures assumed the 'highest' place in the universe - with 
of course man as the 'image of God' as the highest - subsequent secular thinkers 
having self-professedly shed the moral mantle of the mythical, have surprisingly
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nevertheless maintained 'belief in the idea of human dignity. 57 But now in place of 
God-given sanction confess a self-given 'rational' sanction for the arbitrary and 
instrumental treatment of nonhumans.
If then God is indeed proclaimed 'dead' by most secular interpretations of the 
place of man in nature, seemingly, the only remaining case for a unique and 
exclusive human dignity is that human beings are radically different from other 
animals. The case tends to resolutely rest upon man as the uniquely 'rational 
animal'. Clearly however, from the Darwinian perspective man is not the rational 
animal; he is merely more rational than other animals - and that substantively 
speaking, all (sentient) animals have varying degrees of reason. Despite the shaky 
foundations for an understanding of what it is precisely that constitutes human 
dignity, the double-edged sword of myth and rationality continues still to strike at the 
heart of the hope for greater species egalitarianism. In discussion of the relevance of 
a nonhierarchical understanding for a rights-based environmental ethics in chapter 
five, I will return to this idea of dignity and its bearing on a biocentric view of nature.
All of this is not to say that we humans are not 'special'. In the sense that we 
as a species have unique, and in some respects unrivalled characteristics, we are 
most certainly exceptional in the animal world. Indeed, the rights-based view, on my 
interpretation, argues paradoxically that it is both the fact of sameness and 
difference that makes the case for respectful treatment of nonhuman animals morally 
requisite, a position I defend in detail in chapters four and five. At this point however, 
for a clearer understanding of a rights-based position, it is helpful to illuminate the 
importance of the development of evolutionary theory for the advocacy view 
presented here in order to ground our subsequent argument. A surprisingly early - 
and I think radical - tentative observation arising from evolutionary theory in support 
of 'animal rights' was made by the American botanist Asa Gray, a champion of 
Darwinian thought. He noted that in the light of the evidence we tend to accept our 
kinship to other animals, but without abandoning our idea of separateness from 
them. Gray speculates as to the reason why this may be so. He hypothesizes that 
we resist evolutionary facts because of their implications for morality - and 
importantly for this thesis - the implications for the morality of how we treat animals. 
He comments:
57 For a comprehensive overview of the theology of Aquinas, see selections and translations of his 
major thoughts by Timothy McDermott in Aquinas Selected Philosophical Writings (1993).
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'Man, while on the one side a wholly exceptional being, is on the other an 
object of natural history - a part of the animal kingdom....[H]e is as certainly 
and completely an animal as he is certainly something more. We are sharers 
not only of animal but of vegetable life, sharers with the higher brute animals 
in common instincts and feelings and affections. It seems to me that there is a 
sort of meanness in the wish to ignore the tie. I fancy that human beings may 
be more humane when they realize that, as their dependent associates live a 
life in which man has a share, so they have rights which man is bound to 
respect'. 58
This thought, although in many ways radical for the era, is at the same time starkly 
straightforward. Gray is merely pointing out the 'meanness' of this selective 
worldview- a meanness remaining as embedded in our understanding of the natural 
world as when Gray first voiced it. It would seem peculiar that little in real terms has 
changed in our attitudes to other animals in well over a century, but perhaps there is 
a clue to this intransigence within Gray's own words. 59 In acknowledging freely our 
animality, Gray himself - perhaps subconsciously - quickly qualifies our kinship with 
other animals in his subsequent assertion that man himself '...is certainly something 
more'. I contend that it is the ambiguity entrenched in the idea of the 'something 
more' that contains within itself the germ of the underlying problem Gray is 
attempting to draw out. It is this 'something more' that, at least from a rights-based 
perspective, has not to date been adequately defined or defended - despite best 
theoretical efforts from those who would deny nonhumans rights. I submit that this 
'Holy Grail' - much like the mythical cup - remains undiscovered simply because it 
never existed. There is nothing conclusively quantifiable in the 'something more' that 
Gray alludes to; it is a chimera conjured from the imagination of human chauvinism. 
That there are qualitative differences between species and between individuals - not 
least human individuals - is evident; but this does not necessarily mean that there 
exists an 'absolute' trait that no other animal has or does share to lesser of greater 
degree - including some capacity for rational thought. In chapter two the ethical 
contradictions inherent in these conflicting attitudes are discussed in the context of
58 Asa Gray makes this forward thinking assertion in two lectures delivered to the Theological 
School of Yale College in 1880.
59 Whilst not ignoring changes in the modern mindset (at least in the Western mindset) towards 
attitudes to nonhumans, the fact remains that we slaughter, cause to suffer, hunt, experiment on 
and generally disdain the right to flourish of animals on a scale historically unimagined.
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our treatment of nonhumans in the light of contemporary welfarism and welfare 
practice and policy.
What is however clear, is that we humans have a vested interest in 
maintaining this dualistic view of man and nature. Into the twenty-first century the 
greater part of our interaction with nonhumans remains overwhelmingly exploitative. 
Despite 'wildlife' conservation and preservation initiatives - examined in chapter 
three - the human/nonhuman power relationship is decidedly (and perhaps 
decisively) one-sided. So far reaching is our technological reliance on the utilisation 
of nature, that it may fairly be said that to live in modernity is to exploit nonhumans - 
and, at the very least in commonplace 'indirect' ways. Animal 'products' permeate 
even the most mundane aspects of modern life - from tyres to toys, soaps to sweets, 
dyes to diapers, and to extricate ourselves from this embedded exploitation suggests 
an onerous future undertaking.60
1.3 The animal rights view tomorrow
In advocating extending the boundaries of the moral community to include many 
nonhuman animals, a claim of the pro-animal movement is to argue the principle that 
any individual that possesses moral standing must possess it equally. This view is 
encapsulated in Singer's foundational animal liberation maxim that individuals should 
be treated differently only in as much as they possess morally relevant differences - 
enshrined in his call for equal consideration of interests.^ For many however the 
evidently far reaching consequences of such a 'radical' proposition makes any 
practical implementation of greater species egalitarianism wildly implausible. 
Likewise, other objectors view the likes of Tom Regan's and Paul Taylor's extension 
of egalitarianism beyond the boundaries of our own species as amounting to an
60 Naturally, a thoroughgoing anthropocentrist would contest that this necessarily equates to 
exploitation and that the term is emotive. However, exploitation is used in this instance primarily 
in the sense of making use', which may or may not have arguable ethical dimensions. See Cohen 
(1993, 1997) and Scruton (2000) for some counter-arguments regarding this disputed ethical 
dimension.
61 Peter Singer of course makes famous use of this moral maxim as a basis for development of his 
animal liberation position in his pivotal work Animal Liberation (1995).
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effective reductio ad absurdum of their positions.62 The structural and substantive 
basis of this form of species egalitarianism lies primarily in the belief that moral 
standing is not a matter of degree, and thus those beings that possess this standing 
deserve respect as subjects-of-a-life.
However, a recurrent criticism of this form of deontological species 
egalitarianism is that it is fundamentally incompatible with a basic and familiar 'ideal' 
of morality, and in particular, of justice. Christopher Knapp, in defending species 
inegalitarianism, summarises thusly:
'In demanding that similar individuals deserve to be treated similarly, this 
principle demands that whenever two individuals deserve different 
consideration, the difference in consideration must be proportional to the 
morally relevant differences between them. Individuals who are virtually, but 
not quite, identical in morally relevant respects cannot deserve to be shown 
drastically different concern' (2009, p.176).
The central claims from this objection are in effect that the formulation of the 'ideal' 
makes it overly demanding, and for Knapp moral standing has to be a matter of 
degree in order to be just. Furthermore, Knapp argues that animal advocates 
themselves admit finely differentiated matters of degree in their own formulations. It 
is, I believe, true to say that Regan's subject-of-a-life criterion for example is most 
certainly bounded by various 'attributes' that, in fact, Regan is at pains to recount - 
and, those beings that fall outside of a particular attributive assigned category are 
excluded from his subject-of-a-life privileged moral position. Taylor also, although 
broadening his perspective to 'teleological centres of life', limits by definition moral 
standing to those beings that possess the capacity for goal-directedness. Knapp 
rightly points out that there is an embedded vagueness in these terms, and it is upon 
this vagueness that he tends to argue for his form of correlative species 
inegalitarianism.
62 Broadly speaking, for Regan an individual has moral status in possessing inherent worth, and for 
Regan this is a 'categorical concept' (one either possesses it, or one does not), outlined in Regan's 
equally famous The Case for Animal Rights (1983 and 2004). Taylor likewise sees moral standing 
as based upon a possession of inherent worth - encapsulated in his principle of species impartiality 
that'requires every entity that has a good of its own as possessing inherent worth - the same 
inherent worth, since none is superior to another' (1986).
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The limits of the Rights Movement
For our purposes therefore, we need to address two central objections arising from 
the kernel of Knapp's observations before going on to consider some further 
contemporary positions that emanate from the species egalitarian view. The first 
objection is that deontological species egalitarianism is simply overly demanding. 
This is a very real concern for many who would question the practical viability of 
extending the moral community, and has been alluded to in the introduction to this 
work. Put simply, ethics, if it is to have any substantive meaning must, in large part, 
concern itself with the very business of challenging given normative views. If these 
challenges are both rigorous and consistent then to be effectively dismissed they 
must be consistently proven incoherent by equally rigorous counter-argument. To 
hold that a moral theory should be discounted because it is 'overly demanding' is 
surely then an insufficient rebuff. In short, that a theory would consistently and 
logically lead to 'radical' consequences is certainly no good reason to abandon such. 
The second objection, that moral standing has to be a matter of degree, and that 
animal advocates themselves admit finely differentiated matters of degree in their 
own formulations, would seem more credible. The problem with admitting matters of 
degree in ethical formulation echoes longstanding deontological/consequentialist 
divergent positions, a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this thesis. Knapp 
(who is clearly a consequentialist) here however misinterprets the deontological 
perspective as propounded by Regan and Taylor in this respect. Neither Regan nor 
Taylor demands that an absolutist stance be adopted in all circumstances. When 
confronted by direct human/animal conflicts, Regan for example goes to great 
lengths to cater for these differentiations in his evocation of his Miniride Principle and 
his Worst-off Principle. 63 Moreover, Knapp misconstrues Singer's mandate for equal 
consideration of interests in taking it to mean that each being with moral status 
possesses equal interests, whereas Singer denotes that it is an equal consideration
63 The 'Miniride Principle' (minimize overrides principle) broadly states that special considerations 
aside, when we must choose between overriding the rights of many who are innocent or the rights 
of few who are innocent, and when each affected individual will be harmed in a prima facie 
comparable way, then we ought to choose to override the rights of the few in preference to 
overriding the rights of the many. The 'Worst off Principle' posits that special considerations aside, 
when we must decide to override the rights of many or the rights of the few who are innocent, and 
when the harm faced by the few would make them worse-off than any of the many would be if any 
other option were chosen, then we ought to override the rights of the many, cited in Eric Moore 
(2002), p.297.
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of interests (and not 'equal interests' perse) that is morally demanded. These sorts 
of interpretative confusions are not uncommon in animal ethics at large.
The case made by animal protectionists that ascribes moral status to 
nonhuman sentient subjects-of-a-life has thus far largely turned primarily upon 
recognition of the similarities between humans and animals. To date, for animal 
advocates, the push toward this acknowledgment of the similarities served to 
strengthen the case for inclusion of many nonhumans into the moral sphere of 
concern. Simply put, if it could be successfully shown that animals are much like 
humans in multifarious ways, then the success of the animal advocates' inclusive 
project is more likely assured. There is however a problem: similarity may all too 
readily mask difference. Advancing 'likeness' as a benchmark for moral 
consideration carries with it the danger that value is assigned only to the degree that 
the 'thing' being valued is like us. Traditionally then, speciesist biases were 
challenged by disputing the legitimacy of the established boundaries of the moral 
community, whilst an evolved ethic that emphasises a case for difference claims that 
such biases are better confronted by recognising the autonomy and distinctness of 
the 'other'. As Elisa Aaltola points out The first group states that bringing animals 
under the headline 'us' decentres humans, the second states that doing so is merely 
to recentre human importance (2002, p. 194). In this respect the emergent animal 
rights movement may be fairly criticised for promulgating a falsely universalistic ethic 
based upon how others conform to our self image.
Intrinsic and Extrinsic arguments
The notion of the animal rights movement disseminating an egoistic ethic by 
attempting to broaden the moral community through emphasis on similarity (or 
'redefining' difference) brings into focus a serious strategic problem for animal 
advocacy. Contemporary animal protectionists disagree as to whether it is empirical 
argument - based for example on 'facts' such as genetic or group provenance, or 
whether it is ethical argument - based primarily on 'values' such as the wrongness 
of causing unnecessary harm to sentient beings, that has greater validity. Katherine 
Perlo frames this problem in terms of 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' arguments (that, in turn 
can be loosely seen to pertain to the ethical/empirical dichotomy) and defines the 
extrinsic and intrinsic notions thusly:
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'Extrinsic arguments are those that seek to promote an aim and its underlying 
principle by appealing to consideration politically, historically, or logically 
separable from that aim and that principle. Intrinsic arguments appeal to 
considerations within and inseparable from the aim and principle. In this case, 
the aim is animal liberation and the principle is the moral equality of species' 
(2007, p. 1).
In strategic terms (how the animal rights movement at large considers, formulates 
and plans its theory, practice and policy), intrinsic and extrinsic arguments are often 
combined and/or conflated. So for example, the claim that vegetarianism helps to 
reduce animal suffering is an intrinsic argument - in that the aim of animal liberation 
is to reduce animal suffering. It may additionally however be justified on extrinsic 
grounds through an appeal to its environmental benefits - in that meat production is 
hugely damaging to the environment. The former is 'within' the remit of the aims of 
many animal ethicists, the latter 'outside' of this debate and of greater concern to 
'environmental' ethicists 64
Bearing in mind the steadfast axiom that ethical values cannot be derived 
from facts, and the inherent potential for conflation here, there is frequently extant 
within animal advocacy a tacit 'supplementation' of intrinsic based arguments with 
extrinsic claims. Echoing Aaltola's point above, in regard to animal experimentation 
for example, there is a questionable rhetorical stance that deems animals similar 
enough to us humans to merit a ban on experimentation, whilst concurrently claiming 
that animals are dissimilar enough to warrant a ban on experimentation due to its 
ineffectiveness in application to humans. It is perfectly reasonable and correct to say 
that human animals are indeed very similar whilst at the same time very different to 
nonhuman animals, but in strategic terms this potentially sends out confused 
messages to a public largely at present unconvinced by the arguments of animal 
advocates. Nevertheless, it would also seem reasonable that arguments need not 
(should not) have to stand alone for the sake of mere public clarity, and may be 
legitimately augmented and bolstered by additional argument so long as each 
argument does not refute or contradict the rigour of the other arguments. For 
example, Richard Schwartz concurrently argues for vegetarianism on the grounds of
64 This is not to suggest some clear cut distinction between advocates of animal and environmental 
ethics, but simply to state that a case for protecting the environment is largely within the domain 
of environmental ethics as opposed to mainstream animal ethics. There is of course no reason why 
an individual may not sit comfortably in both camps on diverse issues (although some would claim 
this is not possible - the reasoning of which is thrashed out as a major theme in this thesis).
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heath, compassion for animals, sharing, environmental protection and indeed peace 
(2001,pp.222-45).
There is an underlying concern about all of this for any individualistically 
based ethic that seeks to centre moral concern on individual beings. If reasons for 
committing to vegetarianism, for example, are any other (or in fact all other, or even 
some other) of those reasons Schwartz puts forward, but not for the reason of 
'compassion to animals', then the fate of the individual animal remains open to the 
vagaries of entirely 'extrinsic' events. A thought experiment may be helpful here. 
Imagine, for example, that a large percentage of the world's population had in fact 
been persuaded by Schwartz's 'health' argument, but it is subsequently proven that 
certain forms of diet that merely limit or combine limited meat consumption are in fact 
demonstrated to be more healthy than a purely vegetarian diet. In this case, it would 
then be entirely legitimate to begin to slaughter animals on the potentially previous 
industrial scale. Suppose also that with the passage of time society had found ways 
to foster a more sharing and caring society through an expanded humanistic ethic, 
and that an argument for inclusion of nonhumans was simply not required in this 
human-centred paradigm. Again those who may have subscribed to Schwartz's 
'sharing' argument may begin consuming animal flesh without guilt or fear of moral 
disapproval. Likewise, envision that a further technological breakthrough had then 
radically and permanently reversed environmental degradation, and so the 
peripheral benefit to the environment that vegetarianism provided was no longer 
deemed a necessary sacrifice. Those who became vegetarian for this reason may 
well begin to consume meat on a regular basis. Suppose, moreover, that weapons 
were developed that were so terrifying and so widely held that they effectively 
ensured 'peace' and this peace guaranteed a subsequent abundant food supply for 
all. The choice of food may then well include animal flesh for many.
By the same token, it is hard however to imagine how an individually 
developed intrinsic 'compassion for animals' would be directly influenced by such 
'extrinsic' events. Short of a drastic change of heart, the reasons for being a 
vegetarian would remain despite the extrinsic arguments. It is only a commitment to 
the 'compassion for animals' argument that would permanently safeguard the 
individual animal from dispassionate treatment.
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1.4 The challenge of the animal rights view
Given this brief overview of contemporary animal advocacy as I see it, a theme that 
is central to this work is the relationship of this emergent view to wider animal 
protectionist aims. The subsequent chapters will be examining the efficacy of this 
perspective with respect to welfarism, conservationism and wider environmentalism. 
As far as the scope of this thesis is concerned, the wider 'challenge of the rights- 
view' is, then, whether its individualistically centred ethic can be adapted to address 
some of the underlying notional presuppositions that I will suggest are endemic to 
our attitudes and practices towards nonhuman animals within the wider 
environmental debate.
Given the discussion so far, it may be surmised that animal advocates face 
two (interlinked) challenges: what may be called an 'external' challenge, and an 
'internal' one.65 The first challenge encapsulates the sundry animal rights arguments 
and counter positions that have been the central themes of this introductory chapter. 
In short, the external challenge is one of offering consistent, robust and coherent 
arguments that relevantly address the ways in which animals are used in 
contemporary society. The challenge then is not merely one of developing 
theoretically rigorous models, or indeed in generating meaningful debate within the 
wider public domain - although these are certainly significant - but that proponents of 
the rights-based position themselves need to be in a position to respond to the ever- 
changing number of ways in which society (mis)treats nonhumans. It is certainly the 
case that technology applied to animal husbandry, methods of conservation practice, 
and experimental techniques within animal experimentation are constantly altering, 
and this challenge therefore requires the animal rights movement to be able to 
flexibly apply theory to practice where necessary in this shifting paradigm. There are 
of course also subtle cultural shifts both in favour of greater human/animal 
egalitarianism and indeed conversely away from such - and again, both theory and 
practice need to be sensitive and responsive to this changing cultural landscape.66
65 Susanna Flavia Boxall makes this broad distinction in discussion of the contemporary debate in 
'Beyond Orthodoxy: A Pluralist Approach to Animal Liberation' (2005), pp. 1-8.
66 One might think of the 'advances' in animal husbandry and animal welfare in general in 
countries like the UK and Australia in relatively recent years. Conversely, the rise of far eastern 
economies has belatedly brought with it a drive for greater consumer consumption of 'luxury'
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The second, 'internal' challenge, presents an arguable need to achieve 
greater accord within the animal rights arena itself. In effect, although animal 
advocates certainly 'differ in the theoretical basis for their conviction and in their 
understanding of the adequacy of various moral frameworks' (Wennberg, 2003, p.48), 
given the central contentions of the animal rights literature that turns, in these 
diverse respects, upon the moral inadequacy of the current treatment and use of 
nonhumans, it would seem politic that this principal message needs to be retained. 
This underlying notion ought therefore to be uppermost in communication to the 
wider community, not least in order to meet the requisites of the external challenge 
that seeks to generate public debate and to respond to the ever-changing number of 
ways in which society makes use of nonhumans. There is, herein, an ever-present 
obligation to, 'Continue to challenge the status quo by constructing new arguments 
that are compelling in the face of recent experience'. 67 In summary, if the crux of the 
issue is that in modernity many nonhuman animals are, as a matter of course, 
deprived of the essential opportunity to flourish in their particular way (and this 
needless to say encompasses the practices of the food and pharmaceutical 
industries, zoos, 'parks' and sundry other forms of deprivation), then, given that 
thousands of nonhuman animals are being killed, anguished, constrained or 
otherwise neglected and abused every second of every day with impunity, the 
practical constituents (and I believe this means the distinct possibility of positively 
encouraging real-world activism) that make up a theory to practice praxis cannot be 
ignored. As Boxall astutely notes,
'While this cornucopia of arguments is beneficial, for it fosters discussion and 
advances intellectual refinement, it is important to note that the disagreements 
among many animal liberation theorists are over the issues that are tangential 
to the present and future wellbeing of nonhuman animals. Settling the 
question of whether deontology is a superior theory to consequentialism will 
not assuage the pain of veal calves, just as bickering over whether 
Christianity is inherently anthropocentric will not help secure a ban on LD-50 
tests' (2005, p.7).
products, which has in turn therefore seen a huge rise in meat consumption as a marker of 
conspicuous consumption for an increasingly wealthy consumer population. It is estimated that by 
the year 2050 global meat consumption will have more than doubled. 
67 Boxall (2005), p.5.
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For Boxall then, the initial question in regard to the internal challenges that animal 
advocates must ask themselves is, what is the animal experience in the deprivations 
visited upon them by human practices? Once this question is clarified, then on this 
account, it follows that theorists must find theories that adequately respond to that 
actual experience. The danger voiced here of not addressing the real-world 
experiences of nonhuman animals in this manner, is that there is an inherent risk 
that the protectionist responses are confined within the boundaries imposed by an a 
priori theoretical framework - rather than the extant perceptible experiences of the 
nonhuman. In this sense, I concur with Boxall in her intimation that animal ethicists 
may all too readily make practice fit theory, rather than theory fit practice - in effect, 
obscuring directed practical application of theory to the urgent needs of the animals. 
Identifying what in fact are the experiential nuances and needs of nonhumans under 
human control is of course by no means a straightforward task and deserves further 
analysis.68 In the next chapter therefore, specific contemporary issues around 
animal welfare and wellbeing are discussed in the light of animal husbandry.
The challenge of nonanthropocentrism
Prior to discussion of the specific 'problems of welfarism', mention of a principal and 
much discussed theme that arises out of the animal ethics debate and extends into 
much environmental thinking is warranted, namely, the frequently (over)employed 
notion of anthropocentrism. Simply put, we might say that anthropocentrism is the 
view that nonhuman animals have value only because they directly or indirectly 
serve human interests. Conversely then, we may say that nonanthropocentrism 
rejects this perspective and sees nonhuman animal value as intrinsic to the 
individual and thus independent of how it may or may not serve human interests. 
However, these distinctions are not merely speculative, and how they may or may 
not converge have far reaching implications not only for the theoretical debate, but 
for the kind of applied policy and practice towards nonhumans that Boxall sees as 
prerequisite to appropriate responses to animal suffering. Indeed, it is ostensibly our
68 In fact, in a deeply insightful paper Cora Diamond challenges the emphasis on theoretical 
grounding over practical application extant within much normative analytical animal ethics. She 
questions what has become the mainstream methodology - one in which she determines as the 
Singer-Regan approach (characterised by their emphases on rights, capacities, interests or 
biology) - as obfuscating what it is that is, as she puts it, 'important either in our relationship with 
other human beings or in our relationship with animals' (1978), p.467.
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perceived self-assigned place on this anthropocentric 'or' nonanthropocentric 'scale' 
that largely colours an individual's perspective on the animal rights or welfare debate 
- and by extension shapes the individual's attitudes to wider environmental themes 
and nature at large - that are to be explored in the body of this work.
It is noteworthy however that it is not the case that the only way to refute 
anthropocentrism in its wider implications is to claim, as many environmentalists do, 
that 'nature' has intrinsic value, and as Katie McShane points out 'One could deny 
anthropocentrism but claim that the value of every organism depends on the 
contribution it makes to the health of its ecosystem; one could deny 
anthropocentrism but claim that the value of every nonconscious being depends on 
whether conscious beings happen to care about it; one could deny anthropocentrism 
and claim that there is no such thing as intrinsic value at all' (2007, p.171). These 
divergent viewpoints whilst variously denying anthropocentrism nevertheless refocus 
the intrinsic value footing that is commonly adopted by many nonanthropocentrists. 
For example, the first claim that McShane outlines is that the 'value' of an organism 
is based upon its contribution to the wellbeing of an ecosystem, and this is in fact the 
normative view taken by a great many who would call themselves environmentalists. 
This holistically based view, in emphasising interdependencies, focuses not upon 
individual intrinsic value but rather upon how a species (aggregated species-specific 
'individuals') may favourably or adversely affect the complex equilibrium of a given 
ecosystem.69 This individual/species divergence will be pivotal to subsequent 
discussion in chapters four, five and six of the claims made by many 
environmentalists that an individually based ethic cannot meaningfully be applied to 
wider environmental concerns because it necessarily ignores the significance of 
ecosystemic interrelationships.
In order to frame my later arguments, at this point I want to briefly discuss 
these divergent viewpoints in the context of the advocates' own specific contextual 
understanding of the conceptual debate, and what for the participants may be at 
stake. A common argument arising from the animal ethics debate about where the 
emphasis on our moral obligations should lie is perhaps less about the 'value' of
69 It is however a highly dubious claim that any realistic 'equilibrium' exists in a given dynamically 
and process based environment unavoidably subjected to constant change. In this sense the 
'balance of nature' is little more than convenient myth for those who would seek to police nature 
or validate the legitimacy of animal abuse.
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nonhuman animals perse and more about our presuppositions regarding our 'use' of 
them. For example, for those animal ethicists who take an abolitionist line regarding 
animal use the central issue is not how we treat animals, but why we use animals in 
the first instance (questions over the legitimacy of animal use, rather than the scope 
of welfare requisite). 70 However, both the abolitionists and welfarists tend - to 
varying degree - to agree that overt human egoism colours our thinking and 
practices regarding other-than-human-beings and that this egoism foments a form of 
human chauvinism that tends to perpetuate our biases towards nonhumans. Several 
theorists have suggested that in order to counter this self-centeredness we need to 
cultivate a 'respect' for nature rather than one based upon use-value calculus. 71 In as 
much as these arguments pertain to wider environmental concerns, the problem may 
well not be one of ethical wrong-headedness, but a short-sightedness about our own 
actual interests. The claim is that if we are merely to consider the future well-being of 
the human race alone it is incumbent upon the current generation to ensure that the 
environment (and for the purposes of this work this obviously includes the creatures 
within it) remains viable for a decent quality of life for future generations (destruction 
of the environment must at some point threaten the existence of humans). At least in 
this limited way it may be said that there is convergence of aims - albeit from very 
different perspectives. As 'rational' as this sort of anthropocentric thinking may be, 
the apparent convergence of aims does little to resolve either the existing 
environmental crisis, or change in any fundamental manner the way in which we 
treat nonhuman animals. It would seem then that in this context both an 
anthropocentric emphasis on future generations, and the nonanthropocentric call for 
abolition of overt animal use likewise remain largely unheeded in any practical far- 
reaching sense. 72
Nevertheless, it may be countered that adopting a workable and appropriate 
anthropocentric approach to the nonhuman world may require only relatively small
70 Gary Francione for example takes such an abolitionist stance (1996, 2009). See also Joan 
Dunayer in her critique of speciesism (2004).
71 For some examples see Paul Taylor's seminal work, Respect for Nature (1986), Marti Kheel's 
Ethics: An Ecofeminist Perspective (2008) and Gary Varner's, In Nature's Interests? Interests, 
Animal Rights and Environmental Ethics (2002). Albert Schweitzer goes as far as to suggest a 
'reverence' for life itself, see Reverence for Life (2002).
72 For an excellent discussion of these broader themes and contemporary counter-argument see 
Robin Attfield, The Ethics of the Global Environment (1999) and Baker, The Postmodern Animal 
(2000).
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changes in dominant existing ethical beliefs (as the majority of philosophical and 
ethical thought sits squarely in the anthropocentric camp), whereas a 
nonanthropocentric approach by its nature is radical, arguably theoretically 
problematic, and may require nothing short of a 'new' ethics. For many who support 
a nonanthropocentric outlook however, it is not the appeal to human interests that 
are cause for disconcertion in itself, but rather that anthropocentric attitudes leave us 
in effect with only one avenue of moral appeal - human interest. 73 The point of 
departure for nonanthropocentrists stems from this one-dimensionality - in that the 
'human interests' scope of anthropocentrism regards profound 'natural' feelings such 
as respect, awe or wonderment towards the natural world (and our place in it) as 
misplaced. The implication here is that if, for instance, I confess a reverence for 
something - or even a love for that thing or being - I may well 'value' it without it 
serving my direct human interests. However, in expressing my natural empathic 
emotions, a strict anthropocentric interpretation strongly implies that I am making a 
mistaken value judgement. As is readily imagined one may profess a 'love for the 
land' or cultivate a 'respect for nature' and indeed this is precisely what a great many 
people such as deep ecologists argue as fundamental to right-headed environmental 
thinking. It would seem somewhat odd then that they may all simply be mistaken - 
and if in fact they are mistaken, it is less clear what mistake is actually being made. 
As Katie McShane points out, It is one thing to say that ethics shouldn't recommend 
love-of-nature to everyone; it's another to say that to love nature is a mistake' (2007, 
p.179).
Conclusion
In this chapter I have drawn an outline of contemporary interpretations of a rights- 
based position in order to contextualize a broad animal advocacy perspective for the 
reader as a prerequisite to the later development of arguments for a rapprochement 
between animal ethics and environmental ethics. I began with a discussion of the 
'animal rights view today' and what may constitute moral standing and its place 
within animal advocacy. By way of introduction to the wider themes discussed later, 
a brief outline of some of the more pertinent contentions and contemporary 
challenges to the animal rights view were presented, including Warren's weak animal
73 See footnote page 30, for the distinction made here between anthropogenic provenance and 
straightforward anthropocentric attitudes.
59
Chapter 1: Rights and Animals: An Overview
rights claim and the arguments from capacity, reciprocity, anthropomorphism and 
absurdity. I then went on to explore the scope of the animal rights-based view within 
the ethical debate. Issues around the 'language of rights' within contemporary 
discourse were critiqued in the light of the commonplace presumption that human 
beings are in a 'special' moral category and therefore that humankind is frequently 
perceived as being uniquely 'set apart' from nature. I concluded with an evaluation of 
the limitations and challenges of animal advocacy and assessed the centrality of 
intrinsic and extrinsic based arguments for the animal rights movement at large.
Cultivating a workable and appropriate nonanthropocentric approach to the 
nonhuman world plainly takes us beyond the normative animal ethics debate into 
wider animal protectionist issues - which is precisely where this thesis is to boldly go. 
I believe the core claims (and problems) and challenges of contemporary animal 
ethics are not - and indeed should not - be confined to the animal rights/welfare 
discourse. There are, I will argue, core strengths (and weaknesses) in the 
rights/welfare dichotomy within animal ethics that transcend the debate and, as I will 
contend, serve to derail some aspects of wider animal protectionism. The arguments 
discussed so far tend to presume that some sort of choice has to be made between 
anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism. In reality most of us sit somewhere 
along the 'sliding scale' of the divergent extremes - and this is equally true of 'animal 
ethicists' as well as 'environmental ethicists'. Indeed, the biocentric individualism 
argued for later in this thesis may fairly be viewed as a 'discrete eclecticism' of both 
elements, in its resistance to both rigid anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric 
postures. However, as a starting point for extrapolation to these forms of wider 
animal protectionism, in the next chapter I critique animal welfare aims and practices 
within contemporary animal husbandry in order to draw out the core strengths (and 
weaknesses) in the rights/welfare dichotomy as a requisite foundation for wider 
discussion.
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2. Welfarism and Animals: The Limits
of Animal Advocacy
We cannot claim to be promoting the welfare of a species, if we allow
most of its members to be miserable. Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human 
Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate. 1
In this chapter I discuss nonhuman animals in the context of an animal welfarist 
position, and consider the ways in which an abolitionist animal rights-based view 
differs. Both positions are clearly in support of animal interests, but have at their 
heart conceptually diverse and far-reaching theoretical divergence. I challenge what I 
interpret as inherent arbitrariness in welfare-based approaches in the light of 
contemporary animal husbandry practices. 2 I start with a critique of animal welfare in 
terms of its aspirations, and then go on to question the efficacy of its central aims 
both in the context of theory to practice asymmetries and its application to wider 
animal advocacy.
Bernard E. Rollin maintains that 'animal rights is the form that animal welfare 
concerns have taken since the mid-twentieth century' (2002, p.913). He reasonably 
argues that widespread assent to ideas of animal rights emerged as a consequence 
of radical changes in animal use in the mid-twentieth century. Historically of course, 
animals have for millennia been exploited for human advantage. However, pivotal to 
animal husbandry success was a general (though certainly not exclusive) consensus 
of respect for animal's natures which, amongst other things, recognised the 
biological suitability for the environments in which the animals were placed. This, 
arguably, further afforded some degree of protection and care for the animal that 
enabled it to live out a reasonably 'natural' existence - albeit ultimately for
1 Richard Sorabji makes this poignant observation in Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins 
of the Western Debate (1993), p. 217.
2 In referring to 'animal husbandry' here and subsequently, I use the term in its broad sense to 
encompass the various aspects of direct instrumental use of'domesticated' nonhumans - and 
normatively subsumed in general practice under the generic term of'livestock farming'. In this 
respect the term normatively carries with it tacit acquiescence to an (and I argue illegitimate) 
acknowledgement that animal husbandry and its ensuing impact on countless nonhumans is in fact 
morally 'legitimate'.
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instrumental human ends. On Rollin's account, human self-interest ensured that the 
majority of domesticated animals at least enjoyed some prohibition form overt 
cruelty. Rollin argues that with the advent of modern technologies this 'ancient 
contract' was, in large part, broken. It became feasible (and profitable) to put animals 
into environments and uses that harmed their well-being, but did not impair 
productivity. With technological efficiency humans were now able to inflict enormous 
suffering on animal subjects in order to augment human gain - but now without the 
compensatory benefits to these subjects that were historically forthcoming. 
Consequently, this has fomented in the modern mindset awareness of both the 
'unnatural' consequences that technology potentially (and realistically) wrought, and 
a growing concern for the need for some protection for those animals under human 
management. In this way society continues to demand some protection - or 'rights' - 
beyond blatant instrumental cruelty. In short, this 'protectionist' stance has become, 
for many, the commonplace understanding of 'animal rights'.
I contend, however, that notwithstanding the obvious benefits that such 
protectionism affords and the undeniable cumulative lessening of suffering for many 
animals, the idea of 'animal rights' in the context of ethical deliberation has deeper 
meaning and sense of permanency than contemporary protectionist viewpoints 
ascribe. For example, viewing rights as ultimately equating solely to legal protection, 
does not I argue, encompass the 'spirit' of what it is to be attributed rights in general. 
Furthermore, this concept of rights leaves the welfare of nonhuman animals always 
arbitrarily open to interpretation according to politics, period and place. We need, I 
submit, to understand what it is we assert when we talk of 'animal welfare'.
2.1 Animal Welfare
It would seem reasonable enough to state that mammalian animals (at least) have 
'welfare' - in that they each fare comparatively well or ill. Their experiential life may of 
course fare better or worse over the period of their individual lives. Additionally, the 
mental life that each enjoys differs - by degree - across both individuals, and of 
course species. There would seem to be little that is controversial here. However, 
unless we are able to clarify questions about our interpretation and understanding of
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what it is that constitutes the welfare of an animal (and I assert that this is not 
necessarily the same as our normative understanding of 'animal welfare'), and 
further, how this relates to our ideas of what represents full flourishing, we are likely 
to impoverish any subsequent moral enquiry.
Why welfare?
I would like to begin by asking if indeed such a thing as 'animal welfare' exists in any 
consistently wide-ranging context. Many would strongly argue that it does, and that 
moreover welfare considerations are nothing less than the duty, and indeed the 
hallmark, of a 'civilised' society. 3 There are undoubtedly common benefits, interests 
and preferences within and across species to be sure. However, the term 'animal 
welfare' in most contemporary connotations invariably turns upon our perceptions of 
'good' treatment, and the idea of what is 'the good' in turn frequently is assumed to 
be common for all. I do not intend to discuss protracted ancient and contemporary 
philosophical conceptions of the 'good' here, but primarily simply wish to note that 
this view as and when applied 'outside' of the human domain is (necessarily) 
inevitably anthropocentric in nature; simply put, we determine that which is seen to 
be acceptable levels of welfare for nonhumans. Despite - or arguably because of - 
this perspective, perceptions of what comprises acceptable life conditions for 
animals rarely seem to tally with our delimitation of ideas of what is variously 
understood as human flourishing. Notwithstanding this qualitative difference, in 
pragmatic terms, our normative use of 'animal welfare' rarely alludes to specific 
cases and takes on a heterogeneous quality in tending to refer to the dominant mode 
of living for that species (in that the welfare requirements of 'pigs' will be deemed to 
vary from 'sheep' or 'fish' for example). As Regan points out:
'In either case, human or animal, one's chances to live well, relative to the 
kind of good life within one's reach, will depend on the degree to which one 
has the opportunity harmoniously to satisfy one's desires' (2004, p.89).
And more importantly for our argument here:
'If animals lack this opportunity, either because of natural circumstances (e.g., 
flood, draught, fire) or because of human intervention (e.g., destruction of
3 The Jainist Gandhi famously set the measure of such societal affections when he proposed that 
the test of any society is how it treats its animals.
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natural habit), their chance to live well is correspondently diminished' (2004, 
p.89).
One's chance to live well then, is inextricably linked to opportunities to satisfy one's 
desires.4 This observation would seem straightforward enough. Nevertheless, I think 
it important here to make a distinction between an individual animal satisfying its 
desires, and satisfying its needs. I contend in this chapter that much welfare-based 
thinking, whilst purporting to embrace consideration of what may constitute living 
well' for an individual animal, in practice all too frequently contents itself with fulfilling 
little more than the basic needs of that individual (or more usually 'group' of 
individuals). I submit that this aspect of what may be called minimal welfarism is all 
too readily equated to what trades as animal welfare. This minimalist approach to 
animal well-being is apparent in a wide-range of human interactions with the 
nonhuman world. An obvious example is the plethora of modern industrial scale 
farming practices and techniques, based primarily on efficiency, that necessarily 
'trade-off' welfare concerns with economic return. Perhaps less obvious, are 
examples such as zoos where the animal's welfare concerns are more perceptibly 
given a higher priority than those unfortunate individuals that find themselves part of 
the 'machinery' of industrial scale food production. In the zoo setting, facsimiles of 
'natural' environments, appropriately varied diets and stringent health care are 
applied with, I do not doubt, the 'welfare' of the animal clearly to the fore. However, 
arguably, at its core economics (it is a profit-based venture) still stringently apply 
here and it is doubtful whether such a commercially based enterprise such as a zoo
4 1 acknowledge that 'welfare' in its broader sense can encompass not merely desires, but include 
fulfilment of preferences and indeed interests. I submit however that 'animal welfare' as used in 
this work should not be conflated in meaning with this broader (human) understanding and usage. 
Whereas for moral agents these terms certainly take on subtle but importantly distinct 
connotations, I contend that in reference to moral patients within animal husbandry (and I have 
argued that animals in human servitude clearly are such), then our obligations are primarily 
'negative' in character (see chapter 1.1 for discussion of negative rights, and further chapter 3.1 
regarding the delimitations of our obligations to stewardship in this context). In the case of farmed 
animals desires may, for example, include a desire for non-confinement and escape for instance; 
furthermore, their interests may include an interest in living as 'natural' a life as possible; and the 
fulfilment of these would necessitate preferences that are likely at odds with industrial scale meat 
production. For further explanation of my use of animal welfare in the context of this work please 
see Glossary. Where my use of animal welfare diverges from my common meaning, see specific 
footnotes page 69 in discussion of'the one dimensionality of animal ethical theory'and Singer's 
view below.
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can ever deliver much above minimal welfare to what are after all captive creatures 
in 'artificial' environments. 5
More complex still is the relationship we enjoy with domesticated companion 
animals - not ostensibly based on a predetermined commercial footing. In this 
relationship, multifaceted empathic emotions are embodied in the owner/pet 
relationship that millions enjoy. Indeed, for some people a dog, for example, can - in 
a very concrete way - truly be their 'best friend'. The term friend here is a noteworthy 
one, and based primarily upon a classification of some significant other within the 
individual human emotional and social life. 6 This mutually beneficial and supportive 
(at least at its best) relationship carries with it strong presumptions against cruelty. 
This presumption against cruelty permeates our multifaceted relationships with 
domesticated companion animals, and such a mutually reciprocal 'personal' 
relationship would rarely need to invoke conceptions of 'animal welfare' to determine 
the boundaries of duties of care. My overall point here is that regardless of these 
kinds of diverse qualitative dimensions of our interspecies relationships, there is, I 
suggest, a certain synergy between these very different ways in which we view, and 
subsequently treat, the nonhuman animal. Irrespective of the category of 
interspecies relationship, a welfare stance - that aims in general to minimise cruelty 
and advocate an enhanced duty of care - is ultimately no guarantee of individual 
right action and does not therefore carry any weight of a universal 'theory of right 
action' (Regan, 2004, p. 142). Neither is it, in and of itself, necessarily morally 
creditable, as it is quite possible, for example, that a thoroughgoing racist may 
indeed be 'kind' to those of his own race.
Dominant strands in animal ethical theory
As a precursor to further discussion, in the opening chapter the various 
contemporary theoretical responses to what may constitute our moral obligations to 
nonhuman animals were introduced in the light of an 'animal rights' perspective. 
Broadly speaking, we may fairly say that much of the current (and convoluted) 
debate in defence of animals has arisen from two dominant strands within animal
5 For a broad critique of contemporary issues and the polemic debate around the keeping of 
animals in zoo environments, see Christine Van Tuyl, Zoos and Animal Welfare (2007).
6 See Warren Fox for a discussion of such empathic social interrelationships in A Theory of General 
Ethics: Human Relationships, Nature and the Built Environment (2006), p.269.
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ethics. 7 The first is Tom Regan's animal rights theory (2004). The other is often 
viewed as a development of Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism popularised by the 
work of Peter Singer. 8
For Regan, higher mammals (and conceivably several others) are deemed to 
possess certain value-giving attributes. 9 On a conception of each animal possessing 
these value-giving attributes each must be attributed inherent value, and that each 
equally therefore has the 'right' not to be harmed. It is upon these criteria that Regan 
develops his animal rights theory. 10 However, whilst both Singer's and Regan's 
positions certainly argue from divergent premises, they each take (and rigorously 
defend) a particular core consideration: in the case of Singer this is chiefly worked 
out through equal consideration of interests/non-maleficence, and for Regan it is the 
claim for the inherent value of subjects-of-a-life.
Certainly Singer's Animal Liberation has rightly earned a distinctive place 
within theoretical analytical philosophy due to its impact not merely upon the 
academic debate, but upon practices in scientific research - and subsequently the 
way in which the meat industry is both regulated and perceived at large by the 
public. His thoroughgoing empirical expose of factory farming processes and 
procedures has profoundly influenced numerous individuals since its publication, and 
there are few animal activists who would not claim some inspiration from his work. 
Singer makes a clear claim for 'change' in our treatment of most nonhumans 
(ostensibly drawing boundaries at molluscs and creatures 'lower' than these on the 
phylogenetic scale). Singer seeks primarily (although not exclusively) to maximise
7 Contemporaneously there are of course other defenders of animal interests who would claim to 
take neither stance as the sole foundation of their theories, developing among other theoretical 
avenues virtue based ethics, sentience positions or ethics of care for example. For some topical 
exemplars see Marti Kneel, Nature Ethics: An Ecofeminist Perspective (2008), Robert Garner and 
Gary Francione, The Animal Rights Debate: Abolition or Regulation (2010), David Styzbel, The 
Rights of Animal Persons' (2006), Mary Midgley, Animals and why they matter (2006) and Steven 
Clark, The Moral Status of Animals (1997).
8 Although of course Singer's work was preceded by writings from the likes of Brigid Brophy, 
Stanley and Rosalind Godlovich, John Harris and Richard Ryder, Peter Singer's first edition 
publication in 1975 enjoyed a far reaching audience and remains a central text for animal 
advocacy for many. Cited edition Animal Liberation (1995)
9 Such attributes include beliefs and desires; a sense of individual self overtime independent of 
utility to others; perception, memory and a sense of the future (including their own future), 
complex preference and welfare interests and the ability to act on these attributes.
10 Regan's views and arguments are worked out in greater detail in chapter one and I would not 
wish to repeat myself here in dealing chiefly with animal welfarism.
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preference satisfaction. As Richard Sorabji observes when discussing Singer's 
position: The moral theory, if I can say this without disrespect, has a one- 
dimensional aspect, in that only one thing is thought to matter: the satisfaction of 
preferences' (1993, p.211). Nevertheless, despite this (certainly arguable) one- 
dimensionality, Singer's contribution to our contemporary concepts of animal welfare 
remains 'one of the most cogent, influential and effectual works of applied ethics 
ever published' (Llorente, 2009. p.61). However, whilst it is true that Singer's position 
turns upon precursory ideas of satisfaction of preferences, it is interesting to note 
that the terms 'utilitarian' and 'utilitarianism' are almost entirely missing from the text, 
and appear only in descriptive reference to utilitarian theorists. 11 As Renzo Llorente 
points out (2009), his arguments are derived, in essence, from principles of non- 
maleficence (minimising/not causing harms) and equal consideration of interests. 
Indeed, in his work Singer frequently stresses both the latter12 and former13 
principles, and it is fair to say that a formative strength of the work is that his 
practical, substantive conclusions can be derived from both the principle of non- 
maleficence and the principle of equal consideration of interests in symmetry.
This symmetry may be adumbrated by the following logic: 1) It is morally 
wrong to cause the suffering and death of animals unnecessarily; 2) We do cause 
the suffering and death of animals unnecessarily; therefore: 3) What we do to 
animals is morally wrong™ Suffering here, at least for Singer, involves diverse 
actions such as hunting, vivisection and of course meat consumption. It is clear then 
that it is not necessary to derive this form of argument form a general utilitarian 
grounding - in that the premise does not require an obligation to maximize pleasure 
and minimize pain, for example. There is, in short, no imperative of maximization 
inherent in the argument, and so it is difficult to envisage how it may be construed in 
strict utilitarian terms. As a matter of fact, Llorente argues that a central reason that 
he believes Animal Liberation is widely construed as a utilitarian text turns on the 
facts that Singer himself has repeatedly stressed his utilitarian credentials, and that 
numerous of his examples in the work rest on utilitarian grounds (2009, pp.61-68).
11 Namely Sidgwick and Bentham, see 'A Utilitarian View' in P. SINGER, ed, Bioethics: An 
Anthology. (2006).
12 Singer (1995), p.231
13 Singer (1995), p.21
14 For further critique see Colin McGinn, 'Our Duties to Animals and the Poor' in Singer and His 
Critics. Ed. Dale Jamieson (1999), p. 150-1.
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Llorente argues that the principle of non-maleficence herein does not entail any 
'duty' of maximization, and in fact I will argue that the principle serves not merely to 
ground the condemnation of harming animals by the way they are treated, but 
encompasses too an acknowledgment that to actually end an animal's life is plainly 
causing it harm (and arguably, the 'greatest' harm possible). This idea is considered 
shortly in the next section in discussion of the 'Problem of Welfarism' and how this 
idea of death itself as harm foments my later arguments for adoption of a rights- 
based individualism in our dealings with nonhuman animals. At this point however, it 
is important to note that Singer's non-maleficence is not absolute in the sense that 
'equality of species' is sacrosanct. Singer, despite devoting pages to the refutation of 
different meta-ethical reasons for favouring humans and dismissing such biased 
views as 'speciesist', does not conclude that a call to non-maleficence demands 
anything greater than equal consideration of interests, and argues that there are 
certainly 'plausible reasons' to give precedence to 'normal' humans over 'normal 1 
nonhumans. Embedded in his call to non-maleficence are three 'qualifications': 1) It 
is wrong to take a person's life, but not directly wrong to take a non-person's life; 2) 
A person's life is valuable in a way that a non-person's life is not; and 3) A person 
has important interests (preferences) that a non-person does not have. 15
Short of the fact that Singer never clearly qualifies precisely what he means 
by 'directly wrong', Singer's conception of 'equality' across sentient species contains 
one minor and two major arguments to support his view: The minor argument is itself 
twofold and turns upon the altruistic character of ethics generally; and the 
observation that the sphere of moral consideration has tended, historically, to 
broaden. This supposed teleological evolution from 'lower' to 'higher' modes of 
ethical deliberation and moral awareness does of course provide a persuasive 
background for what may be termed a 'rational altruism' - at least in Singer's sense 
of what normatively passes as 'ethics' - and as Singer accepts, has evolved from 
patterns of altruistic behaviour among the social animals. From this foundation 
Singer argues that the principle of equality, as he perceives it, is taken to be a 
straightforward application of the 'universal' point of view - and for him, core to any 
valid ethical framework. What is meant here is that this conception of value views the
15 For Singer, the 'special' life that a person has is bound to the kind of interests that a person has, 
see Practical Ethics (1993), p.94.
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concept of universalisability as finding ethical place in the idea that at least some 
point of view is necessary for holding and validating normative positions. 16
Calibrating Singer's ethical scales
The first major argument arising from this viewpoint is that the principle of equality (at 
least as Singer expounds it) entails notions of equality across species. The second 
major argument follows that the universal point of view leads us to equality across 
species. 17 Giving unconsidered preference to humans is therefore ruled out by the 
principle of equality, which for Singer is the only rational basis for his ethics. 18 
Noteworthy here is that Singer conceives of the principle of equality as substantial 
and not merely formal in nature - in short, an ethical principle that is robust enough 
to effectively exclude sundry inegalitarian practices and 'fundamental' enough in 
nature such as to support equal concern for each individual and his/her set of basic 
ends, even if they differ. Famously, Singer likens his principle to a set of scales, 
asserting that True scales favour the side where the interest is stronger or where 
several interests combine to outweigh a smaller number of similar interests: but they 
take no account of whose interests they are weighing' (1993, p.56). So for Singer, 
his 'scales' are both calibrated for 'interest' based measurement, and set as 
qualitatively impartial.
The important point to note here however is that Singer's 'true' scales weigh 
not individuals, but interests (or satisfaction of interests). A straightforward question 
arises from this analogy: how might we then 'calibrate' his ethical scales for true 
interest impartially between individuals? I believe that the chief difficulty arising from 
this analogy is that rather than being the 'true' scales that Singer presents, the 
scales must in fact be 'loaded' - and the balance decidedly 'tilted' in favour of certain 
preferences. Again then, we are presented with weighing more complex interests 
against less complex interests at large, and for Singer humans (at least most 
humans) have more complex and rich interests than nonhumans. Singer plainly 
thinks that human life is 'worth more' than other forms of life, and likely would
15 For a thorough fleshing out of this principle see Richard M Hare, Moral Thinking (1981).
17 Coincidentally, Roger Fjellstrom argues that these universal prescriptive arguments fail if 
embedded in 'traditional' ethics in 'Equality Does Not Entail Equality across Species' (2002).
18 His principle of equality is outlined in a lesser known work of Singer entitled The Expanding
Circle (1983), p. 109.
69
Chapter 2: Welfarism and Animals: The Limits of Animal Advocacy
disregard the implications of Hume's quote cited at the outset of chapter five that 
The life of a man is of no greater importance to the Universe than that of an oyster' 
in his moral framework. To clarify here, his rejection would not rest upon a 
metaphysical claim that the Universe is 'indifferent' by its very nature, or indeed the 
observation that it is humans that bring value to the world - but rather the more 
unsympathetic conviction that the life of an oyster simply has no 'quality' at all. 19 I 
submit that in contradistinction to his claim Singer's scales are pre-loaded to take 
considerable account of whose interests are being weighed in the balance. In this 
limited sense Singer's principle of equality does not yield fundamental equality 
across species. In effect, his principle allows for sustained 'legitimate' preference for 
humans when human and animal interests are in conflict. In addition, as Roger 
Fjellstrom points out, 'Even if the concept of interests were impartial with respect to 
species, the principle of equal consideration of interests (or other versions of the 
principle of equality) does not by itself imply equality across species' (1993, p.342).
2.2 The hope of welfarism
In deliberating upon ideas of principles of impartial consideration of interests with 
respect to species, it is necessary to acknowledge that we do not of course live in a 
perfect world. There are few humans who get to do whatsoever they wish, when 
they wish to do it. Most are 'forced' to earn a living through repetitive salaried toil - for 
the most part under exploitative hierarchical working conditions and arguably the 
opportunity for full flourishing is, by degree, therefore curtailed. However, 
'resignation' to such necessity - at least throughout most of the industrialised world - 
frequently, I believe, fosters attitudes to wider nature (and to each other) that carry 
'intrinsic' ideas of imperfectability. In short, human lives and human life chances are 
deemed to be 'imperfect', so, it follows, it would seem little more than Utopian to 
imagine otherwise for nonhuman animals.
19 Singer (1993), pp. 85-95.
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The one-dimensionality of animal ethical theory
Arguably, then, the dominant views within animal advocacy subtly reflect this 
conception of imperfectability in their delimitations of the scope of moral concern: in 
that they each take a particular consideration and place extensive ethical weight on 
that particular emphasis - and what or whom is effectively included or excluded. As 
we have noted, in the case of Singer the scope of moral concern is chiefly worked 
out through equal consideration of interests/non-maleficence, and for Regan it is 
developed through the claim for the inherent value of subjects-of-a-life. Despite the 
fact that these positions clearly challenge a traditional understanding of ethics and 
the place of the nonhuman animal, what I believe nevertheless makes these 
dominant views persistently troubling is that both perceptibly move away from their 
ethics (by degree) when considering conflict-of-interest cases. Much of the difficulty 
with applied theoretical consistency in dealing with actual conflicts of interest cases 
within animal advocacy stems from the inevitable limitations of the one- 
dimensionality of the prescriptive ethical framework.
The lack of coherence between Singer's ethical position and actual ethical theory in 
this instance turns, I suggest, primarily upon shortcomings in his formulated meta- 
ethics that persistently defend a form of what can be conceived of as little more than 
human favouritism in instances of direct interest conflicts between humans and 
nonhumans. Reflecting his distinction between self-consciousness and 
consciousness, Singer makes this statement:
'Rational, self-conscious beings are individuals, leading lives of their own and 
cannot in any sense be regarded as receptacles for containing a certain 
quantity of happiness. They have, in the words of American philosopher 
James Rachels, a life that is biographical, not merely biological. In contrast, 
beings who are conscious, but not self-conscious, more nearly approximate 
the picture of receptacles for experiences of pleasure and pain, because their 
preferences will be of a more immediate sort' (1993, p.126).
There are however several interrelated (and compounded) problematic questions 
that arise from his premises:
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1) Whether or not animals that are not self-conscious (the determination of 
which is of course problematic in itself) have biographical lives.
2) Are animals that are deemed not to possess self-consciousness 
individuals?
3) Do animals that are deemed not to possess self-consciousness only 
experience immediate preferences?
4) Are these animals replaceable by 'new' individuals?
5) Do these animals have any meaningful interest in continued life?
6) Are animals that are deemed not to possess self-consciousness merely 
receptacles for pleasure and pain?20
Taken together, these questions raise significant issues for an understanding of our 
relationship to other-than-human animals - and indeed for Singer's conception of 
such. The first question is somewhat moot, in as much as Singer tends to tacitly use 
what are effectively 'weak' and 'strong' definitions of a 'biographical life' as a basis 
for some of his distinctions. A weak definition of a biographical life may be defined as 
one that tentatively applies at minimum to all mammals, perhaps birds and other 
'borderline' creatures (as Singer determines them). The problem for Singer's 
interpretation however is that he tends towards a stronger interpretation of 'self- 
consciousness' when forming his arguments for differences in treatment, and this is 
evidenced if one considers what is excluded. Fish for example, are patently not self- 
conscious according to Singer, in that he does not assign them the capacity to be 
able to tell one's story. 21 This stronger construal would however likely require such 
highly developed cognitive processing (the telling of one's own story) that it would 
probably be strictly applicable only to fully functioning humans in its fullest sense. 
This being so, all nonhumans would need to be designated, at best, a 'weak' 
biography. The problem therefore is that on Singer's stronger interpretation, it is hard 
to see why, for example, the great apes can clearly be incorporated in the strong 
sense along with humans (as Singer would wish to do), whilst other species are 
excluded. What then would be required of Singer is that he provides a demonstrably
20 Roger Fjellstrom discusses Singer's meta-ethics at length in 'Is Singer's Ethics Speciesist?'
(2003).
21 1 would argue that perhaps this stronger usage may better be termed 'autobiographical' on this
interpretation and not biographical - in that Singer is advocating a 'telling of one's own story'. This
is of an entirely different conceptual order to having a 'biography' which is arguably an essential
attribute of a great deal of sentient life. This idea is expanded upon in chapter five in discussion of
a biocentric interpretation.
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non-partial account of the 'biographical life' (non-partial in his human-favouring 
sense) as being consistently superior to all other kinds of life.
The second point is again one of interpretation and meaning. To question 
whether or not beings that are not self-conscious are individuals seems, to my 
thinking, to represent a rather skewed interpretation of self-consciousness and 
consciousness. It is clear that each and every creature is 'unique' biologically and 
temporally (in place and time). It is only when ideas of individuality conflate with 
concepts such as 'person', 'personhood 1 or 'autonomy' that the meaning of individual 
becomes value-laden. Regardless of species designation (and 'species' itself is 
notably a human construct), there exist only individuals - with a unique past, present 
and future. They are not somehow subsumed under some conceptual collective 
consciousness (outside of human construct), but exist as independent conscious 
entities-as'individuals'. This is not to deny diverse and complex 
interrelationships, but merely to state that in substantial form each individual exists 
as a disparate life-force, and not as some perceptible extant homogeny.
Thirdly, is the uncertainty of whether or not beings that are not self-conscious 
experience nothing more than 'immediate preferences'. 22 Again, if 'preferences' are 
taken to mean that nonhumans too exhibit diverse behaviours that show some 
understanding of future events (and this includes self-regarding events), then such 
preferences are visibly evident in the ways in which various animals interact with 
their environment - many of which do not make it into Singer's self-conscious 
pantheon. For example, the collection and storing of winter stores, or the building of 
nests, are illustrations that point to at least some form of comprehension ('instinctual' 
or otherwise) of future events.23 A call to simple 'instinctual' drives as the sole
22 Again, this is not the only criterion that necessarily forms a concept of welfare' and I merely 
discussion this specific aspect in relation to Singer's claim here. In addition to immediate 
preferences considerations of'desires' and 'interests' may be warranted in broader context - see 
footnotes page 60 in discussion of 'why welfare' for clarification of this distinction and its 
distinctiveness in this work; In addition, see Glossary for clarity of general meaning. For further 
and extensive discussion of welfare and well-being in wider theoretical context and its comparative 
usage within the animal ethics debate at large, see Marian Stamp Dawkins' excellent expose, Why 
Animals Matter: Animal consciousness, animal welfare, and human well-being (2012).
23 Even if claiming 'mere instinct' in these instances, there must be conscious cognitive 
predeterminations taking place in complex and 'pre-planned' ways whether one chooses to 
designate such behaviour as instinctual in nonhumans, but somehow always' reasoned' in humans. 
I submit that this attribution of mere instinct is more likely indicative of tacit interspecies bias. It is 
at the very least odd that we may see such predeterminations in other beings as wholly instinctual
73
Chapter 2: Welfarism and Animals: The Limits of Animal Advocacy
reason that such behaviours are commonly observed is to make a false separation 
of kind between human drives and instincts and those possessed by many 
nonhumans. In short, so-called 'instinctual' behaviours are as much a part of human 
motivations as they are to nonhuman ones. Neither human nor nonhuman exist 
entirely by reference to instinct or to reason alone, it is rather, the degree of each 
attribute extant in the individual that defines each. Moreover, that animals can rightly 
be said to have some interest in 'future' well-being, and that many animals have 
these sorts of future-orientated interests is in fact something that Singer lately 
concedes.24
Fourthly, the question of whether or not beings that are not self-conscious are 
replaceable (replaceable in the literal sense) by new individuals of the same species 
is implicitly raised here. If indeed it can non-partially be argued that there is some 
intrinsic qualitative difference between, for example, humans and nonhumans that 
admits to individuals being routinely replaceable, then this idea would seem 
reasonable. Singer however tends to put weight upon the 'possibility' that satisfaction 
of 'non-actual' preferences (extensively human) outweigh satisfaction of actual ones 
(in effect immanent nonhuman preferences), but this reliance upon non-actual 
preferences does not manage to 'save' persons from the replacability that his 
preferentialism designates. As Roger Fjellstrom puts it, 'If 'replaceable' means that 
the loss in a killing can be compensated by the creation of positive value for the 
individual and her/his surrounding, then beings that are not self-conscious are not 
replaceable, just as persons are not.....But if it means that the loss in a killing can be 
compensated by the creation of positive value for the world as a whole, then humans 
and non-humans are equally replaceable, on the same utilitarian principle' (2003, 
P.97).
The fifth question is whether or not beings that are not self-conscious have an 
interest in continued life. As we have seen, Singer argues that there are indeed 
qualitative differences between humans (or rather for Singer, 'persons') and 
nonhumans. As discussed shortly, death is the final and irretrievable cancelling of all
whilst denying the strength of instinctual drive to similar predeterminations in humankind. This is 
of course not to deny that the 'balance' between instinctual behaviours and reason induced 
behaviours do not change as organisms become less complex, but merely to point out that there is 
no clear delimitation that sets instinct as the only criterion for nonhuman behaviour. 
24 Singer lately concedes this point that he argued against in his earlier work, see McGinn's article 
'Our Duties to Animals and the Poor' in Singer and His Critics (1999).
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experiences (and all 'potential' future experiences) for the individual. This surely is as 
true for a human individual as it is for a nonhuman. Singer therefore builds bias into 
his assumption that the human must lose more by assessing such loss in purely 
human (and in this selective case, notably fully functioning and 'privileged' humans 
at that) terms. However, if both self-conscious and conscious beings have at least 
some form of future-orientated preferences, then this is experienced by the individual 
as an interest in continued existence.
The final question concerns whether or not beings that are not self-conscious 
are only receptacles for pleasure and pain - unlike, on this account, self-conscious 
individuals. This question can be answered straightforwardly by pointing to the fact 
that if they are receptacles for pleasure and pain, then they must also be receptacles 
for preference satisfaction (even if the 'preference' was deemed to be merely 
avoidance of pain, it would still constitute a legitimate 'preference'). If they display 
the former without somehow having the latter, Singer seems to give scant reason as 
to why persons are not also such receptacles. He argues that in the case of a person 
'there is a personal loss that is not balanced by the creation of another being' 
(McGinn, 1999, p.310). This statement is not however fully defended - and besides, as 
we have noted, Singer admits that beings that are not self-conscious do have some 
future-orientated interests. This would then seem to negate his argument for 
nonhumans as the sole receptacles for pain and pleasure.
Other considerations
There are of course other relevant and worthy considerations that may additionally 
be taken into account in defining criteria for our moral obligations to nonhuman 
animals - several of which will be discussed later in this work in the context of wider 
animal advocacy ('outside' of the confines of 'animal ethics' alone). Many green 
views for example, place emphasis on our relationships with other-than-human 
animals. 25 As a matter of fact, interrelationships are of course inevitably 
multifaceted, complex and numerous - within and across species, as well as 
individually experienced. Understanding the complexity of 'relationships' is however 
open to wide interpretation and misinterpretation, and at best is a notion that is
25 For emphasis on relationship based obligations see contemporaneously examples from the likes 
of Marti Kheel, Nature Ethics: An Ecofeminist Perspective (2008), and David Styzbel, The Rights of
Animal Persons'(2006).
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notoriously difficult to pin down, due in no small part to the inherent fluidity and 
dynamics of relationships and the given perspective that the relationship is being 
adjudged from. As a very general principle we may say that relationships tend 
towards process (are dynamic in nature) rather than inertness (determined as fixed 
and inflexible). For example, likely the farmer, it may fairly be said, has a 'deeper' 
relationship to the dairy cow than the consumer of cheese or milk products has to 
that - or indeed any other - dairy cow. This of course is not to say that the 
relationship is in any sense equal, consensual or mutually beneficial - indeed in 
modern dairy production this is overwhelmingly not the case. My point here is that 
any qualitative difference in this instance is engendered not in the preference 
satisfaction experienced by the dairy consumer, or in the worth (or lack of it) that the 
farmer gives to the cow, but in the qualitative difference in relationship to the farmed 
animal that each individual (human) experiences. Such things as familiarity over 
unfamiliarity, economic reliance (both farmer and consumer), knowledge or lack of 
knowledge of an individual animal's character traits, or merely the perception of use- 
value and purpose may provide pragmatic reasons for qualitative variances across 
relationships. However, it is that the farmer/dairy cow relationship demands 'more' of 
the farmer than the inevitably distanced relationship experienced by the 'end user' 
(there is at minimum some interdependency in the product/producer 'relationship' not 
extant in the product/consumer one).
In addition, wider cultural relationships inevitably play into this complexity. If 
we further consider the human/cow interrelationship in an alternative contemporary 
cultural context, the relationship between cow and human person takes on a very 
different complexion. In India, for the Hindu, the cow is deemed sacred, and it is this 
revised relationship that alters not merely the human attitude to cows, but also the 
cow's behaviour. In actual fact, cows are treated in this culture much like (revered) 
pets in the western world; being accorded a relationally revised status, they behave 
more like companion animals rather than herded livestock amongst human 
populations. This raises an interesting point for animal advocacy in general terms: 
herein, it is not the religious status ascribed to the cow that defines and enlivens this 
relational shift (although religious edict is of course the initial causation), but rather 
the way in which the dynamic interaction that daily human attitudes and practices
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subtly influence expectations of the other; in this example, both of the cow and the 
human.
Notwithstanding these observations, for many it is these experiential nuances 
that foment and give meaning to human/nonhuman relationship - and not reducible 
theoretical principles or theological decree alone. It can by and large be said that 
ethical theories that seek manageability at the expense of multiplicity, whilst often 
attractive to the theorist, frequently prove inadequate in explaining this dynamic 
quality of extant experiential interrelationships (Kheel, 2008). This sort of dichotomy is 
of course characteristic of the intersections between theory and practice that all 
ethical deliberation must eventually confront. With this in mind, we now move on to 
discuss a defining example of such an 'intersection' within animal advocacy - that 
between animal welfare ethical theory and actual animal welfare practice within 
contemporary animal husbandry. This is presented in the context of what, I contend, 
is a pivotal problem for a welfarist approach: that of death itself as a harm - which 
arises, I argue subsequently, from a fundamental and embedded 'theory to practice' 
asymmetry.
2.3 The problem of welfarism
Each day more than 130,000,000 farmed nonhuman sentient beings meet the 
designated end of their lives - always prematurely, always violently, always without 
chance of escape. During life, animal welfare initiatives strive to ensure that that they 
'fare well' until their appointed time. But can such an individual life, from birth defined 
not as a morally considerable subject-of-a-life, but as a pending 'subject-of-a-death' 
fairly be designated as one that fares well? I will argue here that much animal 
welfare-based thinking, whilst purporting to embrace consideration of what may 
constitute living (and dying) well for an individual animal, in practice all too frequently 
contents itself with fulfilling little more - and frequently less - than the basic needs of 
that individual or group. The core moral problem for this 'minimal welfarism' is that it 
all too readily trades as a reasonable duty of care. In this way animal welfare 
becomes the mechanism for perpetuating its own myth, ameliorating our
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consciences and improving productivity. I argue for an urgent re-examination of the 
term 'animal welfare' itself, and question the moral adequacy of 'Illfare' reducing 
strategies. In order to contextualise subsequent argument for an individualistically 
based environmental ethic, I make a preliminary case here for a re-examination of 
the term 'animal welfare' itself and question the moral adequacy of 'illfare' reducing 
strategies.
Welfare or Ware'?
In formulating my ongoing line of reasoning in support of rights-based animal 
advocacy, in chapter three I start out by proposing two distinct classes of moral 
response in broad terms. Firstly, those creatures we generally perceive as 'wild' 
animals and argue that our current paternalistic attitudes are, in the main, 
inappropriate and argue that only cases that are deemed in direct conflict (for 
example, human non-basic need weighed against nonhuman basic need) may 
warrant overt interventionist strategies. Secondly, I discuss a further classification of 
nonhumans - those that are not normatively deemed to be 'wild', but fall more readily 
within some form of interrelationship with humans (either directly or indirectly). This 
classification I want here to call animals in human servitude, and begin to argue for 
radical change in our welfare-based moral responses. In discussion of the broader 
themes that a developing rights-based view necessarily has to consider (nominally 
welfarism, paternalism and ecocentrism), points of overlap and intersection in our 
taxonomies are analysed within the subsequent chapter - such as notions of 
managed 'wild' deer, game parks, reserves and 'the problem' of companion 
animals. 26 Indeed, it is such points of intersection that raise significant qualifications 
in development of the biocentric individualistic account developed later.
However, before extended later discussion of our moral responses to the 
category of 'wild' animals (and indeed those that fall into the space between 'wild' 
and 'domestic'), in an attempt to more clearly define our commonplace notion of 
'animal welfare' I concentrate here on those individuals who unambiguously pertain 
to the 'animals in human servitude' classification -specifically farmed animals (and
26 See Glossary for working definitions of'welfarism', 'paternalism' and 'ecocentrism' in the context 
of this work.
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primarily for clarity of argument, intensively farmed animals). Indeed, given farming's 
remit to 'produce' sentient animals with the sole aim of ending their lives prematurely 
in order for humans to consume their flesh after slaughter, such beings would 
certainly seem a paradigmatic example of creatures that fall into the category of 
'animals in human servitude'. An individual might for example cultivate a generalised 
'respect for nature' in his or her attitudes to wider nature, but, there may be more 
directly demanded of the individual to those animals that fall under the 'human 
servitude' class of moral response (Taylor, 1986). Many of the arguments for both 
categories are of course frequently rooted in various notions of a respect for life (life 
here nominally meaning acknowledgement of some degree of autonomous 
continued existence of the 'other'), but I want here to primarily consider our moral 
responses to animals that are specifically brought into being directly by us (in the 
main - farmed animals) and discuss our normative obligations to them - what is in 
this context ostensibly termed 'animal welfare'.
The sphere of animal welfare's moral concern tends in practice to broadly 
distinguish two categories of concern for the welfare of farmed animals: firstly, what I 
wish to call the 'living' concerns - those that primarily encompass the conditions of 
the animal's life. Secondly, the 'dying' concerns - those that pertain to our attitudes 
and practices in ending the animal's life. Indeed there is a plethora of 'animal 
welfare 1 legislation that concerns itself with this latter category and includes issues 
around the age and condition of the animals sent for slaughter, transportation of 
livestock and the multifaceted 'finer points' of animal slaughter processes and 
procedures - to name but a few of the legislative controls that are subsumed under 
the familiar category of 'animal welfare' concerns. 27 That we use the term 'welfare' to 
encompass both the living conditions and the dying conditions - those that pertain to 
the inevitable premature slaughter of a healthy sentient being - arguably brings into 
question our very designation of the term 'welfare 1 in any meaningfully applied or 
descriptive sense. At the very least it is incontrovertible that animals in human 
servitude are harmed in various ways by the practices required to bring them to our
27 Responsibility in the UK falls to the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) 
and The Welfare of Farmed Animals (England) Regulations 2000 and equivalents in Northern 
Ireland, Scotland and Wales detail specific standards under which you must keep farm animals .
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plates - and such 'harms' imposed upon the defenceless, need rational defence 
(Nobis, 2008).
The 'traditional' view of animal welfare has conventionally not questioned 
whether we use animals, but how we use them. Although the form of utilitarianism 
that has given rise to many of our normative ideas of what constitutes animal welfare 
has certainly broadened the moral landscape to include nonhumans, it leaves the 
proverbial door open to those who would claim that certain cruel uses of animals can 
be justified by appeal to the greater happiness that may result for human beings.28 
Animal welfare in this sense '...assumes the legitimacy of treating animals 
exclusively as means to human ends as long as certain 'safeguards' are employed 
(Francione, 2008, p. 191). Of course not all 'traditions' are good or right. The key 
question is whether an aspect of a tradition (or the tradition in itself as a conceptual 
whole) can be supported by good moral reasons or not. It is also true that the 
tradition of meat-eating is, for a great many people in other cultures, not a tradition at 
all.29
In questioning the applicability of the term 'animal welfare' here, I of course 
am not advocating that there should be no attempt at easing harms in a generic 
sense - either direct or indirect, individually or collectively, intra-species or inter- 
species. Moreover, animal welfare itself is of course no one thing. There exists a 
broad range of concepts, theories and practice that variously encompass wide- 
ranging protectionist aims and aspirations.30 Indeed, the liberal tradition dictates that 
both individuals and society at large have some moral duty to protect the vulnerable. 
Arguably, so-called 'dumb animals' are extremely vulnerable to human attitudes and
28 See Heather Fieldhouse's The Failure of Kantian Theory of Indirect Duties to Animals', (2004) 
for a critique of Kantian deontological theories in the light of utilitarianism.
29 Obvious examples are of those found in diverse religious prohibitions against the eating of meat 
(or sometimes certain meat) as found contemporaneously in Jainism, some forms of Buddhism and 
Hinduism.
30 Animal welfarists comprise an eclectic mix of ethical standpoints. These ranging from criticism of 
the more abusive forms of agribusiness including many intensive methods of farming - exemplified 
in strategies adopted by organisations such as PETA and the RSPCA in the UK, through to those 
seeking abolition of overt animal use through piecemeal change, to those calling for immediate 
cessation of several 'accepted' practices inflicted on nonhumans. See Peter Singer, "Down on the 
Factory Farm," in: J.P. Sterba, ed, Earth Ethics: Introductory Readings on Animal Ethics and 
Environmental Ethics. 2nd edn. (2000), David Styzbel, 'Animal Rights Law: Fundamentalism 
versus Pragmatism', (2007) also Rob Garner, Animal Ethics (2005). 
and for contemporary welfarist perspectives visit the RSPCA website 
http://www.rspca.org.uk/allaboutanimals/farm/-/artide/FAD_AIIAboutAnimalsFarmAnimals
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practices - not least in their inability to adequately defend or argue their interests, or 
to signify verbal consent or dissent at treatment and use. In this respect they may in 
fact count amongst the most vulnerable individuals. I argue then, that the core 
'problems of welfarism' in this context are threefold: 1. Within the remit of modern 
farming practice animal welfare in fact becomes the mechanism for perpetuating its 
own myth, ameliorating our consciences and improving productivity, 31 2. It does not 
(and arguably cannot) take into account a full recognition of what is assumed to be a 
flourishing life, 3. The normative (mis)understanding and use of the term animal 
welfare itself is misdescribed and misplaced.
Animal Welfare: The myth perpetuated
David Styzbel outlines four useful (although not exhaustive) 'Levels of Harmful 
Discrimination 1 in the treatment of sentient beings.32 Ignoring here the possibility 
(indeed desirability) of a Level '0' harmful discrimination, which would constitute 
effectively no harmful discrimination of course, Styzbel's suggested levels are:
Level 1. Minor Harmful Discrimination. Individuals may have their necessities 
catered for, but often regarded with contempt or indifference.
Level 2. Major Harmful Discrimination. More than 'intangible' discrimination, 
and may include material deprivation (food, shelter, etc.)
Level 3. Very Major Harmful Discrimination. Individuals may be used 
instrumentally - killed violently, eaten, hunted, experimented on and enslaved. 
However, at this level the harm occasioned from this treatment must be 
carried out 'humanely', 'kindly' or with no 'unnecessary suffering'.
Level 4. Extreme Harmful Discrimination. Here individuals may be treated as 
level 3, but with no significant regard for well-being, humaneness or kindness.
It is clear from this that for most of us the perception of the 'standard' animal welfare 
framework for our use of farmed animals falls chiefly under Level 3 (although,
31 By the term 'perpetuating its own myth', I simply refer to the tendency within the broad 
spectrum of animal husbandry, that animal welfare is in practice'institutionalised' into 
agribusiness as 'business as usual'. Welfare in this way can be construed as a means to legitimate 
and perpetuate the industry at large (substantiating its own claims or 'myths') - in that 'end users' 
of animal products are reassured that welfare initiatives were applied at some point in the 
production process and that therefore we have 'done all we can'.
32 David Styzbel outlines his Harmful Discriminations in his paper entitled 'The Rights of Animal
Persons' (2006).
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arguably, on a global basis many factory-farmed animals likely fit more clearly into 
Level 4 in actual practice). The evident problem for those who would support 
humane treatment toward farmed animals is that when mapped out in this way there 
remains a persistent tension between the very major harmful treatment being carried 
out at Level 3 and the proviso within this level that this treatment be humane, kind 
and involve no 'unnecessary' suffering. Within animal ethics as a discipline there are 
numerous responses to this inherent dialectic. Styzbel himself, for example, attempts 
to develop alongside some contemporary eco-feminist positions (Kheel, 2008) a 
version of an Ethics of Care. Likewise, recognising this 'mismatch' of treatment 
(kindness) and aims (killing) a 'New Welfarist' position recognises the dialectic, and 
in response sees incremental change as leading to a long-term goal of abolition of 
overt animal use. In essence, we may say then that new welfarism seeks abolition as 
an eventual goal in response to Level 3 tensions - whilst 'accepting' Level 3 
discrimination in the meantime. In this sense new welfarism is characterised by a 
reliance on piecemeal change to lessen, and eventually dissipate, animal abuse. 
Given the very real cultural, economic and political vested interests at stake, it would 
on face value, seem that the long-termism of the new welfarists is a reasonable - 
and conceivably the only realistic - hope for greater human/nonhuman 
egalitarianism. However, the difficulty here again is that the central tension 
embedded in the Level 3 proposition between 'kindness and killing' doggedly 
remains, and it is this very tension that serves to ultimately derail any meaningful 
piecemeal improvement in animal welfare.
If we concede that incremental change is indeed possible (or even desirable) 
there nevertheless remain several serious problems for this approach. Firstly, as 
Gary Francione points out, there is in fact no evidence that piecemeal change leads, 
by default, to abolition. 33 Certainly, a cursory comparison with the closing history of 
the human slave trade exemplifies the impotence of piecemeal 'improvements' in the 
face of immoral practice. The impetus for change came not from an outcry against 
the welfare conditions endured by those enslaved, but by the growing moral outrage 
at the very idea of slavery itself as being morally indefensible. The anti-slavery 
movement was not motivated by a reliance on piecemeal change, but a conviction
33 Gary Francione takes a largely abolitionist approach to animal advocacy. See Animals as 
Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation (2008).
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that abolition was the only appropriate response to such overt abuse. It is noteworthy 
that this call to abolition was voiced in the face of very powerful forces of opposition 
from political, economic and cultural quarters, and obvious comparison can be made 
to the societal climate encountered by any call for abolition of animal exploitation 
today. The familiar admonishment that the current global economy would crash if all 
animal 'slaves' were to be freed certainly echoes the concerns of those who profited 
from human slavery. In fact, it is a truism that many animal protectionists today 
perceive that they are 'waging war' against the oldest and last form of slavery to be 
formally abolished - the exploitation of nonhuman animals'. 34 Notwithstanding 
perceptible anthropocentric acculturated biases toward nonhumans, it does not 
however, I believe, strain credibility to draw parallels with the anti-slavery movement 
in discussion of the moral case for abolition over normative welfare within animal 
ethics. 35
In addition, animal welfare regulation and legislation does not concern itself 
with the sole interests of the animal, but always has a normatively accepted 
economic basis. Economics in farming practice continue to 'trump' animal welfare, 
and so the 'incremental moral case' must be weakened by continued deference to 
economic trumps. Thirdly, and allied to this, is the concern that advocating 
incremental change merely plays into the hands of the 'abusers'. In the meat 
industry at large, diverse (but limited) animal welfare 'efficiencies' can make for 
greater profitability - as sales may rise if animal welfare is perceived to rise in the 
public consciousness. There is an incongruity here. Consumers wishing to purchase 
more ethically create greater demand, in turn leading to greater slaughter - whilst 
actual improvements in life conditions for the farmed animals remain habitually 
cursory at best. 36 Furthermore, in making provision for a 'kind' death for those who 
cannot either consent or dissent, the benefit would seem clearly not to be morally 
weighted in favour of the welfare of the farmed animal as the dialectic embedded in
34 Steven Best and Richard Khan make this poignant point in Trial by Fire: The SHAC7, 
globalization, and the Future of Democracy' (2004), p.11.
35 Marjorie Spiegel draws some thought-provoking comparisons between the treatment of animals 
and slavery in The Dreaded Comparison (1996).
36 What I mean here is that some 'ethical' consumers, who may refrain from purchasing certain 
animal products and thus lessen demand for those products, now may feel ethically vindicated and 
resume consumption - thus increasing demand.
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Level 3 type welfare (the proviso that we kill with kindness) makes animal 
exploitation both economically and socially acceptable.
If viewing animal welfare purely from an improvement of 'life conditions' for 
those sentient beings designated as livestock - the normative welfare approach - the 
term nevertheless remains problematic. For example, due to animal welfare 
'improvements', battery chickens in the EU will by 2012 live out their lives (arguably 
their short and brutal lives) in an 'enriched1 750 cm2 confined space.37 Despite this 
marginal welfare 'victory', realistically the animals will continue to live out their 
existence in what remains an extremely constricted space for full physical and 
psychological development for an intelligent sentient animal. Nonetheless, with such 
welfare 'gains' inevitably well publicised, the public consciousness at large is likely to 
perceive that the farmed animals now 'fare-well' - sales rise, consciences are 
appeased and more animals die. Indeed, it would seem reasonable for Joshua 
Frank to draw the conclusion that likely 'the greatest barrier to reform in the 
exploitation of animals for commercial purposes appears to be ignorance' (2004, p.5). 
To a point then - a point ostensibly drawn by economic constraints - the meat 
industry is willing to entertain limited welfare initiatives, but those who seek 
incremental welfare change unavoidably 'collude' with a powerful multi-billion dollar 
industry and potentially - perhaps inevitably - play into their powerful hands. 38
Animal Welfare: 'Quality', 'Quantity', and the 'Flourishing Life'
This problem draws out an underlying question: is there then, given the fairly obvious 
difference in treatment and aims of the standardised view of 'best practice' animal 
welfare, a fundamental difference of kind that justifies our continued Level 3 
practices to nonhumans? This is of course a mainstay enquiry of animal ethics at 
large and many argue important differences in each case. For example, a fully 
functioning human can perceive - through cognitive capacities such as imagination, 
visualisation and the internal processing of personal experiential evidence - his or
37 The EU Hens Directive allows 'enriched' cages to be used. Under the directive, 'enriched' cages 
must be at least 45 cm. high and must provide each hen with at least 750 cm 2 of space; 600 cm 2 
of this must be "usable area" - the other 150 cm 2 is for a nest-box. The cage must also contain 
litter, perches and "claw-shortening devices" (Compassion in World Farming, 2007).
38 As discussed above, these are those organisations that are generally seeking 'eventual' abolition 
of overt animal use through gradual piecemeal change - exemplified in strategies adopted by 
organisations such as PETA in the USA and the RSPCA in the UK.
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her impending and inescapable mortality, whereas the nonhuman (presumably) 
cannot do so in this way or to such an extent. However, that moral patients (and 
animals in human servitude manifestly fit this categorisation if we consider even a 
minimal duty of care warranted) in the 'care' of moral agents do not (arguably, 
cannot) 'suffer' the knowledge of their inevitable slaughter is, morally speaking, 
irrelevant (Frank, 2004, p.7). It is not a necessary condition of our having a duty of 
care towards moral patients that the patients themselves have awareness of their 
own situation - or, in the case of the farmed animal, their own eventual slaughter. 
We as moral agents can readily perceive of the dialectic embedded in Level 3 
Harmful Discrimination, and therefore in continuing Level 3 assent to this form of 
normative animal welfare-based practices fail to take seriously the animal's 
fundamental interest in continued existence. The crucial point here is whether or not 
the doomed individual has knowledge of its demise (as in the case, for example, of 
the customarily condemned man) or it does not (as presumably in the case of the 
'condemned' farmed animal) is that, again, it is irrelevant to the moral case. The 
argument that an animal caged from birth 'knows no better' denies, I believe, what it 
is to be a sentient being - namely, to possess a personal and fundamental interest in 
continued existence. In this way, the acceptance of Level 3 Harmful Discrimination 
toward other sentient beings insidiously further sets limits on our moral 
responsibilities owed to such moral patients in its 'quasi-schizophrenic' injunction to 
kill, but kill with kindness.
What then of quality of life over quantity? This is after all what the 
commonplace understanding of animal welfare purports to concern itself with 
primarily. We need firstly to clarify what we may mean by quality and quantity in the 
context of animals in human servitude. A view often posited as largely 'intuitive' in 
nature, argues ultimately that death simply is a qualitatively greater harm to humans 
than to nonhumans, and indeed if this case can be adequately deduced then the 
Level 3 proviso (that treatment must be carried out 'humanely', 'kindly' or with no 
'unnecessary suffering') would perhaps seem reasonable. 39 This may however be 
straightforward speciesism.40
39 'Intuitive' in the sense that this view constitutes the commonplace view and underpins much 
academic theory whilst not necessarily rigorously challenged as legitimate in and of itself.
40 Coined by Richard Ryder, this term is intended here to be understood in its now widely used 
sense of discrimination towards nonhuman animals based upon a taken-for-granted assumption of
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The forthright proposition is not without problematic aspects here regarding 
death as a qualitatively greater harm in this context. Firstly, death as a qualitatively 
greater harm is difficult to verify in any clear falsifiable way, and this raises a serious 
empirical problem for deduced analogous conclusion. How can I know if my 
companion dog does not enjoy her elemental 'dogness' - in her particular and unique 
way - as much as (or more?) than I enjoy my perceived humanity? As many of those 
who have shared periods of their lives with companion animals readily testify, cats 
and dogs for example certainly shows signs of having a fundamental interest in 
continued existence. My companion dog emphatically seems persistently cheerful on 
awaking each and every morning (displaying behaviours that indicate elation such as 
persistent tail-wagging and bodily gesticulations), and which given the weight of 
existential angst inflicting the human spirit, is by and large more than many humans 
can consistently assert (I certainly include myself here). As a minimum concession 
here, we should in all probability err on the side of giving the benefit of 'moral doubt' 
in this instance to nonhuman qualitative capacities (Dunayer, 2004). This is not to 
argue that human lives do not necessarily (normatively at least) possess greater 
complexity of thought and purpose. Rather, that a qualitatively 'greater' human life 
with respect to complexity of thought and purpose does not translate as readily as 
this so-called 'intuitive' view suggests to a qualitatively greater harm at death. At 
death, each sentient individual quantitatively loses precisely the same thing - 
everything. To argue for a qualitative 'sliding scale' with regard to cessation of 
being (as opposed to being here), is to ignore this quantitative dimension. Death is 
no respecter of persons - or, for the sake of this work, 'nonpersons'. The point here 
is that to the dog its own life is, in respect to cessation of such, 'everything' - in that it 
loses from its own perspective all of the richness that 'dogness' brings it. That the 
richness a human may (or may not) enjoy is seen as fulsome from a human 
perspective, does not then mean that the dog - from the dog's perspective - 
necessarily therefore loses less at death. 41 Regardless whether in fact a
mankind's superiority. In this sense speciesism is deeply rooted, often subtle and frequently 
unquestioned - and the animal protectionist literature is not immune to the subtleties of its 
assumptions. For further critique see Richard D. Ryder, Painism: A Modern Morality (2001). 
41 1 concede this to be a counter-intuitive notion at face value. Again, I do not refer to the 
'richness' or lack of it subjectively experienced in life, but merely point out that from the 
perspective of the nonhuman, they lose at death all that they 'own' - namely, their own life. To 
adopt a sliding scale on our human preconceptions of'worth' as a subjective lived experience, and
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nonhuman's life can in some imagined way be proven to possess a single definitive 
qualitative difference with regard to death (and thus substantiate a quantitative 
distinction), this in no way equates to any automatic mandate for unequal moral 
consideration during life.
Secondly, if qualitative capacities are to be used as the benchmark for 
unequal inter-species moral treatment, then the palpable danger is that death (rather 
than life) viewed qualitatively may open up indirect qualitative questions in resolving 
intra-species (human to human) moral conflicts. If we are to concede that there are 
qualitative differences regarding mortality across individuals, then it may be 
legitimate to think of death as a greater harm to, for example, a more intelligent, 
healthy and gifted human being rather than the 'average' human being - or indeed 
more troublingly, the permanently brain damaged human being (Singer, 1993). Whilst 
this in itself does not amount to a clear rejection of the case for unequal 
consideration perse, again this is something likely to be intuitively morally repugnant 
to most.
Thirdly, the notion of qualitatively greater harm may maintain a dangerously 
nonarbitrary distinction between humans and nonhuman farmed animals and thus 
give a deduced reason for continued 'legitimate 1 abuse to nonhumans in human 
servitude (in the sense of Level 3 Harmful Discrimination). This is likely not the aim 
of those who would seek abolition of animal exploitation! Apart from the obvious 
implications here, no determinate single difference between individuals can justify all 
differences in treatment and, once again, irrespective of the doubtfulness of 
determining a clear nonarbitrary distinction, this would not rightly justify an automatic 
mandate for unequal moral consideration (Francione 1996).
in order to conclusively deduce that a given sentient nonhuman life, from the perspective of that 
subject-of-a-life, is not experienced to be rich in the extreme would necessitate a full knowledge of 
'other' minds - and in this case the problematic proposition of knowledge of the minds of'other' 
nonhumans. What I am primarily suggesting here is that we should, at minimum, practice caution 
here in our presuppositions of loss. It is important to clarify however, that this assertion is not to 
make a blanket assumption that the toss involved in death is always perceived to be quantitatively 
equal. From the perspective of a given life, the 'degree' to which death seems to be a loss may 
well be argued to at least be partly subjective, and contextual in nature. I merely suggest that 
such differences are extant in life itself (experienced as 'less' or'more' rich by comparison) and is 
a measure valid whilst alive. Notwithstanding, all such perceptions do of course 'end' at death - 
and there remains (short of notions of recourse to appeal on 'judgement day') no court of appeal 
over subjective petitions concerning the degree of loss incurred by a given individual once death 
takes place. In short, each ceases to exist, equally.
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Where does this lead us? In his seminal work The Case for Animal Rights, 
Tom Regan sets out his 'subject-of-a-life' criterion.42 If we are to better view some 
animals as subjects-of-a-life as Regan intriguingly suggests, how might this view fit 
with the inherent contradiction within Level 3 ascribed welfare in respect to animals 
in human servitude that demands kindliness and killing be taken as mutually 
inclusive? Sentient beings that are subject to the certainty of premature slaughter 
and whose lives are destined to serve our instrumental desires are not 
straightforwardly recognisable in this framework as subjects-of-a-life in the fullest 
sense. Indeed, given that their raison d'etre is to be 'subject' to a (premature) death 
in order to fulfil their instrumental 'purpose', this notion would seem at best 
descriptively redundant. We may then more accurately define these unfortunate 
individuals not merely as subjects-of-a-life in Regan's sense (possessing the full 
attributes of sentience), but as subjects-of-a-death in a substantive sense (thwarted 
in full expression of these faculties by humans). Being mortal, we are all of course 
the subject-of-a-death at some point. However, if there is indeed a single applied 
functional difference in treatment between human beings and farmed beings, it is 
that none of us humans (normatively) have death preordained from birth by someone 
else with the express purpose of ending that life prematurely for instrumental 
purpose alone.
There is here an important distinction to be made between treatment and use. 
A recurrent problem for a welfare based approach is that it tends to myopically 
concern itself with the former, whilst largely ignoring the latter. Welfarism born of an 
acceptance of Level 3 Harmful Discrimination oddly seems not to seriously question 
the 'use' dimension in its moral deliberations, namely, the predetermined bringing 
into being of other highly intelligent sentient higher mammals with the sole aim of 
treating them instrumentally.43 Questioning the very use of nonhuman animals for 
our instrumental ends is however certainly nothing new. In antiquity Theophrastus, a 
pupil of Aristotle, in condemning the practice of animal sacrifice as 'unholy' proposed 
that to kill an animal is unjust because it harms them by the mere fact of robbing
42 Importantly here, Regan's criterion for being a subject-of-a-life is delimited to mentally normal 
mammals of a year or more. Tom Regan, (2004).
43 In this chapter it is helpful to reiterate to the reader that am I of course concentrating primarily 
upon animals in human servitude that almost entirely consist of the 'passive' forms of higher 
sentient mammals. The case for our illegitimacy of treatment and use of non-domesticated 
animals is the subject matter of the subsequent chapter.
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them of life. 44 Interestingly, this ancient notion nevertheless goes both beyond a 
contemporary utilitarian perspective encapsulated within the remit of animal 
liberation, and indeed beyond current UK legislation in recognising loss of life, and 
not just suffering, as a harm (Sorabji, 1993. P. 176). What is it then that might be 
tangibly 'lost' in the quality of life of the animal in its being designated as a subject- 
of-a-death? Firstly, it is expedient to separate the idea of 'being alive' from 'having a 
life'. James Rachels in his comprehensive work on the moral implications of 
Darwinism sees the former as a notion of biology, the latter of biography (1990). 
Sentient life, to obviously varying degrees, possesses both attributes - and this 
raises a further problem for acceptance of the Level 3 stipulation. In qualifying what 
may, or may not, be appropriate treatment for those who may be 're-classified' as 
subjects-of-a-death, welfarism presupposes the legitimacy of use that unconsidered 
acceptance of the Level 3 dialectic engenders. Creating such subjects-of-a-death 
from demonstrably sentient beings we cease to take seriously both the biological 
(cessation of their being) and biographical (loss of their 'lives') aspects of their very 
existence, and in this sense farmed animals must fare not well, but 'ill'.45
Animal Welfare: 'Misdescribed' and 'Misplaced'
Discussion of what we may owe to sentient beings who possess the full attributes of 
biographical and biological lives raises an issue for our understanding of 'quantity' of 
life in this particular context. One important element of a flourishing life may in fact 
be a life span of a particular length, such that to kill a sentient animal is to actually 
prevent it from flourishing in its particular way. In short, that an animal will have 
a fundamental interest in individual continued existence, and if this is indeed fairly 
argued then to ignore this imperative is at minimum, morally questionable. In 
commonplace understanding of what may constitute welfare in human terms, the 
concept of longevity is manifestly linked to ideas of the flourishing life. This notion 
frequently trades as the 'good innings' claim. Some years ago my dear father died at 
the age of 78 and I recall a recurrent theme (many people consoled me with this 
argument): that as sad as his death was, he had ostensibly had a 'good innings' -
44 Extracts from Theophrastus can be found in Porphyry's De Abstinentia, Books ii and iii (Nauck's 
2 nd ed., 1886).
45 David Styzbel suggests that what we call 'animal welfare' in standard cases is in fact better 
described as 'animal Illfare' in 'Animal Rights Law: Fundamentalism versus Pragmatism' (2007).
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living as he did to a 'ripe old age' of 78. Conversely, later that year I sadly attended 
the funeral of my nephew who died from a congenital disease at the age of 27. As 
one might expect the good innings consolation was not forthcoming, indeed quite the 
opposite rejoinder was encountered with heartfelt words like tragedy, waste and loss 
sincerely expressed. So, an implicit but tangible idea of a flourishing life conflated 
clearly with a notion of longevity in such an instance. As Joan Dunayer argues, there 
would not seem to be adequate reasoning why this normatively taken-for-granted 
notion of flourishing should not extend to other sentient beings, whom as sentient 
beings, in like manner possess a fundamental biological and biographical personal 
interest in continued independent existence (2004).
My point here is that the standard notion of animal welfare contents itself with 
the ending an animal's life very prematurely (and always under farming's cost based 
model) and thus ignores, in practice, this conventional interpretation of full 
flourishing. This normative notion, reserved for human (sentient) beings alone, 
furnishes the underlying impetus for the validation of Level 3 Harmful Discrimination, 
and lies at the very heart of welfarism's 'quasi-schizophrenic' acquiescence to the 
dialectical entreaty to kill, but kill with kindness. To kill with kindness is not 
necessarily self-contradictory of course. We may in certain situations choose to 'kill 
with kindness' to alleviate undue terminal suffering - for example in so-called 'mercy 
killing'. However, mercy killing is plainly not of the same moral order as killing an 
otherwise healthy young animal for solely instrumental gain (Simmons, 2007, pp.268- 
275).
Many would of course argue for a naturalistic account, contending that, in the 
'scheme of things', most animals die violently in their early development variously 
through predation, adverse environmental factors, or 'natural' diseases.46 To use an 
argument based on a conflation of longevity with the flourishing life is simply to deny 
the processes of natural selection - in all its moral 'indifference'. However, to argue 
for such a 'state of nature' position is to ignore the precise nature of farmed animals. 
Direct comparisons with so called 'wild' animals and our attitudes to predation, 
intervention and conflict resolution in this context is, I believe, invalid. Whether an 
animal flourishes in nature or not is morally irrelevant to our treatment of farmed
46 See in particular Naess (1983, 1989) for a philosophical basis for a naturalistic approach to our 
obligations to nature at large.
90
Chapter 2: Welfarism and Animals: The Limits of Animal Advocacy
animals. There is a clear distinction to be made between wild animals and farmed 
animals in this case, namely, we bring into being other sentient beings with the 
express aim of ending their lives prematurely for marginal preferences and 
questionable purpose. In modernity, fully functioning humans do not act upon either 
unfiltered instinct or rank necessity (in the arguable sense that some predatory 
species may), but rather we make conscious moral decisions in regard to our 
actions. Further, and perhaps more poignantly, the appeal to 'nature' denies in large 
part the arguably defining quality of human beings - that we are moral beings, and 
as such 'burdened' with inescapable moral agency. 47 To argue for the 'arbitrariness' 
of nature as considered rationale for purposeful foreshortening of sentient lives on an 
industrial scale is to confuse the processes of natural selection wrought through the 
prey/predator relationship, with meat production's decidedly 'unnatural' selection 
processes driven by largely economic factors. In this context the argument that it is 
'natural' to rear and kill animals in order to eat them seems less convincing. Indeed, 
the meaning of the term 'natural' in any context is frequently obscure and value- 
laden. At best, it remains difficult to envisage the highly industrialised processes of 
factory farming, transportation and slaughter as in any way 'natural' in the 
commonplace usage of the term. Notwithstanding these observations, whether 
something is deemed 'natural' or not is, once again, irrelevant to its morality.
Given these very real obstacles, I want to suggest that within this framework 
our use of the term 'welfare' itself is not merely 'mis-described' (although I think it is - 
given that the language does not reflect the reality), but in the context of industrially 
farmed animals 'misplaced'. Simply put, there is something very different in our 
understanding of welfare's aims and means when applied to nonhuman sentient 
beings, and as when applied to human sentient beings. This is clearly exemplified in 
the case of the clause in Level 3 Harmful Discrimination that 'allows' for blatant 
instrumental use of the animal provided that the harm occasioned from this treatment 
be carried out 'humanely', 'kindly' or with no 'unnecessary suffering'. If, for the sake 
of current argument, our existing level of exploitation of animals is not morally 
justifiable, as Gary Francione argues, then promoting more 'humane' exploitation as 
a means to an end (eventual abolition, on the new welfarist view) becomes
47 For extended discussion of the concept of moral agency in this sense see Nagel (1979), Collier 
(1999) and Warren (1997).
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unacceptable as a matter of moral theory (2009). The disparity between human and 
nonhuman welfare aims is palpable here. Clearly, nobody would rightly propose that 
we campaign for 'respectful' rape (many farmed animals are routinely forcibly 
artificially inseminated), 'munificent' murder (farmed animals are violently and wilfully 
killed on a premeditated industrial scale), or more 'sensitive' slavery (farmed animals 
continue to be assigned the status of property) as a directed response to the 
problem of institutionalised abuse. Indeed these notions are intuitively mutually 
exclusive and rightly morally repugnant, due in large part to their essentially violent 
and inescapably abusive nature. 'Welfare' then, for an animal exploited and 
condemned from birth seems a problematic term in this case.
As exemplified by unconsidered acceptance of Level 3 Harmful 
Discrimination, at the very least the term 'animal welfare' itself has, in the context of 
industrially farmed animals, an embedded incongruity that brings into question the 
efficacy of the term 'animal welfare' to adequately describe our normative notions of 
protectionism toward animals in human servitude. Indeed, the term itself within the 
context of modern meat production may in truth be fairly designated as a misnomer. 
We need a new nomenclature, and 'Illfare Reduction' might better describe animal 
welfare practice and policy. That which Andrew Linzey calls the 'power of 
misdescription' is a potent human tool (2009). Through the tool of misdescription we 
describe here specifically the routine abuse of farmed sentient beings in terms of 
'animal welfare', and in doing so we create an 'artificial' distance from the continued 
abuse. At minimum, acceptance of the tension between the Very Major Harmful 
Discrimination being carried out at Level 3 and the proviso within this level that this 
treatment be humane, kind and involve no 'unnecessary' suffering may, in practice, 
mean that calls for piecemeal improvement in the treatment of farmed sentient 
beings may be better understood as 'Illfare Reducing', rather than 'Welfare 
Inducing' 48 Recognition of this reemphasis within animal ethics at large may be no 
bad thing. To reframe the language of abuse is to redefine the abuse. If 'Illfare 
Reduction' more accurately describes our attempts to alleviate suffering within 
modern meat production, then for that 'novel' class of beings - those defined and 
delimited from birth not as subjects-of-a-life, but as subjects-of-a-death - this shift in
48 1 envisage that effectively welfare and illfare can therefore to be viewed as separate scales, 
rather than matters of degree on the 'same' scale.
92
Chapter 2: Welfarism and Animals: The Limits of Animal Advocacy
emphasis may have authentic benefits and begin to foment in the public 
consciousness a redefinition of our relationship to farmed sentient beings.49 
Francione aptly sums up the central problem for a welfarist approach:
'A movement's ends should define its means. If the goal is abolition, 
animal welfare is a means not fitted to that goal either as a matter of moral 
theory or of practical strategy. As a moral matter, animal welfare assumes and 
reinforces the notion that animals are commodities with only extrinsic or 
conditional value. As a practical matter, animal welfare provides almost no 
benefit to animals and only makes exploitation more efficient for producers at 
the same time that it makes animal users more comfortable about exploiting 
nonhumans' (2008, p.127).
2.4 Beyond animal ethics
If 'well intentioned' welfare initiatives towards domesticated animals in human 
servitude are arguably misdescribed and misplaced, how might we then assess our 
moral obligations to beings that fall outside of this delimitation? It is to this question 
that the mainstay of discussion in the subsequent chapter turns. Nonetheless, if we 
'wrong' the domesticated animals that form a shared (although limited) community 
with us, as a prerequisite task, how we may characterise what 'classes' of being can, 
in meaningful terms, be morally 'wronged' firstly needs to be clarified. Matthew 
Talbert in his critique of T M Scanlon's contracturalist moral theory draws upon 
Scanlon's five characterisations of the possible set of beings that can be morally 
wronged ('wronging' on Scanlon's interpretation is principally denoted by an inability 
to justify an action towards the conscious individual that is affected by that action):
1. The beings (or entities) for which things can go better or worse.
2. The beings in the first group who are conscious.
3. The beings in the second group who are capable of judging things as 
better or worse and are capable of forming attitudes on the basis of these 
judgments (i.e., are capable of forming 'judgment-sensitive attitudes').
4. The beings in the third group capable of making specifically moral 
judgments.
49 This does of course constitute the very lifeblood to the contemporary animal ethics debate, the 
contested nature of which is an integral part of the polemic. These themes are revisited in chapter 
6 in discussion of welfarism and a biocentric approach.
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5. The beings in the fourth group with whom it is to our advantage to enter 
into a relation of mutual restraint and cooperation'. 50
In this framework group 1 can clearly be seen to potentially include just about 
anything - from sentient beings to ecosystems (in the sense that ecosystemic 
balance can tip either towards holistic' health' or 'ill health', and thus can in this 
limited meaning be 'wronged'). The remit of group 2 dismisses these sorts of entities 
in its insistence on consciousness. Group 3 further delimits its sphere of 
inclusiveness to more subtle distinctions - those beings capable of judging things as 
better or worse and forming judgement-perceptive attitudes from this capability. 
From a straightforward reading, groups 4 and 5 would seem to infer characteristics 
that, for many, would suggest an exclusively human membership. Scanlon's criteria 
for categorising who or what can be morally wronged, whilst seemingly forming a 
logical basis for determining the sorts of primary characterisations of the set of 
beings that can be morally wronged, are however not without problems.
As Talbert points out, the division between the sorts of beings that can be 
wronged and those we cannot wrong, would then seem to lay in the range between 
groups 2 and 4 (1998, p.204). The actual boundary for making decisions - whether 
these are judgment-perceptive orientated, or what passes as full-blown value-laden 
moral judgements - would, on this schema, not necessarily exclude category 2 and 3 
beings out of hand. Simply put, excluding 'conscious' beings form capacities of 
judgement-perception or indeed 'moral' deliberation is fraught with substantive 
problems of the delimitations of consciousness in various possessors, and of 
defining and determining what precisely is meant by consciousness and its 
metaphysical implications. The boundaries between these groups is, then, not as 
clear-cut as a perfunctory reading would suggest. Given that most humans on a 
demonstrably cursory interpretation would envisage themselves in groups 4 or/and 
5, the blurring of the boundaries between 2 and 3 present difficulties for a forthright 
determination of the characterisations of the set of beings that can be morally 
wronged. In short, without determining what in fact consciousness foments in 
individual animals (group 2 criterion) or indeed where the substantive difference lies 
between judgement-sensitive attitudes (group 3 criterion) and specifically moral
50 Cited in Talbert, 'Our Duties to Nonhuman Animals' (2006). See also Scanlon's What We Owe to 
Each Other (1998).
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judgements (group 4 criterion), the usefulness of such a set of characterisations is 
brought into question. More pointedly for the emphases of this work is that these 
kinds of questions over the quantifiable 'precision' of the sorts of category 
delimitations that Scanlon presents again bring into question the efficacy of any 
attempt to quantify 'difference' in morally prescriptive terms (namely, that the 
boundaries are 'manufactured' - and more accurately, in practice, represent a sliding 
scale rather than any prescriptive formulae).
Animal welfare, or the animal's welfare?
In considering the fundamental and embedded 'theory to practice' asymmetry within 
animal husbandry, an underlying problem for animal advocacy that permeates both 
the theoretical debate and animal protectionist policy emerges. It seems that much of 
the inconsistency and discontinuity in our actual dealings with other sentient species 
tends to be based, in practice, upon the perceived 'practical' considerations rather 
than convoluted theoretical concerns. In short, the gulf between animal advocacy 
theory and protectionist practice is forged not necessarily in an outright rejection of 
the theoretical validity of any particular form of animal 'rights', but rather in deference 
to the more pedestrian expediencies of 'practical' concerns. This straightforward 
observation is at first somewhat obvious - and even for those who would support 
modern farming practices a perfunctory exploration of factory farming procedures is 
all that is needed to convince that animal welfare practice consistently falls short of 
the 'ideals' of mainstream contemporary animal advocacy theory (Singer, 2000). I 
believe that at the heart of the dichotomy is not merely a reluctance to change our 
practices and the way in which we view our place in nature (although no small task), 
but rather has provenance in a theoretical failure in the animal advocacy literature 
and debate at large to come to terms with death itself as (the greatest) harm.
As we have discussed thus far, within the animal advocacy debate there are 
diverse positions regarding the importance of death itself as a harm. 51 For example, 
a consistent argument that Tom Regan forwards against utilitarianism is, put quite
51 Henceforth I will hyphenate the term in order to distinguish it as a pivotal phrase throughout 
this work. Presenting the concept of death-as-a-harm in phrase form can, I believe, more readily 
give terminological credence and technical poignancy to my underlying contentions in this thesis.
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simply, that a strict utilitarian view makes killing too easy. 52 If the 'utility' gained by 
the ending of an individual's life outweighs the utility lost, the killing of an animal (or 
indeed an 'innocent' person, on a strict interpretation) is warranted. There are 
however, some very good practical reasons for wanting to avoid killing regardless of 
any perceived theoretical (and/or real) net gain. There is firstly the ever-present 
problem of uncertainty. In attempting to assess 'right' decisions based upon future 
benefits or gains any deliberation unavoidably comes up against the simple fact that 
future outcomes are virtually never assessable with any degree of certainty. An 
obvious problem with this is not just that such decisions are based upon effectively 
nothing other than the 'likelihood' of events happening in a certain manner, but more 
troublingly the fact that if those events turn out very different from our assessment of 
them, killing 'now' for a supposed benefit later may be difficult to justify as a practical 
matter.
A second problem faced by those who find strict utilitarian calculus 
troublesome is that in practical terms any decisions will always involve a decision- 
maker. 53 The decision maker is, needless to say, human and as such encapsulates 
propensities for error, bias and corruption and arguably is hardly in an 'infallible' 
position to determine (and in fact 'predetermine' in the case of animal advocacy) the 
weighting of the scales of cost/benefit calculus. The pragmatic concern arising from 
this inevitable fallibility is that practical decisions of life and death import - in 
anyone's hands - may be unacceptable because of the possibility (probability?) of 
mistakes or abuse of authority. Joshua Frank cites the death penalty debate to make 
this point, observing that commonly opponents of the death penalty use these lines 
of reasoning, arguing that even if killing is considered justified if all the facts are 
known, there is a 'human error and inherent uncertainty factor' that may lead (and
52 1 admittedly merely adumbrate what are by now familiar criticisms of utilitarianism in its 
broadest sense. The minutiae and convoluted nuances of the ongoing deontological/utilitarianism 
debate is not helpfully addressed here, see Scheffler The Rejection of Consequentialism (1982), for 
a seminal critique of the recurrent debate. However, it is noteworthy that in arguing these sorts of 
rejections here, the fact that it is other species that are under consideration (and the difficulty of 
knowing what may in fact constitute their preferences) only serves to contextually compound 
these sorts of arguments. I consider here only their effect upon practical considerations in animal 
husbandry.
53 Marti Kheel (2008) explores this problem from a feminist perspective, arguing that it is not 
merely the fact that humans are fallible, but also likely patriarchal, hierarchical and deeply biased 
in an over reliance on the role of Nationality' in ethical deliberation in assessing our obligations to 
nonhuman nature.
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likely does occasionally lead) to innocent people being sentenced to death (2002, 
p.50). In addition such utility-based mortal decisions may become routinely allowed 
and fall prey to the 'slippery slope' argument when applied in more questionable 
circumstances.54 In sum then, much of the normative opposition to killing for net 
utility gains is not centred upon convoluted theoretical divergence, but more often is 
grounded in more pragmatic and practical considerations.
This is not to suggest that a strict individualistic theoretical stance is 
necessarily without difficulty in its treatment of death-as-a-harm. Indeed, my 
contention in this thesis is that the theoretical grounding of animal advocacy at large 
struggles with the concept of death-as-a-harm irrespective of its meta-ethical 
underpinnings, and that in its turn this theoretical failure has had profound effect 
upon wider animal protectionist policy and practice. Under scrutiny, an 
individualistically rights-based approach must at some point resort to some form of 
utilitarian calculus (or at least an eclectic consequentialism) in order to maintain 
consistency and coherence. As touched upon in chapter one, Regan uses various 
mechanisms to attempt to adequately address this issue of death-as-a-harm. For 
example, in formulating his principle of respect, Regan simultaneously seeks to 
defend the individual's right not to receive inordinate harm merely in order to ensure 
many individuals receive a 'smaller' benefit, whilst concurrently maintaining that 
harming two people is worse than harming one (if the harm is deemed equivalent). 55 
It is again upon the thorny question of direct conflict of interests between individuals 
or groups that key elements of animal advocacy theory frequently flounder. In 
response, Regan conceives his 'worse-off principle and posits that in situations 
where some choice necessarily must be made between typically two actions that will 
both cause harm, the 'greatest' harm to an individual should always be avoided. It is 
only when the harms are equivalent that consideration of the numbers of individuals 
receiving the (same) harm must be taken into account. There are again here some 
well rehearsed objections. In essence, much like the 'uncertainty' embedded in a 
strict utilitarian view, Regan's presumptive logic is troubling. Clearly, there is inherent
54 The slippery slope argument is the idea that a relatively small first step leads to a chain of 
related events culminating in some significant effect. Such an argument can therefore lead to 
reductio ad absurdum forms. As a general observation here, it does not necessarily follow however 
that a slippery slope may not have embedded stops and checks, and for consistency such a view 
needs to prove that no such stops and checks exist.
55 See Regan (2004), pp. 195-231 for a critique of direct duty views.
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ambiguity in determining when harms are in fact 'equal', or when a given harm is 
greater or lesser. Moreover, as Regan concedes, individuals may in fact feel and 
experience harm in different ways, and possess lesser or greater sensitivity to harm 
- all of which, I suggest, cannot be readily assessed by prescriptive formulae.
In Regan's formulation, ethical treatment is discretely based upon 'category' 
rather than formulaic weighting - for example, his subject-of-a-life category, over 
strict utilitarian calculus. However, Regan's categories are nevertheless treated 
distinctly, and therefore unavoidably introduce categorical bias into its determinations 
when confronted with the aforementioned human/animal direct conflict of interest 
situations. A rights-based system with these kinds of discrete categories of harm, 
raises the problem of how such a framework may coherently include uncertainty - 
and in this respect, the problem of uncertainty pertains not merely to utilitarianism as 
discussed above. Although it is certainly true that no ethical theory can take into 
account every complexity of outcome and unforeseen circumstance, uncertainty is 
likely endemic to all 'real' ethical dilemmas. In practice then, when confronting such 
ethical dilemmas, most contemporary animal advocacy frameworks seem to fall 
short of providing thoroughgoing and decisive guidance on instances of direct 
conflict in respect to the issue of death as a harm.56
Conclusion
In this chapter I have discussed domesticated nonhuman animals in the context of 
an animal welfarist position, and considered the ways in which an abolitionist animal 
rights-based view differs. I then went on to question the efficacy of its central aims 
both in the context of theory to practice asymmetries and its application to wider 
animal advocacy. The dominant strands in animal ethical theory were explored prior 
to an analysis of the one-dimensionality of animal ethical theory in terms of its 
aspirations and possible intersections. I then moved on to discuss a defining 
example of such an 'intersection' within animal advocacy - that between animal 
welfare ethical theory and actual animal welfare practice within contemporary animal 
husbandry. This was presented in the context of a pivotal problem for a welfarist
56 Of course, theory to practice asymmetries lie at the very heart of animal ethics - which in the 
final analysis attempts to provide workable ethical guidelines for Veal' world life and death 
situations and not merely metaphysical ontological explorations or convoluted academic
conundrums.
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approach: that of death itself as a harm - which, I maintained, arises from a 
fundamental and embedded 'theory to practice asymmetry'. Subsequently, I argued 
that the designation 'animal welfare' as used in animal husbandry practice is both 
misplaced and misdescribed. I introduced the idea that the term animal 'illfare' more 
accurately describes our attempts to alleviate suffering within modern meat 
production, and suggested that calls for piecemeal improvement in the treatment of 
farmed sentient beings may be better understood as 'Illfare Reducing', rather than 
'Welfare Inducing'. By way of introduction to the wider themes tackled in chapter 
three, I concluded by moving 'Beyond animal ethics' in an preliminary exploration of 
our moral obligations to beings that fall outside of a strictly domesticated delimitation, 
arguing that death itself is a harm - and a concept that contemporary animal 
advocacy fails to fully acknowledge .
If indeed the extant contemporary discourse within the animal ethics debate 
seems to inadequately address death-as-a-harm and provide us with limited 
conclusive guidance on interspecies ethical dilemmas, it is unsurprising then that the 
grounding and aims of wider animal advocacy seem largely to fail to formulate policy 
and practice that gives clear credence to death-as-a-harm, and adequately inform 
upon our moral obligations to both domestic and wild animals. Notwithstanding the 
problems of welfarism and the inadequacies of theory to practice inconsistencies, for 
a great many people it remains accepted moral principle that to inflict 'unnecessary' 
pain and suffering on individual nonhuman animals is to commit a morally wrong 
action. Likewise, many of the same individuals who feel this to be the case would 
concomitantly consider it morally reprehensible to bring about the extinction of a 
whole species - a theme discussed at length in chapter four. However, while both 
kinds of action seem immoral, it is, as Alan Carter observes, 'far from certain that 
any widely accepted moral theory would actually consider both sorts of action to be 
morally wrong' (2000, p.3).
The general point being alluded to here is that moral theories that focus moral 
concern on the individual are frequently silent on things like species loss, and 
conversely moral theories that have their foci of moral attention upon issues such as 
species and ecosystemic integrity are equally silent on individual suffering. Can we 
then make sense of this apparent incongruity? Must we be either committed to 
opposing individual suffering and 'diminish' the import of environmental integrity (the
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normative animal protectionist view exemplified in much animal welfare and rights 
advocacy), or value environmental integrity and be largely indifferent to individual 
suffering (the normative environmental ethical view exemplified in much conservation 
policy and practice)? The embedded theory to practice asymmetries that arise from 
these diverse and seemingly incompatible theoretical groundings forms the basis for 
the central arguments of the remainder of this work. I begin this project in the next 
chapter, exploring how these sorts of theoretical perplexities and inadequacies have, 
I believe, damaged the wider project of animal advocacy in broader terms. Starting 
with 'Paternalism and Animals', I move on from the discussion of animals in human 
servitude explored in this chapter and broaden the animal advocacy discourse in 
questioning the ethical validity of much conservation theory and practice in the light 
of its problematic theoretical grounding.
100
Chapter 3: Paternalism and Animals: Protectionism and Environmental Ethics
3. Paternalism and Animals: 
Protectionism and Environmental Ethics
Humans are not husbands of nature, and nature is not our wife.
Animal husbandry is long overdue for divorce. Kheel, Nature Ethics: 
An Ecofeminist Perspective. 1
In chapters one and two discussion focused primarily upon contemporary animal 
advocacy and explored the aims, virtues and vices of mainstream ethical thought 
within the arena of the animal rights debate. To date then, discussion has 
concentrated in large part upon theory and practice in relation to domesticated 
animals - those that I classified as 'animals in human servitude'. This of course is a 
wide-ranging group and often includes what may be defined as 'semi-domesticated' 
animals such as deer in deer parks, or semi-domesticated so-called 'wild' ponies. 
The contemporary animal rights debate tends to predominately focus its attention on 
this category of animal (although by no means exclusively of course). 2 The 
arguments presented in this chapter 'broaden' the remit of animal advocacy in its 
normative sense, in questioning the ethical validity of much conservation theory and 
practice in the light of the theoretical grounding arising from the animal ethics 
debate. The focus here therefore is primarily upon 'wild' animals and how elements 
of the preconceptions inherent in animal ethics theory impact upon, and inform upon, 
wider animal advocacy.
Few would argue against the assertion that the direct and indirect impact on 
nature at large from human activity has been, and continues to be, immeasurable. If, 
on the rights-based view, we hold as a general principle that wild animals in the main 
do not need direct 'help' from us in their fight for survival, what is less clear is how 
we variously define the term 'help'. Contemporaneously, it is the interpretation of this 
pragmatic and persistent question that frequently forms the axiological schism
1 Marti Kheel makes this pithy remark in Nature Ethics: An Ecofeminist Perspective (2008), p. 231.
2 All of the main animal protectionist organisations call for protection of animals that may of course 
be designated both as 'domestic' or 'wild'. Welfare campaigns may however take different forms in 
attempting to protect different animals. For example, campaigns by PETA against factory farming 
of domesticated livestock necessarily have a different focus to their campaign to stop seal hunting.
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between interventionist and noninterventionist policy and practice. It seems to me 
that much of the debate here turns upon the legitimacy or illegitimacy of 'paternalism' 
in our dealings with nonhuman animals. 3 In a more general sense, paternalism tends 
to take as a starting point the presumption that what individuals may be interested in, 
is not always in their interest. Asserting that individuals, for various reasons, are not 
always able to ascertain what it is that is in their 'best' interests.
Aside from the possibility of a duty of care, for example, to the severely 
mentally incapacitated, the very young and those deemed medically no longer able 
to function as autonomous persons, the uncontested legitimacy of such a broad- 
brush presumption when applied to otherwise competent adults is, I believe, highly 
questionable. It is of course conceded that it may be that some actions and habitual 
behaviours are indeed 'bad' for us in the long, medium or short term, such as those 
medically proven to cause harm to the individual or individuals. Arguably, human 
autonomy in itself \s of value to individual concepts of self and self-development, not 
least in the 'right' to choose the 'wrong' for ourselves. Notwithstanding, the issues 
around what constitutes autonomy, freedom and our subsequent obligations and 
duties to others are complex, and I do not wish to enter into the finer points of debate 
on human autonomy here.4 However, what is of concern to specific arguments at this 
juncture, and in turn to the wider themes of this chapter, is how we may define and 
understand paternalism as applied to nonhuman species - what I would like to term 
'Interspecies Paternalism'. There are problems in identifying the 'real' interests of 
any individual or group, and the problems are made all the more poignant and 
difficult if trying to assess the interests of nonhumans. Aside from the obvious 
difficulty that it is not merely the needs, wants and desires of the 'other' that we are 
trying to identify, there is the stark fact that the 'other' we are attempting to 
understand is not even of the same species. A further complication, and a central 
enquiry in this chapter, is identifying those who are deemed 'able' to perceive the so-
3 Clearly, I use the term 'paternalism' outside of its general usage. I contend however that the 
sorts of overt presuppositions regarding notions of stewardship and selective protectionism that 
inform upon our relationships with 'wild' nonhumans may rightly be designated as openly 
paternalistic in character. See Glossary for further definition. See also chapter 6.2 of this work for 
exploration of the practical dimensions of selective forms of paternalism.
4 Some useful references for further reading on these themes see, Richard Flathman, Freedom 
and its Conditions: Discipline, Autonomy and Resistance (2003); R.G. Frey and Christopher 
Wellman, A Companion to Applied Ethics (2005); James Sterba, Morality in Practice (2004) and 
Katrin Flikschuh, Freedom (2007).
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called real interspecies interests of individuals or groups. This presents to us a 
twofold question that I want to explore here: can we, in any meaningful sense, act 
'paternalistically' toward nonhuman animals; and if so, is it always (or ever) 
legitimate to do so?
3.1 Stewardship and moral obligations
A paradigmatic problem for animal advocates, and for many who would ascribe to 
green credentials in general is how - given its individually centred ethic - the animal 
rights-based position may provide a credible basis for our 'obligations' to systemic 
environmental management, preservation of ecosystems and conservation of 
endangered species.5 If any sense is to be made of such a question, this category of 
enquiry must presuppose an implicit acceptance of some form of 'obligation' to the 
nonhuman world. Ideas of obligation and duties to others of course can take many 
forms other than general prima facie duties of kindness, fairness, or beneficence. In 
a wider sense, within the human sphere, if we are to acknowledge the 
uncontroversial proposition that there exist meaningful incumbent duties to one 
another - which evidentially in our daily interactions exist in diverse manner indirectly 
independent of formal frameworks of justice - then it is at least plausible that 
'comparative' kinds of obligations and duties of 'care' will be occasioned in our 
interrelations with nonhuman animals. Indeed, arguably, the whole point of moral 
obligations is that they do not disappear if we stop caring about those to whom we 
owe obligations. Obligations are then, by definition, not dependent on how much 
something matters to us, but rather if they engender a duty of care (Carter, 1999, 
p.286).
5 The distinction (although frequently blurred in practice) between conservation and preservation 
should be made explicit at this point. Conservation in normative terms means saving the present 
for future 'use', whereas preservation nominally refers to protection from both present and future 
use. It is not therefore obvious that standard conservationism reflects a credible moral position in 
its 'use-value' orientated determination. By 'moral position' here I refer to a general disposition to 
take the standpoint of nonhumans, and attempt to look at the world from the perspective of their 
'good'.
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The virtues of stewardship
This duty of care is normatively worked out within environmental ethics in the form of 
nonanthropocentric theories of value, that variously construct theories of value that 
strive to make preservation of the natural world morally obligatory. 6 Although of 
course the theories are divergent in nature, as Jennifer Welchman points out, The 
ecocentric, biocentric, deep ecological, and related theories produced vary in their 
normative content but generally coincide with an 'externalist' view of the relation of 
moral considerations to our motivation to act upon them' (1999, p.411). By 'externalist' 
here Welchman is simply observing that such considerations agree that we will be 
motivated to comply with a moral framework if it can be shown to be justified by a 
defensible moral theory, and it is in this sense that externalists seek to develop 
defensible nonanthropocentric normative challenges. In contrast, 'internalists' hold 
that 'theoretical justifications will not motivate an agent to act independent of interest, 
wants, or needs internal to the agents character whose satisfaction depends upon 
realising the objectives of a given theory' (1999, p.412). For many environmentalists, 
internalist theories give us little more than an enlightened anthropocentrism; of 
course an enlightened anthropocentrism may in fact be arguably sufficient to 
engender 'effective' stewardship of nature.7
This observation however, presents a serious challenge to environmental 
theory and practice in regard to our conceptions of the stewardship of the nonhuman 
world. If in fact, as the internalists claim, even the most rigorous and consistent 
argument will not motivate individuals (or groups, and even societies) to act upon 
values that they 'care' little about, then external arguments do not carry the weight of 
persuasion that their exactitude supposes. This is of course not merely a problem for 
environmental and animal ethics, there are those whom remain in principle (and 
practice) ostensibly unconvinced by universal human rights, equality and justice.
6 Some pivotal readings on the diverse theories are Holmes Rolston III, 'Environmental Ethics: 
Values in and Duties to the Natural World' (1991); Arne Naess, The Deep Ecological Movement: 
Some Philosophical Aspects (1983); Paul Taylor's Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental 
Ethics (1986); Eric Katz, Nature as Subject: Human Obligation and Natural Community (1997) ; 
and J. Baird Callicott's seminal work, In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental 
Philosophy (1989).
7 This is a cursory definition of a convoluted theme in order to distinguish important frameworks. 
Welchman herself suggests further reading in John Robertson and Michael Stocker's'Externalism 
and Internalism', (1992), pp.352-54.
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Moreover, if an enlightened anthropocentrism could provide a sufficient stewardship 
doctrine, what then might be gained by adopting an externalist position? I do not 
wish to provide a protracted critique of the merits and demerits of internalist and 
externalist positions here, but it is noteworthy that this question draws out a key 
observation regarding a recurrent theme throughout this work: namely, our 
presumption of the legitimacy of animal 'use'. In this context the legitimacy of use 
must necessarily be a precursory and foundational 'belief enabling protectionist 
policies. What I mean here, is that in order to theorise upon and subsequently 
develop any conservation or preservation strategy towards nonhumans, a 
prerequisite presumption of the legitimacy of human interventionist policy (a right to 
'use' nonhumans in the ways we see fit) is necessary. Despite the professed 
motivation to intervene for the 'good' of nonhuman animals and ecosystems, carried 
with our good intentions is a frequently 'unquestioned' paternalism that is bolstered 
by this very presupposition of use. My point here is simply to state that whether we 
consider our interventionist actions to be borne of a form of enlightened 
anthropocentrism, or one engendered by a thoroughgoing externalist ethical theory, 
neither position critically challenges this underlying presumption of the legitimacy of 
actual use. All of this is not to suggest an absolutist embargo on all use of 
nonhumans (companion animals are a case in point, the legitimacy of which is lately 
hotly debated within animal ethics), 8 but to draw attention to the fact that the 
presumption of use (here in the context of stewardship) is not seriously questioned 
within normative ethics, and indeed within a good deal of environmental ethical 
discourse. Can a paternalism based upon these sorts of presumptions of legitimacy 
nevertheless be seen as reasonable duty of care towards the nonhuman world?
Paternalism, or a reasonable duty of care?
The term paternalism itself has come to have various connotations beyond a 
straightforward sense of paternus - as one relating directly to fatherly care. In 
contemporary association the term frequently takes on an overtone of 
authoritarianism, and habitually not the fatherly 'care' intimated at in its root form. 
This manner habitually results in those in authority making decisions for others that
8 See in particular Joan Dunayer's provocative discussion of the problem of companion animals for 
an animal rights view in Spedesism (2004).
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may be beneficial, but which effectively prevent those people from taking 
responsibility for aspects of their own lives. Commonly of course, this authority takes 
the form of state power, but can pertain to many forms of power relationships. 9 In 
order to illustrate this divergence, if we firstly take the example of fatherly care, one 
imagines such care to be built upon strong natural affections and an unswerving 
desire for the well-being of the young child. In the parent/child relationship there are, 
arising from these desires, implicit parental duties of care to the young child in the 
reasonable presumption that the minor does not yet have the life experience and 
developmental capacity to necessarily assess the full implications of his or her 
actions. Such a presumption would seem uncontroversial. Nevertheless, in acting 
this way, adults can and frequently do thwart the immediate desires of the young 
child - as many a supermarket checkout tantrum demonstrates. It would seem that 
the young child, even if lacking in formed concepts of its medium and long term 
overall good, nevertheless clearly has desires - albeit quite possibly erroneous on 
the adult account. In this sense then, when the parent acts in denying the child the 
full array of tempting goods on offer at the checkout, the parent may be said to be 
acting in a genuinely paternalistic way (that may variously encompass longer term 
health concerns, concepts of what good parenting may entail, or merely exercising 
thrifty budgetary management). Regan outlines a useful set of 'sufficient' conditions 
to illuminate on this general idea of a 'genuine' paternalism:
'An act by an individual (A) is paternalistic if A intervenes in the life of another 
individual (S) and the following conditions are satisfied.
a) A knows that S has a particular preference;
b) A knows that S has the capacity to act in a way that S believes will bring 
about the satisfaction of his (S's) preference;
c) A knows that, unless prevented, S will act in the way S believes will bring 
about the satisfaction of his preference;
d) A knows that S's acting in this way will bring about results that are 
detrimental to S's welfare; and
e) A intervenes to prevent S from acting as S would choose to act, if not 
prevented by A, in the belief that such intervention is for S's own good and out 
of concern for S's good' (2004. p. 107).
9 See Murray Bookchin (1986, 1989) for a thoroughgoing eco-anarchic critique of this form of 
paternalism.
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So, given these conditions, what about the nonhuman mammalian animal of a year 
or more?10 Are we to say that they are in much the same position as the young child, 
and therefore it follows that it is legitimate to act in this genuinely paternalistic way 
toward them on much the same premise? I think both yes and no: this to large 
degree is dependent upon the relationship (if any) that the animal has with the 
human. It would, I feel, be nonsensical to envisage, for example, the relationship 
between a companion dog and its human 'owners' as anything other than 
paternalistic in nature. Presuming a genuine affection and concern for the well-being 
of the animal, the companion dog/owner relationship is indeed defined by 
paternalistic feelings and deeds (we decide on what is best for our 'pets' based on 
our best evidence). It is however, much like the example of a father and child 
relationship, a matter of how we define paternalism in this specific interspecies case. 
Leaving aside for the time being the question of the validity of 'ownership' of animals 
in a broader sense, and moral questions arising from our relationship to other 
animals - which will be discussed in more detail in chapter five, I feel that the 
domesticated companion animal relationship (with some animals at least), is in this 
important respect, qualitatively different from our relationship with 'wild' animals.
A great many domesticated animals would, if suddenly 'set free', find themselves 
psychologically, experientially, and often physically unable to adequately survive 
without the developed reciprocal relationship that both owner and companion animal 
enjoy. 11 This is not to justify a 'selective' paternalism here and thus depart from a 
general individualistically-based stance in our dealings with nature at large, but to 
recognize that there exist limited 'qualitative' differences in our relationship with 
disparate parts of the nonhuman world. After all, the fact that dogs seem to 'willingly' 
admit of surrogate human pack leaders does not in itself justify a 'natural' 
paternalistic attitude (being routinely separated from their mother and siblings at 8 
weeks in order to be 'integrated' into human society, they have little 'choice' in the
10 Regan sets his subject-of-a-life criterion upon this delimitation, see chapter 1.1 for further 
clarification.
11 This is not to align myself, for example, to the argument that modern farming practices should 
continue, as to Tree' the farmed animals would result in their slow death. Many of the animals that 
are farmed are in fact not 'bred' that far from the wild type and given the space and opportunity 
may well thrive (at least within a few generations). However, many dogs for example are 
appallingly over-bred and likely many would lack the strength or acumen to immediately fend for 
themselves.
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matter). However, on balance, the often deeply intimate and reciprocal form of 
relationship between the human and nonhuman that develops is, I submit, of a 
different order to the sort of overt 'instrumental' exploitation that, sadly, categorizes 
most other forms of relationship between human beings and other animals. In this 
more intimate sense this 'special' relationship can legitimately be termed as genuine 
- at least in intent and purpose - in that the 'rights' of the animal can remain largely 
respected. One could of course cite the 'right to freedom to live as 'nature intended', 
but this reductive view is difficult to both define (what does nature 'intend?'), and 
justify (certainly in the case of the very long history of domestication and selective 
breeding of certain animals). After all, the domesticated 'pet' animal has numerous 
opportunities to 'escape,' and is free to run away from the relationship if the animal 
so chooses. Ultimately however, I believe that what makes this 'limited' form of 
paternalism justified is that the relationship that the owner and companion animal 
enjoy is more clearly seen to be mutually supportive - and at its best, largely based 
on trust, loyalty, and indeed reciprocal love. 12 It is worth clarifying a point here 
however: the paternalism inherent within the reciprocal, intimate and mutually 
supportive relationship between companion animal and owner - as I expound it here 
at least - is the only form of paternalism that my interpretation of the rights-based 
view tentatively allows. There are of course animal rights advocates who question 
even this limited form of paternalism as morally valid. 13
To intervene, or not to intervene?
However, what we may 'owe' in obligations and duties to moral agents are, in a strict 
interpretation of a rights-based view, not similarly 'owed' to moral patients. To 
illustrate this point, Regan gives the example of a lion stalking a young child (2004, 
xxxvi). If we act with an assumed prima facie duty to intervene (I trust most would 
agree this prima facie duty in this instance), and with minimal intervention we
12 Whilst there cannot be an absolute 'authentic' knowledge of animal preferences and state of 
being, our best guess based upon our understanding of animal behaviours ('communicating' 
cheerfulness through tail-wagging and other demonstrative positive behaviours for example) I 
believe validates this experientially determined conjecture. Additionally, I do not wish here 
however to suggest that all companion animal/owner relationships are mutually supportive.
13 In particular, Joan Dunayer makes the case that despite the mutual reciprocity engendered by 
the companion animal/human relationship, the animal nevertheless does not have an effective 
'choice' in the matter, is dependent on the whims or wishes of its owner, and even in 'good' 
relationships has a legal status of mere 'property', see Spedesism (2004).
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manage to frighten the lion away, the child may be saved. Since the lion is not a 
moral agent (in the sense discussed in chapter one) then according to the rights 
view, no violation of rights has taken place in frightening away the lion. Regan further 
asks us to imagine that the lion is not now stalking a child, but a wildebeest. The 
same option for intervention is clearly still available to us, so should we intervene to 
'save' the unfortunate animal? Regan answers - correctly I think - in the negative. 
The difference between the human child and the wildebeest in Regan's example is 
perceptible in that the young child does not possess this same degree of 
competence in this situation. When pitted against the considerable skills of an 
efficient predator such as a lion the child plainly does not possess the competencies 
to escape death and if we omit a swift intervention in this case, we not only 'allow' 
the child to fall victim, but in our omission also cease to recognize the young child's 
lack of competence. In short, there are qualitative differences in acknowledging 
assistance to this human being in this situation, and acknowledging the general 
competency of wild animals to use the skills at their disposal to survive. 14
However, as has been remarked by some philosophers, 15 if we are called 
upon to protect the rights of the human in this context, then something is amiss if we 
then refuse to protect the 'rights' of the 'prey' animal. As can be imagined, if such 
interventionist policy is fully embraced as legitimate, this presumption to act against 
predatory animals would effectively instigate a mass culling of predatory species, 
and in point of fact would mean the eradication of all predatory animals in favour of 
the ungulates. This is clearly not the intent of a 'hands-off animal rights-based view 
as presented here. This criticism - apart from extrapolating a specific case to the 
general - I believe overlooks the distinction between moral agents and moral 
patients; indeed a rights-based view, rather than advocating mass intervention, 
would in matters of our obligations to 'wild' animals support as a general guideline a
14 And this would, I submit, include the 'competency' of an immature animal also to develop the 
necessary skills to evade predation. The savannah is home to the immature wildebeest, and it 
needs to develop its evasion strategies or perish; it is clearly not 'home' to the young child in the 
same sense.
15 In attempts to reject the theory of animal rights on an 'absurdity' basis, Roger Scruton has 
argued that 'Any law which compelled a person to respect the rights of non-human species would 
weight so heavily on the predators as to drive them to extinction In a short while' in Animal Rights 
and Wrongs (1996), p. 60. See also Mark Sagoff, Animal liberation and environmental ethics: bad 
marriage, quick divorce (1984). Also, Richard Posner'Animal Rights: legal, philosophical and 
pragmatic perspectives' in C. Sunstein and M. Nussbaum (eds.), Animal Rights: Current Debates 
and New Directions (2004).
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policy of nonintervention. As regards to wild animals in a broad sense, the rights 
view, as I present it here, would advance an obligation to recognize the inherent 
natural competency of prey and predator individuals and groups to 'manage' their 
own lives, in their own ways. It is nothing short of evolutionary fact that all species 
extant today have, over a large expanse of time, evolved proficient competencies 
that help ensure their survival within their evolutionary niches and territorial domains. 
In subordinating wild animals to our purposes, at the very least there is an 
infringement upon the claim of territoriality, which effectively determines their being 
(their dependency upon an environmental niche). The all too apparent problem in 
such routine subordination is, as Frank Schalow points out, that 'Animals become 
vulnerable to exploitation when they relinquish their territorial claim and occupy only 
the space granted to them by the instrumental ends of human beings' (2000, p. 189). 
Historically, the vast majority of evolutionary adaptation of species was patently 
forged without direct interventions from homo-sapiens. In this sense, it may be said 
that wild animals do not need 'help' from us in their fight for survival, and perhaps 
more directly important for the viewpoint outlined here, human beings do not fail to 
discharge a moral duty when choosing not to lend assistance in such cases. So 
much for human-animal notions of what may constitute our moral obligations to 
nonhuman animals, but how then might notions of animal-animal conflicts be better 
understood, if indeed we are to acknowledge qualitative differences in competency?
Animal ethics and the problem ofpredation
In chapter one the Argument from Absurdity was adumbrated in relation to animal 
ethics. It broadly claims that if all sentient beings are to be assigned categorical and 
individual value, then conflict resolution between groups and individuals would 
potentially lapse into absurdity. In short, if all (sentient) beings are bestowed equal 
rights then discerning moral distinctions between them becomes irresolvable. In 
chapter one, several counter arguments were forwarded against the validity of this 
claim. However, the argument from absurdity I believe, also tacitly permeates much 
thinking within mainstream conservation policy and practice. Many who would view 
themselves as conservationists and subscribe to normative notions of environmental 
'management' principles, frequently think it 'absurd' to perceive of even a basic 
notion of equality between human and nonhuman animals as forming a basis for
no
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resolving interest conflicts between species. Importantly, settling interest conflicts are 
seen by many as arguably the primary reason for needing forms of conservation 
management in the first instance - whether they are human-animal or in fact animal- 
animal conflicts of interest. Here I do not wish to argue whether ideas of animal 
rights, values, or notions of equality are in fact legitimate perse, but rather to explore 
the ethical consequences of an individualistically-based understanding of our moral 
obligations within a 'normative' (paternalistic) protectionist understanding of 
interspecies conflict resolution.
In making this 'absurdity' presumption, many environmental philosophers and 
practitioners have sought to distance animal ethics - in particular the notion of 
animal rights - from their understanding of what may constitute environmental ethics 
as applied to nonhuman animal advocacy. 16 The contention is relatively 
straightforward, and in its commonplace form posits that it is absurd to try to protect 
the rights of one creature over another as in doing so we may have to negate the 
rights of one or of another. Therefore, the claim is that we need to ground the moral 
status of nonhuman animals on something other than notions of rights and equality. 
So on this account, for example, the mere act of worming a domestic farm animal 
(for its 'own protection') would, if we were to base our moral deliberations on a strict 
rights-based view, be morally reprehensible - as in the process other creatures' 
'rights' would necessarily be ignored (the parasitic worm in this case), and thus such 
considerations would be seen to be 'absurd' in practice and implication. Such an 
interpretation of a rights-based view does not however accurately reflect its central 
claims. As discussed previously, the normative animal rights stance as presented in 
chapters one and two does not so forthrightly demand such either/or dichotomies, 
and in fact makes exceptional provision for these sorts of value conflicts in its 
theoretical framework. 17
However, this idea of absurdity frequently turns not merely upon meta- 
physical claims about the (in)validity of a rights-based philosophy, but a conception
16 This view permeates much of the thinking of prominent ecologists such as Aldo Leopold (2000), 
Baird Callicott (1989) and Arne Naess (1983).
17 Regan for example uses such exceptions in his evocation of his Miniride Principle and his Worst- 
off Principle, see chapter 1.3 for further explanation. Furthermore, both Singer and Regan delimit 
their scope of moral concern. I will in chapters five and six, in discussion of biocentrism, outline 
and defend a form of animal advocacy that on a cursory reading may arguably be seen to be open 
to this general criticism.
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of nature itself as 'amoral 1 and ethically neutral. Whilst some are willing to tacitly 
accept that animals in the broadest sense have 'rights' (in the sense that humans 
have some obligation not to simply do as they wish to sentient beings), they view 
these rights as severely limited by the 'natural order' in which animals are embedded 
(oftentimes conveniently discounting the embeddedness of the 'human animal' of 
course). This embeddedness of each individual cannot, on this account, be 
disentangled from the ethically neutral 'natural order', and so for many 
environmentalists it is conceded that we may certainly have duties to avoid pain and 
suffering where we can, and that also we should endeavour to try to make the lives 
of animals as 'natural' as we can (and especially true of animals under our direct 
control). It follows then, that if we are to acknowledge the 'demands of nature', 
opponents of a rights-based position invoke a charge of reductio ad absurdum 
against animal liberationists arguing that, given their principles, they should find 
predation morally troubling.
There is an important qualification to be made here however: the 'demands of 
nature' and what is perceived to be 'natural' in any given context is rarely a reflection 
of the process of nature itself. In short, as Michael Pollan points out, 'predation is not 
a matter of morality or politics; it is instead simply a fact about how nature works' 
(2006, p.322). Nevertheless, despite this astute observation, this summary dismissal 
of predation from the sphere of moral concern is perhaps premature. After all, 
predation forms the very axis of the natural order - and as Val Plumwood notes 
'Predation is neither a negligible anomaly nor an ethical deficiency in the 
ecosystem'. 18 To attempt to either eliminate it from the sphere of moral concern by 
designating it as a morally 'neutral' process, or conversely to worry unduly about the 
(natural) empathic sentiments felt in witnessing an animal preyed upon first hand, is 
no reason to fain indifference on the one hand - or overlay nature with undue 
sentimentality on the other.
There are obvious dangers in both extremes. For example, there is the sort of 
overt anthropomorphism that a few (thankfully) pet owners indulge in, variously 
dressing their 'toy' dogs in an assortment of fashionable (humanlike) attire - and in 
so doing arguably diminish their fundamental animality, or calling for the policing of
18 Val Plumwood makes this poignant claim in here article 'Being prey' in Rothenberg, D & Ulvaeus 
eds. The New Earth Reader: The best of Terra Nova (1999), pp.76-92.
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nature to the degree of eradication of predatory species altogether. Notwithstanding 
these 'extreme' views of interspecies relationship, claiming that predation is not an 
'ethical deficiency in the ecosystem' is, I believe, not therefore to suggest that 
'resolute' moral neutrality should be an appropriate developed response to 
witnessing the violence of predation at first hand. Ty Raterman, in a challenging 
paper expressing why predation may be lamentable, makes the point that not to 
lament predation is incompatible with a 'compassionate and genuinely gentle 
disposition' (2008, p.428). He makes the case that it is only moral agents that can 
display virtue or viciousness - and in this sense predators are 'absolved' as moral 
patients of any 'wrongdoing' in their struggle to survive. As such, moral agents 
normatively deem displays of compassion and gentleness as virtuous, and for 
Raterman these attributes demand a particular attitude toward predation, namely 
one of lamentation. This claim seems reasonable in and of itself to the degree that 
any sensitive human being would find certain repulsion in witnessing the attrition of 
the potentially slow, painful and violent death of a sentient being in its final struggles 
for survival (perhaps exhaustively chased down and progressively torn apart by a 
pack of wild dogs for example), who may have otherwise for all intents and purposes 
thrived.
An individual possessing such sentiments, I believe, does not display a 
deficiency either in fortitude of 'character', or in understanding. However, these 
'natural' sentiments should not righty equate to legitimise pleas to police nature. 
What I mean here is that merely because we may possess empathetic qualities that 
can 'lament' instances of violence (lamentable that is in a similar sense that 
Raterman draws out in reaction to witnessing specific instances of predation), this 
acknowledgment does not demand we work towards cessation of all predation as a 
logical progression. In the first instance, this would presuppose that we have at our 
disposal a moral 'right' of mass intervention; a neurological capacity for unequivocal 
judgement; and possess at any one time a comprehensive understanding of the 
infinite complexities of the interconnected subtleties of the proverbial 'food chain' at 
large. In addition, and irrespective of the highly questionable nature of such 
capacities, it would follow that such a mandate for mass eradication of predation 
would necessarily ultimately include the most widespread, resourceful and highly
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efficient predator in nature - ourselves. 19 In this respect, such a magnitude of 
intervention in natural processes would be at best self-defeating!
Nevertheless, many environmentalists believe even these sorts of empathic 
sentiments to be misguided in reference to predation in nature as a whole, and Ned 
Hettinger proposes that When animal activists oppose predation, they are opposing
on
nature' In a sense of course, we all oppose nature by virtue of our protecting 
ourselves from its multifarious dangers - we build houses, fence gardens, eradicate 
life-forms that pose a threat to us, and in fact 'control' (oppose) nature at every turn. 
In truth, it is likely that many of those who see themselves as dedicated 
environmentalists and who may be nominally opposed to an individualistic view of 
nature, nevertheless are unlikely to 'admire' predation in and of itself - red in fang 
and claw. Perhaps there is some truth in Hettinger's statement in this restricted 
respect, but I feel it too bold a claim to suggest that actions against predation or 
projects to police nature at large logically or morally follow from these sorts of 
personally experienced and temporal human sentiments. There will of course always 
be 'radicals' who may propose such actions be taken, or argue that the policing of 
nature is even morally required, but this does not mean (as I feel Hettinger's 
statement intimates) that to be an animal advocate per se is to be driven by 
sentiment alone. 21 Rather, the vast majority of animal ethicists ardently argue the 
case for equal consideration of interests for nonhumans from grounded, exhaustive 
and consistent philosophical lines of reasoning.
There is at the other end of the spectrum of moral response, I believe, an 
similarly insidious call to interference with the 'natural order' that is for the most part 
deemed to be acceptable 'management', and certainly would not be viewed by most 
as in any way on par with the sort of anthropomorphic extremes of the 'sentimental
19 In the sense here that we are also predators, and thus in forwarding a mandate of eradication of 
'predation' itself, then excluding humans would effectively negate the mandate - as predation 
would remain so long as homo-sapiens remain. This of course presumes humanity in our present 
omnivorous state that ideologically embraces widespread meat eating practices - and would of 
course not necessarily apply if humankind at large embraced a vegetarian/vegan diet. The former 
argument that turns upon the questionable nature of our adequate capacity/right/understanding to 
instigate such an undertaking does however remain valid irrespective of the second claim.
20 Cited in Ty Raterman (2008), p. 429, this view is surprisingly common and Ned Hettinger here is 
mirroring the essential early claims of the likes of Aldo Leopold (2000) and J Baird Callicot (1992, 
1998, and 1999).
21 For further discussions around these themes see Steve Sapontzis, Morals, Reason, and Animals 
(1987), and Tyler Cowen's paper entitled 'Policing Nature' (2003), p.173.
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fanatics'. Namely, it is the belief that it is far better for humans to 'intervene' in 
nature in sundry circumstances than to let nature run its course, and it is this 
presupposition that lies at the heart of much interventionist policy and practice. The 
logic customarily runs thusly: in acting as 'agents' in nature it is likely that in the 
event of a 'need' to cull a species (we might think of large deer populations in 
confined areas prevented from naturally expanding for example), humans are able to 
act more sensitively than nature itself; this then, is preferable to a potentially lengthy 
demise brought about at the hand of nature; therefore, we adequately discharge our 
'rightful 1 duties to nonhuman animals in this respect. This claim as stewards of 
nature, although not entirely new, takes form latterly (more or less from the Neolithic 
period with the commencement of agriculture) as a human tendency to see 
ourselves not merely as set apart from the natural order, but somehow, in contrast to 
'nature', kindly and benevolent. 22 Given this tradition, it is unsurprising then that 
those environmentalists involved in the vast culling of innumerable animals do so 
with a confidence born of the belief that whilst nature may know best, man knows 
better.
3.2 Conservation of what and preservation for whom?
Irrespective of the conclusions that may be drawn from this abbreviated discussion, it 
is likely clear that the idea of nature, our understanding of the animals that inhabit it, 
and our ideas of our place within it, are elastic notions that conjure up many things to 
many people. What is clear, regardless of how individuals or groups may define or 
delimit 'nature', is that the infliction of pain, suffering and death on individual animals 
at human hands is widespread. Again, this is a statement of what 'is', and factual in 
form. It is, for example, equally 'factual' that along with pain, suffering and death 
inflicted by humans or by 'nature', there is (at least) the potential at other times for 
many animals to experience elation, pleasure, contentment, thrill and an eclectic mix
22 This shift in emphasis correlates with the inception of farming at the commencement of what is 
now termed the Neolithic period and the subsequent 'control' of the natural environment through 
technological advance.
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of other cognitive and emotional responses to simply being alive. To argue that 
nature is merely red in fang and claw - and therefore it is rationally better for animals 
to die at human hands rather than at the hand of nature - again seems logically 
incoherent. Certainly for the individual 'managed' deer, for example, death by a rifle 
shot (a method that very frequently does not produce as 'clean' a kill as is widely 
claimed) results in the same outcome for the deer as any other 'natural' method of 
extermination - cessation of being (Shelton, 2004). The claims proffered by many 
conservationists that a swift death is preferable to a potentially 'lingering' one, and 
that in killing some animals a greater number may therefore survive (again, 
frequently a dubious claim) have at their core the same problematic arguments with 
regard to our dealings with nonhuman sentient beings that were presented in the last 
chapter: namely, the problem of 'killing with kindness' and the problem of bare 
'utilitarian calculus' in our interspecies dealings.
The problem restated
It is worth examining these claims a little closer. The idea that a swift death is 
preferable to a lingering one seems reasonable on face value. However, it is not the 
somewhat obvious observation that less pain is preferable than more pain that is 
contentious here, but rather it is the justification for this claim that needs further 
examination in this context. There is a paradox embedded in the argument, and as 
Dale Jamieson points out,
'Just as the speciesist conceptualisation of animals is driven primarily by the 
desire to celebrate humans, so here the idea of the natural becomes a 
projection of all that humans think of themselves as having overcome or from 
which they are exempt. Yet, paradoxically, there is often an insistence that 
humans are part of nature, even while excepting them from its moral 
demands' (2008, p. 189).
In this schema humans are seen to have 'supplanted' typical top predators such as 
wolves. In the managed landscape the killing of deer, for example, takes on an 
almost symbolic quality (man as the supplanted predator), giving licence to the 
summary life and death 'managerial' decisions that 'conservation' demands. If 
indeed 'man as the modern wolf is a reasonable working analogy, then latterly the 
supplanter is clearly a more ravening and insatiable beast than its predecessor. The
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symbolic aspect with regard to the controlling of nature fomented within the Neolithic 
mindset remains powerful and resilient within modern ways of thinking about nature. 
Jim Mason in fact argues that such 'dominionism' over nature was initiated with the 
commencement of agriculture - that led to two basic and interlinked beliefs about the 
nonhuman world which can be described as 'necessity' and 'nature'. 23 On this 
account, 'the hunt' is an example of the former, culling practices an example of the 
latter. The hunt is portrayed as 'absolute necessity1 , and as such circumvents any 
spurious questions of choice or morality - hunters perform the 'irreproachable' and 
vital roles of people-feeder and nature-controller. The first role prevents starvation, 
the second 'manages' nature by keeping 'wild' animal populations under control. 24 
This symbolism continues into modernity in the form of the interventionist 
'managerial' mindset, that assumes the role of nature-controller- but latterly the bow 
and spear is replaced with sophisticated modern methods of animal population 
control.
Nevertheless, the legacy is that the controlling of nature has become 'second 
nature' for humans, perpetuating the myth that populations of animals (and despite 
potentially catastrophic runaway human population explosion -'human' animals are 
once again somehow excluded) become ungovernable if not constrained by lethal 
restrictions. The self-proclaimed legitimacy for the modern nature-controller still, 
however, resides in the symbolic and antiquated dualistic call to 'necessity' and 
'nature'. Much like the animal welfarists who acquiesce to the moral acceptability of 
mass killing under the banner of 'animal welfare' (by means of the clause that it is 
carried out 'kindly'), animal conservationists likewise acquiesce to mass killing under 
the banner of 'animal management' (by means of the clause that we can legitimately 
defer to our self-prescribed 'license' as nature's surrogate). Both presuppositions 
embrace a legitimacy of treating nonhumans as we essentially see fit.
23 Jim Mason suggests this useful distinction in Unnatural Order: How We Broke Our Primal Bonds 
with Animals and Nature (2004). The commencement of settled agriculture started around 6000 
years ago, and in evolutionary terms is a very recent innovation.
24 Roger Yates outlines these dual roles in 'Rituals of Dominionism in Human-Nonhuman Relations: 
Bullfighting to Hunting, Circuses to Petting' (2009), pp.142-43.
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A fresh viewpoint
Notwithstanding these differences of interpretation, the point here is a simplistic one, 
and one not premised upon how other beings 'match up' to human ideas and 
patterns of social interactions and ideas of 'moral worth'. It is that contemporary 
ethical debate on animal advocacy may better turn upon questions of our willingness 
to view nonhuman animals on their own intrinsic terms, and as embedded within a 
distinct communal framework to the human. Herein however, is a perennial 
stumbling block in much discourse on animal advocacy: how can we admit of 
intrinsic value outside of the human sphere without in some way 'compromising' the 
very essence of our presumptions of what it is to be human and thus in some sense 
'flattening' the moral landscape? (O'Neill et al, 2008, p107). If we are to subscribe to 
the uncontroversial view that the vast majority of human beings are, by degree, 
conscious of their individuality and social incumbent rights, duties and 
responsibilities, how might we be able to objectively determine whether any 
'meaningful' social structures are extant within the animal kingdom?
Furthermore, can such human preconceptions and prejudices ever form a 
basis for truly objective dealings with the non human world? And, is it 'unavoidable' 
therefore that our thoughts and actions are inevitably - to varying degree - 
paternalistic, anthropocentric and value laden? In overlaying our (current) 
understanding of human thought processes upon other animals, and deliberating 
primarily upon such criteria, we unquestionably then assign 'value' dependent upon 
human expectations. Nonetheless, our human moral theories can only be based on 
what we know about and what we 'ought' to care about, and it may be argued that 
this inevitably makes our theories 'anthropocentric' in nature. However, this empirical 
fact alone does not necessarily mean that such theories only have relevance to 
human beings (Warren, 1997, pp.443-44). A basis of contemporary concepts of 
human rights, for example, invariably places emphasis on the uniqueness of human 
beings. In some clear respects this view may well be valid: after all, we perceive of 
our mortality in psychologically complex and 'meaningful' ways, we compose music, 
write poetry and prose and make diverse complex moral choices - other animals 
seem not to do these things. This uniqueness is however grounded in biological 
divergence - brought about by our diverse biological development from other 
evolutionary routes undertaken by other species. Within traditional (and much
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contemporary) ethical debate such substantive biological facts are however too 
readily recurrently translated into 'moral truths' (Regan, 2004, p.88.), and it is to this 
problem that we now turn.
Broadly, in contemporary terms there are two mainstream groups who 
express environmental concern: Nature conservationists (as discussed in this 
chapter) and those often viewed in the mainstream as 'radical' environmentalists 
(which we turn to in chapter four). 25 The former, in their protectionist concerns and 
interests tend to support normative social attitudes to our moral obligations to other 
creatures, and as such, they have no pressing agenda for sweeping change.26 
Conversely, radical environmentalists believe that far-reaching change is necessary 
in order to address urgent environmental issues. Although both profess a deep 
concern for diverse aspects of 'nature' and the nonhuman animals within it, these 
two groups are fundamentally divergent in their interpretation and response to 
environmental issues.
Who decides?
If indeed, as Alan Carter suggests, protectionist groups can rightly be categorised 
and typified in this way, this raises a preliminary question concerning moral 
considerability in relation to interspecies paternalism itself: if it is legitimate to strive 
to protect and conserve chosen environments and the animals and plants that 
comprise such environments, who decides what, where and how those designated 
as worthy of protection are 'saved'? Initially it would on first reading seem evident 
that likely those determining such far-reaching protestations do so by a consensus 
based up solid scientific evidence, perceived value (or danger) to the wider 
ecosystem, or/and species' scarcity as forming a pragmatic basis for such decisions. 
However, identifying those beings which are to be deemed as morally considerable 
is little short of the central task of environmental and animal ethics at large, and 
determining an established basis for such protestations continues to be decidedly 
elusive. This all does of course presuppose that such deliberations are desirable in
25 Alan Carter makes this distinction in A Radical Green Political Theory (1999), p. 328.
26 This is of course not to tritely suggest that to be a conservationist is to be 'mainstream' in 
outlook. It is however predominately the case (and certainly within the UK) that the majority of 
those who make decisions on environmental policy represent a cultural homogeny in attitudes to 
nature.
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the first instance. After all, even if we were to suppose that a valid and rigorous 
criteria for identifying which creatures warrant degrees of moral considerability could 
be universally agreed upon, any such edict nevertheless must make an assumption 
that 'there are or ought to be, insiders and outsiders, 'members' of the club of 
consideranda versus the rest' (Heyward, 1996, p.56). Thomas Birch sums this problem 
up succinctly:
'Moral considerability is one of the credentials for membership in the elite club 
of those humans or nonhumans, like national parks, who are to benefit from 
the ultimately violent suppression and exploitation of the rest of the others 
(i.e., the objects that are taken as fit for domination and control)', (Birch, 1993, 
p. 314).
It is clear then that determining who or what counts for inclusion into or exclusion 
from this exalted group is not merely a matter of speculative nuance, but in the most 
literal sense, a matter of life and death for countless individuals. Birch argues that 
rather than firstly identifying which beings may be morally considerable as a 
predetermination to valuing them, we ought to initially give moral consideration to all 
beings, and posits that in truth the 'the most fundamental job of the entire business 
of ethical research is the discovery of our obligations'27 . This view is distinctly deontic 
in character, and for Birch this perspective 'returns' the focus back to agents as the 
starting point for inquiry. This standpoint does however contrast sharply with what in 
most environmental protectionist policy and practice passes as the normative 
process of determining moral inclusion or exclusion - based largely upon the 
utilitarian project of maximisation of the net sum of the perceived 'good' (and usually 
founded upon a perceived benefit/loss ratio to the 'local' or wider ecosystem for 
instance). For Birch, returning the focus back to agents can at least more readily 
attend to the inattention in much of environmental ethics to the meaning of 
consideration, and where this consideration should be focused. In short, his idea of 
consideration in this instance is that beings are not initially valued in a determinate 
sense, since this would presuppose value criteria and thus be guilty of the very 
presuppositions that the normative view espouses.
We might better assess such a position therefore as a focusing more upon the 
value potential of each individual - in that they would effectively be seen to be
"Cited in Carter (1999), p.322.
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preliminarily valuable (although at this initial stage not yet 'assigned' distinct value). 
A clear strength here is that this precursory view would, at minimum, negate any 
initial equivocation that any particular creatures be classified as simply 'non- 
valuable'. This does however beg the question of how we may make sense of any 
idea of moral consideration which is not already evaluative (the argument proceeds 
that there must either be evaluative criteria extant, or conversely we are left with no 
consideration at all). Through the prism of a rights-based perspective a prerequisite 
quality that such a precursory view would need to demonstrate would certainly be 
that the disposition of the moral agent (and Birch, like any good deontological 
advocate, must centre moral accountability on the moral agent) be free from 
speciesist assumptions. This is of course no easy task. However, allowing for our 
inevitable imperfect knowledge in determining any legitimate nonhuman moral 
considerability, Birch's precursory view at least makes a considered attempt to avoid 
the pitfalls that befall straightforward speciesist presumptions of hierarchical value. 
Besides, it would seem perfectly reasonable to suggest that a view that is as 
'generous' as Birch's is, at least, defensible.28
Generosity is of course in limited supply. Nonetheless, in adopting the 
perspective that Birch suggests the advocate of the deontological approach does not 
have to be left to the cold comfort of mere insight, intuition or generosity of spirit 
alone. The sort of normative determinates based upon solid scientific evidence, 
perceived value (or danger) to the wider ecosystem, or species' scarcity available to 
those frequently espousing a non-deontological point of view are of course equally 
invaluable to the deontologist. A multi-layered knowledge of these factors may, as 
Hayward observes, '.... be thought of as the ensemble of the maximal available 
human knowledge and understanding than as the prerogative of the deontically 
experiencing individual'. 29 This is all to the good, as no individual would rightly claim 
that moral intuitions are somehow disentangled from individual experience and 
knowledge of the world - as experience is always structured and value-laden. 
Indeed, arguing from intuition is invariably fraught with danger, since intuitions are
28 I in fact develop this broad idea of'preliminary' moral considerability through a tentative 
elaboration of a 'weak' biocentric framework in chapter 5. 
29 Tim Hayward (1998), p.60.
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seldom universal. 30 The deontic view, as I understand it in this context, is claiming 
something less than a straightforward reliance on forms of transcendent 'universal' 
moral truth, and may more modestly be interpreted as a shift of attention from ideas 
of considerability as the starting point for environmental protectionism, to a 
refocusing on the practice of consideration. In short, the focal point then is switched 
to the intersubjective conditions of the practice of considering - and in so doing 
emphasis is shifted toward the 'principles' of consideration, and not merely the 
experience of it - the why rather than the what.
My point here is that for animal protectionism this refocusing away from what 
is to be excluded or included in conservation initiatives to consideration of why 
beings are excluded or included in the first instance, must have far-reaching 
consequences for the claims to legitimacy that the normative conservation view 
conveys. 31 For example, arguments based upon the control of so-called 'invasive' 
species would seem less convincing if viewed in the light of a deontological 
approach that demands initial consideration of the merits or demerits of beings in 
non-speciesist terms (or at least attempts an approximation to a conceptual 'species 
neutrality'). In this respect our ideas of what animal is valuable, in and of itself, would 
antecede decisions about what value we assign its 'place' in what is designated as 
the physical community of accepted creatures (an assessment itself highly fraught 
with complex interdependencies, subtle biases, provincialism and erroneous 
evaluations). These deontological themes are picked up again in chapters five and 
six in consideration of the sufficient prerequisites for a form of biocentric 
individualism.
3.3 Managing mismanagement: The end of the individual?
These observations brings into sharp focus a less vocal, but nevertheless tangible 
contemporary criticism of the rights position as adjudged against a protectionist
30 Heather Fieldhouse discusses the problem of moral intuition in the light of Kantian 'indirect' 
duties to nonhumans in The Failure of Kantian Theory of Indirect Duties to Animals' (2004).
31 And indeed forms the backbone of my development of biocentric individualism in the subsequent
chapters.
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ecosystemic view; namely, that such a stance is sometimes accused of a 
'sentimental' view of animals and nature at large, and is, it is argued, little more than 
a naive attempt to overlay the brute realities of 'nature' with a form of 
anthropomorphic inclusiveness. The claim of sentimentalism is in this way commonly 
ascribed to those who would advocate for animal rights and welfare.
Sentimentality itself is of course not to be confused with genuine sympathetic 
and empathetic responses.32 To be sure, the kinds of overt anthropomorphism 
discussed previously33 that would seek to recreate the animality of the nonhuman as 
a displaced 'pseudo-humanity', and attempts to reconstruct an animal's natural 
propensities into something more 'palatable' to a modern urbanized mindset, I 
believe more accurately describes what is meant by 'sentimentality' in its 
conventional context. This overt sentimentalism is, to some degree, arguably born of 
a modern divorcement from the daily life and death struggles that characterizes 
otherwise 'wild 1 nonhuman existence. Nonetheless, our intuitive emotional responses 
- irrespective of time and place - are, as Kathie Jenni puts it, 'central to moral life in 
manifestation of important virtues such as compassion, and as an indicator that 
something we are party to or are witnessing is wrong' (2005, pp.9-11). 34 Emotions 
may not of course provide a firm or indeed sufficient basis for considered moral 
judgment, but are at the very least an indispensible (and importantly, 'unavoidable') 
starting-point for moral deliberation. There is, however, embedded within our post- 
enlightenment and largely (still) male-dominated culture a distinct and yet tangible 
mistrust of emotion itself- one certainly reflected in the (mis)management principles 
of the 'scientific' paternalism that, I argue in this chapter, drives much conservation 
management policy and practice. In this sense, we are culturally prone to an 
unreflective dualism that sees reason divorced from - and opposed to - emotion. As 
Jenni points out, 'Even though neurobiology itself vitiates this false division, and
32 The role of emotion in moral reflection does of course constitute a major theme of moral 
philosophy and I have no wish to expand at length upon the diverse arguments arising from such 
in this work. However, for a holistic moral philosophy that touches upon many of the themes 
discussed here, see Martha Nussbaum, 'Finely Aware and Richly Responsible: Moral Attention and 
the Task of Literature' (1985), and for a classical interpretation of the role of emotion in 
philosophical thought see David Hume A treatise of Human Nature (2007), and for a more general 
introductory discussion of the role of feelings in moral philosophy see Anthony Weston A Practical 
Companion to Ethics (2002).
33 In 3.1 'Animal ethics and the problem of predation'.
34 Kathie Jenni emphasises the naturalness of empathic responses in The Power of the Visual' 
(2005).
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though it has been rejected in much work in moral philosophy, it persists as a 
persuasive confusion among the general public, as well as among many 
intellectuals' (2005, p.9). 35
Animal advocacy the role of empathy
This is not to suggest that considered introspection, multi-layered knowledge 
and rounded experience do not play a key role in shaping, directing and 
'rationalizing' our elementary empathetic and sympathetic responses. Conversely, I 
do not wish to claim that those who hold to an ecosystemic view of conservation 
management are not so inspired to action by genuine feelings of empathy and 
concern for the environment. Rather, that in charging animal advocates who would 
centre their concern primarily upon individual suffering and use with sentimentalism, 
there is embedded within this charge a frequent tendency towards an unconsidered 
mistrust of the role of emotion in moral deliberation. In the variety of moral 
consternations that arise from everyday moral life (and here particularly of course in 
respect to what may constitute our moral obligations to other-than-human animals), it 
is not emotion itself that is to be mistrusted, but rather unreflective and prejudiced 
determinations. After all, in witnessing the first hand protracted suffering of a sentient 
being (or perhaps, inadvertently being the direct or indirect instigator of such), the 
individual who does not feel distress or disgust is not nowadays rightly deemed to be 
a pillar of Cartesian reason and detachment. 36
This raises a further general concern in respect to the enormity of animal 
suffering globally, and the complexity of ascertaining what in fact may be our 
appropriate moral responses to the varied forms that this suffering assumes. Some 
argue that for 'practical' reasons - such as our effective functioning and general 
mental health, we are better restricting our moral responses and sphere of moral 
concern to problems that we can 'see' - in effect, only those that we witness, or are
35 Also, for some excellent investigation in this particular area see Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes' 
Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (1994).
36 1 of course refer here to Descartes' widely discredited notion that sensations of pain, are only 
possible in beings that are composed of both mind and body because sensations emerge from the 
commingling of these two substances. Animals, according to Descartes, are, however, composed 
of only one of the two substances: body. Hence animals are sophisticated machines that are 
capable of making the physical motions and grimaces that would in humans accompany the 
sensation of pain; but, possessing no minds themselves, animals are incapable of possessing the 
accompanying sensation.
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involved in personally in one way or another. For those holding an ecosystemic view 
of conservation, these may be things that we may therefore be able to pragmatically 
'manage' effectively. For those who support this view (and this support tends in large 
part to be habitually 'tacit' in nature), attempting to identify with the immensity of 
nonhuman suffering in meaningful ways is simply too enormous a task - and 
pointedly, in this respect 'enormous' is all too readily translated to 'erroneous'. In 
effect, therefore good cause for reverting to 'unreflective' habitual responses that, I 
believe, delimit our rational agency and integrity, in omitting all that which passes out 
of view. However, suffering that passes out of view is still suffering. In his discussion 
of 'escapism', John L. Longeway refers to escapism as comprising of strategies by 
which one 'attempts to keep beliefs one does not like out of consciousness...and, 
should they enter consciousness, to distract one from them or put them out of mind' 
(1980, p.2).
It is somewhat odd then, that animal advocates who centre their moral 
concern primarily upon individual suffering and use are criticized by many who may 
take a holistic view of suffering to be sentimental - and by implication naive (by for 
example, environmentalists who would view the 'suffering' of endangered species to 
be encapsulated in the fact that the species itself is suffering threat of extinction). 
What I mean here is that it is substantively the case (in the 'real' and extant world) 
that it is individuals that experience the harm of pain and suffering - in that the 
neurological, psychological and physiological experience of pain and suffering (and 
its ensuing harms) ends at the boundaries of the individual body. This seems on face 
value an obvious statement of fact, but has direct bearing upon the claims of 
sentimentality and naivety against animal rights advocates that many holistic 
environmentalists and conservationists insinuate. Is it, in fact, 'more' sentimental to 
ground notions of animal advocacy upon the actual physical delimitations of pain and 
suffering (such as the harm that each individual uniquely suffers), or upon 
aggregated (and 'non-existent' - outside of our categorizations) human notions of 
'group suffering' such as the 'harm' of species extinction - that drives much 
conservation? Extinction itself is in fact a normal evolutionary process, substantiated 
by the fact that over 99% of documented species that have lived at one time or
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another are now extinct. 37 In this context at least, it may be said that no individual 
nonhuman as far as we can tell was ever 'harmed' by the extinction of 'its' species 
(with perhaps the 'last' representative excepted, by virtue of having no reproductive 
possibility). For staunch conservationists, these propositions must constitute an 
uncomfortable and disconcerting problematic, and herein the rights view sketched 
above is decidedly unsentimental in its broader view.
Modes of inclusion
A highly selective view is starkly evident in our categorising of much of the animal 
world, in that we tend to categorise the world around us in general terms rather than 
the particular. For instance, we habitually classify nonhuman animals in generic 
terms, for example 'birds' or 'bees'. Of course aggregation in this sense is expedient 
in helping us to 'make sense' of the world around us. Virtually all species have some 
form of mutually beneficial collective structure and this is evidenced both in the so- 
called 'lower' and 'higher' animals - arguably culminating in the highly developed 
moral, political and social structures of us homo-sapiens. We readily accept modes 
of inclusion in inter-human relationships, and the individual's place within the social 
milieu is normatively based primarily upon little more than (human) species 
membership (this is of course not to suggest that domination, oppression and 
exclusion do not also categorise our dealings with each other). However, these 
accepted modes of inclusion are largely missing from inter-species relationships 
(Benton, 1993, p.163). In acknowledging humans as both (and concurrently) group 
and individually defined, but viewing the non human world generally as 'collectives' 
and rarely as individuals, we clearly set a distinction ultimately based not on 
concepts of species' collective behaviours, but what may be construed as little more 
than a deep unwillingness to accept the 'individual' within the assigned collective. As 
previously discussed, this tendency toward 'group classification' has historically been 
a central tenet of many sundry forms of discrimination in the human sphere.
We can then, bluntly, view these ways of thinking as 'holistic' - in that they 
promulgate the idea that the existence of a thing does not involve anything more
37 For a thoroughgoing critique see George S. Fichter in Endangered Animals (1995), pp. 5.
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than its relationship to certain other (interrelated) things. 38 Conversely, we may 
broadly observe that atomistic theories tend to view individual things as having quite 
a separate existence over and above that of other things. What is important here 
however is that both holists (and collectivists generally) and atomists (and likewise 
individualists) both accept, by degree, 'interrelationships' as core constituents of their 
respective ontologies. In essence, viewing the world as composing of individuals 
does not of course preclude acceptance that each individual exists within a 
concentrically wider interrelationship with the world around them.
Both views however inevitably influence the ways in which we view wider 
nature and discourse tends to take one of three general forms in contemporary 
society concerning this question: the pessimistic which sees the treatment of animals 
by humans as cause for deep pessimism; the optimistic view - which may admit of 
many problems, but asserts that we can humanely manage the natural world; and 
'realistic' notions which concede to life as a natural struggle in which animal and 
human conflicts will 'find' a natural balance (Walker, 1995, pp.60-61). However, it is 
less clear as to how these generalities are to be understood, and more importantly 
for our discussion here, how the individual animal may be defined within these 
disparate constructs.
In considering the extent of our interventions with those other living creatures that 
share the environment, how might we then square a rights-based animal ethic with 
what may be legitimate obligations and duties to wild animals? As we have seen, 
historically animal ethicists tend to make distinctions between animals in human 
servitude and so-called 'wild' animals. For supporters of animal rights, moral duties 
and obligations to the former category of beings are distinctly drawn between 
welfarist approaches and abolitionist views. Both those who emphasis treatment and 
those who dispute our use of domesticated animals (the rights/welfare dichotomy) 
nevertheless share a common presupposition - that such animals deserve some 
form of protection that exceeds current safeguards.
38 It is helpful here to recount that essentially the idea of atomism is the 'opposite' of holism; and 
likewise individualism is in this respect therefore the 'opposite' of collectivism. See Glossary for 
further definitions of holism in this context.
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Revaluing the individual
Much of the impetus for the widely held presupposition within animal and 
environmental ethics that argues that nonhuman animals deserve some form of 
concrete protection, frequently turns upon notions of intrinsic value - broadly, the 
value a 'thing' has in its own right™ However, the term intrinsic value - rather like 
expressions such as 'liberty' and 'freedom' - whilst in the main engendering 
favourable consent, largely escapes meaningful definition and widespread 
understanding. Moreover, as Katie McShane points out, intrinsic value can refer to 
diverse and very different ethical working concepts, that she groups into four useful 
categories:
1. Views according to which claims about the intrinsic value of X are claims 
about the distinctive role that X should play in moral decision making.
2. Views according to which claims about the intrinsic value of X are claims 
about the distinctive way that it makes sense to care about X.
3. Views according to which claims about the intrinsic value of X are claims 
about which properties of X make it valuable.
4. Views according to which claims about the intrinsic value of X are claims 
about the metaphysical status of X's value properties' (2007, p.47).
It is clear that the varied forms of protectionism (encompassing animal and wider 
environmental ethical contexts) that have been discussed to date in this work can 
fairly be seen to fall under one or other of these general categories. The first group 
for example, embraces views that emphasise moral standing and ideas that intrinsic 
values should outweigh other values in matters of conflicts of interests. The second 
operational category includes views of intrinsic value that tend to differentiate 
between valuing things intrinsically for their 'own' sake, or merely instrumentally in 
attempts to form any valid ethic. The third category comprises of views that involve 
the claim that for something to be intrinsically valuable is for it to be valuable 
precisely because of its intrinsic non-relational properties, and thus views such
39 Although latterly, there have been some calls to abandon the concept of intrinsic value 
altogether from within protectionist literature and environmental thought. Intrinsic value is seen as 
being unhelpful in determining w/7/the nonhuman world should matter to us morally (and 
pragmatically). See for example, Andrew Light (2002), Bruce Morito (2003), Bryan G. Norton 
(1995) and Anthony Weston (1996) for wider critique of this notion.
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properties as legitimately not dependent upon its relationship to something else. The 
fourth group tends to consist of views about the metaphysical status of individual 
value, that proposes that there exist intrinsic value in things despite human valuing - 
in short, that being valuable is a non-relational 'property' of objects. As McShane 
notes, to make these general categorisations is not to say that a given view cannot 
of course fall into more than one of them; for example, Regan's rights-based view 
discussed in chapter one would rightly fall under both group 1 and 2.
So, generally speaking, we may say that our valuing of the intrinsic nature of a 
given thing, and the attitudes that arise from this valuing, play an essential role for 
the purposes of applied ethics in this context. What can be drawn from these broad 
categories is that there is certainly a commonality to such theories of value (in that 
intrinsic value can be/is seen in several independent or combined ways), and it is 
these kinds of categories that have fomented the subject matter of much of this work. 
A primary concern arising from this pluralistic basis has likewise been the 
determination of how, or if, a given theory individuates the bearers of intrinsic value. 
For a work that argues for the illegitimacy of presumptive use of animals and 
advocates a move towards biocentric individualism, how we may determine the 
individuation of what (whom) is deserving of moral standing remains a key element - 
and one discussed at length in the next chapter in the context of holistic approaches 
to animal advocacy.
Within the perspective of the themes of this chapter, it is however a question 
of how a given theory of animal advocacy individuates the bearers of intrinsic value 
that determines, in large part, its application in practice. It is from this notion of 
individuation that the conception of my proposed individualistic account arising from 
an argued illegitimacy of use begins to foment. It would for example, seem a 
reasonable claim that it is nonsensical to talk about relations between things (and the 
subsequent values attributed to them) unless there is an acknowledgment that there 
are things being related. This, in effect, means that we have to separate out 
individual things from the general - the particular from the vague. In fact, our 
psychological make-up is such that we do individuate objects in our environment 
simply in order to make sense of otherwise chaos. The salient point here is that in 
regard to our moral inclinations towards the natural world and the creatures that are 
environed within it, we likewise frequently require that we separate out individual
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things from the mass of experience. McShane makes an interesting comparison to 
the ways in which we view each other in arguing that, 'I have to understand myself 
as separate from you in order to love or hate you; I need to know which part of the 
world you refers to in order to resent you or feel guilty about how I treated you. I also 
need to individuate the 'you' parts of the world in order to think that I have ethical 
obligations toward you' (2007, p.57). These conceptual differentiations inherent in 
this mode of thinking are not pertinent solely to our human understanding of our own 
place in the world, but pertain equally to our understanding of the place of nonhuman 
individuals.
There is however an evident concern that emerges from this straightforward 
assertion: if we are to 'divide' up the world into the individuals that compose such, 
there is then a danger of unavoidably diminishing the importance of relationships, 
systems and the processes embedded in this complexity in deference to a theory of 
individuation. If indeed a theory of individuation makes the individual the singular 
mode of understanding phenomena (in moral terms at least), the counter argument 
is that it will inevitably miss the 'importance' of other things. In actuality, nothing in 
existence subsists in isolation, and to attempt to form an ethic that demands such an 
overtly atomistic worldview would seem inconsistent with the 'experienced' world 
around us. However, reliance upon our tendency to individuate objects (and in the 
context of this work, living 'subjects'), does not of necessity negate our other 
tendencies (such as the tendency to group certain individuals in order to make 
relational sense of the world). 40 In other words, because individuation is suggested 
as the primary mode of understanding phenomena in moral terms, this does not 
mean that it is the only mode of understanding such, and therefore that such a view 
must necessarily ignore secondary, tertiary and other considerations. The central 
observation to draw here in the context of this chapter's themes is that intrinsic value 
does not signify absolute value.
There is here then a need to make a working distinction at this point between 
intrinsic value and moral standing for the purposes of further discussion of a re-
40 We might think here of the difficulty and probable undesirability of individuating a shoal of fish 
at sea. It is clearly more cogent to view these 'individuals' in the shoal context for reasons of 
relational explanation (to determine for example a shoal of mackerel from a shoal of herring). This 
does not however infer that the shoal is a 'living entity' in and of itself, but merely suffices to 
distinguish one aggregate from another.
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evaluation of the individual in wider animal protectionism. Within the contemporary 
debate these terms are often conflated, and, for some theories of value, legitimately 
amount to much the same thing in applied moral deliberation.41 Moreover, for many 
environmentalists for example, the notion of holistic intrinsic value - and not merely 
instrumental value - has considerable appeal. There is a tendency however on this 
account to overlook the subtle distinction between intrinsic value in these terms and 
moral standing - in attributing the latter to inanimate entities, when only the former is 
warranted. Rick O'Neil makes a working distinction in discussion of moral standing 
and intrinsic value, 'Something has intrinsic value if its existence is a good thing in 
itself, apart from its role as a means to other goods. Something has moral standing 
(or moral considerability) if it can be benefited or harmed, if its interests deserve 
consideration. Whereas intrinsic value involves an object's good, moral standing 
involves membership in the moral community and possible possession of a right' 
(2000, p. 185).
3.4 The individual redefined
The effective confusion between moral standing and intrinsic value frequently 
beleaguers the contemporary environmental/animal ethics debate. The arguable 
failure of animal rightists to adequately protect 'nature' may therefore in part amount 
to a confusion concerning the distinction between intrinsic value and moral standing, 
embodied in their reluctance to attribute moral standing beyond the merely sentient. 
Conversely, environmentalists claim that to adequately protect nature demands 
acknowledgment of intrinsic value and subsequent inclusion in the moral community 
to non-sentient entities is likewise arguably to confuse the distinction. In sum, the 
claim that the environment can be best stewarded by effectively making nature part 
of the 'moral community', is to ignore the function of moral standing in ethical debate: 
namely, to acknowledge those beings that our actions and practices could 
conceivably benefit or harm. In this sense, even if inanimate entities have intrinsic
41 For example animal rights theorists such as Tom Regan (2004) in grounding argument upon the 
basis of possession of intrinsic value, extrapolates this to possession of moral worth as subjects- 
of-a-life. In effect, once intrinsic value for an individual (living being) is claimed, it follows that the 
independent subject must possess some moral standing in and of itself.
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value, they clearly cannot 'benefit' in any ethical sense by inclusion into the moral 
community.
Re-evaluating the individual
We may then, in subscribing to any tentative re-evaluation of the 'place' of the 
nonhuman individual in the context of individuation as the primary mode of 
understanding phenomena in moral terms, necessarily be required to reevaluate our 
taken-for-granted paternalistic predispositions towards such beings. The epigraph 
from Marti Kheel resonates here, 'Humans are not husbands of nature, and nature is 
not our wife. Animal husbandry is long overdue for divorce'. This divorce from our 
prescriptive 'beneficent1 relationship may call for a form of 'moral respect' that animal 
advocacy - in its normative presuppositions - fails to embrace. What form then might 
this moral respect take and how might we, instead of subordinating them to our 
wishes, empower such creatures to manifest themselves as their specific kinds of 
beings? Elisa Aaltola suggests a sequential line of argument:
1. 'Animals and humans are all creatures through which being occurs
2. Each creature manifests being in a different manner
3. The special characteristic of humans is their openness to the world 
(understanding beings as beings)
4. This characteristic leads (or should lead) humans to let beings manifest 
themselves and their difference in peace'42
The straightforward ethical significance to be drawn from this logic is that animals do 
not have to resemble humans to count morally. This would seem a forthright 
proposition in itself, but the notion of moral respect seems to intuitively carry more 
ethical weight than a recommendation to simply annul our relationship. As Aaltola 
suggests, an aspect of 'valuing' is assent to a form of 'other acknowledging', which 
resists domination and lets 'the other' retain their situatedness in the world - their 
'otherness' in approbation (Kheel's marriage/divorce analogy is pertinent here). In 
this way our traditional value-laden protectionist ideas can begin to yield to a
42 Elisa Aaltola outlines this argument in her summing up of the Heideggerian views of Frank 
Schalow, William McNeill and Simon James in 'Other Animal Ethics' and the Demand for 
Difference'(2002), pp. 193-209.
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respectful attitude to animals, and so Value' and 'attitude' are effectively 
disentangled. From this assertion Aaltola adds a conclusion to her line of reasoning:
5. 'Letting be' leads to a moral-like (but not 'moral' in the traditional sense) 
acknowledgement of animals as others in the form of wonder1
Of course a 'moral like' acknowledgement can easily be construed as too broad in 
concept. It does not, for example, give us any clearer indication of the actual scope 
of inclusion or exclusion and may be seen as no less anthropocentric in essence as 
any other value-laden 'elitist' ethical stance. If we are in fact to consider what or who 
may be included in a respectful attitude to others, should the inanimate world also be 
included as many deep ecologists suggest, or are sentient animals to be considered 
more 'awe inspiring' and thus demand 'greater' respect? This then leads us to a 
troubling proposition. If we are to prefer (some) animals over rivers and rocks for 
example, then given this, it is likely that we will further prefer some animals over 
others. This again introduces a 'selective ethic', likely based on how the entity 
matches up to human beings (those things 'closer1 to us are ascribed greater value). 
Furthermore, this 'respect' criterion may in the final analysis be too subjectively 
based to form a broad ethic of action - the 'letting be' may have to include, for 
example, the 'letting be' to suffer innumerable 'preventative' harms. This idea of 
'letting be' and the consequences for animal protectionism is explored in greater 
depth in the light of an individualistically-based view in chapter four in critique of 
ecocentrism.
Reformist Tinkering?
A key point of intersection between welfarist aims within animal ethics as presented 
thus far, and many of the avowed aspirations of protectionist ethics is, I argue 
throughout, a commitment to what Alan Carter terms 'reformist tinkering' (1999, p.28). 
Encapsulating this reformist agenda is an underlying 'faith' in the power of 
incremental positive change.43 But is there any convincing evidence that reformism - 
both in the guise of welfarism and protectionist initiatives - has in fact the power to
43 Direct comparisons can be made here between this faith in positive change that many 
environmentalists proclaim and the belief in the efficacy of piecemeal change that the 'new 
welfarists' tout, see chapter 2.3 for a discussion of new welfarism and its problematic
presumptions.
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change our arguably deficient basic moral responses to our obligations to other 
beings? In short, reformism, in the final analysis may simply not take the problem of 
power differentials sufficiently seriously.
If we are to admit of the necessity of some form of species differentiation in 
our moral thinking, it would seem to follow that as a preliminary task we need to 
ascertain our meaning of 'species' above and beyond its general (although varied) 
scientific usage. That animals are usefully categorised according to phenotype 
(chiefly, individuals closely resembling one another with the ability to interbreed) in 
order to make sense of the niche evolutionary adaptations life on this planet has 
evolved to fill, does not directly equate to legitimate aggregate 'value' judgments of 
the same. As intimated previously, there is no such extant thing as 'species' that 
concretely transcends its aggregate components. This observation is critical here 
because if the aggregate parts are merely convenient human constructs, it does not 
therefore validate the straightforward assumption that such classifications can 
'embody' relevant moral status in and of themselves. Neither then in this context is 
the aggregate 'species' likewise morally distinct, and therefore 'species' can only be 
morally relevant in the ways that its constituent elements are. In short, 'species' has 
no essential 'core' nature. As Daniel Elstein succinctly points out Therefore, to make 
moral distinctions based on species in itself, without reference to what species 
consists of, is to make moral distinctions based on nothing'. 44 Whilst it is true that 
the construction of species is 'real', it is the reality of species itself that is in question 
in this case. Of course there are many instances where such social constructions 
can legitimately be the subject matter of moral reasoning, and indeed ethics at large 
variously ponders elusive constructs such as rights, freedom and liberty - none of 
which could be said to exist in 'independent' concrete form.
Furthermore, this is not to make the highly implausible claim that species' 
differences do not clearly exist, or that such categorisations are not valid (and likely 
essential) as convenient conceptual tools for biological enquiry. Rather it is to infer 
that in being socially constructed, such constructs are inevitably culturally 
contextualised - and therefore frequently value-laden. What may be viewed as useful 
in one cultural context may be seen to be detrimental in another. For example, even
44 Daniel Epstein makes this distinction as his basis for a Moral Species Concept in 'Species as a 
Social Construction: Is Species Morally Relevant?' (2003).
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within the scientific community divergent concepts tend more to reflect diverse 
epistemic interests rather than providing some universally understood meaning of 
the term: evolutionary biologists emphasise evolution with regard to species; 
ecologists focus upon ecological niches; whilst other biologists interested in 
morphology define species in terms of morphological characteristics (Wilson, 1999, 
p. 192).
Given that the constructed term itself has no universal meaning, it is evident 
then that talk of 'species' as morally relevant is open to misinterpretation at best, and 
incredulity at worst. Simply put, species is not a morally relevant term. The term is 
frequently misused in this sense, often to equate our constructed concepts of 
'species' (defining particular groups differently) with our tendency to speciesism 
(valuing particular groups differently). However, the confusion here is more than 
mere semantics, as our value judgments concerning various species are not, in 
practice, judgments about the divergent importance of species, but about the 
importance of the qualities that are correlated with our perceptions of 'species'. 
Crucially, speciesism in this respect disregards individual differences both within and 
across species, whilst at the same time ignoring the foundational animal liberation 
maxim that individuals should be treated differently in as much as they possess 
morally relevant differences.45 If we are to base value judgments on distinctions 
between differences in what amounts to little more than appearances (creatures 
look' different), then such commonplace assumptions unavoidably ignore qualitative 
morally relevant characteristics in favour of superficial distinctions. Again, 
appearances alone are not morally relevant; likewise, whom individuals have the 
ability to successfully reproduce with is not morally relevant.
Deconstructing 'species'
The constructed term 'species' is, moreover, not confined to commonplace 
assumptions or speciesist platitudes. Within animal ethics, and much animal 
protectionist thinking, the term is rarely substantiated or challenged and takes on a 
taken-for-granted quality. Within discourse on animal rights and the place of the 
nonhuman animal, many theorists readily debate the moral relevance of species
45 Peter Singer of course makes famous use of this moral maxim as a basis for development of his 
animal liberation position, Animal Liberation (1995).
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without at first ascertaining what in fact species is, or what it may mean in the 
context of the debate. In short, species membership is recurrently thought of as an 
essential characteristic of an individual - whereas in concrete terms beyond 
classifications of membership, it does not exist.
I contend that because the meaning of species in the context of animal 
advocacy has not to date been routinely and rigorously deconstructed, opponents of 
animal rights have sometimes used this ambiguity to bolster their positions.46 As 
Elstein observes, The claim that species is morally significant seems to hold more 
water when we have not said what species is' (2003, p.7). It is, I argue in this work, 
the very interpretation, understanding and use of 'species' that likewise forms the 
collective shaky foundations for the ascribed legitimacy of many aspects of animal 
welfarism (in chapter two), animal protectionism (in chapter three) and ecocentrism 
(in chapter four). In each case, what it is that we mean when we espouse 'species' 
needs to be acutely deconstructed.
The very nature of interpretation of course presupposes differences between 
human individuals, groups or indeed cultures. There is also, it is to be admitted, a 
frequent normative correlation between a strict scientific classification of what 
species may constitute and generic interpretation. For example, the biologist Scott 
Atran concludes that:
'Generic species often correspond to scientific genera or species, at least for 
those organisms that humans most readily perceive, such as large 
vertebrates and flowering plants.....A principled distinction between biological 
genus and species is not pertinent to local folk around the world'. 47
These sorts of societal and cultural interpretations can, conversely, influence 
biological categories. For example, it is a continuing interpretive anomaly that 
humans are classified as apes, since we are genetically closer to chimpanzees - in 
fact more than chimpanzees are to orangutans. Evidently, societal and historical
46 In particular Carl Cohen has argued this value-laden form of species' in asserting that 'when we 
think clearly and judge fairly, we are all speciesists of course', in The Animal Rights Debate 
(2001). Cohen, I believe, uses the term incorrectly in attributing qualities to the constructed and 
descriptive term, and thus uses species to somehow 'naturalistically' equate to unequal moral 
value judgments - and so is able to make the dangerous assertion that......'we are all speciesists
of course'.
47 Scott Atran, The Universal Primacy of Generic Species in Folk-biological Taxonomy: Implications 
for Human Biological, cultural, and Scientific Evolution in Robert Wilson's Species: New 
Interdisciplinary Essays (1999).
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interpretations continue to permeate even our own provenance, let alone how we 
interpret other species. This is not to say that there are not marked differences 
between humans and chimpanzees (or apes for that matter), but rather that there are 
marked disparities in how we interpret these differences. For example, biologists will 
rightly interpret the 'usefulness' of species in the way that is pertinent to their needs 
-the relevant characteristics for their field of concern. Likewise then, it is reasonable 
to propose that in order to form a species concept relevant to moral philosophy, 
theorists need to interpret the usefulness of species from whatever characteristics 
are morally relevant.
Conclusion
The arguments presented in this chapter 'broadened' the remit of animal advocacy in 
its normative sense, in questioning the ethical validity of much conservation theory 
and practice in the light of the theoretical grounding arising from the animal ethics 
debate. A key enquiry of this chapter has concerned the difficulty of how an animal 
rights-based position may provide a credible basis for our 'obligations' to systemic 
environmental management, preservation of ecosystems and conservation of 
endangered species. Throughout this chapter I have drawn attention to the fact that 
the presumption of use inherent in much animal advocacy (and here examined in the 
context of stewardship) is not seriously questioned within a good deal of 
environmental ethical discourse. The delimitations of the scope of interventionism 
and the development of a 'hands-off animal rights-based view were then presented 
through a critique of 'Animal ethics and the problems of predation'. Subsequently, 
the problem of identifying those beings which are to be deemed morally considerable 
with a paternalistic context was investigated, again in the light of the recurrent theme 
of the underlying presumption of legitimacy of animal use. In conclusion, in 'Re- 
evaluating the individual', individuation was suggested as the primary mode of 
understanding phenomena in moral terms, and argued to be crucial in any 
reevaluation our taken-for-granted paternalistic predispositions towards nonhumans. 
For the ethicist then, mere appearance or taken-for-granted characteristics 
must prove wholly inadequate for any moral assessment of the meaning of species. 
Key to the arguments presented within this work is an acknowledgment that a focus 
on a morally founded species concept would necessarily require us to classify
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species not as an essential characteristic of an individual, but rather as the sum of 
morally relevant characteristics of each individual perse. The pertinent point here is 
that this will of course demand that we reassess our prescriptive paternalistic 
presuppositions regarding the place and the definition of the 'individual' in wider 
nature. In sum, a morally founded species concept leads us to classify individuals 
according to the types of moral respect they require, and not according to a 
constructed conception of 'species' that is deemed to somehow transcend its 
aggregate components. A morally founded species concept, I will subsequently 
argue, is then both 'biocentric' and individualistic in essence. In chapter four an 
exploration of holistic responses to animal advocacy is undertaken. I argue that they 
too are largely ineffectual in creating an inclusive ethic that embraces the value of 
the individual within the whole, and likewise suggest that they carry with them the 
same sorts of presumptions of legitimacy of animal use that permeate the diverse 
strands of animal advocacy discussed thus far.
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4. Ecocentrism and Animals: The New 
Stewardship Creed
Environmental fascism and the rights view are like oil and water: they 
don't mix. Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights. 1
In the previous chapter the idea of paternalism within animal advocacy was 
introduced in the context of conservation theory and practice. I will suggest in this 
chapter that what is generally understood to be 'environmentalism' is, in its many 
guises, decidedly holistically-driven in its frequently unquestioned acquiescence to 
the concept of 'preferred groups'. It is this presumption of the individual as valued to 
the degree of its systemic value to a greater whole rather than the value of each 
individual that persistently drives the rationale of most green thought. 2 An ecocentric 
approach and its efficacy for adequate animal protectionism will be discussed in the 
light of the central contentions of this work. Ecocentrism itself, although usually 
equated to a general form of nonanthropocentrism, comprises a particular form of 
nonanthropocentrism that represents a 'subset' of a broad-spectrum 
nonanthropocentric stance. Harold Glasser gives a useful working definition,
'Ecocentrism values ecosystems as wholes and defines value in terms of the 
well-being and flourishing of these ecosystems. Ceteris paribus, it tends not to 
differentiate between the relative value of an ecosystem's diverse 
constituents. Ecocentrism is an assertion of the intrinsic value of whole 
ecosystems and of each constituent' (1997, p.73).
Conversely, a general nonanthropocentrism, as such, offers little or no guidance for 
determining the relative value of individual members or ecosystems. This is not to 
say that nonanthropocentric views necessarily have no descriptive or theoretical 
substance, but that the term itself inevitably embraces diverse ways of looking at,
'This is a key contention for Regan regarding prescriptive environmentalism (2004), p. 362. 
2 See Naess The Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects (1986), Bill Devall and 
George Sessions, Deep Ecology: Living As If Nature Mattered (1985), and Warwick Fox in A Theory 
of General Ethics: Human Relationships, Nature and the Built Environment (2006), also for a 
broader perspective see an earlier paper entitled, 'Deep Ecology: A New Philosophy of Our Time? 
(1984).
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and theorising about, the environment at large. The term is useful, not least as the 
descriptive antonym of the traditional anthropocentric view that has, for those who 
would describe themselves as nonanthropocentric in outlook, fostered what Stewart 
Davidson calls an 'epistemic disconnection with nature' (1995, p.321). From the 
nonanthropocentric position, traditional anthropocentrism has in large part failed to 
observe the sorts of pivotal interrelationships between the parts of the 'whole' that 
individuals experience as part of their own existence - a failure that has, as Alan 
Carter observes, brought humanity 'perilously close to undermining the very basis of 
its own continued existence' (1999, p.324). Naturally, in a straightforward unqualified 
sense, we cannot in any meaningful way avoid being anthropogenic if it is merely 
taken to mean that we inevitably perceive and interpret the world around us from a 
human perspective. 3 In an interpretation of the 'formal' use of anthropocentrism, 
Stephen Avery remarks that 'If it is accepted that we cannot break out of the 
'hermeneutic circle', then it is naive to expect that we can avoid being 
anthropocentric in this formal sense of the term. Formal anthropocentrism, then, 
represents nothing more than the consequence of being human' (2004, p.35). What is 
centrally at issue in the context of the current argument is, however, not whether or 
not anthropocentrism in this sense may be unavoidable (and my ongoing claim is 
that it largely is), but rather what precisely it is that carries the burden of work within 
an adequate 'nonanthropocentric' environmental ethical framework.
Seeking an adequate environmental ethic
There are two provisional principal issues regarding what it is that may constitute an 
'adequate' environmental ethic in our dealings with nonhuman animals - and by 
extension the domain of nature at large. There is the preliminary task of identifying 
what dispositions may be constitutive of an environmentally sensitive, appropriate, 
sustainable and effective interrelationship with the living and non-living world; and 
secondly, there is a need to identify what may be the appropriate role of pertinent
3 An important distinction is to be made here between anthropogenic provenance and 
commonplace anthropocentric ways of thinking. See Glossary for a detailed explanation of my use
and of the pivotal distinction to be made.
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developed environmental 'virtues' (or indeed vices) within such an emerging 
environmental ethic.4
An adequate environmental ethic will, at minimum, need to provide a 
theoretical platform for promoting sustainable practices, policies and individual ways 
of life. The laconic problem is that there is certainly far less agreement regarding 
what is practically (and frequently theoretically) required in order to meet this 
'general adequacy' condition. Notwithstanding these difficulties, it is clear that any 
'adequate' ethic must confront both theoretical and practical challenges. Minimum 
criteria for a proposed adequate environmental ethic are that it should then:
1. 'Provide a theoretical platform for reliable, sustained and justified critique of 
environmentally unsustainable practices, policies and lifestyles.
2. Provide action-guidance - i.e., recommend a course of action - in concrete 
situations regarding individual or communal interactions or relationships with 
the natural environment.
3. Provide arguments, reasons, and/or justification that are efficacious in 
moving people to adopt or implement the solutions that are recommended'. 5
Herein, the first and second of these proposed necessary conditions are theoretical, 
the third is largely practical in nature. These necessary conditions for a supposed 
adequate environmental ethic perceptibly present complex challenges. Indeed, 
fundamental questions over the adequacy of any ethical framework (whether 
founded upon a virtue, consequentialist, rights based, intuitionist or a pragmatic 
basis) to wholly address these conditions, are of course the very substance of 
contemporary ethical discourse and debate. The proposed biocentric individualistic 
view that challenges the legitimacy of animal use advanced later in this work is of 
course no exception. The preliminary task of identifying what dispositions may be 
constitutive of an environmentally sensitive, appropriate, sustainable and effective 
interrelationship with the living and non-living world is however wide-ranging in 
nature - in that we can variously be disposed to treat nature as something to be 
studied, subdued, feared, 'separate', sublime or mysterious. Theoretically speaking,
4 Although it may well be imagined that there are of course several criteria for determining 
'adequacy' here, Ronald Sandier makes this useful 'preliminary' distinction relevant to the 
purposes of the current argument in discussion of his take on a virtue based ethic, in 'Towards an 
Adequate Environmental Virtue Ethic' (2004).
5 Sandier (2004), p.479.
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an individual may be viewed (and/or view themselves) as anthropocentric or non- 
anthropocentric in outlook, but in practice, the dichotomy between anthropocentrism 
and non-anthropocentrism is of course not so coarsely drawn as theoretical posits 
intimate. As intimated in the closing remarks of the previous chapter most of us 
display a ready mix of all of these dispositions and theoretical leanings towards 
nature at various times and in diverse instances. Nevertheless, the particular 
dispositions we may hold towards certain aspects of our interrelationships with 
nonhumans inevitably provide distinct normative force in discerning the sort of 
theoretical and practical criteria for a proposed adequate environmental ethic. 
However, such an ethic, if it is to provide the requisite normative force that has 
bearing upon moral agents qua moral agent, will nevertheless need to address the 
above tripartite considerations of the minimum criteria for a proposed adequate 
environmental ethic - irrespective of the theoretical ethical grounding. For example, if 
it is proposed that ecological sensitivity is 'normative' for all human moral agents, it 
must be substantiated that its normative moral force does not depend merely upon 
one's desires or views if it is to present a rigorous challenge to alternative 
perspectives. In short, the challenge must be to attempt to provide a 'neutral' 
framework for adjudicating between - and assessing competing - individual and 
cultural claims. This problem of 'neutrality' is of course not a problem restricted to the 
domain of environmental ethics, but nevertheless as a minimum starting point a 
requisite ecological sensitivity may fairly be included (or at least not excluded) in any 
such theoretical platform. It is arguable that a purely 'virtue' based call to greater 
ecological sensitivity can have the normative wherewithal to function as an 
alternative to traditional approaches to environmental ethics, but it is likely that this 
disposition will figure in some form or another in any such theoretical approach to our 
ethical obligations to the nonhuman world. 6
If we are to attempt to characterise ecocentric ethics in relation to animal 
advocacy, then acknowledgment that a definitive characteristic of such is that the 
diverse forms are usually rooted in holistic metaphysics. Put somewhat simplistically,
6 For a comprehensive critique of the place of virtue in normative models see Carolyn Merchant's 
work in which she formulates these central themes, in Radical Ecology: The Search fora Livable 
World (1992). I also discuss my reservations regarding virtue in the context of the biocentric 
approach in 5.4, 'A comparative analysis of the biocentric approach' in critique of my biocentric 
approach and Taylor's - see, The problem with virtue' in this regard.
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the central assumption of a broader ecocentric ethic is, therefore, that everything is 
connected to everything else - if one part is removed or modified it has a causal 
effect on other parts; that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts; and that 
knowledge is context-dependent (Merchant, 1992). In this sense each part takes its 
meaning from the whole; biological systems are not closed systems, but open and 
process driven (they are continually changing); and that there is (should be) a unity 
of human and nonhuman nature - as opposed to a purely dualistic worldview 
(namely, some recognition that humans and 'nature' are part of the same ecology).
4.1 Shades of Green
Ecocentric ethics do of course encompass diverse views and positions. The 
traditional anthropocentric (or sometimes 'egocentric') view, has been challenged by 
what are seen to be 'ecocentric' moral theories which are, very broadly speaking, 
characterised by a moving away from a solely human-centred view. Extant 
egocentric ethics underlie much political and ethical discourse and of course carry 
with them the historical culmination of supplementary religious, political and ethical 
assumptions that continue to permeate much of western culture. A strict egocentric 
ethic has been historically associated with the mechanistic worldview and more 
recently free market capitalism (Damasio, 1994). Conversely, ecocentric ethics 
informs diverse groups including many 'greens', deep ecologists, bioregionalists, 
ecofeminists, spiritual ecologists and many organic producers (Carter, 1999). In 
addition, some who would see themselves as 'environmentalists' arguably lean 
towards a decidedly anthropocentric ethic - one that seeks social justice as a chief 
goal, and motivates groups such as social ecologists, socialist ecofeminists and 'left' 
greens among others. 7 There has then, remained an underlying tension between a 
mechanistic view and what may be termed the organismic: one based on the 
cosmos of the Renaissance that imbued the world with a 'living character' comprising 
elements of earth, fire air and water. In large part, the mechanistic worldview has
7 Murray Bookchin's social ecology is a high profile case in point (1982, 1986 and 1989).
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therefore come to be associated with a broad anthropocentrism, whilst the 
organismic viewpoint characterises much nonanthropocentrism.
Some parallels
A key element of green thinking in relation to the themes of this work is that much 
like the welfarists and conservationists discussed previously, many green political 
theorists propose 'working with the system', and (primarily in the last 15 years or so) 
have come to largely accept that the familiar liberal representative state cannot, and 
probably should not, be transcended. As Steward Davidson puts it, 'References to 
'green states', 'eco-states' and 'ecological states' - terms which would once have 
been considered oxymoronic by greens - are now commonplace within 
environmental literature'. 8 Importantly for this work, this position mirrors key 
observations made in chapter two and chapter three in relation to new welfarism and 
conservation ism. In chapter two the new welfarist 'piecemeal' approach to animal 
welfare, one characterised by its project to seek to work from within the current 
(abusive) system in order to attempt to secure incremental animal welfare 
improvements, was challenged. 9 Likewise, similarities can be drawn with the 
paternalism of much conservation practice and policy contested in chapter three. It 
was similarly argued that this approach to animal advocacy is fundamentally 
problematic - in that it posits that any duty of care be legitimately worked out in the 
form of 'nonanthropocentric' theories of value, whilst concurrently invariably 
committing to the 'accepted' normative anthropocentric model as a basis for 
determining conflicts of interest between humans and nonhumans. 10
Regarding the forms of animal advocacy that welfarists, conservationists and 
likewise greens promote, there is in this shared tacit acquiescence to convention an 
inevitable blunting of the radical edge that, arguably, ought to rightly characterise 
these diverse forms of animal advocacy. Despite disagreements on matters of 
ontology, ethics and focus, the 'loss of innocence' as Davidson terms this manner of 
acquiescence to extant values, forms a common thread in respect to these diverse
8 Davidson makes this point in defence of ecoanarchism in 'Ecoanarchism: A Critical Defence' 
(2009).
9 See Chapter 2.3 The Problem of Welfarism' for an extended discussion of the problems of a new 
welfarist approach.
10 See Chapter 3.3 'Managing Mismanagement: The End of the Individual' for further analysis.
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(and arguably incompatible) views. 11 I have argued in chapters two and three that 
such acquiescence in extant value systems present serious problems of application 
of theory to practice. These problems do not however merely represent convoluted 
ontological or epistemological praxis, but promulgate dire life and death 
consequences for countless nonhumans.
It is reasonable to suppose that for many, finding a philosophically adequate 
justification for intrinsic value within the nonhuman sphere is the principal axiological 
problem of environmental ethics. The broad problem for ecocentrism is one of finding 
substantive justification for the intrinsic value of nonhuman species, which in turn 
may be partly or wholly dependent on the particular circumstances prevailing. A 
further difficulty lies with the impenetrability in ascribing observable objective and 
intrinsic characteristics to nonhuman entities (Merchant, 1992). Can we, for example, 
rightly say that a meaningful ecological 'ethic' persists when ecology itself is 
forwarded as an 'objective science' rendering ethics as representing little more than 
a subjective value system? Excepting an elongated exploration of these sweeping 
definitions, it can at least be recognised for the sake of current argument that the 
connections between 'nature' and human values are complex and convoluted.
Radical agendas
Within the broad remit of environmental thought, how these connections between so- 
called nature (and indeed how nature itself is defined), and the ways that human 
values are theoretically proliferated are unsurprisingly diverse. As an example of this 
diversity within the wider debate, and how such interpretations inevitably inform upon 
the delimitations of our perceived moral obligations to nonhumans, I will here 
adumbrate an 'ecocentric' view that diverges from the 'normative' notion of 
ecocentrism in order to illustrate this point. The anarchist philosopher Murray 
Bookchin envisions a type of ecocentrism that takes as its basis a form of social 
ecology. For Bookchin this is characterised by a mix of process, diversity, holism, 
and the balance of nature. This view is normatively deemed as anarchic in aim - in 
that his particular form of social ecology would eliminate hierarchical structures
11 Davidson uses this term to express what he refers to as the 'step back' from anarchist green
first principles, p.48.
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across ecology and society in enlivening organic non-hierarchical relationships. 12 
Preliterate societies, he maintains were organic in nature with a far greater degree of 
egalitarianism. Although, on this account, there were 'differences' based on age, 
gender and kinship, these societies did not see themselves as necessarily superior 
to nonhuman nature and were, in this sense, a 'unity of diversity' that embraced an 
unfolding of the processes of life. For Bookchin then, a primary goal of social 
ecology is to abolish the dualisms inherent in hierarchical society, and create an 
'ecology of freedom 1 . This would reunite the human with wider nature and each 
other. For Bookchin, this does not mean a return to some concept of a pre-industrial 
Utopia, but rather that his social ecological vision would embrace the advances in 
science and technology under an ecological way of living within the world.
For the purposes of this work, Bookchin's theory as sketched here, is 
particularly notable in making a clear distinction between ecology and what he sees 
as environmentalism. Crucially, for Bookchin, environmentalism does not challenge 
the underlying institutional practices endemic to capitalist society - but rather in 
diverse ways 'facilitates' both intra-species (human to human) and inter-species 
(human to nonhuman) interrelations. A useful way to appreciate this ecological 
perspective that challenges the presumed hierarchy within nature is to envisage the 
ecosystem as a 'food web' and not as the oft quoted 'food chain' (at least not so in 
'hierarchical' terminology). On this account, this is a continual process of interaction 
between human communities and natural ecosystems that occur as they 
concurrently 'evolve' - in essence, the idea is that nature is transformed, as human 
society is transformed. 13 Crucial for an awareness of this interactive process (and for 
later argument) is a sympathetic assent that homo-sapiens are a result of an 
evolutionary process that has both biological (animal) provenance as well as a social 
and cultural (human) evolutionary development. To avoid ecological collapse 
Bookchin argues that humans must acknowledge that they need to live within 
bioregional communities - which set 'natural' limits on the range of human activity in 
that human activities are 'scaled' to appropriate local conditions and requirements. 
This decentralised vision, echoes a central tenet of anarchist thought, that 'without
12 For an in-depth exploration of Bookchin's social ecology and eco-anarchic theories see Remaking 
Society (1989), The Modern Crisis (1986), and The Ecology of Freedom (1982).
13 Alan Carter makes these distinctions in A Radical Green Political Theory (1999).
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rule does not mean without rules' (1999, p. 14). In contrast to a deep ecological view 
discussed at length below, the social ecologists see the underlying environmental 
crisis as having its basis in the dialectic between the institutional structures of 
society, whereas deep ecology conversely, views the problem as one of fundamental 
conflict between the mechanistic worldview and the organismic. Deep ecology can 
therefore be said to focus its approach '...upon eliminating the perception of 
fundamental people/environment and spiritual/physical cleavages', and that therefore 
'....one of its primary goals is to help eliminate environmentally degrading practices 
and policies by helping individuals avoid pseudo-rational thinking' (Glasser, 2007, 
p.83).
This brief digression exemplifies well the subtleties and diversities extant 
within environmentalism at large, and serves to illustrate the extent to which our 
theoretical underpinnings inform on the delimitations of our moral obligations to the 
nonhuman world - and the living beings within it. An ecology based upon (human) 
'social' criteria such as Bookchin's is, for example, certain to weigh up our moral 
obligations to individual nonhumans differently to a 'deep' ecology based upon 
holistic (interrelationist) concepts of nature. The key observation to draw here is that 
given their theoretical foundations (social and ecological respectively), both 
nevertheless are equally likely to fall short of an ethic that recognises a 
thoroughgoing equal consideration of interests for individual nonhuman animals.
The 'ontological holism' of deep ecology
Deep ecology itself, for example, is ostensibly not advanced as an 'ethical 
framework' - one that seeks to formulate a legitimate basis for our moral obligations 
to other beings, but rather is better described as a paradigm borne of a sense of a 
deepening ecological crisis. Unlike the example of Bookchin's social ecology, its 
focus is not upon political and social infrastructures, but rather it centres its project 
upon a 'transformation' at the level of human consciousness and perception of the 
interrelated ness of nature and our place within it. In this, it is clear that the 
underlying aim of deep ecology does not merely concern itself with institutional 
reform for example, but seeks to legitimise 'new' social and economic paths to global 
sustainability. For supporters of a deep ecological worldview, the earth is perceived 
as a nurturing and 'living' organism, and one that enlivens a cultural constraint to
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overt exploitation of the nonhuman realm. Such constraints, it is hoped, imbue a 
culture with 'subtle1 ethical restraints or sanctions expressed in the normative 
'oughts' or 'ought-nots' of given cultures. This view is clearly ambitious, and for deep 
ecologists necessarily and fundamentally divergent from the so-called 'shallow 
ecology' of much mainstream environmentalism that views humans as separate from 
their environment, fomenting a 'human apartheid' wherein humanity is distinct from 
'nature'. 14 The 'shallow' environmental position is further criticised by deep ecologists 
for its limited emphases on the opposition to pollution and the depletion of resources 
as core to it central aims. In contradistinction, the deep ecology movement is not 
only concerned with these kinds of problems (which of course are significant) but 
with nothing less than a proclaimed revision of the place of the human and 
nonhuman in nature.
Deep ecology is in this regard an ontological principle, in that it concerns itself 
with the very nature of being (our place in nature and the biospherical web of life). As 
Warwick Fox puts it, deep ecology 'is concerned to criticise mechanistic materialism 
and to replace it with a better 'code for reading nature'. This code can be generally 
described as one of 'unity in process'. By this is indicated both the idea that all 
'things' are fundamentally (i.e., internally) related and the idea that these 
interrelationships are in constant flux' (2006, p.195). The underlying principles of this 
ontologically based worldview are in fact shared by many people who are concerned 
in one way or another about many of the ways in which humankind is adversely 
impacting upon the biosphere and the unconsidered effects of runaway 
anthropocentrism. For sure, it is a common enough shared human phenomenon that 
through an appreciation of nature, wonder at the diversity of life on earth, and the 
aesthetic appreciation derived from 'experiencing' the awe of natural landscapes that 
a realisation of our embeddedness in nature is fomented and nurtured. If, as Alan 
Carter suggests, these sorts of considerations are what a 'spiritual' experience boils 
down to, then this view of nature is unlikely to illicit objection from most. 15 
Problematically, for many deep ecologists, their ontological reading of the 
environmental crisis and the appropriate human response is viewed as 'deeper' than
14 Warwick Fox offers this division in his paper, 'Deep Ecology: A New Philosophy of Our Time
(1984).
15 Carter critiques and challenges the 'spiritual' dimension of elements of deep ecology (1995),
p.331.
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the calls for greater human/animal egalitarianism - such as voiced by many animal 
protectionists for example. For many of its advocates, this 'radical' path demands of 
the individual a new philosophy of self - one ultimately recognising the 
interconnectedness of community. 16 I submit that there is in the kernel of their 
ontological view the idea that metaphysics and ethics are inextricably interwoven. In 
illustration of this, Michael Zimmerman draws the distinction between deep ecology's 
ontological commitment and his assessment of animal ethicists in claiming that,
'Deep Ecologists maintain that in the long run (if there is a long run) humanity 
must move to a new understanding of what humanity and nature 
are....Emphasising the need for an ontological shift differentiates deep 
ecologists from ethicists who seek to extend 'moral considerability' to 
nonhuman beings. Deep ecologists argue that a change in ontology must 
precede a change in ethical attitudes' (1993, p. 198).
I contend that there is problematic disquiet lurking within the ontological remit of 
deep ecology however. To possess a profound ('deep') appreciation of the natural 
world does not of course necessarily entail that one needs to be a strict holist in the 
'deep' sense that is tacitly implied in Zimmerman's claim, or indeed that one must 
subscribe to an ontological shift in perception - if in fact such a requisite 
paradigmatic shift in human perception is even a psychological possibility - or 
evolutionary desirable - for humankind to embrace. Clearly, any call for mass 
radical change is sure to face serious opposition, and in the case of the paradigmatic 
shift that deep ecology demands, the alternative ontology will need a thoroughgoing 
pragmatic basis if it is to convince individuals to 'radically' change. Such a claim also 
begs the question of the possibility of 'ontological change': if the requisite task is to 
'change' ontology, then the 'ontological' question remains as to which ontology is to 
be revised - and if an 'egalitarian' inter-relative based one, how might this be
15 At this juncture it is noteworthy that I am not of course suggesting that 'deep ecology' is the 
only (radical) form of ecological protectionism. For example, J. Baird Callicott has advanced an 
influential environmental philosophy grounded in his conception of'the land ethic' (see assorted 
works 1988, 1989, 1992, 1998, 1999 and 2005). For some further readings on the diverse 
theories advanced under the 'green banner', see Holmes Rolston III, 'Environmental Ethics: 
Values in and Duties to the Natural World' (1991); Arne Naess, 'The Deep Ecological Movement: 
Some Philosophical Aspects (1983); Paul Taylor's Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental 
Ethics (1986); Eric Katz, Nature as Subject: Human Obligation and Natural Community (1997) ; 
and in this particular context J. Baird Callicott's seminal work, In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays 
in Environmental Philosophy (1989).
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understood? This ontological conundrum is aptly characterised by Thomas Nagel as 
a view from nowhere, in attempting,
'...to view the world not from a place within it, or from the vantage point of a 
special kind or awareness, but from nowhere in particular and no form of life 
in particular at all. The object is to discount for the features of our pre- 
reflective outlook that make things appear as they do, and thereby to reach an 
understanding of things as they really are' (1989, p.208).
The pertinent point as I see it here is that to seek 'a view' from a non-relativistic point 
that entirely abstracts from our biases and prejudices, and effectively ignores how 
particular ontologies become manifest (and in this case the 'ontology' of 
anthropocentrism), is to seek a 'view from nowhere' and in practice unlikely to 
convince, in and of itself.
Moreover, animal rights advocates who would seek to ('merely') extend moral 
considerably typically (and certainly every animal ethicist that I have met) do in fact 
possess a 'deep' (and well informed) appreciation of nature and the diversity of life 
on earth. For example, the 'radical' proposition of a biocentric view (that claims it is 
the possession of 'life' itself whereupon moral considerability is to be determined), 
despite its ambitious and challenging remit, does not however make the lofty claim 
that some 'ontological shift' in human perceptions on mass is prerequisite to a 
morally valid applied ethic. It is perfectly feasible, I believe, within the framework of a 
consistent and rigorous ethic to 'reassign' moral import to the possession of being as 
the starting criterion for moral deliberation, without first demanding that one 
embraces some 'deep ecological epiphany' about the very nature of nature - more of 
which will be examined in the next chapter.
In fact, the commitment to an ontological holistically based worldview takes 
many (troubling) forms. For example, one approach that has developed from a deep 
ecological perspective is what is generically termed 'new age' holism. 17 This is 
frequently characterised by a tendency to move away from the normative post- 
enlightenment analytical project of discovering nature's 'truths' through observable 
and empirical research (a professed basis for 'mainstream' holism by many of its 
advocates), toward a 'spiritualised' identification with nature itself. In this context
17 See Alan Carter, A Radical Green Political Theory (1999), p. 80, for a discussion of the 
implications of new age holism in the light of individualism.
150
Chapter 4: Ecocentrism and Animals: The New Stewardship Creed
holism takes on a highly subjective character, and arguably this interpretation of a 
personalised 'interrelationism' within nature as a whole ostensibly relies on an overly 
eclectic notion of holism. A problem from the point of view of an individualistic 
position such as advanced in this work (and also true of more 'credible' forms of 
ecocentrism), is that all atomic phenomena become defined and determined 
primarily by their connection to the whole (and not necessarily their contribution to 
such, or their 'intrinsic' worth). I contend that this way of amalgamating discrete 
entities into a collective homogeny speaks less of an interrelationism based upon 
extant real world interdependencies and symbiosis, and more of a desire to form an 
environmental ethic (or quasi-religious creed?) that troublingly accentuates the 
connections between phenomena over the phenomena itself. Deep ecology's holism 
in this guise is not benign. Rather than proclaiming a clear interconnectedness that 
enjoins all things and challenges our perception of being, paradoxically, in its attempt 
to create a 'whole', deep ecologists recreate a spiritualized pantheistic 'other'. Thus, 
an ontologically based interrelationism on this account is transfigured into a mystical 
interpretation of matter - that in pantheistic tone makes nature God, and god Nature. 
Rather than forging a deeper understanding of an interconnected world, this form of 
holism obfuscates the particular, and the importance of distinctiveness in nature. 
Perhaps most troublingly for an individualistic view of animal advocacy, is that it 
obfuscates our understanding of our place in nature whilst concurrently lessening the 
importance of the individual within this place. All the while this form of spiritualised 
holism fails to form any clear ethic for directing our moral obligations to extant 
discrete individual nonhuman beings.
Much like other forms of holism, such as scientific and axiological holism 
(discussed shortly), the particular form of ontological holism arising from a deep 
ecological view claims that constituent parts must not be viewed as isolated 
individual entities, but in terms of their connection to the whole (Fox, 1984). The 
central issue for an individualistic view is, again, that there is an assumption (albeit a 
tacit one in this form of holism) that we are unavoidably confronted with a dichotomy 
between individualism and holism. This is not to argue that there is not necessarily a 
divergence from this perspective, or indeed that holists are wrong in rejecting a 
'narrow' individualistic account that ignores the importance of connectivity and
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community, but rather that the interrelations between and amongst individuals are 
not as readily subsumed into a collective whole as this view suggests.
Carter's Interrelationism
Are then the central tenets of holism and individualism mutually exclusive and jointly 
exhaustive? In short, must we reject individualism if we are to embrace holism, or in 
emphasising the importance of the individual in nature are we then required to 
necessarily discard holistic approaches? This central question is the principle theme 
of the subsequent and final chapter. However, in the context of the deep ecological 
stance sketched here and its import to animal advocacy, Carter himself suggests a 
'middle way' that is neither strictly holistic nor individualistic, which he calls 
'interrelationism'. 18 His alternative ontology is focused upon interrelationships to 
others, rather than the emphasis that a strict deep ecological approach gives to 
numinous connections to a 'mysterious' and spiritualised 'whole' (1999, p.335). For 
Carter, inclusion of the connections between the 'parts' in any formulated theory is 
essential, however, he criticises ontological holism for introducing a spurious set of 
connections between the parts: namely, the 'connections' posited between the parts 
and the whole. Spurious, on Carter's view, because the parts of a whole are simply 
not connected to the whole, but are connected to the rest of the whole (more directly 
connected). Carter clarifies this with a logic example,
'If a whole W consisted of parts A, B and C, then to talk of C being connected 
to W would be to talk of C being connected to A, B and C. An extra C has 
been conjured up out of nowhere! Similarly, to talk then of A and B being 
connected to W is to conjure up an extra A and B. We have now conjured up 
an extra A, B and C - in other words, an extra W - a whole new whole! Out of 
nowhere has emerged this totality standing above all the parts. Rather than 
such a holistic talk showing the interconnectedness of everything, it turns the 
whole into something other, for what apart from something other can one be 
connected to?' (1999, p.335).
Simply put, Carter is advocating that we better view our place in nature from within it, 
and not as if it were something external to which we are connected. In this respect 
interrelationism focuses on our relationships to each other and the
18 Carter's interesting take on interrelationism is sketched very briefly here, for a fuller rendering 
see Carter (1999), pp.334-40.
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interdependences of each relational component. Further arguments that focus upon 
these kinds of ideas of interrelationism raised by Carter and others will be 
considered in the context of a biocentric approach in the next chapter. There remains 
however a question of how ideas of interrelationism square with normative holistic 
theories of value concerning our dealings with individual other-than-human beings.
4.2 Holism and the individual nonhuman
The polemic quote from Regan which forms the epigraph of this chapter contrasting 
what he terms environmental fascism with the rights view is, I believe, not merely an 
indictment of environmental holism and its consequences for a rights-based position. 
Regan is here making a serious charge against a holistic understanding of the 
environment in highlighting a fundamental and problematic dichotomy of thought 
within ecophilosophies at large. For Regan 'what holism gives us is a fascist 
understanding of the environment' (2004, p.372), one that is in his view 'totalitarian 1 in 
concept - in that it unavoidably subsumes the interests and rights of individuals 
under notions of systemic value. 19 Certainly, as David Goodin observes, '...a key 
issue in the modern environmental debate is the ethical locus of ecosystems as 
collective wholes versus that of protecting individuals' (2007, p.419). For our 
purposes, James Sterba gives a useful working definition of holism and 
individualism,
'According to holists, the good of a species, or the good of an ecosystem, or 
the good of the whole biotic community can trump the good of individual living 
things. According to individualists, the good of each individual living thing 
must be respected' (2006, p. 157).
The holistic viewpoint sketched in this preliminary context is derived from a concept 
of the 'good' of the biosphere as a whole - in effect one that subordinates the good 
of the individual to the good of the whole. Others too have examined the holistic 
approach in the light of individualism. Eric Katz argues that a holistic understanding 
of the environment (and of course this must include the living creatures that form part
19 See also Marti Kheel's take on radical environmental holism in her ecofeminist work, The 
Liberation of Nature: A Circular Affair' (1985), pp. 135-49.
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of it), is problematic primarily because it deemphasises individuality to the degree 
that individual animals can readily be substituted for one another in cases of loss. 
For Katz, this 'substitution problem' has severe moral implications, as at minimum it 
necessarily severely weakens respect for the intrinsic value of individuals (1985, 
pp.241-56). Building on this reticence, William Aiken holds that the actual implications 
of holism would be nothing less than the total loss of individual rights. 20 Further, in a 
seminal paper, Mark Sagoff austerely concludes that holistically based 
environmentalism is simply not compatible with animal rights. 21 Moreover, as Don 
E. Marietta remarks in his discussion of the charges against holism, These charges 
against, and reservations about, holism are serious. If they are well-founded a 
holistic approach to the environment is a rejection of humanistic ethics, with its 
concern for individual worth and individual rights'. 22
This is serious indeed, if holism as a project overturns the very basis of 
humanistic ethics and individual rights. Of course, the validity of this lofty claim 
depends on the interpretation of the scope of such an ethic and whether or not such 
a holism necessarily requires that human interests sufficiently be considered only as 
part of some larger whole. Notwithstanding, arguments are often radical in 
conception and ramification, for example, Baird Callicott controversially argues that 
the extent to which environmentalism itself is biocentric may be measured by the 
extent to which it is misanthropic 23 There is however, I suggest, a common thread: 
there is a general consensus held in all of the above viewpoints that there is at least 
some 'in principle' concession to human needs over nonhuman needs in cases of 
direct and unavoidable conflicts of interest and that a considered environmental 
perspective should not on balance override human ethical concerns for the human 
community.
20 William Aiken, 'Ethical Issues in Agriculture', in Tom Regan, ed., Earthbound (1984), p.269.
21 See Mark Sagoff's critique of the irreconcilability of a rights based view in the light of holistic 
environmentalism in 'Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Bad Marriage, Quick Divorce', 
Report from the center for philosophy and Public Policy (1984).
22 See Don E. Marietta's discussion regarding the form of holism adopted and the logical outcomes 
of a holistic approach in 'Environmental Holism and Individuals' (1988), p. 252.
23 Although later backtracking somewhat on his original claim, Baird Callicott in discussion of the 
diverse aims of animal liberation in the light of wider environmentalism famously makes this 
distinction that continues to influence the wider debate, in 'Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair'
(1979), p. 326.
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The 'credibility'of holism
Nevertheless, as these diverse views readily illustrate the arguments for and against 
a holistic understanding of the environment and its perceived implications for an 
individualistically based ethic are polemic and frequently contested within the wider 
debate. The legitimacy of a holistic approach to understanding our place in nature - 
and by extension the extent of our moral obligations to nonhumans - is nonetheless, 
in large part, frequently and widely unquestioned. This seeming credibility of a 
holistic ethic towards nature in the public consciousness carries an authoritative 
sanction that individualistic rights-based understandings of our moral obligations to 
nonhumans seem to lack within the wider public arena. Don E. Marietta outlines 
three possible reasons for this presumption of holistic legitimacy: holism as 
'scientific'; holism as 'axiological'; and holism as 'deontological' (1988, pp. 254-56). 
The 'scientific' view that a holistic approach to nature at large reflects a 'deeper' and 
well-founded empirically based understanding of the interrelatedness of all living 
things is widely accepted. It is of course perfectly reasonable to accept a substantive 
evolutionary perspective on the origin and development of species in a 'species' 
specific way; one that acknowledges the interdependency of species within the biotic 
community.
A difficulty arises however in that 'scientific holism' may not merely be 
expressed in strict evolutionary or ecosystemic terms, but is frequently expounded 
also in terms of concepts such as 'family', 'kinship' or 'nature's economy'. It is these 
latter descriptions of the interrelatedness of nonhumans to each other (and to us 
humans) that potentially 'overlays', what is at root, merely a straightforward 
taxonomy for a methodical classification of species within their respective 
evolutionary niches. Scientific holism used in the benign descriptive and systematic 
sense of observable relationships within and across species - what Alan Carter calls 
'an environmentally benign interrelationship' (2004, p.320) - is of an entirely different 
order to the 'conceptual model' that value-laden terms such as 'family' or 'kinship' 
inevitably evoke. Expressing and emphasising the interdependency of species in 
these emotive anthropogenic terms undoubtedly forms a useful educational model, 
and one that may present to a wider audience an understandable cursory conception 
of the complex workings of nature. However, few scientists or indeed philosophers 
would claim that this model equates in any meaningful way to recognition of some
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elusive form of holistic 'oneness' that is somehow embedded in nature, or that 
interdependencies are conceptually rigid and fixed - rather than fluid and dynamic in 
disposition. For example, a holism denuded of its overt emphasis on the 
intersections between species, returns us to a conception of species as comprising 
not of systemic interrelationships, but one that reemphasises the members and the 
species' membership of individual organisms. Holism in this sense then, gives us at 
best, little more than a 'model' for understanding how species interrelate, rather than 
a 'model' for understanding our moral duties and obligations to those beings.
The second version of holism that Marietta proposes is 'axiological' holism 
and is related to the scientific form of holism that emphasises the intersections 
between species, in that the notion of axiological holism ascribes value on the basis 
of the systemic 'role' that an organism plays. Moreover, much like the idea of 
scientific holism, axiological holism is no one thing, and in its more extreme form the 
value of an individual organism exists entirely in the contribution that it makes to the 
ecosystem as a whole. Less extreme axiological forms nonetheless also tend to take 
the 'big picture' view, and share in common the notion that it is the contribution made 
by organisms that determines the (variable) value of that organism. Clearly, this 
displacement of value from the individual is problematic for a rights-based 
individualistic viewpoint as any 'inherent' value that a being is deemed to possess as 
a subject-of-a-life in its own right for example, is at once relocated from the individual 
subject-of-a-life to that of a 'subject-of-ffte-life' of the ecosystem at large.
Thirdly, 'deontic' holism holds that moral standing (and consequently 
subsequent moral duties) derives from membership in the biospheric community. 
This form in a sense conflates the scientific and axiological versions in that it treats 
any obligations to the 'whole' system of nature as one aspect of moral duty. If 
scientific holism sets up a credible way of looking at nature (and the nonhumans that 
inhabit it), and axiological holism attempts to legitimise a shifting of concern away 
from the individual to its contribution to the whole, then deontic holism gives licence 
to the idea that the primary moral concern must lie with our duties to this 'whole' 
(Marietta, 1998, pp.250-254).
Taken together then, these forms of holism present a three-pronged argument 
for a 'moving away' from atomistic views in favour of holistic worldviews, and often 
these positions are viewed as polar opposites - atomism at one end of the scale and
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holism at the other.24 As Marietta points out, the central problem for this approach to 
the nonhuman world is that all too frequently...
'Holism is taken beyond its basis in biological science and treats both persons 
and the systems of nature as abstractions, without attention to the actual 
individuals of which the system is composed. The system of nature is no 
longer the interworking of organisms and inorganic features of which we have 
actual knowledge. Interdependence becomes an abstract notion. It is thought 
of in vague images and terms; symbolic thinking ignores the things which are 
out there in the world. The whole is not simply greater than its parts; it 
becomes a vague concept in which the parts become hazily perceived or lost' 
(1988, p.256)
This sort of abstraction is unduly reductionist, in that the individual is subsumed into 
the sum total of the whole, and as such is perceived of as merely a 'functional part' 
of that whole. In short, from an ethical perspective, the moral worth of any individual 
is relocated with reference solely to its relational membership to the totality. If, for 
example, we were to apply a similar raw reductionism to humans in like manner - 
defining a person in terms of biological concepts alone, we would necessarily ignore 
the plethora of other notable capacities and functions such as the psychological, 
aesthetic, moral and spiritual elements that go to 'make up' that individual. Indeed, 
'individuality1 itself is likely found precisely in the unique distribution of these latter 
qualities rather than descriptive (and prescriptive) biological function. This view 
would therefore be deemed reductionist in this instance in that it considers primarily, 
functionality, and largely ignores humanity. Viewed then in a wider sense, holism, in 
reducing the individual to an abstraction, considers only a small part of what is 
generally thought of as 'humanness' - or importantly in the context of this thesis 
comparative notions such 'dogness' or 'whaleness' for example. I contend that it 
is likely the case that the underlying appeal to a holistic viewpoint resides less in its 
proclaimed (pseudo)scientific basis or its 'big picture' systemic worldview, but more 
in its 'ease of use'. The reductionism that a holistic stance engenders may have 
appeal by virtue of the seeming 'short circuiting' of the inevitably difficult and 
complex decisions that traditional ethical concerns must confront when in tension 
with contemporary environmental concerns. The conflicts between traditional 
perspectives and the challenges that environmentalism brings are of course the
24 See Eric Katz for a discussion of the fundamentally skewed aims of holistic and atomistic 
worldviews in 'Organism, Community, and the 'Substitution Problem' (1985), pp.241-56.
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lifeblood of much environmental ethical deliberation. However, giving due 
consideration to one specific aspect of this complexity is, in ironic tone, to ignore the 
'whole' picture in the mistaken belief that 'all' of ethics can be subsumed under a 
rigorous holistic ethic. After all, an all-encompassing holism must equally apply to 
our human domain as much as the nonhuman one, and cannot readily be extracted 
from human ideas and ethical frameworks any more than it can exempt any other 
aspect of nature. Simply put, holism as an ethical response cannot disassociate itself 
from human animals whilst seeking to apply its abstractions to nonhuman animals. 
Traditional ethics is therefore in unavoidable conflict with a holistic view, as holism 
must seek (at least in its more extreme forms) to view the value of an individual as 
existing entirely in the contribution that it makes to the whole - a view that no 
traditional mainstream theoretical framework embraces.25 That holism is in conflict 
with traditional ethics does not of course in and of itself invalidate its central claims. It 
is perfectly possible that future generations faced with difficult environmental 
decisions will deem it necessary to adopt forms of environmental fascism and 
implement sundry draconian measures to assuage disaster. In such circumstance a 
holistic approach may provide a 'stripped down' account of our moral obligations to 
confront such challenges. But, this is certainly not to endorse what would effectively 
be the 'end' of the individual, or to suggest that such measures would not follow by 
an inexorable logic from holism's abstractions.
'Different' individualisms
A central and persistent difficulty that can be draw out from the apparent tenuous 
grip that our established moral concepts seem to have on conceptual groups or 
collectives is our 'familiarity' with established moral frameworks - that in the main 
deal with individuals, and not collectives. There is unsurprisingly certainly a wide 
consensus that individual humans are intrinsically valuable, and broadly speaking 
traditional theories differ primarily in the weight that they give to capacities such as 
self-consciousness and rationality - whilst concurrently maintaining the predicate of
25 It is of course true to say that more radical versions of green thought argue for a fuller 
recognition of interdependency and 'oneness' with nature, additionally some religions such as 
Buddhism, for example, advocate a subsuming of self into the whole. However, traditional 
anthropocentric ethics have tended in the main to seek to place value not in the contribution that 
individuals can or may make to abstracted notions, but in extant human capacities such as
rationality and sentiment.
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acceptance of at least some idea of human intrinsic worth. The difficultly is therefore, 
finding a nonanthropocentric environmental ethic that could ground intrinsic value in 
nature. 'Nature' is of course an expansive term. The difficulty in formulating such a 
nonanthropocentric ethic is that the individualistic forms of animal rights and welfare 
- introduced in chapters one and two, and discussed in the light of paternalism in 
chapter three, largely delimit the moral scope of concern to those nonhuman animals 
that in some way or another 'interact' with humans. Therefore, any move from the 
value of individuals to the value of species is inevitably constrained in scope, in that 
the sort of animals that humans normatively interact with make up what is a 
demonstrably small percentage of life on earth. The perceptible stumbling block is 
that ethical frameworks that aim to give intrinsic worth to other (usually human-like) 
animals because of claims to subjecthood, sentience or demands for equal 
consideration of interests for example, do not forthrightly encompass the pantheon of 
creatures that preoccupy many environmentalists.
In the next chapter biocentric positions that attempt to ameliorate this disparity 
are discussed; at this point it is useful to note however that the 'boundary issue' 
endemic to any form of moral considerability beyond the purely anthropocentric, 
doggedly persists. Cryptically put, when attempts are made to broaden the moral 
horizon, wheresoever that horizon is 'situated' there will always remain something 
'more' beyond the new horizon. For example, Paul Taylor in discussing distinctions 
between inherent worth and intrinsic value draws the moral boundary not at 
sentience and non-sentience as some individualists have done,26 but between the 
living and the nonliving. 27 Again, moving the sphere of moral considerability one step 
further out from either straightforward anthropocentrism or mainstream animal 
protectionism simply begs further questions as to the success of defining any 
'natural' stopping point once a 'familiar' boundary is dismantled. In Taylor's 
framework a firm grounding would need to be constructed to enable a clear 
distinction to be made between, for example, protozoan forms of life and atoms.
These observations notwithstanding, the fundamental difficulty remains: 
namely, that any move from the value of individuals to the value of species is
25 By individualists I refer to the mainstream animal rights and welfare theorists, discussed at 
length in chapters one and two - esp. Regan and Singer.
27 See in particular Paul Taylor's seminal work, Respect for Nature (Press, 1986) and also Rob 
Garner for a contemporary sentience based framework in Animal Ethics (2005).
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inevitably constrained in scope. This difficulty for such a move highlights very real 
differences between individualistic accounts of moral considerability and holistic 
viewpoints. Elliot Sober gives an example of possible threats to the members of 
species of blue and sperm whales to illuminate the disparity,
'... [a] holistic property - membership in an endangered species - makes all 
the difference in the world: a world with n sperm and m blue whales is far 
better than a world with n + m sperm whales and 0 blue whales. Here we 
have a stark contrast between an ethic in which it is the life situation of 
individuals that matters, and an ethic in which the stability and diversity of 
populations of individuals are what matter'. 28
Some of the differences between animal preservationists (in the main holists) and 
animal liberationists (mostly comprising of individualists in one form or another) 
intimated in this example were discussed in the previous chapter. At root here is the 
persistent difficulty of assigning value based upon a contributory theory of function 
that is independent of the actual interests of individuals.
A critical needs approach
A theory of animal advocacy (and interestingly holists advocate that animals form 
niche contributions to systemic value - so may loosely be seen as 'animal 
advocates' in this limited sense) that is somehow 'independent' of the actual 
interests of individuals would all too readily seem to lay itself open to a charge of 
ambiguity. Nature is more than the sum of its parts, and to try to comprehend a 
gestalt holistic understanding of 'the whole' is likely to fail in the face of the 
inestimable complexity of interrelationships that must ultimately escape any deep 
understanding. As Stewart Davison tersely notes, 'Our knowledge of nature's 
workings is, and always will be, limited' (2007, p.315). Given then the problematic 
complexity of biodiversity and the interrelationships between and within species, in 
shifting the value of individuals to the value of species, it remains unclear as to how 
a given species specific contribution to the 'whole' may be assessed and quantified 
in any substantive and long-term way. It is of course true that if the yardstick is an 
anthropocentric determination of how particular 'contributions' may form negative or 
positive outcomes for human interests, then it is possible that such an approach may 
provide useful categorisations for assessing 'resource' allocation and use. This
28 Cited in Agar, Valuing Species and Valuing Individuals' (1995), p.398.
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overtly anthropocentric agenda does not however fairly reflect mainstream holistic 
approaches that ostensibly seek to form a structured contribution-based coherency 
within nature.
As holism turns upon a conceptual contribution-based framework, it would 
seem therefore that exponents of a holistic environmental ethic have failed to show 
that such an ethic prohibits morally unacceptable treatment of individual animals. In 
the main, in order to circumvent the claim to ambiguity, proponents of a holistic 
environmental ethic subscribe to some derivative of Aldo Leopold's oft-quoted dictum 
that 'A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the 
biotic community. It is wrong when it tends to do otherwise' (1966, p.240). Again, the I 
problem here is that although these criteria may well enjoin us to preserve species 
form destruction (and in some sense as a 'secondary' effect arguably preserve 
'individuals' within these groups), it leaves actual individuals metaphorically out in the 
cold.
An animal rights-based ethic on the other hand does prohibit morally 
unacceptable treatment of individuals. As discussed in chapter one, in practice, 
rights-based views do nevertheless concede that in some instances of direct conflict 
of interests allowance for the favouring of the interests of humans over nonhumans 
is variously factored into the given theoretical framework. Despite the arguable 
anthropocentric undertones a 'critical needs' stance (critical needs here pertain 
largely to direct and 'unavoidable' conflicts of interest) seeks to place humans on an 
equal footing with nonhumans regarding matters of self-preservation and protection 
from harm in the struggle to survive. 29 I do not believe concession to a form of 
inherent protection of critical needs weakens an individualistic viewpoint or dilutes its 
central position - that of ascribing value to individuals, as opposed to a view valuing 
species or the contribution that they may make to the biotic community. In this 
respect an ethic that seeks to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic 
community and not the individuals that compose these elements, falls foul of the 
same sort of problems that many paternalistic forms of environmental management 
encounter. 30
29 See the extended discussion in chapter one of this thesis in the context of, The Weak Animal
Rights Claim'.
30 See the discussion of paternalism in chapter 3, with particular reference to the arguments 
presented in the sub-chapter entitled 'Paternalism or a Reasonable Duty of Care?'
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In sum, rights-based animal advocacy does in some instances of direct 
conflict of interests permit the favouring of the interests of humans over nonhumans, 
and this provision is then perhaps better understood as a prima facie right not to be 
treated as a mere means to another's ends, rather than a statement of unconditional 
equality in all circumstances. As Angus Taylor puts the distinction: 'Rather than 
saying that all sentient beings have equal inherent value, we could say that all 
sentient beings equally have inherent value' (1996, p. 13). This idea is crucial to an 
understanding of the individualistic perspective argued for throughout this work, and 
indeed underpins the central theoretical conception of the biocentric approach that I 
suggest subsequently. In this way then, a critical needs perspective does not 
necessitate an obliteration of the distinction between human and nonhuman lives in 
instances of direct conflict where a choice between significant harm to one or the 
other is required. In short, an individualistically based critical needs view operates in 
circumstances of direct conflicts of interest - and this does not require humans (or in 
fact nonhumans) to relinquish their right to survival. This 'self-defence' qualification 
is frequently overlooked by supporters of a holistic approach in their critique of rights- 
based individualism. To clarify, Taylor summarises this view succinctly:
'We may significantly interfere with sentient beings, or intervene in non- 
sentient nature in a way likely to restrict sentient beings in their autonomous 
pursuit of satisfying their vital needs, only in self-defense, or when such action 
is required in order to satisfy our vital needs or those of other sentient beings. 
Further, we should promote the environmental conditions that foster the 
exercise of autonomy by sentient beings, to the extent that we can do so 
without harm to ourselves' (1996, p. 17).
For many holists an individualistically based ethic is often interpreted as unrealistic, 
primarily because they tend to interpret the view as not sufficiently factoring in such 
imperatives as Taylor outlines - which for many environmentalists reflect critical 
aspects of 'nature' red in fang and claw. However, the environmental ethic evolving 
from a rights-based view that concedes legitimate self-defence (and in fact this is the 
'normative' animal advocacy view), does not aspire to guarantee the well-being of 
nonhumans, but merely to posit the lesser claim that in practice these creatures 
should be free from overt adverse indirect or direct human interference wherever 
possible. Needless to say, in application, where one determines what constitutes
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reasonable interference and what, how or when actions can be deemed direct or 
indirect remains problematic for any ethical theory.
It is important at this point to reiterate that in the main the subject matter of 
this chapter concerns itself with a critique of holistic approaches through the prism of 
rights-based individualism. Holists are primarily preoccupied with the contribution 
that nonhumans that lie outside of a strict domestic delimitation - so-called 'wild' 
animals - make to the wider ecosystem. The individualistic view, on my 
interpretation, is not in conflict with holism in the respect of its injunction to let 
animals live as much as possible according to their 'natures'. This does however 
mean that domesticated animals and wild animals are to be viewed (and treated) 
somewhat differently. On a rights view this does not equate to giving different moral 
weightings to domesticated over wild animals (or indeed, wild over domesticated 
beings), but simply to state that if an ethic is to embrace the injunction to let animals 
live according to their natures, then a distinction is necessitated between 'wild' and 
'domesticated' natures. Companion animals arguably seem to flourish with intimate 
associations with humans, and it would be difficult to disentangle this associative 
'domestic nature' from a companion animal's 'wild nature'. In this restricted sense no 
contradiction needs to exist between a critical rights view and the flourishing of 
natural ecosystems, as this view goes some way to reconciling the rights of (some) 
nonhumans with the satisfaction of critical human needs. The holistic account 
likewise recognises this element. What is more problematic however is that a 
framework that reallocates the value of individuals to the value of species 
countenances an ethically insupportable degree of human interference in nonhuman 
nature - the substantive subject matter of the previous chapter.
4.3 Hierarchy and the individual nonhuman
These sorts of ways of viewing the world around us that emphasise our relationships 
to each other and the interdependences of each relational component do not merely 
pose metaphysical questions about endemic ways of thinking about the kinds of 
ways we construct the world around us (and this nominally descriptively equates to 
the 'nonhuman' world). Rather, they present us with the challenge of determining
163
Chapter 4: Ecocentrism and Animals: The New Stewardship Creed
how it is that these assumptions are so readily applied to our everyday relationships 
to the natural world. I submit that there is a strong tendency (at least in mainstream 
Western ideology) to think and act through a process of 'downward comparison' 
within a presumed hierarchical framework that frequently thwarts a meaningful 
application of an open interrelational framework (Bookchin, 1982).
I suggest that the tendency to stratify the nonhuman world is more than an 
'inevitable' consequence of merely seeing 'things' from a human perspective - a 
'straightforward anthropocentrism' if you will, or even perhaps the spectre of an 
emergent speciesism. Interestingly, this mode of categorising 'nature' has by no 
means been restricted in modernity to nonhumans alone. As a matter of recent fact, 
even other hominids have also routinely been subjected to this pernicious form of top 
down 'profiling'. For example, much anthropological and popular literature has 
repeatedly presented Neanderthal man as effectively stupid, indolent and lacking in 
sophistication - this despite recent strong and mounting evidence to the contrary 
arising from anthropological research. 31 There would seem to be something more 
than a mere tendency to stratification as a tool for simplifying the complexity of 
relations within and across nature occurring here, which I believe, largely stems from 
an entrenched, assumed, implicit and disquieting 'human chauvinism' that 
categorises the world by 'kind' and not by 'degree'. 32 This is a world created in 
'man's image', a world created out of man's overt anthropocentrism. 33 Precluding a 
protracted critique of the 'human condition', convoluted metaphysics or ontological 
lines of reasoning here, there are, fortunately, more pragmatic concerns for an 
applied understanding of our interrelationships with other-than-human beings from 
this perspective. If for example, as discussed in the previous chapter, we are indeed 
to view humanity 'as a steward, a farm manager, actively responsible as God's 
deputy for the care of the world' (Hailwood, 2003, p.238), a simple question arises: if 
hierarchy (at least as we generally apply the term based upon ideas of constructed 
levels of 'legitimate' dominance) does not in fact exist in 'nature', what is it that
31 See the exhaustive empirical findings ofJoao Zilhao et al, 'Symbolic use of marine shells and 
mineral pigments by Iberian Neandertals' (2010).
32 Darwin maintained throughout his life that differences, although impressive, are always matters 
of degree and not of kind. See James Rachels, Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of 
Darwinism (1990), pp. 56-60 for an excellent discussion of this theme.
33 See arguments presented in chapter 1 and 2 of this work regarding the consequences of overt
anthropocentrism.
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legitimises our 'schizophrenic' like wholesale abuse of nonhumans on the one hand, 
and our presumption of 'good' stewardship on the other?34
These questions further touch upon a preliminary wider theme that 
characterises contemporary environmental thought at large, that Bryan Norton 
argues has 'locked environmental ethics into a paralyzing dilemma, a dilemma that 
lies at the heart of most discussions of environmental values' (1995, p.344). For the 
most part, for Norton, this is the dominance of moral monism - the presumption that 
a single theory suffices to support a uniquely correct moral judgment in every 
situation. Whether or not the goal of seeking a unified, monistic theory of value that 
can adequately refute the 'legitimacy' of our presumed use of nonhumans represents 
a misguided mission as Norton argues - or is desirable or even possible in 
application, is clearly beyond the scope of this present work. What is however 
pertinent to the themes dealt with here is that monism, in attempts at formulating an 
all-embracing ethics (or in reality, what amount to theoretical approximations of 
such), all too easily separates the theoretical from the applied - and in the process 
ignores what Norton refers to as the 'messy details of everyday environmental 
management practices' (1995, p.345). Indeed, the central contention of this thesis 
throughout is that the illegitimacy of the very real relentless and daily tangible use of 
nonhumans for our instrumental gain goes almost entirely unchallenged in 
mainstream animal advocacy theory that largely tends to focus upon welfare, 
'respect' or good stewardship.35 In fact the 'messy business' of the use of animals is 
in itself, I believe, the key issue for animal advocacy. After all, 'using' animals is 
what we do in practice, and as I have argued for earlier, morally speaking, the issue 
is not one of how we use animals, but why we use animals. I will return to this key
34 1 use the term 'Schizophrenic' in the sense that we slaughter and confine animals on an 
industrial scale for trivial use, whilst concurrently maintaining the view that we are nevertheless 
'good stewards'.
35 Whilst it is true that animal rightists such as Regan, and environmental theorists such as Taylor 
amongst others base their theories around recognition of nonhuman (at least some nonhuman) 
inherent value, in the final analysis in cases of real-world direct conflicts of interest the perennial 
presumption of human use invariably (and often subtly) 'theoretically' trumps the 'worth' of 
nonhumans when the theory is pushed to consider such. In this sense, it is my central contention 
that these sorts of monistic value theories fail in the 'messy business' of application of theory to 
practice. Examples of theorists who have begun to question the illegitimacy of the deep seated 
presumptions of use of nonhumans contemporaneously include the likes of Gary Francione (1996 
and 2009) and Joan Dunayer (2004).
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theme in chapter six in discussion of theory to practice praxis within animal 
advocacy.
As we have seen, the 'legitimacy' for such use is primarily derived from 
straightforward assumptions about the fixed nature of hierarchical relations that 
accept a 'natural' superiority of one species over another - and in this case the 
legitimacy of humankind's 'superior right' to steward non-humankind as it sees fit. 
These presuppositions are anthropocentric in perspective and thus inherently anti- 
pluralistic in character - in that only the values considered to be compatible with 
anthropocentrism will, in the final analysis, be deemed to 'have value'. 36 What I 
mean here is that if humans are seen to be seated atop the stratified pyramid of 
hierarchical relationship, then any value assigned beneath this rarefied position will 
necessarily be linear, and therefore reductive in form (in as much as any hierarchy 
will lead to some form of pragmatic reductionism). However, as Murray Bookchin 
succinctly puts it, 'ecology recognizes no hierarchy on the level of the ecosystem. 
There are no 'Kings of the beasts' and no 'lowly ants'. These notions are the 
projections of our social attitudes and relationships on the natural world. Virtually all 
that lives as part of the floral and faunal variety of an ecosystem plays its coequal 
role in maintaining the balance and integrity of the whole' (1980, pp.59-60).
It is likely, therefore, that an environmental theory of value which conversely 
claims to be non-hierarchical and pluralistic must then address the central issue of 
subordination of relations, and attempt to circumvent the overt subordination of 
individuals. If in fact morally pluralistic views claim a basic plurality of values, then to 
the contrary, monistic approaches within environmental ethics must find theoretical 
and practical solutions for incorporating the kinds of values that are experienced in 
multiple manner and diverse contexts under a 'single' theory.
Holism revisited
Naturally, plurality of goods requires differentiation of goods - and problematically of 
course, 'goods' may be variously defined. For example, if the biosphere itself is 
deemed as the 'basic' good from which other goods arise and a continuing source of
36 Hugh P. McDonald makes this important point regarding hierarchical structures in his paper 
setting out his theory of creative actualization, in Toward a Deontological Environmental Ethic'
(2001).
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'goods' (resources) for humans, then from an environmental perspective, humans 
themselves may be seen as one of many species within the biosphere that can 
contribute or detract from the whole (in fact a normative holistic approach). For moral 
agents, this relationship implies some moral obligation and duty - if only conceded to 
the absolute minimal degree that the survival of the biosphere is reciprocal with our 
own human survival. To this extent the claims of holists are reasonable, in as much 
as the biosphere is the condition of life - and so it is therefore a reasonable claim that 
it takes 'priority' over any one species (and of course by extrapolation for holists, any 
one individual) in terms of duties and obligations owed. Notwithstanding, if one 
accepts this high level biospheric view, the convoluted theoretical and practical 
problems of holism discussed previously in this chapter nevertheless persist when 
attempting to quantify what it is that may constitute actual contributions (adding to 
the health of the biosphere) or detractions (adversely affecting the health of the 
biosphere) from the 'whole'.
Yet, if we are to concede a minimal duty to nonhuman nature (and the 
creatures that compose it) it is likely to be worked out as assent to what may, for 
example, be understood as a generalised mutual non-interference (substantively a 
live and let live ethos). This stance must, at least tacitly, acknowledge the individual 
as considerable - and not solely the aggregated notions of species 'membership' 
under a nominally stratified structure as the considered criterion. For example, for 
most environmentalists who support a general holistic approach to environmental 
management, any 'good' that an individual possesses is lost upon death (a 
commonplace and 'natural' enough occurrence to be sure). So on this account: The 
good of the species is more morally considerable, since the survival of the species is 
a condition of individuals of the species and thus required for individuals: the unique 
good of individuals requires survival of the species' (Norton, 1995, p.427). The broader 
claim implicit here is that for advocates of this high level viewpoint the 'good' of a 
given species remains of greater moral concern than the good of the individual. It is, 
in essence, this distinction that forms the basis for the schism between holistic and 
individualistic views. This dichotomy may be put thusly: species matter more than 
individuals as individuals are transient, whereas species are more permanent; 
individuals matter less as they are only members of a specific species, ergo it is the 
status of the species in the biosphere that has import.
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However, for an individualist this logic is fundamentally skewed. Whilst it is 
certainly true that in nature there are distinct groups of animals that interbreed and 
share physiological traits ('species') and those showing signs of divergent 
evolutionary traits ('sub-species') extant upon the world at any particular period in 
history, it is not so readily argued that species are fixed in any meaningful way, or 
that our understanding of 'species' at any one time is assured and unchanging. If for 
example all individuals within a species cease to exist, perhaps due to unforeseen 
cataclysmic events (or more likely in the 21 st century the indirect or direct actions of 
humans), then we deem the species 'extinct'. If a very few members of the same 
species are however later found to be alive and reproducing (say half a dozen) in 
some far flung corner of the world, many environmentalists all too readily switch their 
centre of concern away from 'ideas' of species to those specific surviving individuals. 
These individuals are now categorised as 'endangered' (although for holists 
normatively under the flag of 'species integrity'), campaigns are run, posters of the 
individual animals circulated, and monies extracted from the sympathetic. It would 
seem here that a 'numbers game' is being played out with regard to the very 
definition of species in this instance: namely, that a small number of identifiable 
individuals now come to represent the former equivocal category of 'species'. It 
would in this case appear that holism's mantra of value as assigned only to the 
contribution to the 'whole', is abridged here to an obligation to individual animals - 
and not the contribution that they make on aggregate. The key observation here is 
that, after all, it would be difficult to argue the ecosystemic contribution to the whole 
of only half a dozen beleaguered individuals. In fact, a stringently purist view would 
likely assign the species to evolutionary history along with the countless species that 
merely 'failed to adapt' to environmental change. 37
37 By 'purist' here I am merely intimating that a concession to scientific holism that frequently 
gives authoritative legitimacy to holism's claims would have to grant that species extinction is 
'business as usual' within the processes of natural selection. There is then often a highly selective 
focus in operation in conservationist aims under the holistic paradigm as we largely only want to 
'save' (from natural processes) the 'cute' animals - nominally those that most resemble us in form 
or habit. This selective view is borne out by the fact that the World Wildlife fund (WWF) have what 
they term as 'flagship' species - unsurprisingly, entirely composing of the cute or 'dangerous' 
animals that preoccupy the masses, and not the obscure, ugly or strange that may be in equal or
greater dire straits.
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The human 'species'
If the central tenet of holism is that the value of an individual organism exists in the 
contribution that it makes to the ecosystem as a whole, and if this axiom is, for the 
sake of consistency, to be applied to all species, then the maxim is deeply 
problematic for one species in particular - homo-sapiens. Problematic in this 
instance because humankind has had, and continues to have, a devastating effect 
on the biosphere. If in fact a contribution/detraction calculus was strictly applied to 
the human impact upon the rest of nature at large (either individually or collectively), 
it is difficult to imagine how our unique 'contribution' to the biosphere may be 
positively presented. This is not to argue for a misanthropic assessment of human 
contribution in these terms, but merely to point out that if indeed it is a truism that the 
good of the species is more morally considerable, since the survival of the species is 
a condition of individuals of the species and thus required for individuals - in that the 
unique good of individuals requires survival of the species, then why should humans 
alone be exempted? Put somewhat differently, the difficulty is that a premium is put 
on individual human life in most, if not every, circumstance. This valuing of 
individualism over species is precisely what holists seek to avoid. Indeed, it is not 
merely that human individuals are valued as independent entities from species' 
membership, but that they are valued above any normative notion of aggregated 
membership. Again, this is the very antithesis of the holistic approach. Clearly, 
humankind is not separate from nature (nature as holists view it) in any definitive 
sense, so how is this serious disparity to be legitimised by advocates of the holistic 
approach?
A commonplace retort when confronted with this glaring observation often 
takes on the form of argument largely based upon 'different levels of obligation'. 38 
This form of justification for disparate treatment in this context frequently begins by 
citing the 'legitimacy' of the considerable weight of nothing less than the long 
tradition of liberal thought, with its emphasis on individual rights. Advocates argue 
that to deny that humans are exempt from this form of special consideration is in 
effect to challenge the whole of western liberal thought. This fact in and of itself does
38 See Callicott in 'Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair', Environmental Ethics 2 (1979), and 
McDonald Toward a Deontological Environmental Ethic', Environmental Ethics 23 (2001) for good
examples of this class of reasoning.
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not however go any substantial way in answering the central enquiry as to why 
human individuals alone are be exempted by holists. Merely citing (human) tradition, 
whatsoever that tradition may be, does not equate to a rigorous and consistent 
counter-argument. Moreover, none of this definitely answers the central and 
pressing question as to why it is that humans alone are exempted from holistic 
contribution-based valuing, whilst all other creatures are to be valued in this way. 
Simply because we may have levels of obligations that may (or indeed may not) 
diminish concentrically outwards from ourselves, does not serve to explain why all 
humans are exempted and all nonhumans included within the holistic paradigm. 39
For example, why should it be the case that my companion dog with whom I 
share a rewarding, loving and emotionally intimate life is automatically to be valued 
on a species-based criterion on a strict holistic view, whilst a human individual the 
other side of the world that I have never met, will never know, and share no kinship 
with other than some vague notion of 'humanity' is to be valued on a individual- 
based criterion only? For sure, I have obligations in the sense that I am no more 
allowed to murder that stranger than I am to murder family members. But these sorts 
of legalistic obligations again give us no clear reason (other than, for example, one of 
societal cohesion) as to why this is to exclude all other creatures from this privileged 
position merely because the societal traditions extant at a particular point and place 
in history retain profoundly anthropocentric biases. Likewise, these kinds of 
considerations are not limited to the 'special' relationship of domesticated animals 
and humans. The 'wild' robin who visits my garden daily is valued as a discrete 
individual - not as a generic and nonspecific 'representative' of the genus Erithacus 
(its particular markings are readily identifiable on frequent observation). To propose I 
view my companion dog or individual wild creatures I personally encounter other 
than they appear - as individuals - is deeply counter-intuitive to our everyday 
experiences. It is of course true that I do not have intimate obligations of direct care 
towards the robin (as I do towards my companion dog) or any other wild creature - 
but this is primarily because to do so would in fact negate their designation as 'wild'.
39 It is worthwhile reiterating here that although humans are frequently voiced to be included, on a 
positive contributory based consensus, it is human activity and runaway population explosion that 
is the primary causation of the current (and likely the greatest) mass extinction of species. To 
ignore this painful fact by exempting humans from the holistic contributory paradigm is, to say the 
least, a serious default for holistic claims.
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The argument habitually proceeds with an acknowledgment that within society 
(a subtle move from 'nature' to 'society' here is to be noted) there are more intimate 
relations and more casual ones. It is upon this point that the holistic argument for the 
legitimacy of disparate treatment introduces the concept of 'weaker' obligations. On 
this account, for example, I have a weaker obligation to individuals in the wild, not 
least because I should preserve their autonomy. However, in response it may 
equally be admitted that I therefore in like manner have a 'weaker' obligation to the 
stranger whom I will never meet, who is also an autonomous and distinct individual. 
The move being made here by holistic advocates is a subtle, and continued, use of 
the notion of species membership (in this case homo-sapiens) to legitimate disparate 
individual practices. It does not, I believe, answer the central claim of attributing 
dissimilar treatment however, but merely attempts to make a distinction of 'wild' (so a 
weaker obligation is requisite) whilst ignoring other distinctions - such as distance or 
anonymity (the stranger on the other side of the world whom I will never meet for 
example). In addition, it is claimed that 'weaker' claims are clearly commonplace and 
legitimate within the human community (as the notion of a concentric circle of 
obligation and duty itself strongly infers). But this simply means that in fact the 
distinction drawn between so-called wild animals and other beings is then tentative 
at best, as there are abundant beings that fall outside of, or somewhere in-between, 
this category. 40
A second and allied move that characterises this argument is to demarcate 
and distinguish the biosphere from the 'sphere' of society. 41 The distinction is made 
by arguing that whilst the biosphere is all inclusive, different societies are not. 42 The 
argument follows that, The exclusivity of these societies creates obligations to the
40 In addition, this also raises serious and convoluted questions as to the definitions of autonomy. 
Such as, is the wild creature more or less 'autonomous' than the stranger? What does 'wild' confer 
and infer? Where is the line to be drawn between wild and other creatures? For some in-depth 
discussion of these questions see for example C Alien and Mark Bekoff, Species of Mind (1997), 
and L Johnson, A Morally Deep World: An Essay on Moral Significance and Environmental Ethics 
(1991).
41 For an interesting alternative take on this distinction see the literature on ecoanarchism in 
discussion of society as a distinct from, but reflective of nature: Murray Bookchin, The Ecology of 
Freedom (1982) and Remaking Society (1989), S Davidson Ecoanarchism: A Critical Defence 
(2009), Simon Hailwood Eco-Anarchism and Liberal Reformism (2003). Also useful is L Martell 
Ecology and society: an introduction (1994), Ted Benton Natural Relations: Ecology, Animal Rights 
and Soda/Justice (1993) and Alan Carter's A Radical Green Political Theory (1999). 
42 Hugh P. McDonald notes this move in Toward a Deontological Environmental Ethic' (2001), pp.
427-29.
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biosphere and to other humans which do not extend to individuals of other species. 
Our duties within and derivative from civil society are especial to human society, 
although they may include domesticated species' (McDonald, 2001, p.428). On this 
account then, societies are a 'distinct' mode of value to which justice must be done. 
Whilst it is to be admitted that there are certainly incumbent duties on individuals and 
society at large, and that these sorts of normative practices are in large part 
applicable to the human sphere alone, it is again less easy to envisage why precisely 
the various forms of human civil society that humankind generates - and that are 
distinctive to our species, should therefore automatically endow humans with an 
absolute exclusivity in consideration of their biospheric (individual) status.
In short, the leap from having a 'unique' organisational and functional way of 
being (and a myriad of nonhumans also have evolved complex unique 'societies' that 
work to the species' good), to suggesting a difference of 'kind' that sets humankind 
apart from nature, tends in the final analysis to fall back upon unconsidered 
acceptance of the 'traditional' anthropocentric worldview (human society as 
sacrosanct and defensible in and of itself). The burden of proof here must be upon 
legitimising this claim, and this would require a substantive (falsifiably proven) 
'discrediting' of all other nonhuman communities as being of an entirely different 
order to our own. This, I suggest, is a forlorn venture - especially in consideration of 
our shared genetic provenance and the far-reaching empirical studies into the sorts 
of group complexity found in many higher mammals for example.43 Furthermore, it is 
also unclear in the quoted statement by McDonald as to why the biosphere should 
be assigned obligatory consideration along with humans, whilst all other creatures 
that make up this biosphere are again ipso facto excluded in light of human 
individual exclusivity. In sum, a holistic view of nature cannot consistently and
43 And recent rigorous empirical studies also strongly suggest this to be the case. Some useful 
starting references on the empirical research into these forms of intraspecies complexity are: 
Alien, C., and M. Bekoff. 1997. Species of Mind (1997), Brosnan, S.F., and Frans B. De Waal., 
'Monkeys reject unequal pay', Cluton-Brock, T.H., and G.A. Parker. 1995. Punishment in animal 
societies. (2003), Douglas-Hamilton, I., S. Bhalla, G. Wittemyer, and F. Vollrath, 'Behavioural 
reactions of elephants towards a dying and deceased matriarch' (2006), Fehr, E., and S. Gachter, 
Tairness and retaliation: The economics of reciprocity' (2000), Frank, S.A., Foundations of Social 
Evolution (1998), Katz, L.D., ed. Evolutionary Origins of Morality: Cross Disciplinary Perspectives. 
(2000), Nowack, M.A., and K. Sigmund,.'Evolution of indirect reciprocity'(2005), Parr, LA., B.M. 
Waller, and J. Fugate, 'Emotional communication in primates: Implications for neurobiology' 
(2005), White, T.I., In Defense of Dolphins: The New Moral Frontier (2007), Wilkinson, G., 
'Reciprocal food sharing in vampire bats' (1984).
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legitimately exclude any one species, not least because such an account would no 
longer be a 'holistic1 account of life on earth - but rather a 'discriminatory' account of 
life on earth. Holism cannot capture the 'whole' whilst retaining the 'part'.
4.4 Ecology and the individual nonhuman
In general then, ecologists balk at the suggestion that ecosystems can be 
meaningfully understood by studying individual 'members' of component species or 
sub-species in isolation. Given that key properties of any ecosystem are symbiosis 
and diversity, then those who take a collectivist view emphasise that the elements 
that comprise ecosystemic diversity are not merely interrelated, but interdependent. 
Collectivists tend, therefore, to see the individual as unavoidably enmeshed within 
the 'whole' - and for them, the individual is transfigured into a 'supra-individual' 
entity. 44 Clearly, diverse environmental factors including habitat change, species 
adaptation and climate variance create and recreate niche diversity and developed 
symbiosis. However, systems are inherently dynamic in structure, and viewed over 
elapsed time no natural system is ever 'fixed'. That the individual within this changing 
dynamic is subject to pernicious environmental change both in form and habit is as 
true for the human animal as for the nonhuman animal - despite the belated human 
confidence in the 'taming of nature' through technological advance.
This observation leaves us with a question: can the systemic view of nature 
ever paint a complete and accurate picture of the individual within it, and if so how 
might its relationship to the whole be characterised? I contend that the way in which 
interrelatedness is often understood by contemporary ecologists does little to define 
or indeed describe the individual animal. At best, it merely informs upon the 
observed modus vivendi of target species. For example, if my daughter, having 
observed the tawny owl that frequents the tree in the field at the end of my garden 
asks me what a tawny owl is, I can (supposing a reasonable knowledge) begin to
44 Alan Carter introduces this phrase in discussion of a collectivist mentality. Whether or not this is 
strictly true of all holists is of course a matter of debate, in A Radical Green Political Theory
(1999), p. 73.
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describe its colouration, form, habit and classification. This answer - no matter how 
'accurate1 - is likely to be unhelpful to a young, enthusiastic and enquiring mind. I 
have, to my best ability, in dry and purely descriptive terms relayed my knowledge of 
the classification that is 'tawny owl', but I have said nothing about the 'owlness' of the 
animal in question. Is this owl a 'capable' owl by expected criteria - does it hunt 
mostly successfully? Is it stealthy? Does it nurture its young proficiently? Without 
observing at length the unique owl in question, at best, I can only answer in the 
terms set by our ecological understanding of the animal 'other' - namely, its 
relationship to the wider ecosystem. My daughter may subsequently pass an 
examination on the form, habit and classification of the tawny owl, but is little closer 
to 'understanding' the owl that frequents the tree in the field at the end of the garden. 
Moreover, if the youthful imagination of my daughter were to envisage what it may 
be like to be that owl, as Thomas Nagel famously points out, this would merely 
inform her of what it would be like for her to behave as the owl behaves.45 This is of 
an entirely different order to understanding what it is to be that owl. To quote Nagel 
in respect of this general problem of understanding individual nonhumans: 'We 
cannot genuinely understand the hypothesis that their nature is captured in a 
physical description unless we understand that more fundamental idea that they 
have an objective nature (or that objective processes can have a subjective nature)', 
(1974, p.448). I will return to the question of relationship of the individual to the wider 
ecosystem in chapters five and six, in discussion of environmentalism and a 
biocentric individualist approach.
Nonetheless, if we cannot indeed fully understand the otherness of the 
nonhuman, it is reasonable to propose that our collective experiences and sense of 
being that we share with individuals belonging to our own species, at the very least, 
enable each of us to have some broad comprehension of our multifaceted and 
frequently mutual experiential common ground. This is not to ignore the perennial 
epistemological problem of 'other minds' however - that in a broader philosophical 
sense apply to our understanding (or lack of it) of each other. AQ Notwithstanding,
45 Nagel makes this astute point in his now celebrated paper entitled 'What is it Like to be a Bat?' 
(1974), p.439.
45 The 'Problem of Other Minds' philosophical challenge is generally expressed as follows: given 
that I can only observe the behaviour of others, how then can I be certain that others in fact 
possess minds (or at least our comprehension of such) in the first instance? The thought behind
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there may remain further difficulty in the context of understanding the otherness of 
nonhuman animals that foments a greater challenge to our conception of an 
'objective nature' when thinking in terms of nonhuman subjectivity. Whereas, I 
believe it is perfectly cogent to make at least some presumption that, as humans, we 
can recognise - through shared experience, empathy and analogy - our all too 
human complex needs, wants, hopes and fears to a greater extent than we might 
comprehend these attributes in nonhumans, it is less convincing that this recognition 
equates to humans being assigned a 'special moral category'. That we can identify 
to a greater or lesser extent with one another (we might say, intra-human empathic 
identification), does not mean that our actual treatment of others should be adjudged 
on this basis alone. In fact this kind of selective categorization of groups and 
individuals is the hallmark of many of the more sinister forms of exclusion that litter 
human history.
Towards a moral individualism
Throughout this work I have argued that humans and nonhumans share both 
similarities and display marked differences; that humans feel kinship with many other 
animals whilst at the same time feeling peculiarly separate; and, that humans think of 
themselves as both 'apart' from nature and yet 'a part' of nature. Any attempt at 
formulating an adequate environmental ethic must, I believe, fully acknowledge - 
and indeed embrace - this persistent, and defining tension. For an individualistic 
stance, it is this very tension that demands a refocusing of our 'place in nature'. On 
this view, to question this place is to question our interrelationships; to question our 
interrelationships is to question our treatment and use of others; to question our 
treatment and use of others is to question our relationships to each other. Our moral 
obligations then must be determined and defined not upon group membership, but 
on individual characteristics and the relationship between individuals. From this 
standpoint, different treatment cannot therefore be adequately justified by reference
the question is that no matter how sophisticated someone's behaviour is, behaviour on its own is 
not sufficient to guarantee the presence of mentality. It remains possible, for example, that other 
people are actually nothing more than automata made out of flesh. In addition to Nagel, for 
further analysis see Daniel C Dennett's seminal work, Brainstorms (1981), and for a more 
contemporary reading, Anita Avramides', Other Minds (2001).
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to a 'preferred' group, and this of course raises serious and difficult challenges 
regarding our treatment of individual nonhumans.
By way of example here, a recurrently controversial illustration of a particular 
nonhuman use would be the treatment of certain groups in medical experimentation. 
A case in point is the chimpanzee willfully infected with a lethal disease in order for 
the progress of the disease to be monitored, and then killed (or left to die) and 
dissected for further study (a common enough daily occurrence). This use of a 
sentient higher mammal is deemed not merely morally justifiable, but de facto 
morally acceptable. These terms are not, I submit, mutually inclusive or necessarily 
logically follow from each other and there is a subtle, but crucial, difference in 
emphasis here. We may (and frequently do) manage to justify a great many of our 
actions concerning the natural world, and issues of what may or may not be 
justifiable often turn upon what is deemed 'expedient' in particular instances. 
Expedience, however, leaves little room for open ethical debate. What is morally 
acceptable in this instance is not wholly dependent on any perceived justification 
(such as the oft cited 'benefits' to humans), but is founded upon the presumption that 
membership of a group (chimpanzee in this case) confers a different set of 
acceptable relational criteria. Such overt use would be considered utterly inhumane if 
applied to a human animal. 47
If we are to assent to a moral individualism, this approach would require that 
we consider 'specific' chimpanzees, and the peculiar characteristics they display. 
Moreover, if what constitutes acceptable relational criteria is founded upon the 
acceptance that the human displays certain particular characteristics, then what if 
the chimpanzee in question can be shown to possess these (or more precisely, 
'equivalent') characteristics? Or indeed, that some humans do not possess such 
faculties. Darwin himself certainly emphasised the exhaustive similarities that exist
47 The very term 'inhumane' does of course carry with it the idea of 'humanity' and concomitant 
'human' traits. It is in itself interesting that no direct equivalence exists to describe similar 
nonhuman traits. One cannot imagine a working use of a term such as 'inanimality' to describe 
animal instigated cruelty for example. The absurdity for many of such a proposition merely 
highlights our deeply embedded anthropocentric view of existence in the refusal to ascribe any 
such traits to other beings (and especially perhaps higher mammals). Indeed, the term 'animality' 
is most frequently used in a derogatory sense.
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between humans and other animals.48 Consistency may then require that our 
treatment of the chimpanzee is also morally questionable. To be consistent would 
require that we not only look at specific chimpanzees, but specific humans, and 
consider what justifies using this specific chimpanzee over that specific human - or 
indeed any other individual of any other species.49 It is clear that human beings differ 
in many important ways, displaying marked physical and psychological variance. 
Much like the above example of the tawny owl, to ascribe the descriptive term 
'human being' is to say very little about the extremes of abilities and traits extant 
within the phenotype. As we share our evolutionary provenance with other animals 
(latterly 'higher' mammals), it is little short of absurd to deny such variances exist to 
similar degree amongst nonhumans.
A medical doctor may, for example, hold to the ideals of equality, but would 
not balk at the necessity to treat individuals in a targeted and specific way. Of course 
treating people differently is not objectionable if there is a relevant difference 
between them that justifies such a difference in treatment (medical background, age 
or diagnosis for example). But any competent doctor would treat each patient the 
same if both had exactly the same ailment with the same set of conditions. What is 
true for medical treatment here in the specific, holds true for 'moral' treatment in the 
general. For instance, one may cite numerous occasions where a given action may
48 Darwin attributed many traits to other animals at the time, on what to many may now seem to 
be empirically deficient grounds, arguing that other animals can experience anxiety, grief, 
dejection, despair, joy, love, tender feelings, devotion, ill-temper, sulkiness, determination, 
hatred, anger, disdain, contempt, disgust, guilt, pride, helplessness, patience, surprise, 
astonishment, fear, horror, shame, shyness and modesty, cited in James Rachels, Created From 
Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism (1990), p. 175. However, a great deal of 
contemporary research is correlating his assumptions and indeed showing that many other species 
possess all of these attributes and more - in addition some findings conclude that a 'moral sense' 
is to be found in several higher animals. Some useful starting references on the empirical 
research into these forms of intraspecies complexity are: Alien, C., and M. Bekoff. 1997. Species of 
Mind (1997), Brosnan, S.F., and Frans B. De Waal., 'Monkeys reject unequal pay', Cluton-Brock, 
T.H., and G.A. Parker. 1995. Punishment in animal societies. (2003), Douglas-Hamilton, I., S. 
Bhalla, G. Wittemyer, and F. Vollrath, 'Behavioural reactions of elephants towards a dying and 
deceased matriarch' (2006), Fehr, E., and S. Gachter, 'Fairness and retaliation: The economics of 
reciprocity' (2000), Frank, S.A., Foundations of Social Evolution (1998), Katz, L.D., ed. 
Evolutionary Origins of Morality: Cross Disciplinary Perspectives. (2000), Nowack, M.A., and K. 
Sigmund, 'Evolution of indirect reciprocity' (2005), Parr, LA., B.M. Waller, and J. Fugate, 
'Emotional communication in primates: Implications for neurobiology' (2005), White, T.I., In 
Defense of Dolphins: The New Moral Frontier (2007), Wilkinson, G., 'Reciprocal food sharing in 
vampire bats'(1984).
49 And of course Peter Singer sparked lasting controversy with the disability rights lobby by 
suggesting precisely this kind of species egalitarianism (1993, 1995).
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be thought to be morally justifiable, such as a war waged against an aggressive and 
expansive invader - and herein, we may invoke ideas of self defence, survival or 
even perceive such a response as a 'just' war (Sterba, 2000). This however does not 
automatically equate to a blanket moral acceptance of all of the horrors that 
inevitably follow from such a war.
A species-neutral approach
A fundamental tenet of moral individualism within the framework of an 
individualistically-based environmental ethic as presented in this work is 'species 
neutrality'. In short, that the same sort of moral 'rules' that regulate treatment of 
humans should pertain to nonhumans. Assent to a species neutral approach though, 
is certainly not controversy neutral. Indeed, for many, species neutrality is not only 
conceptually difficult, but perhaps thought a practically impossible proposal. Much of 
this work to date has, in essence, wrestled with these sorts of conceptual and 
acculturated ways of thinking about nonhumans and has defended, what are for 
many, manifestly far-reaching views. In vindication of the basic need for species 
neutrality as a moral starting point, it may then be helpful to consider two other 
principal moral rules that we readily do apply: the rule against killing; and the rule 
against inflicting pain. 50 If we may say that there is any such a thing as a 'universal' 
moral injunction, then a sanction against killing would certainly meet with 
overwhelming cross-cultural assent. However, a key enquiry for our purposes is to 
ask if the same (or similar) reasons can apply in the case of nonhumans (or at least 
some nonhumans)?
Much like questions over pain infliction, the moral brevity of killing when 
applied to other than humans, tends in practice to turn upon what constitutes the 
current scientific perceptions of what place a particular animal may occupy on the 
customary phylogenetic scale. 51 It does not seem surprising then that when we
50 I extrapolate here on James Rachel's assumptions (1990), p.208. He gives two examples of 
basic moral rules in his discussion of what may constitute right moral action. 
51The conventional phylogenetic scale or evolutionary tree is a branching diagram showing the 
inferred evolutionary relationships among various biological species or other entities based upon 
similarities and differences in their physical and/or genetic characteristics. It is to be noted 
however that the hierarchical structure of the evolutionary tree is a human construct, and the 
inherent complexity of evolutionary processes claim no teleological progression or indeed any 
universal linear progression from Mower' to 'higher' forms. Therefore talk of animal 'levels' on a 
phylogenetic'scale' is not merely misleading, but more worryingly introduces the idea that
178
Chapter 4: Ecocentrism and Animals: The New Stewardship Creed
consider this question, the animals furthest from humans on the scale seem to elicit 
greater moral ambiguity in the minds of many. The sentient monkey may seem to 
possess more of the familiar traits we deem morally relevant than, for example, the 
mouse; the mouse more than the mackerel; the mackerel more than the mite. We 
seem to have less moral 'confidence' the further we travel from what we understand 
to be 'human'. In fact, many would argue that it is precisely this point - that we 
cannot have a working moral confidence in our interrelationship to other-than- 
humans - that makes the very idea of species neutrality unfeasible. If, they may 
argue, we can only be 'sure1 of our duties and obligations by reference to what we 
'know' (us humans in this case), then talk of flattening the moral landscape through 
adoption of a species neutrality is to venture blindly into indeterminate and ever 
increasing uncertainty.
This is a serious contention, and arguably corresponds reasonably with our 
pre-reflective intuitions. These intuitions lead us to conclude that, for example, killing 
a complex sentient being that possesses what we may observe to be a biographical 
life - such as the aforementioned monkey - would seem morally more questionable 
than squashing the aforesaid mite underfoot. 52 In this sense it is likely true to say 
that the wrongness of killing does not have to be viewed in 'absolute' terms, as one 
killing could be seen as more objectionable than another (as in the instance of our 
monkey or mite). The problem, I believe, arises here not in the ambiguity of our 
understanding of other species or indeed forthrightly in the values we assign others, 
but in a more pedestrian claim. Simply, that our moral sentiments concerning other 
animals remain largely shaped by pre-Darwinian notions chiefly bolstered by a 
Judeo-Christian belief in the idea of the uniqueness of mankind and subsequent 
concepts of human dignity (McDermott, 1993). Pointedly, those ascribing to a value- 
laden interpretation of the hierarchical phylogenetic scale in addition tacitly claim a 
qualitative difference in the seriousness of killing, largely tend not to normatively 
adopt any such scale in daily practice. For example, most individuals intuitively 
sanction the killing of the monkey (in medical experimentation) and the mite (disease 
or nuisance control), the mackerel (even with 'stocks' fished to severe depletion) and
judgements of moral worth can rightly be extrapolated from this account, and thus severely
misconstrue its central aims.
52 See previous Chapter 2.3 for discussion on what may constitute biographical and biological lives
and their relevance to sentience and full individual flourishing
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ultimately when deemed 'necessary' - the man (in countless executions and 'just' 
conflicts). It would seem that our pre-intuitions fail, in large part, to guide our actual 
practice. The claim then for a pre-intuitive qualitative sliding scale regarding the 
'seriousness' of killing seems to lack any consistent practical force (Rachels, 1990, 
pp.208-210).
There are of course many prohibitions concerning cruelty and mistreatment 
that trade on such qualitative notions. From animal welfare legislation to 
conservation and protection laws, the degree of protection could correlative^ be 
seen to diminish as perceived complexity diminishes. However, it remains true to say 
that what protection exists for those supposed 'complex' enough to benefit is 
severely limited in scope. As I have argued in chapters two and three, welfare 
'protects' (and usually ineffectually) only until the inevitable slaughterhouse, and in 
like manner much conservation 'safeguards' in large part for human needs, wants 
and preferences.
What then of our second rule, the directive against inflicting pain? Much like 
the first rule against killing, the moral injunction against inflicting (unnecessary) pain 
attracts widespread assent. The fact that sentient animals can suffer in complex 
ways upon pain infliction, and that many suffer in much the same sort of ways that 
humans suffer is, in the twenty first century, now a matter of substantive fact. 53 In so 
far as both humans and many nonhumans likewise posses this capacity, it is 
inconsistent therefore to take the one suffering - but not the other - as grounds for 
objection. 54 If we are to view the willful infliction of pain as something morally 
questionable, then the significant moral task is ascertaining if there is 'good reason' 
for causing this suffering. Following from this, if then the infliction of suffering is 
considerable, the corresponding justification must be comparably persuasive. 
Irrespective of the impact of animal welfare initiatives (as discussed in chapter two), 
it is fair to say that the majority of consumers drastically underestimate the degree of
53 The Cartesian view that animals were effectively automatons and did not possess the ability to 
directly suffer is of course now rightly empirically discredited.
54 It is noteworthy that the boundary between what constitutes sentience (and the subsequent 
ability to feel pain in diverse ways) and what is not sentient is not straightforward. Empirical 
research is challenging the traditional pantheon of the animals that possess sentience. Irrespective 
of sentience, it is clear that so-called non-sentient life can nevertheless be harmed in a myriad of 
ways- not least in the closing off of potentiality to reproduce and flourish that a premature death
terminally ensures.
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suffering caused to animals raised and slaughtered for the table. Many think rather 
vaguely that the end of an animal's life may involve cruel practices, but content 
themselves with the consolation that we 'do what we can' to minimize the inevitable 
trauma of slaughter. Likewise, believing that animals live relatively 'natural' lives 
during the rearing process, many people choose to foster a halcyon 'animal farm' 
image of the farmyard populated with happy hens, contented cows and pleased pigs. 
Of course, the truth of industrial profit-driven agribusiness parodies such a contrived 
image in practice. The 'need' to produce affordable produce 'justifies' immense 
suffering to the animals designated as livestock. In practice then stark economic 
calculus is the 'good reason' proffered for causing suffering on an industrial scale. 
The justification runs, that it would be 'impossible' to produce low-priced meat whilst 
fully considering the animal's welfare. This would however seem a slender moral 
justification when one considers both that the eating of meat is not a necessary 
requirement for good health, and the production of meat is, furthermore, ludicrously 
inefficient in practice.55
If then our two principal moral rules - the rule against killing and the rule 
against inflicting pain - seem not in practice to wholly bear upon even our direct 
relationships to nonhumans (we might say that the instrumental use of livestock 
constitutes a 'direct' relationship, whereas our interrelationships with so-called 'wild' 
animals are often of an 'indirect' nature), how might these inconsistencies square 
with the idea of species neutrality? If what we consider to be established moral 
principles, can in actual practice be so readily circumvented when expedient 'good 
reason' can be advanced, then perhaps the claims of established 'biased' 
approaches are weakened. In this sense the fundamental claim for neutrality is 
conversely strengthened, in its insistence that the same sort of moral 'rules' that 
regulate treatment of humans should pertain to nonhumans.
The problem of 'value-adding'
The core argument for a form of species neutrality is however not confined to 
individualistic notions of animal worth. In matter of fact, an argument for holism within 
environmental thought starts with the claim that nature in its entirety has intrinsic 
value (or at minimum something more than merely instrumental value). Much of this
55 See chapter two for further discussion, statistics, and examples regarding these two points.
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form of argument is based upon an acknowledgement that nature itself is the 'thing 1 
that gives rise to individual organisms - that can be attributed intrinsic value. 56 From 
the perspective of this work, this viewpoint is important to an understanding of how 
the individual may figure in systemic views of nature, in that it grounds a basis for the 
intrinsic value of nature in an acknowledgment that individual organisms can be 
attributed intrinsic value. Where it critically departs from an individualistic approach 
to intrinsic value is of course in its insistence and emphasis on systemic value (the 
value lies with 'nature' that gives rise to individuals) rather than what I want to call 
discrete value (the value lies with the individuals that constitute 'nature'). For the 
holists who advance this point of view then, the value that is associated with nature 
as a whole, adds to the value associated with the multitude of individual entities of 
intrinsic value that it contains, thereby strengthening value-based arguments for the 
preservation and protection of nature'. 57
This form of holism is both appealing and controversial. The elementary 
principle underlying the claim is ostensibly that it provides a basis for the view that 
nature as a whole is suffused with value that is something more than instrumental. 
This vein of argument however raises what Gary Varner has termed '...a species of 
the genetic fallacy' and he comments:
'Rolston's argument appears to be that ecosystems have more than 
instrumental value because their products have more than instrumental value. 
But surely this is fallacious. Suppose that an otherwise devastating hurricane 
happens to clear up the waters of a lagoon so that it is very beautiful or that 
air pollution happens to create more beautiful sunsets. Just because the 
lagoon or the sunsets have more than purely instrumental value, it does not 
follow that the hurricane and the pollution also have more than merely 
instrumental value.....It is fallacious to argue that, because X came from Y and 
X has intrinsic value, Y must also have intrinsic value or even a value more 
like intrinsic value than purely instrumental value' (1998, pp.22-23).
Varner's logic would seem reasonable in this instance. However, before exploring 
the consequences of this observation for an understanding of the place of the
56 Undoubtedly the best known advocate of this form of argument is Holmes Rolston III - and 
developed in his concept of 'projective nature' which has the key attribute of'systemic value'. In 
turn, he further develops this into a particular form of non-instrumental value. See Holmes Rolston 
III, Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Value in the Natural World (1988), pp. 197-98. 
57 Robert Elliot makes this point in 'Instrumental Value and Nature as a Basis for the Intrinsic
Value of Nature as a Whole' (2005). 182
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individual animal within this paradigm, I believe it is firstly important to clarify a 
distinction that can arguably be made between what may constitute the substantive 
claim being made and the formal claim. The formal claim that Rolston makes is that 
nature 'as a whole' is suffused with intrinsic value and that something may be valued 
intrinsically - and thus have intrinsic value - in virtue of serving some purpose. 58 
This then is a formal claim about a concept of intrinsic value that is clearly holistic, 
and as it stands, is a fairly commonplace starting point for many who subscribe to a 
holistic worldview. It is however the substantive claim that follows from this formal 
conceptual claim that is more problematic. To make a substantive claim from this 
formal concept would require a view of intrinsic value as necessarily 'interconnected', 
and therefore 'purpose-serving' elements are defined by their internal 'value-adding' 
properties. 59 A substantive theory of intrinsic value would therefore seek to specify 
the sort of value-adding properties concerned.
The clear problem here for corroborating the substantive claim is determining 
how these properties may be defined and delimited in a holistic paradigm. For 
example, is species' rarity, beauty, wildness or 'naturalness' ascribed a high value- 
adding reckoning (and these attributes tend to spill much ink in environmental 
literature), whilst the built environment, common species, 'pests' and 'non-native' 
species count as adding less value to the perceived 'whole'?60 In the context of 
Varner's analogous hurricane response to Rolston, how then might advocates of a 
holistic approach conceive of the 'value' of the hurricane in this instance? It may be 
argued from a holistic standpoint that the hurricane had intrinsic value in the sense 
that it gives expression to nature's power. Or perhaps that it may possess intrinsic 
value by virtue of the fact that it exemplifies some aesthetic quality such as grandeur 
(Elliot, 2005, p53). These interpretations may well be subjectively valid for some (that 
'awe' of nature for the individual provides intrinsic value in itself), but the problem 
that Varner illuminates remains - namely, its actual instrumental 'effects' upon the
58 Elliot gives an example of efficiently performing a given task (so the mode of instrumentality is 
efficiency in this case) and posits that the tool may be valued intrinsically despite what it may
produce (2005), p.44.
59 Again, Elliot makes a distinction between forms of value and observes that something has pure 
intrinsic disvalue if it possesses no property that improves its value; something is purely value- 
neutral if it lacks both value-adding and value-subtracting properties.
60 And these kinds of 'practical' problems are explored in greater depth in chapter 6.3, 'Holism and
a biocentric approach'.
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lagoon or the air. It is fair to say that in this example the hurricane played a definitive 
role in change, but whether this casual change is acknowledged to be a 'positive' 
value-adding and non-instrumental property is something entirely different. This is to 
claim not merely interconnectedness and causality, but the designation of 'intrinsic' 
value-adding properties arbitrarily - and thus open to capricious interpretation. It is 
certainly true that most hurricanes would not possess such positive attributes, and 
would likely be viewed not as some complex (and troublingly infinitely complex) 
casually value-adding property, but likely something ranking rather 'lower' on the 
value-adding casual calculus. In essence then, this problem of what is perceived of 
as value-adding cannot, I submit, be subsumed into vague notions of 
'interconnectivity', systemic integrity or indeed some notion of the power of casual 
events to carry with them intrinsic value merely because they 'exist' as entity, 
experience or process. We could for example equally of course claim that all things 
(the universe in sum) are in flux and process, and thus attribute everything extant as 
either intrinsic or instrumentally valuable dependent on one's worldview, but this 
hardly forms any clear ethic for our moral obligations to the nonhuman world and the 
individuals environed therein.
The implications of 'other animal ethics'
How we may end up legitimating treatment of individuals and groups is however 
inevitably bound up with how we may perceive our understanding of the nonhuman 
'other'. How might we disentangle notions of the other from anthropocentric notions 
of sameness and difference is a thorny problem for animal advocacy at large. More 
precisely for our current argument, can the otherness of the nonhuman animal only 
be made meaningful through human representations? If in fact this is the case then 
it is difficult to envisage how the nonhuman animal can remain distinct and dissimilar. 
Elisa Aaltola expresses this problem in critique of 'other animal ethics' which seeks a 
respect for difference as its core value and attempts to discard exclusion based on 
ideas of similarity. 61 Notions of 'similarity' have on this view traditionally been the 
primary focus of much contemporary animal advocacy and the mainstay rationale for 
arguing against our anthropocentric normative attitudes to nonhuman animals. 
Indeed, a common and recurrent worry for many environmentalists and ecologists is
51 See Elisa Aaltola, 'Other Animal Ethics' and the Demand for Difference' (2002), p.203-209.
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that those who would take an animal rights-based outlook and emphasise 
human/animal similarity may be simply viewing 'other' animals through a form of 
uncritical postmodern sentimentalism. Herein, the animal loses it 'animality' and 
becomes subsumed into a humanised worldview - exemplified for many in the 
domestic 'pet'. This ardent aversion to viewing animals in this perceived over- 
romanticised way that is criticised by many holistic environmentalists, may however 
in itself be a form of 'anthropomorphophobia'62 Whether this term is fairly ascribed in 
general terms to the majority of 'green' thinkers is of course debatable. What is more 
certain is that the claim by many holists that traditional animal ethics, in emphasising 
'similarity' as a sufficient reason to assign animals moral status, has sentimentally 
turned nonhuman animals into 'pseudo homo-sapiens'. In short, for many 
environmental thinkers the two principal things to be avoided concerning our 
relationship with animals are anthropomorphism and sentimentalism (Holmes Rolston 
III, 1988). On this view, it is not our kinship with other animals that should form the 
basis for a moral assessment of our relationship with them, but our actual 
estrangement from them. Aaltola challenges three 'alternatives' arising from these 
divergent views:
1. The first is that we are to stop using human conceptions in our understanding 
animals and be somehow mystically 'objective'
2. The second is that since this objectivity is impossible, we are to forget about 
understanding animals altogether
3. The third is that we should try to find a common language (that both animals 
and humans share) through which to understand the animal' (2002, p.204).
Clearly, the first alternative would likely demand the impossible (we use our human 
concepts to understand the universe around us - it is unlikely we can exclude the 
category of 'other animals' from this process). The second potentially draws a 
dangerously inflexible line between 'them' and 'us' - between the Darwinian 
discerning of the difference of 'kind' or 'degree' discussed in chapter two. Moreover, 
in practice, it entirely ignores our biological shared provenance (and similar 
neurological/emotional processes) and sets humankind artificially apart from nature, 
and has historically been (and continues to be) the customary justification for 
multifarious abuse of nonhuman beings. The third alternative is perhaps more
62 Steve Baker coins this phrase in The Postmodern Animal (2000).
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promising: we need neither to 'demand' that animals fulfil a prerequisite 'tick list' of 
human-like attributes as a basis for moral value, or insist that those who do 'rate' 
higher on the tick-list be valued more. Rather, as the animal rights movement 
maintains, we need to acknowledge that similarities are important. Each individual 
within and across species of course 'differ, but all (at least sentient) beings (including 
us humans) undoubtedly share experiential lives (in the sense of Regan's subject-of- 
a-life criteria discussed in chapter one). In short, if we are to begin to understand our 
moral obligations to nonhumans in the wider context, we concurrently need to 
embrace difference and similarity, whilst acknowledging that both these concepts 
reside in the diverse attributes of each individual - and not in aggregated notions of 
otherness.
A misanthropic ethic?
It is apparent that in referring to 'animals', implicit in the very word is a plurality of 
meaning. Whether or not 'animal' is used in its descriptive sense (to distinguish it 
from vegetable or mineral), or in its distinctive sense (normatively to distinguish it 
from 'human'), it is in either case clearly not describing or defining any one thing that 
is 'animal'. Rather, implicit in both senses is an acknowledgement that there is in fact 
no 'animal' perse, but rather an astonishing multiplicity of animals. This distinction is 
not merely a semantic one. If, for example, we are talking of 'animal nature', it is 
difficult to see how this may therefore embody any unequivocal meaning other than 
in a purely (and overly eclectic) descriptive or distinctive sense. Clearly, each 
species of animal displays distinct behaviours, and furthermore each individual within 
these species will vary by degree in temperament and behaviour. There is then, at 
minimum, a tacit acceptance of some degree of individuality embedded in our 
normative understanding of the word 'animal'. This account does not however sit well 
with the holism intrinsic to much green thinking. In persistently viewing nature in 
collectivist terms (the holistic 'whole') there is a tendency to frequently conflate the 
'natural' with the social. For example, observed sub-species behavioural patterns for 
western lowland gorillas will inevitably show some variances to mountain gorillas. 
This divergence of behavioural traits is unsurprisingly found to be largely due to 
differences in environment, and subsequent adaptation. What is 'natural 1 social
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behaviour for one sub-species is, irrespective of the degree of difference, not 
necessarily 'natural' to another.
If taking a broad-brush evolutionary outlook, we can fairly say that the plain 
fact that one is human (possessing the requisite 'bundle' of recognizable shared 
attributes) entitles one to no 'special' consideration.63 This is not to take the factual 
findings of evolutionary theory - the 'is' and to extrapolate a moral 'ought'. This 
would in so doing commit the standard philosophical error of deriving conclusions of 
what ought to be the case from premises of what is the case. Nor is it to sanction 
'thinking less' of ourselves simply because we are biologically closely related to other 
animals-the aforementioned leveling of the moral landscape. Of course, neither is it 
licence to ignore genuine sympathetic feelings of 'kinship' with our own species. But 
full acknowledgement of the moral consequences of our evolutionary provenance 
and subsequent moral development may indeed mean that any revaluation of our 
place in nature will likely require a simultaneous revaluation of the place of the 
nonhuman in nature.
Conclusion
The subject matter of this chapter has been focused primarily upon the evaluation of 
holistic approaches through the prism of rights-based individualism. Following on 
from discussion of paternalism, I suggested in this chapter that what is generally 
understood to be 'environmentalism' is, in its many guises, unequivocally holistically- 
driven in its frequently unquestioned acquiescence to the concept of 'preferred 
groups'. I further asserted that a framework that reallocates the value of individuals 
to the value of species countenances an ethically insupportable degree of human 
interference in nonhuman nature. I then went on to challenge the broader ecocentric 
view that considers the individual as valued merely to the degree of its systemic 
value to a greater whole rather than the value of each individual. Through an 
analysis of biospheric egalitarianism, I contended that the holism of a deep 
ecological approach obfuscates our understanding of our place in nature whilst 
concurrently lessening the importance of the individual within this place. I concluded
63 James Rachels makes the Darwinian case for a 'moral individualism' in place of traditional 
concepts of human dignity in Created From Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism (1990). 
How an envisaged moral individualism may fit with current green thinking is explored further in
the next chapter.
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with a fundamental tenet of moral individualism within the framework of an 
individualistic environmental ethic - that of 'species neutrality' and the implications of 
'other animal ethics' for an understanding of our treatment of individual nonhuman 
animals and their assigned place in nature.
It is how in fact we are to reevaluate our place in nature and subsequently 
reevaluate the place of the nonhuman in nature that has been the underlying 
concern of this work - and indeed, the standard preoccupation of much of 
environmental and animal ethics. Ultimately, admittance to some degree of 
'favouritism' towards humans tends to characterize most ethical frameworks in one 
way or another (including the 'nonanthropocentric'). 64 Any ethic that seeks a 'moral 
hierarchy' that effectively favours humans (and for some this will be a 'necessary' 
condition if normative misanthropic conclusions in application are to be avoided) 
cannot in a strict sense, forward itself as nonanthropocentric. Equally, as Stephen 
Avery notes, 'any ethic that does not have a moral hierarchy favouring humans must 
both demonstrate the hierarchy it does adopt, if any, and show why, per impossible, 
such a hierarchy does not lead to a misanthropic conception of morality' (2004, p.35).
This is an important thought in respect to the practical application of 
theoretical frameworks that seek to challenge the boundaries of the moral 
community and question normative interrelationism. If for example, an ethic is 
advanced that may advocate a general respect for nature,65 but in instances of direct 
conflict of interests invariably legitimates human precedence, then as we have seen, 
it may well be the simple case that the tendency in application is to value those 
animals that are 'closest' to us on the phylogenetic scale, or those that prove most 
economically valuable or aesthetically pleasing. This however is not to suggest that 
what therefore is required is a 'one size fits all' ethic that can provide stringent ethical 
guidelines that prescriptively 'rank' all cases of genuine conflict of interests. In fact it 
is not merely highly unlikely that such an ethic will ever be devised, but that such an
64 As critique within the body of this work has shown human favouritism is not restricted to 
anthropocentric theories alone. Examples so far discussed include Regan's lifeboat scenario as an 
instance of a rights-based human favouritism; the acceptance of many husbandry practices by 
welfarists that tacitly favour human 'trivial' wants; the culling of healthy animals by 
conservationists that favour elitist conceptions of nature; and the species value-based hierarchy 
over individual flourishing that many holists advocate.
65 For example, Paul Taylor's comprehensive account of a respect based framework in Respect for 
Nature (1986). Also, see the comparative analysis of my own biocentric account and Taylor's
formulation in chapter 5.4.
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overly prescriptive 'manifesto' would be entirely inappropriate in the face of the 
inestimable complexities of the diverse interrelations extant between and amongst 
the myriad of life forms that share this planet. With these provisos firmly in mind, the 
subsequent chapter explores the efficacy of a biocentric approach in view of the 
claimed illegitimacy of animal use that, I have argued, mainstream animal advocacy 
struggles to draw out.
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5. Biocentrism and Animals: A Fresh
Perspective
The life of a man is of no greater importance to the Universe than that
Of an Oyster', David Hume, 'On Suicide' 1
In chapter one the animal rights-based view was outlined, followed by a critique of 
animal welfarism in chapter two. In chapter three, concepts of stewardship were 
examined in the light of conservation theory and practice, and chapter four explored 
contemporary holistic theories through the prism of an individually-based 
perspective. I have argued that welfarism, paternalism, conservationism and 
environmentalism, as presented here, share troubling common ground. Indeed, this 
thesis has contended throughout, that despite the disparate claims of these diverse 
projects, underpinning each is a persistent and profound human chauvinism that 
selectively informs upon our moral deliberations and the values we assign to the 
nonhuman world. This chapter will begin by challenging the long held view that an 
animal rights-based ethic is necessarily and irretrievably incompatible with the 
proclaimed aims of environmental ethics at large, and go on to ask if a developed 
form of biocentric individualism can provide an adequate moral framework for our 
dealings with nonhumans in the light of the arguments presented in the preceding 
chapters.
The substance of this thesis then has primarily concerned itself with our attitudes, 
practices and biases towards the nonhuman world, and specifically those nonhuman 
living creatures that share the environment with us humans. In arguing that there 
remain persistent chauvinistic attitudes towards the nonhumans that we designate 
both as domestic and wild, I have attempted to show that within contemporary 
animal protectionist theory and practice many deep-seated prejudices continue to 
permeate much of our thinking regarding our dealings with such creatures. My 
position has been that the central problems inherent in animal welfarism transpose 
themselves subtly into the paternalistic aims of conservation, and likewise, doggedly
1 David Hume, v On Suicide' (1898), Vol. 5, p.410.
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reside in many holistic eco-based alternatives. This stance can be summarised 
thusly:
1. There is a dichotomy of thought arising from the animal ethics debate 
regarding the legitimacy or illegitimacy of animal 'use' (and not just treatment) 
- nominally recognised as the animal rights/welfare schism.
2. This dichotomy is not limited to the animal rights/welfare debate and not 
restricted to the domain of 'animal ethics' alone.
3. Animal welfarism (the 'normative' approach to our moral response to 
domesticated nonhumans) accepts in large part our limited use of animals in 
diverse ways, and as such concentrates its protectionist initiatives on 
treatment rather than use.
4. Although there is a frequently voiced incompatibility between animal ethics 
and environmental ethics, the central dichotomy between treatment and use 
inherent in the rights/welfare debate nevertheless pervades much 
contemporary environmental ethical theory and practice that is chiefly 
concerned with so-called 'wild' animals and nature at large.
5. Despite its focus of moral concern on 'species' rather than individuals, the 
emphasis on treatment fostered by welfarist thinking 'evolves' to underpin 
and bolster the normative approach to both conservation and preservation 
theory and practice.
6. In this respect holistic and ecocentric theoretical approaches to our moral 
obligations to nonhumans are likewise not immune to the deep-seated 
presumptions that drive the rights/welfare dichotomy.
7. It is the underlying presumption of the legitimacy of animal 'use' that ultimately 
derails our moral dealings with nonhumans, and not merely questions over 
the efficacy of stewardship, treatment, or 'management' of these individuals or
groups.
8. The use or treatment dichotomy that permeates our attitudes and practices to 
nonhumans cannot be wholly resolved by reference to capacities, species or 
notions of interconnectivity alone and requires a shift in emphasis.
9. This emphasis needs to be formulated upon the illegitimacy of use, which in 
turn can comprise a moral foundation for applied biocentric individualism, as 
argued for in this chapter.
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5.1 Two movements
Humans are fond of stratifying life on earth and speaking descriptively about nature 
in terms of higher and lower forms of life. From a purely biological perspective, 
scientifically categorising life in terms of biological complexity serves many useful 
purposes, not least in defining nature's complex adaptive strategies and the 
processes of natural selection within each distinct evolutionary niche in terms of 
type, genus, species and sub-species. Indeed, through the scientific method we 
begin to make sense of the natural world around us, and inevitably, our place within 
its interconnected schema. However, the will to transpose these biological facts into 
a picture of life on earth that is 'ranked' from lower to higher forms, and thus make 
value judgements from this stratifying process is of an entirely different order - one 
that Darwin himself was at pains to avoid. 2 We may consider such ways of thinking 
about nature as generally reductionist in disposition (in the sense that nature is 
'reduced' in some way to supposed hierarchical component parts). For the purposes 
of this work, this reductionist thinking tends to ostensibly fall into two categories: 
individualistic reductionism - which characterises the animal ethics view; and 
ecosystemic reductionism - which in turn tends to dominate environmental ethical 
thinking. In this sense the dominant view is that there are extant 'two movements' 
that consider humankind's 'place' in nature and our subsequent moral 
responsibilities to the nonhuman world. 3
Individualistic Reductionism
Broadly speaking, identified in chapters one and two was the observation that the 
animal protectionist movement focuses in the main on animal individuals as sentient 
beings and on our ethics in relation to these beings. In this sense, the sphere of
2 For Darwin there were no 'more evolved' or Mess evolved' species, only diverse adaptations due 
to environmental pressures. See James Rachels, Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of 
Darwinism (1990) for an excellent appraisal of Darwin's wider thought on the ethical dimensions of
his theory.
3 This of course ignores extant theological worldviews and purely scientific explanations. See 
Barbara Noske, Two Movements and Human-Animal Continuity: Positions, Assumptions, 
Contradictions' (2004) for further critique.
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moral concern is the domain that is that nature which has evolved as individual and 
sentient - in essence that nature which can feel pain, pleasure, fear and 
multitudinous emotional responses.4 This focus on sentience arises, in part, from the 
acknowledgment that there is clear evolutionary continuity between the human and 
animal condition. Of course acknowledgment of human sentience has deep ethical 
significance and is at the root of the condemnation of oppression, persecution, 
slavery, torture and multifaceted forms of overt abuse. Importantly for animal 
advocates, this human-animal continuity entails the acknowledgement that many 
animals have pysiological and neurological systems that resemble ours. The broad 
ethical observation to be fairly drawn from this is that if well-being is important to 
humans, it is reasonable to suggest that it is also important to other (sentient) 
animals. In brief, not only do many animals have bodies like ours due to our shared 
evolutionary provenance, but their 'subjectivity' - their mind and their emotional life - 
resembles our own.
Human animal/nonhuman animal continuity in both physiological and 
psychological terms calls then for a 'parallel' continuity in ethics. In short, this means 
that ethical obligations vis-a-vis nonhuman animals cannot be radically different from 
those vis-a-vis other humans. This form of reductionist thinking has, for many who 
would see themselves as environmentalists (or at least as possessing some 'green 
credentials'), limited appeal. With the animal rights focus on sentient individuals 
many environmental ethicists argue that most animal rights advocates are effectively 
indifferent to 'nature' - other than 'animal nature'. For example, the remit of the 
animal rights movement it is argued, whilst vocally condeming factory farming 
practices, has little to say about the globally extensive 'factory' farming of plants that 
are deemed as little more than a human crop resource. This, despite the fact that 
these methods turn hectares of diverse and often rich ecosystems into near sterile 
plant monocultures, whilst all the while destroying innumerable animal life in the 
relentless processes of production. It is argued that members of the animal liberation 
movement often seem to display little awareness of the Violence' involved in 
bulldozing an acre of land or building a road. 5 A claim frequently made by many
4 This is the working definition that Singer himself proposes. Peter Singer, Animal Liberation
(1990).
5 This observation is made by J Livingston in his book entitled Rogue primate: An exploration of
human domestication (1994).
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green thinkers in this respect is that those animal ethicists who would support 
individualistic reductionist thinking and advocate a focus upon individual pain and 
suffering have in some way lost touch with 'nature' as an interdependent system 
where everything has its place, function, and appropriate physical organisation. It is 
suggested that due to the alienating effects of urbanization, technological optimism 
and the modern urbanocentric mind-set most urbanites no longer see nature as the 
'community of killing', that historically closer familiarity with the animal community 
engendered.6 Herein, as Barbara Noske points out, many argue that the animal 
movement tends to portray animals as though they themselves were isolated, city- 
dwelling consumer-citizens, living entirely outside of any ecological context. 7 Such a 
view amounts to a form of reductionism, one that we may call 'individualistic 
reductionism'.
A characteristic, therefore, of the modern debate is that many greens argue 
that consideration for the plight of wider ecosystems elicit at best moot response 
from mainstream animal rights groups. There is, it is fair to say, a reasonable retort 
from animal rights advocates, in that any 'movement' needs to address itself to 
specific issues and must delimit itself to its proclaimed aims and objectives if it is to 
have a reasonable chance of reaching these aims and goals. Thus, the animal rights 
movement concentrates the majority of its efforts on 'domestic' sentient animals (in 
the main those animals that are deemed to be 'directly' and purposely affected by 
human activities such as farmed animals, companion animals and hunted animals - 
those previously designated under the general descriptive phrase of 'anmials in 
human servitude'), and leaves much of so-called 'wild' and 'managed' animal 
protectionism (those creatures in diverse ways 'indirectly' affected by human activity) 
to other organisations who profess such aims 8 . In this context it is legitimate to think 
of the 'restricted' concern for particular groups that movments such as the animal 
rights lobby forward, not as a narrow, naive or inconsistent viewpoint, but as one that
6 Lemaire contrasts modern vegetarianism and its largely urban provenance with predatory nature 
and its independent organisation in, Met open zinnen: Natuur, landschap, aarde (2002).
7 Noske (2004).
8 Such organisations are of course numerous, with diverse emphases on various aspects of animal 
and environmental protectionism. These range from government sponsored agencies such as the 
environment agency and country side councils to private organisations such as woodland and 
wildlife trusts, the Green Alliance, the RSPB, the Marine conservation society and environmental 
Protection UK. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of environmental organizations for an 
extensive list of extant organisations in the UK and worldwide.
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merely aims at addressing specific animal abuses in what may be considered distinct 
'man-made' circumstances. The claim by many environmentalists that animal 
rightists are therefore 'indifferent' to wider nature, and thus ignore the complex 
ecosystemic interrelationships of life on earth in their focus on individual sentient life, 
should be contextualised.
Ecosystemic Reductionism
If we are then to attempt to contextualise the divergent debate and the subsequent 
emphasis on what it is that merits protectionist initiatives in each case, we firstly 
likely need to identify what may be the 'working' definition of the term 'animal' itself 
that each perspective normatively employs. For example, 'animals' for people in the 
deep green/deep ecology movement are first and foremost wild animals - i.e., fauna 
living in the wild. It is not sentience or cruelty issues that are central here: it is 
nature, naturalness, and environment. 9 In contrast, for most animal ethicists the 
term is generally understood as other-than-human sentient beings. So, there is a 
sense of 'animality' and 'wildness' inherent in a (deep) green interpretation of nature
- one that is intrinsically seperate from the built environment - and one that is not 
empahsised to this extent within the animal rights movement. For many, this 
separateness is of course implicit in the very word 'environment' - as meaning in its 
literal sense that which surrounds us, and here there is an evident lingusitic 
distinction built into the concept of 'the' environment between the human and 
nonhuman domain.
Certainly, in biological terms, we are nevertheless as much a part of (in the 
sense that we are not apart from) the environment as any other 'thing' (both animate 
and inanimate). Oddly enough - and perhaps because one would expect the inverse
- it is the animal protectionist movement rather than the deep ecology movement 
which invokes animal-human continuity as a line of reasoning for considering 
animals as individuals. For animal rightists this 'shared' animality is both cause for 
greater caution in our presumed use of other sentient beings (they share a 
physiological and psychological provenance with us), and also a reason for
9 Baird Callicott is happy to make this distinction that determines 'naturalness' as a primary 
criterion for ethical ascription, In defense of the land ethic: Essays in environmental philosophy
(1989).
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recognising our (possibly) unique human traits. One such trait disussed in this work 
may be our distinctive developed predisposition within the animal kingdom for what 
is generally understood as 'moral agency'. 10 Importantly for animal advocates this 
predeliction (albeit itself an evolutionary 'development') demands incumbent moral 
duties to nonhumans (as well as of course to humans) arising from this inescapable 
biographically and biologically acculturated 'moral nature'. As previously noted, in 
contradistinction to animal rightists, advocates of a holistic view tend to conceptually 
and pragmatically equate 'animals' with their species (including here the human 
animal). Equating animals with their species, and by extension with their place in the 
ecosystem, amounts to another form of reductionism (as individuals are thusly 
'reduced' to designations). In this sense it may properly be termed ecosystemic 
reductionism.
If many holists criticise the focus on individuals that the animal rights-based 
view posits as forming an inadequate response to the challenges of environmental 
ethics, then likewise many animal ethicists perceive shortcomings in the ecocentric 
or systemic perspectives. The immense suffering caused to animals in what many 
greens would view 'domestic' settings - in particular farmed animals - elicits scant 
concern from many environmentalists. Many deep greens therefore have little 
interest in domesticated 'animal nature', and generally speaking tend to be rather 
uninformed and unconcerned about the way animals are treated in factory farms and 
laboratories. Can however such clearly draw distinctions be made between animals 
in human servitude, those designated as feral, and so-called wild animals?
A problematic commonality?
So, how then are we to navigate between ideas of individualised ethics and 
ecosystemic reductionism? Gary Varner reformulates one argument that has been 
widely influential within the debate,
1. 'Environmentalists reach the conclusions they do because they are conerned 
with values that reside in wholes (species, biotic communities, and 
ecosytems)
10 1 use the term in the widest context to refer to the fact that humans have developed as social 
creatures and as such individuals learn complex social interactions requiring convoluted 
understandings of the normative 'moral' boundaries that are acted out within the societal milieu by 
'moral agents'. In this sense moral agency is an inescapable evolutionary trait.
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2. But only indiviudals (perhaps only conscious individuals) have interests.
3. Therefore appeals to what is in nature's interests will not provide firm 
philosophical support for the environmental agenda' (1998, p.6).
The animal rights-based view questions the normative 'place' of animals in human 
society and ethics. In this sense it may be reasonable to propose that animal 
advocates could, perhaps, bridge the gap which separates it from holistic 
approaches by 'overcoming' its exclusive focus on sentience. It could, for example, 
extend its compassionate ethics so as to include the non-sentient and even the 
inorganic. The difficulty of course would lie in its capacity to then broaden its 
perspective to include the whole earth without simultaneously humanizing and 
colonizing it (an extreme scenario might be troubling initiatives to 'protect' prey 
animals or a program of eradication of all predatory animals altogether). If 
compassionate society is about broadening the remit of ethics, many radical green 
perspectives such as deep ecology, conversely espouse a compliance with and 
obedience to nature's measure, nature's rhythm and nature's limitations. 11 For 
example, deep ecology's central thesis proposes a compliance with a conceptual 
nature that includes things like mortality, predator-prey relationships, precedence of 
species, and finiteness. In this way, instead of asking how animals are part of human 
ethics, deep ecology asks how animals (and humans) are part of nature.
One point of theoretical convergence however is that both a broad 
environmental ethic and an animal rights-based ethic are, at least notionally, united 
in their rejection of the legitimacy and efficacy of anthropocentrism (at any rate in its 
more crude forms). This bedrock of shared principle is not to be ignored. If indeed 
the driver for a reassement of our principles and practices towards the nonhuman 
world is a genuine willingness to view other-than-human entities as possesing some 
degree of independent value (albeit assigned various significance according to 
ideology), then the approaches that both the animal rights view and a broader green 
view engender may represent a (divergent) 'working out' of a shared ideology, rather 
than constituting an oft-cited ideological chasm. The apparent dichtomy of approach 
between animal rights advocates and environmentalists may be less one of
11 Livingston makes this distinction explicit in his exploration of human domestication of primates 
in Rogue primate: An exploration of human domestication (1994).
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irreconcilable ideological perspectives, and bettter viewed more straightforwardly as 
different approaches to somewhat different protectionist challenges.
This is of course not to deny serious ideological differences in perspective (in 
particular where the emphasis of concern lies - primarily with 'species', or foremost 
with 'individuals'), but to merely suggest here that each view need not automatically 
be assigned the 'mutal exclusivity' that tends to dominate the contemporary debate. 
Tom Regan's famous adage that 'Environmental fascism and the rights view are like 
oil and water: they don't mix' is astutely made (2004, p.362). Stretching this analogy 
somewhat, this does not however mean that each component part cannot reside in 
the same space, share similar properties and bring their distinctive qualites to the 
whole. Significantly, adopting this 'inclusive' proposition may, at minimum, open up 
consideration of common-ground between the theorectical emphases that each 
position holds. Indeed, in this context, it is the possiblity (and desirablity) of 
consideration of such common ground that foments a central theme of this work.
Within the extant theoretical underpinnings of each prescribed view, is there 
then to be found any speculative commonality? The normative protectionist aims of 
the 'standard' welfare approach (discussed in chapter two) certainly premises its 
arguments upon notions of some moral duties and obligations encumbent upon 
humans in their daily treatment of nonhumans. Likewise, paternalistic forms of 
conservation (considered at length in chapter three) are consistently underpinned by 
an accepted belief in a requirement for humans to recognise their systemic place in 
nature and act accordingly. In this respect, both views emphasise human agency 
and direct obligations toward other-than-human life (and for some, by extension, 
inanimate nature). If there is indeed therefore to be found a shared ideological 
premise, it is likely a prescriptive assent to some form of 'stewardship' encumbent 
upon human beings. For instance, in the nominal animal rights literature this 
normatively takes the form of 'welfarism'; within environmental thinking, 
'conservationism' and 'protectionism'. I believe the pragmatic distinction is one of 
focus. For welfarists it is the treatment of individuals (and sometimes groups), and 
for environmentalists it is the treatment of groups (and sometimes indivduals). Both, 
nevertheless, bring to the debate this shared presumption of stewardship.
This presumption of stewardship as legitimate was however challenged in 
chapter three and four. It was suggested that such a supposition may in fact share
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an underlying failing, in that our taken-for-granted moral obligations and duties are 
bounded (and I believe constrained) by normative concepts of stewardship alone - in 
essence, that we do 'what we can'. Stewardship in this sense frequently translates to 
doing our best with the convuluted 'complexites' of extant interrelationships. This 
emphasis on 'best' treatment is exemplified across the broad spectrum of 
human/animal interaction from welfare practices concerning domesticated animals, 
to the emphasis on selective stewardship endemic to conservation policies, and 
further finds place in the 'eco-refocusing' found in much green radical thought. In 
short, can a 'doing our best' ethic continue to be maintained as an appropriate, 
legitimate and wholly sufficient moral response to our dealings with the nonhuman 
world, and crucially for this work, the living creatures that share the enviroment with 
us humans?
5.2 Animal Ethics as Environmental Ethics
If we are then to seriously consider nonhumans as individual bearers of value, it is 
not necessarily the case that we have to abandon ecologically based ethics anymore 
than we would need to do so if we consider humans to be bearers of individual value 
(Livingston, 1994). This elementary observation is frequently overlooked in the wider 
debate. Ethical deliberation regarding principle and practice is of course largely a 
matter of considered scrutiny of principles as well as specific application, and it is 
this eclectic process that helps establish the requisite moral 'priorities' in each case 
in point. This is not to suggest however that the diverse ways of viewing nonhuman 
nature discussed to date are to be somehow conflated in application. Indeed, as our 
discussion in the previous chapter contrasting holistic approaches and animal 
advocacy drew out, our worldviews clearly have far reaching divergent theoretical 
and applied consequence with regard to our attitudes to animals and their 
subsequent treatment. It may fairly be said however that there are certain 'facts' that 
underlie these divergent approaches that each view needs to confront. For example, 
the appropriate treatment of wild animals can variously pertain to questions over 
such things as the relationships between each other (that is intraspecies 'facts'), 
those questions that relate to the interaction with the environment in general terms
199
Chapter 5:: Biocentrism andAnimals: A Fresh Perspective
(the dynamism of systemic facts'), and facts about animals that belong to other 
species (the veracity of interspecies 'facts'). 12 These sorts of substantive deductions 
can, and frequently do, establish a backdrop for such normative judgments within 
animal advocacy.
It is upon these sorts of 'facts' that the holism of a good deal of 
environmentalism ostensibly trades, and this approach is typified in Holmes Rolston 
Ill's remark that 'what is in nature may not always imply an ought (and it may seldom 
do so in interhuman ethics), but ought in environmental ethics seldom negates wild 
nature' (1998, p.79). But how might these sorts of 'facts' about the interrelationships 
between humans, nonhumans and the environment relate to one another in the 
context of the divergent theories? On the one hand many advocates of individualistic 
rights-based views argue primarily from an initial conception of 'respect'. 13 This 
notion is worked out in diverse manner within the sometimes disparate 'animal rights' 
theoretical frameworks, but nevertheless share the common basis of respect as the 
building block for arguing the moral case for animal advocacy as the predominant 
virtue. On the other hand, as discussed in the previous chapter, for many holists this 
notion of respect is for them 'broadened' (rights-based advocates would argue 
'diminished') to the ecosystem at large rather than residing with individual animals - 
with the individual contribution to such forming a contributory factor alone in the 
respect due to the 'whole'. Again, this difference is not merely one of semantic 
divergence. For Rolston for example, there is a definite core category separation of 
'human' (and for Rolston I suggest here a conflation of normative traditional ethics 
and contemporary rights-based positions in that both are viewed as 'human' ethics) 
and environmental ethics, and he posits: 'In an environmental ethic, what humans 
want to value is not compassion, charity, rights, personality, justice, fairness, or even 
pleasure and the pursuit of happiness. Those values belong in interhuman ethics, in
12 Laura Westra makes this broad tripartite distinction in her ethic of'limited hostility', and I 
extrapolate her general points in terms of intraspedes facts, systemic interrelationships and 
interspecies veracity. See 'Ecology and Animals: Is There a Joint Ethic of Respect?' (1989), p. 220. 
13 1 use this term in the loosest and non-technical of senses here, simply to imply that if it is 
admitted that there exists notions of at least some moral obligation to nonhumans (that we cannot 
do simply what we wish), this implies a degree of Vespect' (and likely a sympathetic disposition) 
be present in order to make sense of the need for moral obligation in the first instance - in short, 
that if at least some sense of respect is totally absent, it is difficult to see how any normative 
obligations could consistently follow.
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culture, not nature, and to look for them here is to make a category mistake' (cited in 
Westra, 1989, p.225).
A reconciliatory ethic
There would seem to be little hope of any firm reconciliation of so-called 'human' 
ethics and environmental ethics on the above account. But as J. Baird Callicot 
himself observes in his response to Dale Jamieson on the convergence of animal 
and environmental ethics, 'animal-liberation ethics and environmental ethics are 
closely related, theoretically, and natural allies, pragmatically.' 14 Despite the 
theoretical and applied nuances of holistic and individualistic approaches (and 
intermediate positions) that have preoccupied the preceding chapters, the fact 
remains that the central concerns of animal ethicists and environmental ethicists 
share common ground: namely, a suspicion and condemnation of taken-for-granted 
overt anthropocentrism in our dealings with the nonhuman world. I believe that this 
commonality is all too frequently overlooked in the inevitable theoretical allegiances 
forged in the heat of the debate.
Historically, during the effective emergence of the formal animal-liberation and 
environmental ethical movements in the late 1960's and early 1970's much of the 
attention was centred upon concerns for anthropogenic species extinction and 
habitat and ecosystem destruction, and these sorts of 'holistic' concerns were 
generally conflated with the individualism of the emergent animal-liberation 
movement. What Callicott's work initially drew was a distinction between the two 
emergent nonanthropocentric ethics that the respective positions fomented. In this 
respect the modern debate was born - and tangible allegiances forged. However, 
those who share the common ground of condemnation of overt anthropocentric 
practices, in practice, are not nearly as polarized as the polemics of the debate 
suggest. Many 'environmentalists' are in fact deeply concerned with the pain and 
suffering of individual animals alongside concern for their habitat loss and
14 J. Baird Callicot is of course a pivotal figure in the animal-liberation/environmental debate and 
his seminal work 'Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair' is often cited as a foundation for the 
schism that has dogged the contemporary discourse. Callicott himself has however formed a more 
conciliatory approach belatedly. This citation is from the opening paragraph of J. Baird Callicott's 
further response to Dale Jamieson's critique of Callicott's initial paper following a 'Triangular Affair' 
which was entitled 'Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Back Together Again'. The 
'corrective' (Callicott's term) response follow-up paper that the actual quote is taken from is 
suffixed 'Back Together Again, Again' (1998).
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ecosystemic degradation and destruction; likewise, many animal rights advocates 
(and certainly the vast majority that I have personally encountered) also have an 
working awareness of the interconnectivity of species and the importance of habitat 
retention to individual (and group) flourishing. 15 There is, I believe, frequently a false 
dichotomy fostered in presumptions, from either 'camp', of mutual exclusivity. What I 
mean here is that in realistic terms if one 'cares' for the environment, it is 
unsurprising that the same individual also has concerns for the 'things' that make up 
the environment. To suggest otherwise is to draw an anaemic picture of the 
complexities and interrelatedness of being, that humans share and experience along 
with the rest of life on earth.
An adequate environmental ethic may in fact demand more of us than a 
radical critique of our inculcated attitudes and dispositions towards nonhumans. At 
the core of our questions over the moral responses to the nonhuman realm must be 
the meaning and value we give to our everyday interspecies interrelationships. Can 
this meaning be found within the boundaries of any one ethical discipline, and must 
'animal ethics' and 'environmental ethics' embrace a pragmatic interrelationism if it is 
to begin to change hearts as well as minds? If such instrumentally blinkered human 
centered ethics seems, as Bryan Norton suggests, at present 'incapable' of 
'recognising the fluidity of contemporary environmental issues and values, do we 
need a new ethic and theory of value' (2005, p.298)?
It is however, in part, these sorts of self-proclaimed complexities seen to be 
endemic to the 'web of life' that make formulating adequate ethical responses to 
diverse nonhumans and nature at large both challenging and problematical. 
Notwithstanding, attempts to 'redefine' the place of animal advocacy within the wider 
environmental arena have more recently been attempted. Dale Jamieson, for 
example, proposes what Callicott describes as a kind of hybrid animal- 
liberation/environmental ethic (Callicott, 1988), and so for Jamieson, 'one can go quite 
far protecting the environment solely on the basis of concern for animals, because 
nonhuman animals, like humans, live in environments' (1998, p.260). Irrespective of
15 This is of course not to suggest that care for the environment of necessity goes hand-in-hand 
with care for nonhumans perse. There are, naturally, diverse factors that determine one's 
understanding, passion, interest and emphasis that stem from a heady mix of sociological, 
psychological and cultural influences. I merely suggest here that 'environmentalists' and 'animal 
advocates' are in practice not so readily differentiated as much of the polemic of the contemporary
debate suggests.
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any shared ethos that environmental and animal protectionists may or may not have, 
on face value Jamieson's 'bottom up' claim here would not readily be embraced by 
the majority of mainstream holists, who (as discussed in chapter four) conversely, 
take a decidedly 'top down' view of nature (the whole over the parts). However, 
Jamieson presents a somewhat refined account of this claim. He proposes two kinds 
of intrinsic value, the first he designates as 'primary', the second as 'derivative'. 
Included in his primary conception are those beings 'who can suffer, take pleasure in 
their experiences, and whose lives go better and worse from their own point of view' 
(1998, p.47). Simply put, these are the kinds of beings that can be said to have 
interests - even if they are not interested in their interests (they have an inherent 
telos whether or not consciously aware of it). This categorisation necessarily then 
gives no account of non-sentient 'nature' as such, and certainly does not encompass 
species per se, biotic communities or ecosystems. Following in the rights-based 
tradition (as outlined in chapter one), Jamieson accredits primary intrinsic value to 
subjects-of-a-life as morally considerable (animate, sentient life in particular) and not 
inanimate nature (rocks, plants, water, atmosphere, and so on). His second, 
'derivative', kind of intrinsic value is more subtle, and turns upon the notion that 
effectively there can be no value without a valuer. As Callicott explains it, 'value' is 
primitively a verb and 'intrinsic' correlatively an adverb (1999), thus as Jamieson puts 
it, 'we intrinsically [adverb] value [verb, transitive] something when we value it for its 
own sake (1998, p.261). So, we can value a thing (and this may well encompass 
species, non-sentient life, oceans, rivers, mountains - or in fact just about anything) 
intrinsically. However, those who would seek to subsume some or all to these 
'things' under the derivative category would need to supply reasons why some things 
are derivative and others not - why, as Callicott observes (1999), old growth forests 
are to be valued intrinsically (derivative intrinsic value), and why for example a pair of 
old, worn-out shoes should not be valued intrinsically (and not assigned derivative
intrinsic value).
Jamieson then, gives us a supplementary account of intrinsic value in his 
evocation of derivative intrinsic value in this context. But an immediate problem 
arises as to how we may consistently determine when derivative intrinsic value ought 
to trump primary intrinsic value. This is certainly a pertinent issue for many 
environmentalists, who may for example want in certain circumstances to override
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the interests of a 'primary' intrinsic value holder in order to ensure the continued 
existence of a derivative one. For example, a common foraging animal such as a roe 
deer that has 'strayed' onto a conservation area containing a very rare plant species 
and threatens to immanently eradicate it entirely. This is not to necessarily condone 
extreme measures such as culling the animal (an all too frequent 'first resort' in 
practice), but to simply make the point that even in merely removing it we (perhaps in 
a 'weaker' sense) nevertheless clearly here prioritise a derivative holder over a 
primary one. These sorts of considerations of course raise foundational questions 
regarding the mainstay of animal ethics at large - the what (or whom) it is that 
deserves moral consideration. Drawing on the example above of the deer and the 
rare plant species, is it then ever in fact legitimate to choose the non-sentient lifeform 
over the sentient? Or, as Jamieson argues against in response to Rolston's view, 
'that on many occasions we should prefer the lives of plants of those of animals.' 16
This form of enquiry of course brings us full circle. As Callicott notes, 
Jamieson represents his 'hybrid' view as 'being rooted in traditional views of value 
and obligation' (1999, p.45). These 'traditional views' ostensibly reflect the twin pillars 
of modern classical ethics: utilitarianism and deontology. For Jamieson, the 
deontological approach to animal ethics demands recognition of the sentient subject- 
of-a-life as possessing (his form) of 'primary intrinsic value'. As discussed at length 
in the opening chapter to this work, it is, therefore, unsurprising that a theory founded 
upon the deontological approach should 'value' a notion of primary intrinsic worth 
(the deer in this case) above a derivative one (the rare plant). 17
The 'environed' environment
Aside from this perennial problem of deciding upon value assignment in conflicts of 
interest, which as we have seen, are endemic to environmental ethical 
considerations, Jamieson's dualistic notion does not adequately answer the problem 
of species impartiality in respect to preferential regard to humans in 'lifeboat'
16 Jamieson, in his conclusion, argues that we should normatively not in this context trump the 
primary value of the deer, p.45.
17 See particularly the discussion of deontological ethics in respect to the modern debate in
Chapter 1.1. of this work.
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situations. 18 Again, we may in certain circumstances wish/need to override one 
primary intrinsic value holder's rights in order to protect another (for example where 
a choice must be made between two 'similar' species or individuals). Jamieson's 
primary/derivative theory is then arguably more acceptable to environmental ethicists 
in that it is more 'inclusive' in its allowance for derivative intrinsic value of the sorts of 
'things' that preoccupy many environmentalists (species, biotic communities and so 
on). However, it tends in practice to merely move the recurrent problems of 
determining when derivative intrinsic value ought to trump primary intrinsic value and 
issues of species impartiality in respect to preferential regard to humans one 
deliberative 'step out' - whilst still giving little guidance on how these sorts of 
endemic problems be resolved. This is of course not necessarily a refutation of this 
inventive attempt to 'hybridise' environmental and animal ethics, but merely to 
suggest that despite its 'inclusiveness', the theory nevertheless has to confront the 
same sorts of ethical dilemmas that more 'straightforward' environmental theories 
are obliged to tackle as business as usual.
Talk of a 'shared' environment raises wider questions regarding the 
significance and meaning of what it is that is considered to be shared in this respect. 
Is, for example, this shared domain to be felt, in practice, one largely delimited by a 
shared 'local' biospheric commonality, or is it better understood more eclectically, as 
perhaps embracing the entire planet? In fact, much of the subject matter of this work 
has touched upon this subtle, but decisive differentiation in discussion of the diverse 
attitudes to animal advocacy arising from this delineation. For example, many 
individualists, would in general terms tend towards a more 'local' account of 
perceptions of environmental (moral) significance in concern for individuals, whom 
for them, are seen to be 'individually placed' within a given environment (be it a man- 
made one as in the case of 'the farm' or household, or a local populace ensconced 
within a natural environment). As we have seen, holists, conversely, take the wider 
and interconnected view - one which may well encompass the entire planet in 
environmental (moral) scope.
The key point here is that within this process of engagement, it is the living 
creatures that are extant within this environment that gives meaning to the very
18 Although this phrase is used here in a general sense, there is of course Regan's (in)famous 
lifeboat scenario that considers such a direct conflict of interest and preferential regard.
205
Chapter S: Biocentrism and Animals: A Fresh Perspective
conceptual term. Simply put, 'environment' (as used in its literal sense of 
'surroundings') makes little sense if there are no living creatures to be surrounded. 
Robin Attfield expresses this a priori concept thusly, 'Environments never exist 
before the environed creature does, and cannot exist without such a creature. They 
comprise a process rather than a fixed objective entity, and are continually under 
construction through the activities of the living being environed' (1999, p.10). This is 
of course not to suggest that the inanimate elements that go to make up the vast 
majority of matter that we now call the environment does not in concrete form exist 
(and of course, pre-exist, complex life), or indeed form the basis for life, but rather 
that such does not rightly warrant the term environment without that which is 
environed. Neither, I contend, is this a forthright 'leap' from the ontology of 'what is' 
(in this case the environment in toto) to an assumption about where we place value 
(clearly an ethical declaration). It is rather a straightforward assertion of 
'surroundings' as understood as a necessary condition of that which is surrounded 
(and in the context of this work, these constitute the living creatures that make up 
such). Indeed, conversely, I am singularly not inferring any substantive leap from the 
ontological 'nature' of nature (notwithstanding the 'intrinsic' value that nature may 
have that, for example, deep ecologists may wish to assert), or attempting a crude 
'reading off' of ethical prescriptions from nature, but rather - more modestly - simply 
affirming that the 'meaning' we give to the concept of surroundings necessarily 
includes that which is surrounded therein. 19
To clarify my point here, in respect to formulating adequate environmental 
ethical responses (our theories of right and responsibility) and subsequent 
axiological value theories arising from them, it is upon the range of things that have 
import that such value theories are normatively founded. In effect, to range a 
meaningful ethic merely upon the 'surroundings' itself is to negate the very term (and 
at once 'deny1 Attfield's conceptual claim above). This claim is pivotal to the
19 Likewise, I here make no direct claim to a derived value hierarchy that 'ignores' the qualification 
of pre-existing ecosystemic conditions in favour of living creatures alone. The biocentric 
individualism argued for in this work does not seek to 'ignore' the dynamic and sustaining nature 
of biospherical underpinnings, but rather to claim that our moral focus is more correctly (and 
fruitfully) centred upon the living creatures that are environed within given ecosystemic 
frameworks. In chapter 6, in discussion of holism and a biocentric approach, I argue further that 
such frameworks can in fact'by extension' be afforded protection if we centre our concern upon
those beings that make up such.
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arguments presented in this work. If indeed it is a reasonable assertion to suggest 
that it is the animate (the living creatures) that bestow conceptual meaning upon 'the 
environment' (rather than the other way around), then any ethic that seeks to 
displace this central role of living beings is arguably misplaced. In this way, holistic 
environmental theories that attempt to amalgamate elements of the animate and 
inanimate (rocks, rivers, etc.) in an all-embracing schema, I submit, miss this 
assertion. If it is ostensibly upon the range of things that our moral theories are 
grounded, then an environmental ethic that is grounded in a range delimited by life 
itself (in that it is 'life' that gives conceptual meaning to 'environment'), would seem 
to present a coherent and consistent starting point for an environmental theory of 
value.
5.3 Biocentric Individualism: A starting point
Biocentric individualism, which recognises the moral standing of all individual living 
creatures, would arguably therefore constitute an appropriate ethical perspective in 
this key respect.20 As Paul Taylor determines it,
'...to view the place of humans in the natural world from the perspective of the 
biocentric outlook is to reject the idea of human superiority over other living 
things. Humans are not thought of as carrying on a higher grade of existence 
when compared with the so-called 'lower' orders of life. The biocentric outlook 
precludes a hierarchical view of nature' (1986, p.45).
In consideration of this non-hierarchical view of nature and the moral standing of life 
itself as morally important, the biocentric view largely differs from 'mainstream' 
alternatives to nonanthropocentrism in its focus upon attributing non-hierarchical 
moral standing to 'living' creatures. So for example, by way of distinction, two 
principal exemplars of converse conventional ecological thinking outlined previously 
include ecocentrism, which regards ecosystems and the biosphere as possessing 
moral standing independent of living creatures, and sentientism, which accords
20 Robin Attfield makes this broad assertion (1999), p.27.
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moral status to only those creatures that we suppose experience (humanlike) 
'feelings'. 21
For biocentrism, intrinsic value lies in the perceived 'good' of the bearers of 
moral standing (and on this account, the living). This perceptible good may include 
such things as the capacity for growth and flourishing, practical autonomy, and to live 
as 'natural' a life as possible. Clearly here, are distinct echoes of the criteria that a 
rights-based animal advocacy suggests - such as acknowledgement of individuals as 
subjects-of-a-life (although for most rightists only 'some' individuals on normative 
accounts), and usually some interpretation of a conceptual equal consideration of 
interests. Importantly however for the biocentric view (at least my interpretation of 
such), is that no automatic priority is accorded to beings that are deemed to be more 
sophisticated (and pointedly, this includes human beings).22 Therefore, this claim 
would likely be resisted not only by affirmed anthropocentric human chauvinists and 
conversely holistic ecocentrists, but also by those contending an egalitarianism that 
professes a one-for-one form of equality across individuals or species based on 
notions of respect or reverence for life, for example.23
The form of biocentrism outlined here readily concedes and accepts that in 
matters of direct conflicts of interest that may involve discerning between more 
complex and sophisticated capacities, then such attributes may take precedence 
over simpler ones - but as Attfield points out, this is exclusively the case only where 
both are at stake (1999, pp.39-41). To reiterate for clarity's sake, no automatic priority 
is accorded to beings that are deemed to be more sophisticated or complex in 
nature. The criterion of this form of value-theory begins then with the possession of 
life itself as its pivotal moral principle. One not based upon human superiority; 
species membership; contribution to the whole; possession of sentience; 
stewardship; genetic kinship; 'respect'; or acknowledgement of difference - none of 
which, I have argued in this work, provide an ethical framework that is wholly 
consistent, tenable and defensible in the light of the illegitimacy of presumptions of
21 Both ecocentrism and sentientism have previously been discussed in chapter 4.
22 This is of course not to suggest that because humans are as much a part of the natural 
landscape that therefore the moral landscape is flattened to the degree that humans ought to 
therefore imitate other species' behaviours, or soliciting that we ought likewise to 'follow nature'.
23 Paul Taylor develops a theory of respect for nature that attempts to recognise a form of equality 
across species worked out as a respect ethic (1986). Albert Schweitzer goes further and suggests 
a metaphysic of'reverence for all life' as an attitude of being - see Meyer and Bergel (2002).
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animal use (in that they concede when determining right action in direct conflicts of 
interest that humans and human interests invariably take precedence). It is then life 
itself as the signifier of the environment itself (that there is no meaningful 
environment without living beings), that gives moral weight to biocentrism's claim for 
the recognition of the moral standing of all individual living creatures as a starting 
point for interspecies moral deliberation. Taylor encapsulates these kinds of ideas in 
a fourfold assessment of what he determines within his biocentric schema as 'core 
beliefs' of an eclectic biocentric outlook, 24
1. The belief that humans are members of the Earth's Community of Life in the 
same sense and on the same terms in which other living things are members 
of that Community.
2. The belief that the human species, along with all other species, are integral 
elements in a system of interdependence such that the survival of each living 
thing, as well as its chances of faring well or poorly, is determined not only by 
the physical conditions of its environment but also by its relations to other 
living things.
3. The belief that all organisms are teleological centres of life in the sense that 
each is a unique individual pursuing its own good in its own way.
4. The belief that humans are not inherently superior to other living things' (1986, 
pp. 99-1OO). 25
Although these core beliefs for a biocentrically focused approach could, if taken 
together, arguably form a tentative schema for an understanding of the biosphere 
and our place within it, it is important to acknowledge that viewing life itself as the 
primary criterion for moral standing does not mean, on the account forwarded here at 
least, that other things lack value of other kinds. 'Inanimate' landscapes for example, 
may well be seen to possess an value, not least in their aesthetic and inspirational 
appeal, or indeed for the straightforward instrumental value that such natural
24 These core beliefs will be revisited and restated in 5.4, in exploration of the comparisons with 
my biocentric development and Taylor's approach.
25 Taylor's use of the term 'teleological centres of life'can readily be compared to Regan's 
'subject-of-a-life' criterion. There are of course important differences in scope and inclusion 
(Regan's subject-of-a-life for example is primarily delimited to sentient life of a year or more). 
Nevertheless, the primary focus of the individual as an independent and autonomous being, I 
believe gives'credence to a tentative comparison in the context of this work.
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resources hold for those animals ensconced therein (including of course, human 
animals). In accepting a plurality of values of different kinds, in this limited sense 
biocentrism is pluralistic in nature. This embedded pluralism in the form of 
biocentrism that I am advocating here recognises that value can readily be assigned 
on both an inherent and instrumental basis (to, for example, 'ecosystems'), but 
without recognising independent value in them, or independent moral standing. In 
short, merely because the environment is both dynamic in nature and the arena for 
life itself (and to be highly valued in this respect), this does not then mean that it 
therefore carries any meaningful moral status in and of itself. If we are to accept the 
possibility of positing any moral status above and beyond a strict anthropocentric 
delimitation (and the body of this work openly argues that we ought), it is, I suggest, 
the living creatures that, after all, give meaning to the environment itself whereupon 
moral standing is to be centred.
Putting the 'individual' into biocentric individualism
However, simply denoting 'living creatures' as a basis for moral standing again 
raises the sorts of thorny perennial questions for animal advocacy regarding 
individualism and holism discussed in chapters three and four. If we determine that it 
is life itself that should form a foundation for subsequent moral deliberation, the 
question remains unanswered as to whether the focus of moral standing is to be 
accorded to individual living creatures (as possessors of individual being), or upon 
aggregated notions of 'living creatures' such as species (as possessors of, if you 
like, a 'shared' being). Furthermore, the dichotomy is not as clear cut as this enquiry 
suggests. It is, for example, reasonable to suggest that the continued existence of 
species has prominent instrumental value in that the continued existence of 
individuals (possible future 'individual' members for instance) is interwoven with the 
continued existence of its phenotype. Therefore, moral status could not be conferred 
upon any individual monkey for example, without there being extant some category 
recognisable as 'monkey'. However, recognising this does not therefore equate to 
recognising intrinsic value for species, unless this category can clearly be seen to 
possess an independent good of its own (Attfield, 1999).
To clarify, holists may of course retort that the very fact that species spawn 
individuals of that species makes it nonsensical to try to disentangle the individual
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good of members from the 'good' of the whole. The problem here however is that in 
such a holistic account, the notion of species itself would have to be proven to 
possess a good of its own independent of its actual (and possible) members. This 
task would seem to be forlorn, in that it is highly implausible that a 'category's good' 
can be proven to be completely independent in this respect. Therefore the problem is 
not, as holists may propose, that because species spawn individuals of that species 
it makes it nonsensical to try to disentangle individual members from the whole, but 
rather it is that it is nonsensical to attempt to disentangle the notion of 'species' from 
the individuals that have a good of their own independent of our aggregated 
categorisation.
Regardless of the difficulty in 'proving' the good of a species in this way, a 
biocentric account as presented here does not in fact deny that species' flourishing is 
a key element of biodiversity. If a multitudinous array of species face extinction (and 
thus a multitude of 'future' individuals), then the threat to biodiversity (literally 'life- 
diversity') is clear both from a biocentric perspective and an eclectic holistic 
viewpoint. Again, this is not however to concede that biodiversity is necessarily 
something that demands moral plausibility in and of itself, but it is certainly to 
recognise that biodiversity has value independently of human interests (a largely 
normative nonanthropocentric claim). In this limited sense of valuing biodiversity, 
biocentrism has no serious contention with a holistic approach and its central aims. 
But again, this is not to claim that notions of biodiversity have to therefore hold sway 
over and above that of the moral import of the individuals that make up this 
perceived diversity. Biodiversity can, perceivably, just as readily be interpreted in 
individualistic terms (many individual creatures of many and varied types) as it can 
be perceived of in terms of species (many and varied types). The core claim here is 
that when deciding on instances of direct conflict of interests, it is unhelpful to try to 
assess what these interests may be on an aggregated notion of species flourishing 
alone - as species in this sense do not possess a good of their own to be decided 
upon. Attfield sums up how a biocentric view can accommodate the wide ranging 
concerns of animal and ecosystemic advocates,
'Unlike ecocentrism, biocentrism avoids making a (vulnerable) appeal to the 
supposed intrinsic value of the health of ecosystems, supporting ecosystem 
preservation rather through its importance to the well-being of creatures. A 
biocentric ethic supports biodiversity preservation directly, and also reinforces
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cultural arguments: aesthetic arguments turn out to concern preserving for 
appreciation, and scientific arguments to concern for preserving for study or 
appreciation' (1999, p. 139).
It is at this point noteworthy that a biocentric ethic, as forwarded here, must 
recognise the impossibility of preserving all life, and acknowledge the complex 
implications for practical application. 26 There will be instances, for example, where 
there is a need to invoke criteria such as capacity or ecological relations in situations 
of conflict resolution and the appropriate moral response. Invoking these sorts of 
considerations are however fully compatible with a biocentric and individualistic 
approach, in that such attributes are clearly constituents of 'life' in diverse and 
particular ways. What I mean here is that in viewing 'life' as deserving of moral 
standing, 'life' is not to be seen as some intangible or conceptual hypothesis, but 
carries with it an immanent plethora of criteria for decisive moral consideration. At 
the same time biocentrism maintains as a central maxim that no automatic priority is 
accorded to beings that are deemed to be more 'sophisticated' and thus accords 
value upon the superfluity of particular criteria arising from individuation in and of 
itself. In short, a determination not adjudged upon hierarchical precedence or 
perceptible 'importance' to human designated constructs of nature, but upon extant 
considerations of the attributes arising from individuation itself.
Some problems for the biocentric view
Again, despite these particular claims, it is to be admitted that a biocentric view 
inevitably shares the recurrent problem of the impossibility of preserving all life in 
equal measure (as all applied environmental theories must pragmatically face). I 
believe that this limitation is to be readily accepted, in principle, in all ethical theories 
that attempt to understand our moral obligations to the nonhuman world. In a 
nutshell, wheresoever the delimitations of our moral obligations are drawn, ultimately
26 It is noteworthy however that the practical implications for a biocentric application are palpable 
and far reaching. For example, it is well documented that in order to produce one pound of bovine 
protein, an animal needs to be fed 21 pounds of plant protein. The ratio for pork is 8:3 pounds and 
for poultry 5:5 pounds. On these simple calculations alone it is clear that an applied biocentrism 
(and it is my view that a truly consistent respect for life ethic arising from biocentrism would 
necessarily entail effective cessation of meat-eating) would require far less acreage of land and 
foment an opportunity for enabling vast areas set aside for nature and nonhuman flourishing 
(including 'freed'farmed species), and of course does not exclude the revitalizing potential for
future human enjoyment thereof.
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these will always operate in deference to the dynamic decay and regenerative 
processes of the web of life itself; the processes of which operate equivalently 
across the human and nonhuman domains. Biocentrism furthermore strives to 
uphold its central maxim of no automatic priority to hierarchical or group distinctions 
whilst concurrently needing to deal with endemic conflicts of interest as business as 
usual. It is in this respect of its central maxim that a biocentric approach inevitably 
sets distinct challenges for our moral deliberations regarding nonhumans that other 
protectionist theories discussed thus far in this work do not.
These distinct challenges are not as alien to normative moral intuitions as a 
cursory reading of biocentrism might however suggest to some. Jason Kawall asks 
us to consider a thought experiment that is worth reproducing here in full:
'You are walking along a sidewalk and notice that there is a small insect just 
ahead of you. You can easily avoid killing it by slightly adjusting your step, 
and at no expense to yourself. Most of us will hold that in this sort of case you 
ought to avoid stepping on the insect. It is not an overwhelming moral duty, 
but it does seem like a simple good thing to do. We thus have a 
straightforward case in which most people (who don't consider themselves 
biocentric individualists) attribute some degree of intrinsic value to a creature 
simply in virtue of it being a living thing' (2003, p.341).
There are several important points arising from this everyday occurrence that need 
unpacking here. Interestingly, it is the mere fact that it is a living creature (and not for 
example an item of litter) that ostensibly seems to be the motivation for the 
employment of the avoidance strategy in this case. It does not seem to be concern 
about slipping or soiling a shoe that provides the motivation for the act - as the 
stipulation in the example is that avoidance would be at no cost to oneself, and 
therefore it is to be fairly surmised that our shoe or person would be unaffected. 
Claims of self-defence or overly demanding cost-benefit would not therefore seem to 
serve to explain our avoidance of the insect in this instance. Neither is it apparently 
a case in this illustration of destroying a creature that has some aesthetic beauty or 
obvious rarity, as the stipulation is that it is merely a 'small insect'. Again, a claim of a 
duty of 'preservation' of something that is deemed to have aesthetic or rarity value 
cannot be adequately advanced here to explain the avoidance tactic. Furthermore, 
the insect does not represent the sort of creature that is straightforwardly recognised 
as being something 'like us', and thus an argument for refraining from killing a
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sentient 'human-like1 being that we 'know' will obviously suffer does not likewise 
apply. Additionally, the scenario does not rely upon an avowed sentimentalism or 
naive anthropomorphism - as we are not attributing any human-like complex 
cognitive or physiological capacities to the creature, and thus our actions cannot 
readily be charged with mere anthropomorphic sentiment.
As Kawall rightly points out, not everyone of course will share this reaction to 
the insect, but at the very least, it does seem to constitute an extremely common 
response. It is of course true to say that the killing of countless similar insects is 
carried out daily in standard husbandry practices with the (over)use of pesticides and 
other controls. However, in the instance of animal husbandry notions of 'self- 
defence' in preservation of valuable crops, and/or the need to safeguard food 
supplies may arguably be advanced as legitimate. Notwithstanding, these kinds of 
notions are not however pertinent to Kawall's commonplace scenario.
Biocentrism has of course had its supporters and detractors.27 Generally 
speaking, biocentric theories - and as an early, and well-known interpretation this 
tends to concern Paul Taylor's conception of biocentrism in the main - have been 
criticized on broadly four main fronts: for being too individualistic; for being too 
morally demanding in practical terms; for inconsistency between principle and 
theory; and for having little to say on our moral obligations to animals in human 
servitude. 28 The first is an obvious criticism levied at individualistic accounts overall. 
As discussed at length in the previous chapters, inevitably those who view the world 
in anthropocentric or holistic ways, or who wish to emphasize the interconnections or 
contributions to the whole will, ultimately, find difficulty with any theory that proposes 
an individualistic account of nature (and will of course find difficulty with most animal 
advocacy theories that focus upon use and treatment of subjects-of-a-life - and that 
likewise concentrate in the main, on the individual).
With regard to the second general criticism, it may be reiterated that merely 
because a moral theory is perceived to be supererogatory, this claim does not 
negate its consistency or exactitude of argument. If our actions can be substantively 
argued to be morally indefensible, merely citing the difficulty of implementing such
27 For some interesting and varied criticisms of a biocentric approach see, Gene Spitier (1982), 
Bryan Norton's review of Taylor's Respect for Nature (1987), Peter Wenz (1988), Holmes Rolston 
III (1988), Joseph Des Jardins (1993) and Michael Zimmerman et al (1993). 
28 See James Sterba (1995), pp. 191-95, for an exploration of each of these criticisms.
214
Chapter 5: Biocentrism and Animals: A Fresh Perspective
does not constitute a valid counter argument. It may of course be the case that 
'Utopian' theories can transmute into dystopian antithesis in practice, but again this 
says little about the robustness of the argument in question, and likely more about its 
perceived and prospective implementation in practice. In any case, irrespective of 
these observations, I propose that the biocentric approach outlined here does not 
demand theoretically more than normatively applied human ethics in its central 
claims that 'life' is to be valued in and of itself, and in its maxim of attributing no 
automatic priority to hierarchical or group distinctions - both of which are firmly 
enshrined in human rights legislation. 29 Furthermore, the demands that may arise 
from the adoption of a biocentric outlook reflect in large part the same sorts of 
ethically complex decisions that plague both consequentialist and deontological 
mainstream ethical theories. For example, a straightforward utilitarianism may 
require us to 'calculate' potential pains and pleasures at every moment - no easy 
task for sure. Kantianism may require repeated verification that each judgment is 
made in accordance with the categorical imperative - again fraught with complexity. 
Regarding operability then, it is more a deep seated unwillingness to extend the 
basis for our normative ethics (essentially some concept of the inviolability of life) 
beyond strictly human boundaries (essentially, the 'too demanding' aspect), rather 
than to successfully argue its ineffectiveness in principle or practice.
The third criticism in large part tends to reflect Taylor's own claim to principles 
of proportionality and minimal harm. 30 The primary criticism here turns upon the 
question of why it is that some ways of aggressing against the basic needs of wild 
animals are deemed to be incompatible with Taylor's formulation of the attitude of
29 Of course the delimitation of which is 'human' life in this instance. Nevertheless, my point here 
remains valid - that irrespective of its human boundary delimitation, the ethical presuppositions do 
exist and are widely accepted in everyday understanding, and that possession of life and equality 
of consideration of interests form key foundational and normative ethical and legislative concepts 
in modernity.
30 Taylor formulates and expands upon these principle in his Respect for Nature, pp.269-91. It is 
unnecessary to critique the merits and demerits of these principles at length in the context of my 
aims at this point (I explore some of these aspects further in 5.4), but in order to illuminate on 
further argument, the principles run thusly: A Principle of Proportionality: Actions that pursue non- 
basic human interests are prohibited when they aggress against the basic interests of (wild) 
animals and plants and are incompatible with the attitude of respect for nature. A Principle of 
Minimal Harm: Actions that pursue certain non-basic human interests are permissible even when 
they aggress against the basic interests of (wild) animals and plants provided that they are 
compatible with the attitude of respect for nature and provided that no alternative way of pursuing 
those non-basic human interests would involve fewer wrongs.
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respect for nature, whereas other ways of aggressing against the basic needs of 
animals and plants are compatible with this attitude. The criticism is therefore one of 
forwarding priority principles that are inconsistent with the general theory of respect 
for nature. James Sterba however provides a modified and conflated account of 
these principles which, I believe, is at least closer to a liberal understanding of the 
straightforward principle in operation in contemporary human ethics. This is 
constituted primarily as an injunction that prohibits meeting some people's non-basic 
or superfluous needs when it is in direct conflict with satisfying the basic needs of 
others. Sterba terms his principle 'A Principle of Disproportionality' which states, 
'Actions which meet non-basic or luxury needs of humans are prohibited when they 
aggress against the basic needs of individual animals and plants, or of whole 
species or ecosystems' (1995, p. 199). Sterba's formulation does of course open itself 
up to the criticism of being far too demanding in its intended scope in much the same 
manner as Taylor's principles, but does at least tentatively avoid Taylor's principle to 
theory inconsistency in its wider remit of allowance of inclusion of more than 
individuals. 31
The fourth common criticism of Taylor's version of biocentrism - that of having 
little to say on our moral obligations to animals in human servitude is, I believe, 
largely warranted. In Taylor's defence, his respect ethic is squarely aimed at 
formulating a framework for human/animal interrelations as they pertain to the 
'natural world', and for this reason those animals that may be viewed as already 
under the direct control of humans are indeed principally excluded. In this respect 
this omission is one of scope rather than distinction. Such an omission does however 
raise questions over the applicability of biocentrism (at least Taylor's version) to 
animals in human servitude (and primarily domesticated sentient beings).
'Weak' and 'strong' biocentrism
If we are to concede that one model of our positive obligations to others is, within 
human ethics at least, one of concentric circles of positive obligations (that broadly 
we start with those closest to us, such as family, and work 'outwards' in strength of
31 But, in doing so opens up the criticism that it must contend with the very problems already 
discussed in the context of holistic approaches that attempt to include the non-living under a 
moral paradigm. In this sense, Sterba opens up a can of worms that undermines the inherent 
strength of the individualism embedded within the 'mainstream' biocentric view.
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moral obligation), then it is feasible on this account that we may owe comprehensive 
moral obligations to those animals in human servitude that fall under the category of 
'companion' domesticated animals. In many instances, in practice, these nonhumans 
form part of the family group (or at least certainly elicit some direct obligations of duty 
and care as a prerequisite minimum). In this way our positive obligations to 
nonhumans who fall under a 'primary' circle of care within the concentric framework 
can, I submit, in fact include a wide range of animals in human servitude. However, 
despite widespread professed animal welfare concerns, those domesticated animals 
that fall outside of the category of 'companion', may in some estimations be 
relegated to the very outer rings of the concentric circles of moral obligation. It was 
precisely this category of nonhuman animals - those that I have argued fall into a 
'moral vacuum' regarding our positive moral obligations within the concentric 
paradigm - that formed the central arguments against the presumed legitimacy of 
use discussed in chapters one and two.
It may appear therefore that a biocentric approach (at least on Taylor's 
account), would seem inadequate in dealing with our positive moral obligations to 
what is after all a very large category of nonhuman animals - namely, those various 
types of animals that we raise primarily to slaughter for meat. This conclusion would 
certainly seem a reasonable one, in that it is difficult to see how we may at once 
'respect' the life of an individual being in a full biocentric sense, and concurrently 
legitimate the premature ending of that life for trivial purpose. The constraints 
incumbent upon us arising from the kinds of positive obligations that biocentrism may 
engender on face value - loosely, the obligations to 'do good' to other living beings 
and foster a respect attitude to nonhuman nature - are with regards to our 
interrelationships with nonhumans at large, limited in opportunity and scope. 32 I 
propose then that in this sense, it is these kinds of 'positive' obligations derived from 
a reading of Taylor's biocentric model that form that I want to call the 'strong' 
biocentric argument (I critique further the points of intersection and departure
32 The sorts of positive limitations to 'proactive' action are evident in our interactions with 'wild' 
animals in the sense of their detachment from everyday human situation. Likewise, as I have 
argued in chapter two, it is difficult to see how the 'scope' of welfare initiatives that accept killing 
with kindness are actually doing 'good' to the individuals in question. It is perhaps more clear how 
we may arguably display attitudes of positive obligation to companion animals that may fall under
'primary' concentric concern.
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between Taylor's view and my developed biocentric approach in this respect below 
5.4).
Before developing this idea further, there is a subtlety to be briefly drawn out 
here regarding the arguably troublesome delimitations of what is to be included in 
our positive obligations. 33 As noted earlier, for many animal rights advocates, for 
example, moral standing is largely accorded to only those animals that are 
determined to be sentient (with the concomitant capabilities to feel pain and to 
experience suffering). Whilst it is true that this view certainly does not preclude 
kindness, respect, care or feelings of sympathy towards other 'living 1 beings (and 
arguably these characteristics, tend in practice, to compliment a morally responsible 
animal protectionist stance), a strong biocentrism, at its heart, makes no absolutist 
distinction between the way we should treat sentient and insentient beings. This is 
not to say that a category distinction cannot be readily made between what is 
deemed to possess sentience and what is outside of our delimitation of such. In fact, 
many animal advocates argue that it is precisely because the possession of 
sentience produces an awareness of pain and suffering (and concurrently therefore 
engenders a fundamental interest in continued existence), that sentience therefore 
rightly forms the pivotal attribute for ascribing moral standing. 34 From a biocentric 
perspective however, this singular focus is potentially problematic. In the first 
instance, ascribing moral standing to sentient beings alone in practice means that 
these alone constitute the category of creatures that are to 'legitimately' included into 
what is deemed to be the moral community.
However, for the biocentrist, determining moral standing on sentience alone 
raises the now familiar spectre of selective human bias - something that animal 
advocates plainly seek to avoid. A primary concern is that such a selection 
nevertheless 'predetermines' the kinds of traits, that again, turn out to be those that 
resemble us the most (have the 'tick list' of attributes we rate as valuable - and 
herein embraced under the 'package deal' of 'sentience'). This determination is 
disconcerting for the biocentric view proffered in this work - in that whilst it may be
33 These observations briefly introduced in this section are discussed further in chapter 6 regarding 
the practical implications of a developed biocentric approach.
34 And indeed, as the majority of animal husbandry is practiced on sentient beings, much of 
chapter two was concerned with sentience and its relative importance with the animal welfare
debate.
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substantively 'proven' that the possession of sentience brings with it the concomitant 
ability to suffer (on our terms and understanding at least), this 'selective membership' 
to the moral community, arguably, by degree, suffers nevertheless from the same 
kinds of exclusivity that characterises other forms of value hierarchy attribution. 35 
Secondly, the possession of sentience is a 'moving target', and which animals are 
included or excluded in this exclusive predetermination is subject to change with the 
advance of research and our understanding of neurological and biological 
processes. Members of the moral community may in this way potentially have their 
membership rescinded, whilst 'new' members may be welcomed in upon newfound 
possession of the 'green card' of sentience. In this respect biocentrism errs on the 
side of caution in determining sentience alone as the benchmark for moral 
considerably. 36
As Victorian Moran puts it in discussion of Albert Schweitzer's reverence for 
life ethic, It is life defined as the ability to grow and reproduce that grants ethical 
standing, not the ability to experience suffering and joy' (2009, p. 178). There would 
then in this strong biocentric sense at least, seem to be a problematic disparity 
between the delimitations of moral considerability set by many animal advocates and 
those potentially 'limitless' moral demarcations seemingly advocated in a strong 
biocentric approach. 37 However, the biocentric project does not necessarily need to 
be abandoned to endless supererogatory moral oblivion.
35 This is not to suggest that sentience is not a valid way of ascertaining how complex an animal 
with regard to the phylogenetic scale for example. However, this leaves out in the cold countless 
other creatures that are not therefore deemed to have a 'legitimate' stake in living out their lives 
in their own particular ways (in that we can potentially do whatsoever we wish to them as they 
cannot 'suffer'). Biocentrism in this respect attempts to form a more 'inclusive' ethic by 
determining our moral prescriptions upon life itself as a starting point for moral deliberation 
(rather than just those creatures that in our determination possess similar traits to us humans). 
The central contention from a biocentric perspective is that sentience in this respect may be as 
morally 'blind' a determination of value as any other human determination.
36 Importantly here, this is not to say that sentience cannot legitimately form one of the criteria for 
determining direct conflicts of interest - biocentrism endeavours not to throw the baby out with 
the bath water in this respect. This notion is explored in greater detail in chapter 6 in discussion of 
the practical implications of biocentrism.
37 In fact Schweitzer's ethic of reverence for life proposes that the inherent value in all life can in 
the final analysis only be worked out as an 'ethical mysticism'- in that there must always be an 
inherent dichotomy in centring ethics upon the individual (essential to Schweitzer), whilst 
concurrently needing to accept the fundamental connectedness of all life (also fundamental to 
Schweitzer's conception of the 'will to live, in the midst of the will to live'). Schweitzer's take on 
inherent value then turns primarily upon his concept of the 'will-to-live which establishes the value 
of life, but without distinctions within the value of life. Schweitzer himself sums up his ethic in his
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It is here that consideration of our negative moral obligations to other than 
human animals can usefully be taken into account, that is to say, the sorts of moral 
obligations incumbent upon us to not interfere with, or aggress against, other living 
beings. In the perspective of my arguments in this work, it is of course this negative 
(hands-off) sense of obligation that has formed a persistent thread in the arguments 
advanced in the preceding chapters. 38 In the form of the preferred biocentric position 
advanced here, it is the negative moral obligations embedded in biocentrism that 
form what I wish to call the 'weak' argument for a biocentricatly based animal 
advocacy. For instance, the widely accepted obligation not to cause 'unnecessary' 
harm to living beings capable of feeling pain and experiencing suffering, applies to all 
such beings irrespective of their closeness to us. This obligation then is not one (at 
least in theory) of diminishing responsibilities per se, but rather a general assent to 
not causing unnecessary harm - wholly because it is something felt to be morally 
reprehensible. 39 Sterba's derived Principle of Disproportionality outlined above, gives 
us a starting point in this respect in its instruction to prohibit actions when they 
aggress against the basic needs of individual animals and plants for non-basic or 
luxury needs (and for Sterba, unlike Taylor, also whole species or ecosystems).40
famous maxim, "A person is truly ethical only when he or she obeys the compulsion to help all life 
which he is able to assist, and shrinks from injuring anything that lives. Such a person does not 
ask how far this or that life deserves one's sympathy as being valuable, nor beyond that, whether 
and to what degree it is capable of feeling. Life as such is sacred to him', cited in Meyer and Bergel 
(2002), p.239.
38 The recurrent move towards a 'negativist' approach to human/animal interrelationships has 
permeated my central arguments to date. In sum, the form of animals rights outlined in chapter 
one largely advocated respecting subjects-of-a-life and as such argued for the cessation of many 
practices and emphasised our negative obligations over interventionist welfarism. The critique of 
problems of welfarism introduced in chapter two again argued the ineffectiveness of'positive' 
welfare intervention and against the legitimacy of use of farmed animals at large. Chapter three 
advanced a 'hands-off' approach to animal protectionism that espoused an 'negative' model in 
contrast to the 'positivist' and interventionist models of conservation theory and practice. Chapter 
four further argued for an individualistic account that challenged the holistic view in recognition of 
the right to flourish of the individual and thus refocused holisms positive and interventionist 
'species based' approach to an emphasis on the adequacy of extant negative obligations to nature.
39 Of course many would argue that in practice there is a form of diminishing responsibility 
displayed in everyday interaction. For example, it may well become more difficult to determine 
what actually constitutes 'unnecessary'the further down the phylogenetic scale one goes. For 
instance, it may be readily argued that whilst unnecessary killing of an otherwise flourishing 
sentient'being is wrong, it may be less convincingly argued that indirect killing of invertebrates for 
non-basic ends (perhaps hobby gardening) commonly engenders the same moral import.
40 See Sterba's derivative form of'Biocentric Pluralism' (1995) for further differences between
Taylor's biocentric view and his own.
220
Chapter 5: Biocentrism and Animals: A Fresh Perspective
The point to note here is not the distinction between Taylor's or Sterba's 
delimitation of the biocentric remit, but rather that for both it is the 'default' nature of 
our obligations to nonhumans that, in practice, determines the sum of our moral 
obligations to them. What I mean here is that the argument for 'positive' 
interventionism (and this includes a 'strong 1 interpretation of biocentrism) is 
frequently fraught with the very presuppositions, biases and presumptions of the 
validity of some degree of 'legitimate use' of nonhumans that has fuelled the thrust of 
my contentions throughout this current work. A negatively weighted stance on our 
moral obligations, that 'respects' the individual as a subject-of-a-life in its fullest 
sense, in simple terms, does not suffer from the same presumptive moral chauvinism 
as positivist interventionist strategies unavoidably do.41 The weak claim can be 
stated therefore as, one that is in support of a biocentrism that turns upon prohibition 
of actions that meet non-basic needs of humans when they aggress against the 
basic needs of individual nonhumans - and for the purposes of the current 
argument, these basic needs include the 'right' to flourish in their own particular 
ways. In fact, the very term 'prohibition' as used here, clearly conveys a negative 
connotation in its admonition against human non-basic aggress of the basic needs of 
nonhumans. When framed in this way, the scope of the biocentric claim outlined 
above clearly still has the determinate of the possession of (individual) life itself and 
rejection of automatic value hierarchy as playing substantial roles in our moral 
deliberations.
For many, however, individual life itself as constituting a key element for moral 
considerability does again raise the spectre of an implausibly demanding moral life - 
one effectively requiring us to think in moral terms about everyday actions that in 
practice we tend to take for granted. As mentioned previously, a 'demanding' moral 
stance does not of course, in and of itself, mean that the view is necessarily flawed 
or inconsistent. What are more credible are specific questions over effective 
everyday application for such a position. A moral viewpoint that may seem overly 
demanding upon an individual could be (and frequently is) summarily dismissed by
41 1 am happy to 'extend' Regan's subject-of-a-life criterion into the biocentric context. Despite 
Regan situating his criterion with mature sentient life, the core argument for a biocentric approach 
to the nonhuman world, I believe, does not distort or distil the meaning of Regan's term -which 
professes a respect for the life of the individual experiencing being. In fact it is the continuity 
between animal rights and the biocentric approach suggested here, that forms much of the rigour 
of the underlying impetus for argument for biocentric individualism presented in this work.
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some as simply being too alienating from everyday experiential normative 
behaviours. By way of illustration, Kawall suggests that many people would be 
similarly alienated if morally challenged over something as everyday and pedestrian 
as the choice of fruit to accompany breakfast (2008, p.70). Giving the example of 
bananas, he points out that there are nevertheless significant differences in fruit crop 
production that have direct and indirect consequences for workers, crops and the 
environment. Irrespective of the apparent trivial nature of being asked to consider the 
moral dimensions of such an everyday event as the choice of what fruit to consume, 
if the veracity of these kinds of differences are confronted by the consumer the 
'straightforward' and basic choice can be seen to have far-reaching real-world 
implications despite its initially proclaimed overly demanding demonstrations.
Naturally, fomenting an ethical conscience about patterns of consuming 
does not necessarily mean that we have to adopt a biocentric position. My point here 
is that basing one's ethical perspective upon a biocentric foundation may demand 
little more of us in terms of weighing up the moral implications of our everyday 
actions than any other ethically motivated life 'choices'.42 Notwithstanding, it is not 
requisite to have to take into account every possible connotation and permutation of 
our everyday actions in order to accede to a generalized biocentrism that asks that 
we give consideration to the importance of individual life (over holistic conceptions of 
life) whilst questioning the illegitimacy of according any automatic priority to beings 
that are deemed to be more sophisticated (over normative hierarchical conceptions). 
In fact, given that the 'weak' account of biocentrism that I am proposing does 
takes into consideration a measured elucidation of what is encompassed in the idea 
of 'life' in this context, the moral demands may in actuality be less onerous than a 
critical reading may suggest. In short, 'life' in terms of the weaker biocentric 
interpretation is certainly not to be seen as some abstract or conceptual hypothesis, 
but carries with it various embedded criteria to aid decisive moral judgment. As 
intimated earlier, we may for example invoke criteria such as capacity or direct 
ecological relationship - both of which are 'compatible' with a biocentric and
42 For example, one can commit to a vegetarian or vegan diet for many reasons such as concern 
for the environment, health concerns, animal welfare disquiet or religious edict. Such a diet 
demands of the individual consistent and careful scrutiny in everyday culinary choices. 
Vegetarians and vegans would however rarely see such convoluted considerations as onerous or
overly exacting.
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individualistic approach. Such attributes are clearly constituents of everyday 'life' in 
diverse and particular ways, and therefore elements to be legitimately included for 
consideration within a 'bio-centric' remit.
However, in providing such a wide-ranging moral scope, it may well be argued 
that the sort of weak biocentrism claimed here merely returns us full circle to the 
moral maze, and potentially makes the 'measured' value of life so minimal as to be 
empty. In response, it is reasonable to suggest that any ethical theory that attempts 
to make prerequisite determinations on each and every possible moral permutation, 
and is thus overly prescriptive, likely oversimplifies the inherent complexity of 
interspecies moral deliberation. That biocentric individualism is proposed, as Gary 
Varner qualifies it, 'as sets of generalisations that allow for exceptions, is I submit, in 
fact an inherent strength of a biocentric approach'. 43 However, given this 
acceptance of fluidity in moral determination, the question of what exactly may 
constitute a firm theoretical foundation (other than appeal to individual virtue) for 
such an applied biocentrism remains. Certainly, at minimum, a biocentric approach 
does demand greater environmental awareness in our everyday lives; but it 
demands something more. What I am certainly not suggesting is that the form of 
biocentric individualism discussed thus far represents an all-encompassing 
contingently viable environmental model in and of itself.
Notwithstanding this caveat, my arguments for the illegitimacy of use arising 
from the normative positions of the animal ethics debate, conservation policy and 
practice and holistic approaches to animal advocacy, I submit, forms a more 
coherent basis for a biocentric framework - one that does not require an all-too- 
demanding virtuousness or assent to notions akin to 'sanctity' of life. Rather, a weak 
form of biocentric individualism can be grounded in the considered arguments for 
illegitimacy of use arising from the animal ethics debate, as argued for in this work. It 
is to this notion that I now turn in reference to Paul Taylor's influential work Respect
43 Gary Varner however proposes a distinct consequentialist form of biocentric individualism and 
sets his qualification against three working principles that state: PI Generally speaking, the death 
of an entity that has desires is a worse thing than the death of an entity that does not; P2 
Generally speaking, the satisfaction of ground projects is more important than the satisfaction of 
noncategorical desires; and P3 Other things being equal, of two desires similarly situated in an 
individual's hierarchy of interests, it is better to satisfy the desire that requires as a condition of its 
satisfaction the dooming of fewer interests of others (whether these interests be defined by 
desires of biological interests (1998), p.95.
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for Nature, in order to clarify my formulation of biocentric individualism as outlined 
here, its particular strengths, how this differs from Taylor's view, and why I believe it 
offers a challenging, effective and grounded approach to animal advocacy.
5.4 A comparative analysis of the biocentric approach
In his seminal work Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics, Paul W. 
Taylor advances a challenging theoretical framework that turns upon development of 
an attitude of 'respect for nature' (1986). In this section I want to examine the efficacy 
of this view in the light of my own development of a biocentric and individualist 
approach, and critique its points of intersection with, and departure from, Taylor's 
central themes. Before discussion of the points of intersection and departure from 
Taylor's position, it will be helpful to outline what I consider to be Taylor's central 
thrust in order to firstly clarify the foundation of his biocentric view.44
Some initial remarks on Taylor's biocentric outlook
In chapter three of his work Taylor outlines four 'beliefs' that form the core of the 
biocentric outlook that I outlined in the previous section. My own biocentric view is in 
complete accord with these core beliefs. I restate Taylor's core beliefs here in 
summary in order to form a platform for a comparative analysis of the biocentric 
approach: (a) The belief that humans are members of the Earth's Community of 
Life 1 ; The belief that the human species, along with all other species, are integral 
elements in a system of interdependence'; (c) The belief that all organisms are 
teleological centres of life'; (d) The belief that humans are not inherently superior to 
other living things' (1986, pp. 99-100).
Taylor's theoretical framework is largely developed out of these core beliefs and it 
may be valuable here to adumbrate their pivotal importance to his development of
44 Clearly, in summarising Taylor's key points here, I acknowledge that the considerable nuances 
of his developed theoretical grounding cannot be adequately encapsulated in bullet point form. 
Nevertheless, in regard to a critique of his central claims as adjudged against my particular 
individualistic conception, the adumbrated points above sufficiently serve to ground discussion of 
the key divergences.
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the respect for nature ethic. Core to Taylor's biocentric view, is his assertion that 
humans be viewed as 'non-privileged' members of the earth's community of life. 
Humans as contingent, biological beings share with other organisms similar 
requirements for life. In this respect we are likewise vulnerable in that (despite our 
technological acumen) we nevertheless share an inability to guarantee the 
fundamental conditions of our existence. There is for Taylor in this shared 
vulnerability and shared evolutionary provenance a sense of kinship. Indeed, we are 
on this account, newcomers - being recent arrivals within the biosphere. For Taylor 
therefore, the notion that humans are the final goal of the evolutionary process is 
incongruous with evolutionary processes. A further claim that Taylor makes is that of 
the centrality of the interdependency of life. Within this interdependency humans are 
not immune from the complexity and interrelatedness of being. Indeed we are 
dependent on many forms of life - such as invertebrates for example - for our very 
existence and it is somewhat disconcerting that In stark terms, life on this planet is 
not dependent on us and would, given our negative impact on the biosphere, in all 
likelihood do much better without us.
An assertion that underpins Taylor's biocentric model is that all organisms are 
teleological (goal-directed) centres of life that have goods of their own (welfare 
interests) that we can morally consider for their own sake. In this sense, organisms 
have a 'point of view' and can, thusly, be benefitted or harmed. Within this paradigm, 
having preference interests (largely construed as conscious desires or wants) is not 
however necessary for being morally considerable. According to Taylor, all individual 
living creatures as well as species populations can be benefited or harmed and 
hence qualify as moral subjects. Thus, for example, insentient organisms (plants, 
fungi, microbes, and many invertebrate animals) aren't, for Taylor, excluded from the 
moral arena. Importantly however, Taylor denies that species themselves are moral 
subjects with a good of their own, in that species is seen as a 'class' - and for Taylor 
classes cannot possess a good of their own (1986, pp. 68-71). As James Sterba 
notes, 'according to Taylor, however, showing that entities have goods of their own 
does not establish that we ought to respect them' (1995, p. 192). And it is in 
establishing this 'respect' that Taylor claims that it is necessary to instantiate his four 
core beliefs outlined above in development of his ethical system.
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Subsequently therefore, in chapter four Taylor outlines his 'Ethical System' 
and within it formulates his 'Basic Rules of Conduct, 'Priority Principles, and The 
Basic Standards of Virtue'. It is within the development of this ethical system and, as 
he puts it, the 'standards of good character and the types of virtues associated with 
the various rules of conduct' (1986, p. 169), that the central points of contention and 
departure from my approach to biocentric individualism are largely found. How rules 
and principles actually may apply in practice in matters of conflict of interest - and as 
to what contextual factors may have relevance in relation to each other - is 
discussed separately in the subsequent and final chapter. Prior to this discussion, 
clarification of my own development of a biocentric and individualist approach will 
serve to ground this exploration. Notwithstanding my accord with Taylor's biocentric 
core beliefs, there are points of departure that distinguish my own development of a 
biocentric and individualistic position. These turn upon three principle divergences 
that I am calling: 1. 'A bottom-up view'; 2. The failure of animal advocacy'; and 3. 
The problem with virtue', and I will in turn outline the distinctiveness - and what I 
believe to be the unique strengths - of my particular biocentric and individualistic 
approach.45
A' bottom-up' view
There is an important matter of focus that differentiates my take on biocentrism from 
Taylor's position. Cryptically put, mine is a 'bottom-up' view and Taylor's is a 'top- 
down' perspective. What I mean here is that in general terms Taylor takes an 
'environmentalist' standpoint, in that he sees 'nature' as a 'thing' - and moreover, a 
thing to be respected.46 I believe that it is largely due to this top-down perspective
45 1 discuss here only my specific divergences from Taylor's work as a helpful precursor to chapter 
six and the exploration of my biocentric viewpoint in regard to welfarism, paternalism and holism. 
James Sterba outlines the more familiar criticisms levied at biocentrism in general, which include 
among other things - being too individualistic, being too demanding, having principles that are 
inconsistent with theory, and for not dealing adequately with domesticated animals (1995, p.191). 
These criticisms form key themes in the next and concluding chapter.
45 Although of course, a 'thing' composed of individual, but interrelated entities. Again, I make no 
claim here that animal ethicists and environmental ethicists are somehow a 'species apart'. See 
my central comments regarding Two Movements' at the beginning of this chapter (5.1) for an 
extended discussion. Indeed, it is to me both intriguing and poignant that a 'top-down' perspective 
such as Taylor's solicits a biocentric approach, whilst the 'bottom-up' view that I take likewise 
'ends up' advocating a biocentric approach through a critique of contemporary animal advocacy - 
that nevertheless largely accords with Taylor's core (environmentally focused) beliefs. See the
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that Taylor primarily talks in terms of nature at large and the 'wild' animals that 
constitute such.47 In this way, Taylor naturally (as an 'environmentalist') tends to de- 
emphasise the preoccupation of those who primarily see themselves as animal 
ethicists - namely, the question of what may constitute our moral obligations to 
domesticated and semi-wild animals (specifically those defined in chapter two as 
falling under the 'animals in human servitude' category). 48 For the sake of current 
argument, it may be said that Taylor thusly sees nature as being made up of 
individual interrelated components; whereas, the animal ethicist in me, conversely 
sees the individual components 'making up' nature 49 This change in emphasis and 
directional viewpoint is not merely semantic, but one I believe that provides a valid, 
useful and fresh perspective on the biocentric approach. In this respect, Taylor 
emphasises the 'biocentric' in biocentric individualism, whereas I accentuate the 
'individual' in biocentric individualism; as an animal ethicist concerned with 
individualistically-based advocacy ethic, I candidly put the 'individual' back into 
biocentric individualism. 50
following sub-chapter The failure of animal advocacy' for my particular lines of reasoning in this 
regard.
47 This is not to assert that many of the principles that Taylor outlines in his ethical system cannot, 
with further argument, be applied to varying degree to our interrelationships with non-wild 
animals. However, Taylor's main thrust of argument is clearly from a 'nature' perspective and 
those 'wild' animals that dwell therein. In particular, see his sustained arguments and numerous 
examples regarding development of his ethical system that exemplify this emphasis on wild nature 
(pp. 169 -218). I believe that there are additional ethical and practical considerations with regard 
to domesticated animals that Taylor (and I believe rightly, given his remit) does not explore in- 
depth. For example, advocating his 'hands off' approach to nature (pp. 193-96) seems on face 
value problematic when considering ethical determinations within animal husbandry. How a 
biocentric view (in particular my take on such) may broach these kinds of considerations is 
discussed in the next chapter regarding possible practical implications (specifically, in 'Welfarism 
and a biocentric approach').
48 This has of course been a common criticism of Taylor's approach. See in particular James Sterba 
'From Biocentric Individualism to Biocentric Pluralism' (1995). Also for a broader perspective see 
Laura Westra (1989), K Van Houtan, (2006), R Sandier (2004) and R O'Neill (2000).
49 The use of the term 'animal ethicist' is used in the widest sense here in order to reiterate my 
theoretical leanings (which by now are hopefully clear!) which, generally speaking, have 
provenance within the animal ethics debate.
50 As we could, of course, put emphasis on 'life' itself as the key criterion for moral considerability 
and this may include a more 'holistic' interpretation - the 'thing' that is life. See in particular N 
Phelps, The Quest for a Boundless Ethic: A Reassessment of Albert Schweitzer' (2009), and D 
Goodin, 'Schweitzer Reconsidered: The Applicability of Reverence for Life as Environmental 
Philosophy' (2007). I attempt to unambiguously ground my conception of life in individual 
possession of such - and in this respect I believe such grounding to be intuitively more 
comprehensible and substantively self-evident.
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As has been evident throughout this work, I propose the biocentric model, 
consequently, in the light of contemporary animal advocacy - and first and foremost 
from an 'animal rights' perspective. As I have argued at length in the previous 
chapters, the individualistic approach to valuing other-than-human beings, I believe, 
provides a substantive theoretical framework that does not wholly rely on shaky 
human presuppositions of legitimacy of use, skewed value hierarchy, presumptive 
paternalism or holistic conceptions of contributory and aggregate value. In this way, 
my own 'bottom-up' development of biocentric individualism I believe goes some way 
towards 'bridging the gap' between the central claims of much of the animal rights 
narrative and wider animal advocacy concerns. 51 Such bridges can of course be 
variously constructed. I certainly do not claim that my particular 'bridge' forms the 
only foundation for a reconciliation of the animal rights narrative and wider animal 
advocacy. 52 Notwithstanding, I do however submit that the 'individualism' embedded 
within my take on animal advocacy (and the critique of, what on my account, are the 
chief forms - welfarism, paternalism, and holism) establishes a firm (and needed) 
grounding for Taylor's astutely observed core beliefs of the biocentric model.
The efficacy and validity of my theoretical framework in application to a wider 
advocacy ethic ('biocentric individualism') finds place in the grounding, of what I have 
argued, is the variously accepted presumptions of the legitimacy of animal use 
(discussed shortly in light of Taylor's stance under the 'failure of animal advocacy' 
and 'the problem with virtue'). An example of this departure from Taylor's top-down 
view may help to clarify my point here. How a prerequisite foundational critique of
51 1 accept that much of the animal rights literature focuses primarily on the possession of 
sentience or the ability to feel pain and experience harm; or demands equal consideration of 
interests/non-maleficence - and not upon the weak form of'biocentrism' as presented here. There 
is however a well recognised failure within animal ethics to address wider animal advocacy 
concerns pertaining to wild and semi-wild animals (discussed in chapters one, two and three). In 
taking a biocentric approach in this work, the essential aims and criteria of animal ethics can, I 
feel, be readily embraced into a theory of value that can address this wider remit. Bioeentrism as a 
value theory asks for moral considerability to be centred upon a respect for nonhuman (and 
human) nature and the possession/continuation of a flourishing individual life - neither of which is 
at odds with the fundamental spirit of animal ethics. In this sense, with regard to my argument for 
the illegitimacy of use arising from normative animal advocacy perspectives, biocentrism 'bridges 
the gap' between animal ethics and environmental ethics.
52 For some thought-provoking work in this respect see D Jamieson, 'Animal Liberation is an 
Environmental Ethic' (1998), J Baird Callicott's reconciliatory work'Animal Liberation and 
Environmental Ethics: Back Together Again' (1988), and also J Sterba (1995), N Agar (1995) and 
G Varner (2002) for further exploration of this theme.
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contemporary animal advocacy strengthens the biocentric perspective, is highlighted 
in Taylor's own delineation of the 'Attitude of Respect for Nature', Taylor states:
Thus the reality of a community's good, like that of a species-population, can 
be found nowhere but in the lives of individual organisms, even though when 
we speak of the good of the community we are not referring to the good of 
each individual member taken separately. The good of the community is a 
statistical concept' (1986, pp. 70-71).
Taylor's distinction here seems entirely sensible from a biocentric perspective. 
However, the 'statistical' distinction that Taylor makes, although clearly - and I 
believe rightly - made in order to emphasise the importance of individual living 
creatures over 'statistical 1 assessments, has on my own biocentric account (having 
as a prerequisite critiqued the pitfalls of holism), the pressing potential to be 
misconstrued in the holistic mindset. We can of course understand this form of 
statistical thinking - in that humans in order to try to understand interrelationships in 
nature frequently aggregate (and this tendency was discussed at length in chapter 
4.2 and 4.3 in respect to holistic understandings of nature). Nevertheless, the stark 
distinction may all too readily bring us full circle to the troubling notion that 
aggregates ('statistics') themselves morally 'count' in assessing value hierarchies 
(and I submit this form of misconstruction as an inherent problem for much of 
Taylor's biocentric account). In this sense then, I am more cautious than Taylor in 
'allowing' even this distinction, as it again leaves the ethical door open to the very 
same arguments that formed the basis of my rejection of both paternalism in chapter 
three (that 'statistical' interpretations of nature colour actual practice in ways that 
harm individual animals) and holism in chapter five (in that moral weight can be 
given to aggregates over and above individual moral weighting - and again, harm 
countless individuals). The statistics of 'populations and communities' are primarily 
relevant to our tendencies to construct nature in human terms, and in this narrow 
sense are valid - at least to the degree that a weak biocentric view as forwarded in 
this work can (indeed, should) readily include concern for populations and 
communities. Notwithstanding this inclusiveness, under the developed 'bottom-up' 
biocentric paradigm proposed here, it is upon individual living creatures that our 
'moral lens' is to be primarily, unswervingly and recurrently trained.
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The failure of animal advocacy
The second principal reason that my particular take on biocentric individualism is 
posited as an appropriate framework for animal protectionism concerns the 
preoccupation of much of this work - our presumption of animal use. Indeed, a 
central aim of this work has been a refutation of the presumed legitimacy of 
nonhuman animal use by humans. I posit that if one accepts the (radical?) 
theoretical arguments presented here against such presumptions, an appropriate 
framework already exists that vindicates and bolsters this position. That framework is 
biocentric individualism. My key point here is that if one can envisage a paradigm 
where the theoretical grounding of my earlier arguments regarding the illegitimacy of 
use is fully embraced and implemented, then the formulated argument for the 
illegitimacy of use can properly comprise the theoretical foundation for an applied 
biocentrism. 53 In short, the theoretical grounding that the argument for illegitimacy 
of use engenders is thus aligned to an applicable framework. What I mean here is 
that simply stating (and of course arguing at length in the preceding chapters) that 
our overt use of nonhumans is illegitimate, does not in and of itself, carry with it any 
directive for action - or suggest a robust applied framework for moral determination. 
Likewise, I believe Taylor's biocentric approach, whilst attempting to formulate 
general principles of action, arguably fails in its appeal to precursory individual virtue 
as its moral imperative (discussed shortly). In contradistinction, in aligning the 
applicability of a weak form of biocentric individualism with the ethical underpinning 
of notions of illegitimacy of use, my tentative proposition is that these shortcomings 
can be ameliorated (or that such an alignment at least forms a complimentary and 
useful fusion).
In the body of this work I have argued that contemporary animal advocacy 
largely fails because it primarily turns upon a tripartite obfuscation: succinctly, that, 
welfarism denies death as the greatest harm, paternalism assumes value hierarchies 
in moral deliberation, and holism refocuses the import of the individual in deference 
to aggregation. In short, as recurrently argued, they all assume an underlying 
legitimacy of animal use. The weak form of biocentrism as presented here
53 And it is the more 'practical implications' of this applied framework that are the central 
preoccupation of the next chapter.
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challenges this legitimacy at its very core. If, therefore, the primary avenues of 
animal protectionism (which to reiterate, I argue are welfarism, paternalism and 
holism) fail in this respect, then we are left with the pregnant question of 'where 1 we 
are to centre our moral deliberations regarding 'nature' and our place within it. 
Following Taylor, I argue that this is to be centred upon (individual) life itself as the 
primary 'moral' factor. This view is therefore 'biocentric' in essence. However, it is 
one based not upon a presumption of development of subjective virtue alone, but 
rather upon the argued 'failure' of the central forms of animal advocacy that, 
variously and necessarily, redefine our moral foci.
In sum, my recurrent claim has been that animal advocates, such as 
conservationists for example, sincerely claim to 'respect' nature and its 
interdependences - but as I have argued (in chapter 3 regarding paternalistic 
initiatives) fall short of a comprehensive non-hierarchical adoption of such in 
practice. At minimum therefore, I advocate that caution needs to be exercised as 
'respect' it would seem, can take many forms - as comprehensibly argued for in 
discussion of welfarism (in chapter two), paternalism (in chapter three), and holism 
(in chapter four). Many environmentalists who would support a biocentric approach 
(and of course Taylor's seminal work is undeniably significant here) may of course 
argue that acknowledgment of the validity of a biocentric view properly precedes the 
argument for illegitimacy of use as presented in this work. In essence, supporters 
may maintain that biocentrism already has within its ethical framework a demand for 
respect, and thus ipso facto makes overt use of nonhumans illegitimate. It may in 
this respect seem that I am putting the proverbial cart before the proverbial horse. 
However, critics have frequently articulated a serious deficiency in the central 
argument for 'respecting' nature.54 The strong view in essence requires the 
acceptance of a generic 'respect for nature' (and the central role of 'life' itself) and 
therefore in the final analysis must appeal to little more than the sustained individual 
development of an ecologically insightful 'personal virtue'. Given that 'virtue' is in
54 See Victoria Davion (2006) for some interesting and comprehensive contemporary wide-ranging
criticisms in this respect.
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dire short supply, the 'workability' of biocentrism (and certainly as advanced by 
Taylor) has recurrently been questioned, and it is to this problem that I nowtunv55
The problem with virtue
A general remark, and one that colours subsequent lines of reasoning, is that on my 
view development of an attitude of 'respect for nature' as presented by Taylor is not 
necessarily, in and of itself, any guarantee that, in practice, we accord the full moral 
consideration that may be due to nonhumans. 56 We may in fact develop a perfectly 
reasonable, rigorous and considered 'respect' persona - and forward a 
thoroughgoing animal advocacy framework, but as I have thematically argued thus 
far, nevertheless retain within it deeply seated presumptions of the legitimacy of 
animal use. Indeed, at the core of this work I have consistently maintained that those 
who variously advocate for nonhuman animals - and of course viewed by many to 
be the 'good guys' - do in fact possess some form of a developed 'respect for nature' 
ethos. I have however argued that they nonetheless retain within their worldview 
some presumption of the legitimacy of animal use subtly embedded within their 
particular and disparate 'respect' schema. I have therefore, in turn, argued explicitly 
that developed forms of welfarism (in chapter two), paternalism (in chapter three), 
and holism (in chapter four) share this troubling common ground. In actual fact, this 
thesis has contended throughout, that despite the incongruent claims of these 
diverse projects, underpinning each is a persistent and profound human bias that
55 This is of course a central criticism of virtue theories in general. For further insight see, James 
Sterba ( 2000,2006), David Styzbel (2006,2007), Marti Kheel (2000, 2008), and Steven Clark, The 
Moral Status of Animals (1997). For an 'ecological' perspective see also Carolyn Merchant's work in 
which she formulates these central themes, in Radical Ecology: The Search fora Livable World 
(1992). Likewise, see Ronald Sandler's take on a virtue based ethic, in 'Towards an Adequate 
Environmental Virtue Ethic' (2004).
55 1 do not wish to necessarily imply here that development of personal 'virtue' in this respect is 
not prerequisite to thinking in nonanthropocentric terms concerning nature. Indeed, I 
wholeheartedly consider that Taylor's development and supporting ethical framework is largely 
cogent and consistent with a developed 'respect' ethic (in that it arguably fosters an all-embracing 
respect for nature). In fact, a process of personal ecological 'awareness raising' and acceptance of 
'non-anthropocentric' positions are obviously a precondition of'thinking' about these very themes. 
I merely point out that a developed virtue ethic does not in and of itself guarantee 'right' action 
(as 'virtue' can be variously construed). Neither is such a change in consciousness likely attainable 
by everyone - not least because it is unavoidably dependent upon cultural, educational, social and 
experiential influences. Furthermore, as intimated earlier, animal advocates such as 
conservationists for example, claim to 'respect' nature and its interdependencies - but as I have 
argued (chapter 3) fall short of a comprehensive non-hierarchical adoption of such in practice.
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selectively informs upon our moral deliberations and the values we assign to the 
nonhuman world arising from a fundamental assent to a conceptual presumption of 
our legitimacy of animal use. Given that I have attempted to show that these 
principal forms of animal advocacy variously (and by degree) fail, it is appreciable 
that on my account the efficacy of a developed personal 'virtue' such as Taylor 
advocates consequentially fosters assent to an overarching inclusiveness ('respect' 
in Taylor's terminology), and is in practical and commonplace terms, questionable.57 
It is with this unease in mind that I now explore Taylor's basic standard of virtue in 
respect to the difficulty of providing an objective specification of environmental virtue, 
and my reading of such.
In a paper considering the workability of an environmental virtue based ethic, 
Ronald Sandier considers four commonplace concerns58 : 1) that 'it is not possible to 
provide an objective specification of environmental virtue 1 , 2) 'an environmental 
virtue ethic will lack the resources to provide critique of obtaining cultural practices 
and policies', 3) 'an environmental virtue ethic will not provide sufficient action- 
guidance', and 4) 'an environmental virtue ethic cannot ground constraints on human 
activities regarding the natural environment' (2004, p.477). I concern myself here 
primarily with point 1 in respect to Taylor's basic standards of virtue. I will explore 
concerns 2, 3 and 4 in chapter 6, in discussion of the theory-to-practice 
considerations for a biocentric approach.
The initial concern, that 'it is not possible to provide an objective specification 
of environmental virtue', is I believe particularly problematic in regard to Taylor's 
development of his standards of virtue. Taylor's arguments, although admirably 
cogent and robust, nevertheless clearly turn upon a 'subjective' and personal 
development of a 'respect' ethic. In this sense, the commonplace disquiet regarding
57 Taylor does in fact develop 'constituent' virtues that go to make up his general conception of a 
developed virtue that includes conscientiousness, integrity, patience, courage, temperance, 
disinterestedness, perseverance and steadfastness-in-duty (p.201). Notwithstanding this 
impressive framework, I submit that a thoroughgoing development of these saintly traits, does not 
necessarily equate to adoption of the sort of environmental ethic that Taylor presumes these 
attributes will foment. We could, for example, develop each of these traits to perfection and retain 
a perfectly reasonable position that does not embrace a comprehensive biocentrism; indeed, a 
'moderate' anthropocentrist may possess these admirable traits in spades in regard to his own 
species - but deny an overarching species inclusiveness in the biocentric sense.
58 Sandier defends a conception of environmental virtue as a form of what he calls 'character 
virtue' in this work. I merely extrapolate the concerns he identifies in regard to Taylor's 'basic
standards of virtue' here.
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the 'impossibility' of providing an objective framework seems to my mind of particular 
relevance. This subjectivity resonates in Taylor's preamble to his 'standards of 
virtue'; Taylor states:
'With reference to environmental ethics, the attitude of respect for nature is 
expressed in one's character when one has developed firm, steady, 
permanent dispositions that enable one to deliberate and act consistently with 
the four rules of duty: Non-maleficence, Non-interference, Fidelity and 
Restitutive Justice. Those dispositions are the virtues or good character traits 
that make it possible for a moral agent to regularly comply with the four rules 
and by doing so express in its conduct the attitude of respect for nature' 
(1986, p.199).
To reiterate, on my biocentric account, rather than reliance on developing highly 
subjective 'permanent dispositions', it is the underpinning of the arguable 'failure' of 
key animal advocacy approaches that form a grounding for, and key strength of, the 
proposed adoption of the weak biocentric individualism argued for in this work. I 
contend that an environmental framework that adequately addresses our moral 
obligations, whilst concurrently fostering a workable 'respect' ethic (and I happily use 
this term in Taylor's sense), requires not merely assent to personal development of 
'ecological virtue'59 , but necessitates an acknowledgment of the inadequacies and 
inefficacies of the core avenues of contemporary animal advocacy. In short, my core 
claim (and point of departure from Taylor in this respect) is that a developed 
sensitivity to nature worked out solely as a personal virtue ethic all too readily leaves 
the ethicist open to the vagaries of the determinate advocacy route (and of course I 
precisely argue that these normatively take the form of the (dys)functional 
dimensions within a welfare, conservation or ecology based framework). An ethic 
that recognises the illegitimacy of use embedded in standard animal advocacy, and 
thereupon suggests a refocusing on individual life as the primary moral foci, does, I 
submit, offer a firm and robust theoretical grounding for the biocentric perspective. It 
is to an exploration of the 'robustness' in practical terms that the remainder of this 
work now turns.
59 'Ecological' here, in Taylor's sense of the development of an individualised ethic towards 'nature'
at large.
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6. Biocentric Individualism and Animals: 
From Theory to Practice
'The most effective way to promote wild nature is not by doing new 
things and undertaking new projects, it is simply to refrain from the 
murderous activities that are part of everyday life'. Dale Jamieson 1
This final chapter will explore some thoughts on the practical implications in matters 
of conflict of interests, and as to what contextual factors may have relevance in 
relation to each other in adoption of the biocentric approach to animal advocacy 
developed within this work. After an introduction to the principal issues that I believe 
a biocentric view likely needs to consider in application, the tripartite central themes 
of this thesis will be 'revisited' in discussion of their practical implications. 2 This re- 
examination will begin with an exploration arising from the critique of welfarism in 
chapter two. With this critique firmly in mind, the 'hands-off approach developed 
within the biocentric perspective will be evaluated in synthesis with an 'abolitionist' 
viewpoint and notions of non-maleficence. 3 Following on from this evaluation, a 
central problem drawn out from discussion of selective paternalism in chapter three
1 Dale Jamieson makes this succinct observation in, The Rights of Animals and the Demands of 
Nature'(2008), p. 195.
2 These are, of course, the now familiar themes of Welfarism, Paternalism and Holism. I return to 
each of these themes in consideration of the practical elements for a biocentric approach, both for 
continuity purposes and clarity for the reader. It has been a persistent claim throughout this work 
that there is a need to address issues of animal advocacy somewhat differently dependent upon 
the qualitative degree of relationship extant (although there are certainly key points of 
intersection, see primarily in this regard chapters 1.2, 1.3, 5.2, 5.3 and subsequent argument in 
this chapter). Therefore, in 6.1, I raise concerns regarding the practical implications for my 
biocentric view with regard to animals in human servitude in the light of welfarism. I then go on to 
explore what I argue are the subtle but distinct variances in our pragmatic responses to wild and 
semi-wild animals in 6.2 when examining the delimitations of selective paternalism in conservation 
practice. In 6.3, I then broaden my exploration of the practical implications of advocacy in analysis 
of holism and the probable demands, commonality, and limitations of biocentrism in wider 
functional terms.
3 This will chiefly follow Gary Francione's (1996, 2009) and Joan Dunayer's (2004) development of 
an abolitionist perspective in regard to animal husbandry and the critique of the limitations of 
welfare - in synthesis with my biocentric position. For precursory discussion of the abolitionist view 
in respect to this work, see chapter one, The challenge of non-anthropocentrism', and chapter 
two, 'Animal welfare: the myth perpetuated'. Further to this analysis, I primarily develop Taylor's 
notion of non-maleficence in this particular respect (1986, pp. 172-79).
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will be examined in the context of the assumptions of the legitimacy of value 
hierarchies and how these assumptions colour actual practice. These assumptions 
of legitimacy will be compared and contrasted with the 'non-hierarchical' biocentric 
paradigm and the challenge this presents to protectionist theory and practice in 
critique of notions of selective forms of paternalism. Holistic approaches to animal 
advocacy arising from an ecocentric perspective, which as I have argued, refocus 
the import of the individual in deference to aggregation will then be re-examined in 
the light of the developed individualistic and biocentric position. In this section I will 
offer some specific thoughts as to how interest conflicts between different beings 
may be resolved and look at what type of contextual factors may have relevance 
within a developed biocentric approach.4 In conclusion, an exploration of the broader 
themes that application of theory to practice must inevitably encounter will be 
undertaken in respect to the development of the individualistic account suggested in 
this work.
Before a brief synopsis of what it is that I consider a biocentric view plausibly 
needs to take into account in practice, an initial and overarching observation is to be 
borne in mind when discussing the 'practical implications' of a biocentric approach. 
As Taylor starkly notes, 'the biocentric outlook has not been proven' (1986, p. 167). 
This statement is nevertheless significant, and unavoidably colours any theoretical 
exploration of the pragmatic dimensions of the developed biocentric outlook. This 
'fact' alone need not however imply that a robust, rigorous and consistent process of 
rational justification in matters of conflict of interests cannot be successfully 
undertaken, but merely highlights that in practicable ways the biocentrically based 
theoretical grounding has not been tried and tested. Allied to this initial remark is a 
wish to reiterate my aspiration for the biocentric approach - which is in the first 
instance, to advance an environmental ethic that, at the very least, challenges
4 In 6.1, I take an abolitionist stance towards contemporary husbandry practice, and as such this 
negates extensive exploration of specific' cases of conflict of interest (in that, on my biocentric 
account, husbandry will effectively cease) and as such notions such as cognitive ability for 
example, are not a central issue within this paradigm. In 6.2, I widen the perspective and I argue 
that selective paternalism does not accord in practical terms with biocentrism's core beliefs, and 
examine the practical concerns relative to selective paternalism in light of a biocentric approach 
(specifically, conflicts of interest arising from the differing values assigned to native and non- 
native animals in contemporary conservationism). I leave exploration of how broader interest 
conflicts between different beings may be resolved until the discussion of holism in 6.3. I offer a 
biocentric outline that recognises the 'embedded individuation' in the biocentric approach, and 
discuss this in the light of interest conflicts arising from this individualistically-based account.
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individuals to 'take seriously decisions involving injury or death to living things of any 
species' (Schweitzer, 1955, p.318). It is with these overarching observations firmly in 
mind that the subsequent exploration is to be contextually construed.
There is, in addition, a significant point to be drawn out in advance of 
discussion of specific examples of theory to practice praxis: namely, the central 
importance of the establishment of priorities among interests. Indeed, the question of 
how, why and when we establish priority among interests is at the very core of any 
exploration of the delimitations of a developed environmental ethic. As Gary Varner 
fittingly states,
The satisfaction of interest constitutes a fundamental moral value, because to 
say that a being has interests is to say that it has a welfare, or good of its 
own, that matters from the moral point of view. So if an action would satisfy an 
interest, that is a prima facie reason for performing it. On the other hand, the 
dissatisfaction of interests constitutes a fundamental moral disvalue. So if 
what I do sets back the interests of some other being, that is a prima facie 
reason for not doing it' (1998, p.77).
Given that biocentrism recognises that living organisms have wide ranging interests, 
it would seem then that the crux of the issue for a biocentric outlook pivots upon how 
it may reconcile these diverse interests. These claims would certainly seem to 
constitute robust objections to positions that endevour to extend moral standing to all 
living creatures. In common with other 'far-reaching' perspectives that nominally 
challenge normative ways of doing things, the biocentric view does seem to sit 
squarely within what many would see as the 'radical' theoretical pantheon.5 The 
weak biocentric view is not irretrievably incapable of formulating 'real-world' moral 
responses to our relationship with nature. Rather, it is that our moral expectations 
are so shaped by our embedded anthropocentric biases (and I have argued that this 
chiefly takes the insidious form of a presumption of the legitimacy of animal use), 
that biocentrically based propositions are frequently framed as problematic in 
application. This contention typically takes a form of argument that claims that
5 Of course, many would also view any ethic that challenges anthropocentrism at its core as 
'radical' in essence. Nevertheless, it may be reasonable to suggest that in its core beliefs (as 
outlined previously at the start of this chapter) biocentrism may take us further from a strict 
interpretation of anthropocentrism than many contemporary welfarist, conservationist and holistic
perspectives.
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biocentrism is simply too morally demanding.6 In referring to strong biocentric 
frameworks, Callicott controversially suggests that 'a point of moral overload is 
reached and the whole enterprise of ethics threatens to collapse into absurdity1 
(1986, pp.402-3). I do not however consider that a 'moral overload' is in any respect 
inevitable in practical application of a biocentric approach, or indeed that a 
developed biocentric position takes us inexorably headlong into the realms of 
absurdity. That it is fundamentally challenging to our commonplace ways of 
interrelating to other beings, is however fully conceded and embraced. With these 
provisos and contentions to the fore, I will now address some of these challenges 
through a re-examination of the tripartite central themes of this thesis in light of the 
practical inferences for the adoption of a weak biocentric approach.
6.1 Welfarism and a biocentric approach
In outlining his rule of non-maleficence, 7 Taylor echoes Dale Jamieson's sentiment 
that forms the epigraph for this chapter, and posits that, 'Perhaps the most 
fundamental wrong in the ethics of respect for nature is to harm something that does 
not harm us (1986, p. 176). If indeed, as Jamieson intriguingly suggests, we simply 
need to 'refrain from the murderous activities that are part of everyday life', then both 
Taylor's and Jamieson's notions taken together present a direct and serious 
challenge to extant presumptions of the legitimacy of animal use. I submit that this
6 'Being too morally demanding' is one of the four key arguments against biocentrism that James 
Sterba outlines (1995, p. 191). For an extended discussion and references with regard to the claim 
that biocentrism is overtly moral demanding see in particular chapter 5 of this work, 'Weak and 
strong biocentrism' and again in the same chapter, 'Some problems for the biocentric view'. Other 
criticisms that Sterba outlines are: 2. 'that it is too individualistic', and this was largely dealt with 
in chapter 5 under 'Putting the individual back into biocentric individualism' and again later in 6.3 
'Holism and a biocentric approach; Further , 3. 'that the principles forwarded in biocentric views 
are inconsistent with theory', actually comprised a central theme of my critique of Taylor and my 
reasoning for argued divergences from his theoretical grounding in chapter 5.4, 'A comparative 
analysis of the biocentric approach'; lastly, Sterba cites a fourth common criticism, 4. x that of not 
dealing adequately with domesticated animals', and in taking a 'bottom up' view, this does of 
course represent a key theme - and indeed strength - of my take on biocentrism. See in particular 
my divergences from Taylors 'top down' view discussed in 5.4, and many of the arguments in 
chapter 2 regarding animal husbandry. The theme is again taken up in 6.1 - exploring the limits of 
interventionism for domesticated animals in 'Welfarism and a biocentric approach'.
7 In short, Taylor expresses this as '...the duty not to do harm to any entity in the natural 
environment that has a good of its own' (1986, p.172).
238
Chapter 6: Biocentric Individualism and Animals: From Theory to Practice
challenge has particular practical resonance within the context of animal husbandry.8 
Given that the very idea of 'husbandry' itself strongly infers (indeed, demands) direct 
and selective intervention in the lives of non-threatening and largely sentient 
nonhumans, then it would seem evident that both Taylor's maxim of non- 
maleficence, and Jamieson's injunction to refrain from our commonplace murderous 
activities, are adversative to the project of animal husbandry at large. This is a 
serious claim, and one that raises a fundamental question mark over the very 
'possibility' of direct interventionism in the form of contemporary animal husbandry 
practices under the biocentric paradigm.
Non-interference and the question of constraints
I argue that contemporary animal husbandry, in practice, is characterised by 
deliberate, formalised and explicit intervention in the lives of nonhumans for the 
purpose of meeting human ends. This pervading interference requires that moral 
agents make purposeful and premeditated decisions to use animals in specific and 
prejudiced ways. This is, of course, what is generally understood as 'farming'. 
Clearly, efficient and effective farming by its very nature (that it requires direct and 
repeated interventionism), necessitates certain constraints on the otherwise 
'freedom' of individual beings. Taylor outlines four general types of constraints that 
are helpful in the context of our current exploration:
1. 'Positive external constraints (cages; traps)
2. Negative external constraints (no water or food available)
3. Positive internal constraints (diseases; ingested poison or absorbed toxic 
chemicals)
4. Negative internal constraints (weaknesses and incapacities due to injured 
organs or tissues)' (1986, p. 174).
This is not to suggest that diverse forms of farming practice under the aegis of some 
form of welfare framework does not by degree try to circumvent or ameliorate illfare
8 By 'animal husbandry', I refer here to the entire project of formalised animal usage for direct 
human ends, and not the 'overused' quasi-religious notion of'good stewardship'. Contemporary 
husbandry by and large takes the form of large scale 'farming' of animals - on the whole, the 
wholesale 'husbandry' of which is 'legitimised' by the assigning of property status to those 
individuals that are deemed fit for such purpose.
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excesses arising from these forms of constraints. 9 However, the very act of 
constraining of animals for our selective ends, frequently (and certainly in the case of 
Taylor's definition of 'Positive external constraints') is, in fact, standard practice. In 
regard to Taylor's other constraints ('Negative external constraints', 'Positive internal 
constraints', and 'Negative internal constraints'), these variously occur all too 
frequently as a consequence of modern farming practices irrespective of the 'best 
efforts' of welfarist protectionism. With regard to animals in human servitude, my 
claim is straightforward: the biocentric approach developed here is clearly antithetical 
to contemporary animal husbandry. 10
Constraints and the Rule of Fidelity
In addition to the question of constraints, what Taylor refers to as his 'Rule of Fidelity' 
(1986, pp. 179-86) is I maintain, in principle, equally pertinent to our use of animals in 
human servitude. 11 The salient points of the rule are worth reproducing in full, and 
what the 'rule' as Taylor determines it under his biocentric paradigm absolutely 
forbids,
'...is the exploiting of a situation where an animal is deliberately led to be 
trusting, or is made unaware of any danger, as a way to further the non-moral 
interests of humans to the detriment of the animal. Let it be repeated that 
there need not have been any agreement made between human and animal. 
The animal acts in a certain manner because it does not suspect that the 
situation is threatening or dangerous, and the human knows this. Indeed, the 
human may be doing his best to hide from the animal the threat of danger that 
his presence poses for it. When the animal is then taken advantage of by this 
deception, it is being treated as a mere means to human ends' (pp. 184-85).
9 For an exploration of the meaning and implication of 'illfare' see chapter 2.3, The problem of 
welfarism'.
10 And this basic assertion, I argue, is in effect the underlying 'practical implication' in instigation of 
a biocentric paradigm regarding animals in human servitude. In this context, issues around the 
possession of sentience, distinctions between sameness or difference, or what value we assign to 
cognitive abilities for example, are secondary to my overall claim here that defends an abolitionist 
stance on biocentric grounds. See chapters one and two for critique of the central arguments 
arising out of the animal rights and welfare debate and their argued inefficacy for a thorough- 
going animal advocacy.
11 Clearly, Taylor is referring to practices such as trapping, hunting and fishing. However, I make 
the case that such premeditated deception is a defining characteristic of'meat production'. In this 
respect I deviate from, and develop further, Taylor's claim that it solely pertains to wild animals.
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It is noteworthy that Taylor again clearly uses this rule in respect to 'wild' animals in 
discussion of its application to hunting and trapping. However, my claim is that each 
of these elements of duplicitous intent and action are entirely applicable in regard to 
modern farming practice (or indeed, small-scale or traditional husbandry) and thusly, 
this concept is crucial in defining the delimitations of pragmatic moral action in regard 
to 'non-wild' animals in human servitude. Indeed, within the remit of contemporary 
animal advocacy, it is, on my biocentric account, the rule of fidelity that is 
consistently and recurrently broken. Furthermore, concerning possible conflicts 
between the duty of non-interference and fidelity, Taylor notes that, 'Here again our 
first moral requirement is to refrain from creating conditions where animals come to 
trust us if those conditions interfere with their freedom or impose constraints on other 
wild living things' (1986, p.195). 12
Abolitionism and the weak biocentric approach: A synthesis
If we are to refrain from creating conditions where animals come to trust us, then it 
follows that we are to refrain from animal husbandry and its accompanying 'myth' of 
animal welfare. 13 In fact, advocating Taylor's 'hands off approach to nature (1986, 
pp. 193-96) in consideration of the practical determinations within animal husbandry 
(in that husbandry is definitively 'hands-on') presents diametrically opposed aims, 
that cannot equitably be reconciled with the central purposes of animal husbandry. 
Where then, does instigation of such a biocentric framework leave the contemporary 
farming of nonhuman animals? I have argued throughout this work that it is 
essentially our presumed legitimacy of animal use that derails much advocacy at its 
core. The presumption of the legitimacy of animal use does of course find its
12 There are inevitably other considerations in respect to conflicts between the duty of non- 
interference and fidelity that require pragmatic attention (indeed, this is the raison d'etre of this 
chapter). In this section, I deal only with animals in human servitude and argue that biocentrism is 
essentially negating of husbandry practices - and thus, 'conflict of interest' is endemic to the very 
'practice' of farming of animals. I contend that the biocentric approach is in this regard wholly 
incompatible with what passes as modern animal husbandry. In the case of wild and semi-wild 
animals and our attitudes to wider nature, the point by point practical dimensions of such cases of 
conflict will be explored subsequently - and as such is the subject matter of much of the analysis 
in, 6.2 'Paternalism and the Biocentric approach'; and 6.3 'Holism and the biocentric approach'.
13 I argue that animal husbandry, by its nature, interferes with individual 'freedom' and must 
impose constraints on (otherwise) wild living creatures (and Taylor argues his form of biocentrism 
on these conditions). My take on welfarism and its accompanying 'myth' was developed at length 
in chapter 2.3, 'Animal welfare: The myth perpetuated' in respect to welfare's denial that death is
the greatest harm.
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workaday place in our industrial scale daily abuse of countless nonhumans for 
(trivial) human ends. The biocentric approach forwarded here, that supports a view 
that there is a duty not to do harm to any individual that has a good of its own, must, 
I believe, dispute this legitimacy - and call for nothing less than the practice of 
wholesale animal husbandry to be abolished. 14
In chapter two, the limits of animal advocacy were discussed in the light of an 
animal welfare approach, and the burgeoning move in some quarters towards 
'abolitionism' within the animal ethics arena was introduced and developed. 15 I 
consider that in the context of the 'failure of welfarism' - argued for within the body of 
this work16 , the core beliefs of biocentric individualism rightly accord with the basic 
principles of abolitionism arising from the animal ethics discourse. 17 The suggested 
synergy between abolitionism and weak biocentric individualism finds place primarily 
in their common call to a 'hands-off approach. This synchronicity is aptly expressed 
by Gary Francione in outlining his abolitionist stance, '...just as we regard every 
human as having inherent value that precludes treating that human exclusively as a 
resource for others, so, too, do animals have inherent value that precludes our 
treating them as our property' (2008, p.23). 18
From servitude to sovereignty
In practice then, on my account, it is the abolition of wholesale husbandry practice 
that constitutes the overarching 'practical implication' of the biocentric paradigm. In 
respect to animals in human servitude, it is not therefore an examination of specific
14 Again, 'animal husbandry' is to be understood here as a 'methodology' for mass meat production 
and not to be construed as 'good stewardship'.
15 For my position on the abolitionist view in respect to this work, I refer the reader to chapter 
one, The challenge of non-anthropocentrism', and chapter two, 'Animal welfare: the myth 
perpetuated' of this work. For thoroughgoing exploration, see Gary Francione's (1996, 2009) and 
Joan Dunayer's (2004) development of an abolitionist perspective in regard to animal husbandry 
and the critique of the limitations of welfare.
15 This was of course the central theme of Chapter Two, and forms one of the 'tripartite failures' of 
animal advocacy that characterises this work.
17 Gary Francione succinctly sums up his central claim in a pivotal sentence, 'If we are going to 
make good on our claim to take animal interests seriously, then we have no choice but to accord 
animals one right: the right not to be treated as our property' (2008, p.25).
18 In his work 'Animals as Persons', Francione is clear however that we are not morally obligated to 
treat nonhumans as human persons in as much as humans have interests that nonhumans do not 
have, and vice versa (2008, p.23). Also, it is to be noted that Taylor's biocentric view is somewhat 
broader in scope than Francione's. See chapter 5.3 for extrapolation of his biocentric position, and 
again in 5.4 for analysis of Taylor's approach in respect to my own.
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issues around the practical implications in matters of conflict of interests, and the 
contextual factors may have relevance in relation to each other in adoption of the 
biocentric approach to animal advocacy that is obligatory with regard to animal 
husbandry. Under a biocentric (abolitionist) approach, the legitimacy of husbandry 
itself becomes a moot point. Rather, it is to the matter of what conditions would need 
to be in place, and as to how these may tentatively come about upon effective 
abolition of extensive animal husbandry that is of pragmatic concern. I follow 
Francione in his claim that it is first and foremost, the property status of nonhumans 
that needs to be addressed. As long as nonhumans are accorded this status, then it 
is difficult to envisage that a biocentrically-based approach can have practical force.
Alongside what Francione sees as the inevitable and necessary vigorous 
educational campaign, he offers what I believe to be five useful criteria that may be 
extrapolated to form a 'practical framework' for a biocentric model (1996, pp.192-211): 
1. 'An incremental change must constitute a prohibition'. Essentially, this correlates 
with identification that certain institutionalised animal exploitation behaviours need to 
be prohibited - rather than, for example, simply ameliorated by the sorts of welfare 
initiatives discussed in chapter two; 2. The prohibited activity must be constitutive of 
the exploitative institution'. This is a corollary to criterion one and helps to define 
what may constitute exploitation - in short, the activities that fall under an 'agreed' 
exploitative intent need to be defined; 3. The prohibition must recognise and respect 
a non-constitutional animal interest'. This form of prohibition correlates with a general 
'respect' attitude developed in this work, and Francione's claim here is essentially 
that this recognition would help in 'targeting those interests the animal would have 
were the animal no longer regarded as property' (1996, p.292). 4. 'Animal interests 
cannot be tradable'. Building upon the previous criteria, Francione is careful to point 
out that such a claim against tradability is not necessarily to infer that a right cannot 
be overridden by another right per se (reflecting the 'weak' biocentric account 
developed in chapter five), but rather that it is necessary that (animal) interests 'be 
understood as trumping the interests of property owners' (1996. p.206). Again, this 
prohibition seems to correspond favourably with notions of the species neutral 
approach discussed in chapter four; 5. The prohibition shall not substitute an 
alternative, and supposedly more humane, form of exploitation'. This fifth criterion 
clearly has resonance with the central arguments in chapter two of this thesis
243
Chapter 6: Biocentric Individualism and Animals: From Theory to Practice
regarding the 'problems of welfare' and the failure of incremental welfarism. 
Francione sees this criterion as holding, 'that it is inconsistent with a rights theory to 
treat some animals exclusively as means to the ends of others, or as property, in 
order to secure some benefit that is hoped will eventually secure a higher moral 
status for other animals' (1996, p.207). 19
Whereas I would not suggest that these criteria necessarily present a 
complete and comprehensive framework for instigation of a biocentric paradigm, I 
believe they certainly offer a pragmatic preliminary way forward in addressing the 
seismic changes that a biocentric worldview would manifestly initiate. I leave the final 
observation to Francione,
'Our accepting that we have no moral justification to continue to treat 
nonhumans as commodities would not entail letting domesticated nonhumans 
run free in the streets. It would, however, entail that we stop bringing animals 
into existence for the purpose of human exploitation. We should care for those 
who are here now, but we should stop causing more to come into existence. 
We would still have to work through what equal consideration would mean in 
our dealings with non-domesticated animals. But even that would be much 
easier to do if we accepted that the property status of nonhumans has no 
justification other than as a result of speciesist hierarchy that we created and 
that we perpetuate' (2008, p. 128).
And it is indeed precisely to the issue of working through what equal consideration 
would mean in our dealings with non-domesticated animals that I now turn, in 
exploration of the practical implications of 'Paternalism and a biocentric approach', 
and the subsequent broadening of this exploration in discussion of 'Holism and a 
biocentric approach'.
19 Naturally, the abolitionist stance is not without its detractors, and I would not wish to imply that 
abolitionism would be without practical problems in application. Indeed, Rob Garner defends his 
take on a broad animal protectionism in an excellent and pertinent jointly authored debate with 
Gary Francione in, The Animal Rights Debate: Regulation or Abolition '(20 10). Garner cites 
possible problems for an abolitionist stance in practice, including: the argued 'fundamentalism' of 
an abolitionist stance; a mounted defence against Francione's (and my) claim that welfarism is 
counterproductive; an argument that welfare in practice does work (refuting the abolitionist's 
'myth'claim); that incremental abolitionism is practicably possible in Garner's view; and 
arguments as to the inefficacy of 'moral crusades' that Garner argues 'characterise' the abolitionist 
stance. I do not wish to reproduce the full counter-arguments here, and largely follow Francione's 
take in defence of abolition in regard to contemporary animal husbandry practices. I make my own 
observations regarding the failures of a welfarist approach (and need for abolitionism) in chapter 
2.3, and thusly argue the need for a radical rethink on animal husbandry practice. Further possible 
problems in application of my biocentric approach are discussed subsequently in 6.3 and 6.4.
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6.2 Paternalism and a biocentric approach
At the outset of chapter three, a core problem for animal advocates and for many 
who would ascribe to green credentials in general was introduced. The suggested 
difficulty was whether an individually centred ethic could provide a credible basis for 
our 'obligations' to systemic environmental management, preservation of 
ecosystems, and conservation of endangered species. I argued that whether we 
consider our interventionist actions to be borne of a form of enlightened 
anthropocentrism, or one engendered by a thoroughgoing ethical theory, neither 
position critically challenges the underlying presumption of the legitimacy of actual 
animal use. I then questioned if a form of paternalism based upon these sorts of 
presumptions of legitimacy can ever ground a wholly satisfactory 'duty of care' 
towards the nonhuman world.
In this section I examine the functional concerns relative to conflicts of interest 
arising from the differing values assigned to native and non-native animals in 
contemporary conservationism in light of a biocentric approach.20 I believe that the 
differentiation between what is accepted to be 'native' - and what is deemed to be 
'non-native', is central to explaining why animals are routinely disparately treated in 
practice. 21 The 'selective' nature of paternalism, I argue, characterises a great deal 
of contemporary conservation practice. It is then, the selective nature of 
conservation practice that I wish to largely concentrate upon here in regard to its 
possible practical implications for animal advocacy in light of a biocentric and 
individualistically developed framework.
20 This emphasis echoes the themes of chapter three. I believe the selectiveness embedded within 
much conservation theory and practice forms a key (and under evaluated) problem for advocacy in 
this respect. Although conservation does of course also centre its concerns upon 'conserving' rare 
and threatened species, I contend that competing claims in regard to Yarity' and vulnerability 
likewise pivot upon this same embedded selectiveness - and as such I concentrate my analysis 
here on the (native/non-native) distinction in practical application in order to illuminate my overall
argument.
21 1 refer here to what is generally termed as 'nativism'. This notion is frequently (especially within 
the UK) the foundation of much of contemporary conservation practice. This often takes the form 
of the 'native good, aliens bad' presupposition.
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The problem of 'selective paternalism'
If 'good' stewardship may fairly be understood as the attempt at 'redressing' 
ecosystemic balance in regard to 'wild' nature, whilst generally supporting of 
reasonable welfare standards for those animals that form part of a mixed human- 
animal community (usually companion and livestock animals), stewardship in 
practice nevertheless seems highly selective in its sphere of concern. 22 So-called 
feral animals and exotics belong neither to the first group (the 'native' ecosystem) 
nor to the second (a mixed domestic community). 23 On this account the persecution 
and eradication of these animals is in fact justified primarily on the grounds that they 
do not seem to belong to any community on the one hand, or a designated local 
ecosystem on the other.24 Furthermore, 'invasive pests' (as these creatures are 
frequently termed) are demonised as extraneous 'foreigners' and considered neither 
interesting as species, nor as individuals. 25
It is worthwhile at this point clarifying what may be a useful 'working' definition 
of the multifaceted attributes that constitute a living entity in regard to a general 
biocentric interpretation. Lawrence E. Johnson attempts such a working definition: 'A 
living entity is an ongoing process, occurring in a dissipative thermodynamically open 
system, organising and maintaining itself in near equilibrium with its environment by
22 Generally understood, environmental stewardship refers to responsible use and protection of the 
natural environment through conservation and sustainable practices. I explore here notions of 
'stewardship' in relation to what I am calling 'selective paternalism'.
23 And these frequently constitute animals such as 'foreign' freshwater crayfish, mink, grey 
squirrels and many 'non-native' vigorous plant species in the UK.
24 It is to be remembered that many feral species did not 'choose' to live where they are now 
living; Humanity took them there. The sorts of practical implications in discussion here, in this 
sense are in the business of'managing mismanagement' (ostensibly attempting to manage 
previous mismanagement). Given that fallible humans are attempting to rectify previous fallible 
human 'error, this is an activity potentially thwart with infinite regress.
25 It is interesting to note sinister echoes of the sorts of elitism that finds pragmatic place in the 
exclusion of designated human groups in contemporary society. The blatant propaganda of political 
parties such as the BNP in the UK, likewise demonise 'extraneous foreigners' and 'non-natives' and 
call for direct action against such. One wonders what self-image underlies such attitudes. Is the 
overt 'selectivism' employed by rigorous conservationists and preservationists a curious 
comparitive case of human foreigners (in the ecological sense) condemning animal foreigners? It is 
evident that (the largely white, male and middle class) conservationists would not advocate the 
eradication of themselves - as members of a group of exotic white 'invaders' - whose extremely 
adverse impact on local ecosystems has been well-documented. Might they then legitimately 
support curbing all (non-aboriginal) human lives and births, not to mention more drastic 
measures? If not, the question remains as to how such measures can rightly be justified with 
regard to nonhumans.
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means of high levels of homeorhetic feedback sub-systems'; and in consideration of 
individual interests arising from this state he further adds that, 'A living entity has an 
interest in whatever contributes to its coherent and effective functioning as the 
particular ongoing life-process which it is, with its own particular character' 26. On this 
interpretation, sentient beings (at least) therefore have interests which are simply not 
just the aggregated interests of individuals. Selective forms of paternalism deny this 
particularity in the discriminatory intent to exclude certain aggregated categories of 
nonhumans under their 'protectionist' agenda. Despite the professed intent of 
ecosystemic management policies for the 'common good', the kinds of zealous 
interventionism displayed in much conservation, preservation and restoration policy 
and practice towards feral and exotic animals, I believe, all too readily exemplify the 
prosaic presumption of the legitimacy of animal use discussed throughout this work. 
Prosaic or not, it is clear that the implementation of such selective forms of 
paternalism have serious practical implication for countless nonhumans.
Notwithstanding, the aim of conservation practice in this context is primarily to 
ensure the continued survival of flora and fauna 'native' to the locale/region/political 
border/or other professed boundary. 27 This would of course on face value seem a 
reasonable and arguably worthwhile aim. However, contemporaneously, 'native' has 
in practice come to denote species belatedly (and usually within living memory) 
introduced - by accident or design - by humans. So, if these 'new' species possess 
an evolutionary advantage (or it may be said, some 'resident' species thus now 
possess an evolutionary 'disadvantage'), eradicating those category of species 
deemed to be detrimental to the 'native' ecosystem would seem a paternalistically 
responsible thing to do for those subscribing to this mindset. Indeed, many 
conservations and preservationists defend the diverse methods of control (which 
variously include shooting, poisoning, trapping, gassing and sterilisation) and the 
incalculable infliction of pain and suffering these methods cause, by asserting that
26 These distinctly biological definitions are to be found in Johnson's 'Future Generations and 
Contemporary Ethics' (2003), p.478. 'Homeorhetic' here is adopted by Johnson to indicate that "life 
maintains itself within a favourable range of states, but does not continually maintain constant
states'.
27 'Native' here is used in a general sense to include that which is designated by humans as largely 
existing in a particular place before the arrival of humans and their biological 'baggage'. In this 
wider sense it can mean whatsoever we deem it to mean, but has belatedly come to be more 
specifically aimed at 'late arrivals' on the regional scene such as 'foreign' freshwater crayfish, 
mink, grey squirrels and many 'non-native' vigorous plant species in the UK.
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they are in fact acting morally. The general assertion is that there is a moral 
obligation to preserve biological diversity, and, for advocates of this view, this 
sometimes necessitates direct interventions in order to 'undo1 adverse ecological 
consequences. Again, this seems a reasonable claim if in fact such an obligation is 
requisite.
Viewed through the prism of biocentric individualism, there are however, I 
believe, several functional difficulties with this patent claim for selective paternalism 
in the context of nonhuman 'foreigners'. Perhaps the most apparent is the now 
familiar contradictory definition of nature.28 The contradiction embedded in this 
central claim is that nature on the one hand should be viewed as separated, 
autonomous and largely distinct from the human realm, whilst on the other hand is to 
be seen as somehow not separated; concurrently, it is to be viewed as dependent on 
good stewardship and not autonomous - and therefore something to legitimately be 
manipulated and (re)constructed according to human perceptions. It is clear then 
that the belief that nature is (or rather more precisely, should be) viewed as distinct, 
creates - in the case of feral and exotic species - a conflict with the belief that it is 
appropriate for humans to (re)construct the environment. 29
Furthermore, if it can be argued that it is nevertheless legitimate to target 
certain species whilst still retaining an 'in principle' adherence to non-interventionism 
(a 'hands-off approach in Taylor's terminology), this then raises the question of 
which species are to be singled out. To put it another way, what 'biological baggage' 
is to be deemed morally obligatory to eradicate at all costs? Historically speaking, 
the culling of wild animals entirely in order to (re)construct 'nature's balance' is a 
decidedly recent impulse. This shift in attitude towards the natural world is not merely 
reflective of our increasing impact and global awareness, but marks a paradigm shift 
in the age-old presumptions of the legitimacy of use of nature: in the main, the claim 
that humans have the 'right' to destroy nonhumans whenever, wheresoever and 
however they deem fit. Irrespective of its antecedence, in practical terms, this blatant
28 See discussion on the diverse understandings of nature in chapter 3.1. In particular, for a 
broader perspective on interpretations of what nature may constitute, see the critique of 
holistic/individualistic views of nature that forms the central theme of chapter 4.
29 See subchapter 3.3, 'Managing Mismanagement: The End of the Individual' for development of 
this embedded contradiction in respect to individualism.
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assertion forms the very antithesis of the biocentric approach developed within this 
work.
This further begs the question for selective interventionism as to how far back 
we are to turn the 'ecological clock' - pre-industrial, pre-European, pre-Neolithic or 
perhaps, more troublingly, even pre-homo-sapiens - or indeed any arbitrary choice 
that suits the current environmental paradigm. It is the question of 'which nature' we 
are to create that I believe forms a central problem for interventionism; as Jo-Ann 
Shelton remarks in discussion of the shooting of sheep on Santa Cruz island in 
attempts at 'restoration' of the (presumed) archaic pre-European landscape,
The Nature Conservancy planned not simply to conserve populations of pre- 
Columbian plants and animals, but to restore a pre-Columbian landscape. 
The two goals are similar, but not identical. Conservation allows for the 
possible co-existence of species; restoration is a type of biological cleansing, 
an 'exorcism of the exotics' that requires that all European elements be 
remove in order to recreate an archaic scene. The Nature Conservancy 
considered it necessary to eliminate the sheep as quickly as possible, and, in 
December, 1981, it instituted a program of shooting them. By June of 1989, 
over 37,000 sheep had been killed'. 30
It is clear from this 'real-world' example of the practical application of 
interventionism's zealousness to (re)create nature in man's image of nature, that it is 
not limited to exorcising 'standard' exotics, but may well encompass the decidedly 
non-exotic - in this case the modern sheep, a derivative 'species' largely 'created' by 
man in the first instance.31
This instance illuminates the second practical difficulty for selective 
paternalism: namely, that we cannot promote the interests of chosen species without
30 Shelton gives this graphic historical example of normative prescriptive presumptions of 
interventionism in restoration practices. In the UK, ideas of restoration are often conflated with 
conservation, and to disentangle the practice from theory would likely need a case by case 
assessment. The quote is from Shelton's paper entitled 'Killing Animals that Don't Fit In: Moral 
Dimensions of Habitat Restoration' (2004).
31 Relatively recent mass culling of grey squirrels in the UK that, as a species, have been resident 
for over 130 years is a case in point. In order to try to bolster numbers of red squirrels and stop 
the 'advance' of the grey, grey squirrels are being systematically destroyed in many UK regions. 
For a good example of the zealousness of selective paternalism, see the paper produced through 
the Scottish governments' rural development program 'Control of Invasive Non-Native Species' 
and the 'Red Squirrel Action Plan 2006-2011.
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ignoring humane considerations about others. 32 In the above example of selective 
paternalistic practice, the public outcry had two dimensions: firstly, that the shooting 
was wasteful (dead animals were left to putrefy where shot), and secondly that the 
process was cruel - as there was little or no consideration for the pain and suffering 
of the sheep. Many thought that the reasoning did not justify the cruelty 
demonstrated by the restorationists. More worthy of note than the reactionary 
(though arguably justified) public outcry was the response from the restorationists, 
whose retort was that the negative sentiments (negative for the restorationists that 
is) expressed by so many people could summarily be dismissed simply because they 
were based upon ignorance - in this case, ignorance of 'habitat restoration'. This 
elitism is not uncommon from the proponents of selective paternalism. Further 
extrapolation of Shelton's example of the practical implications for (some) 
nonhumans of the embedded selectiveness with paternalistic forms of animal 
advocacy will be useful in illuminating its functional dimensions. In making a 
comparison between the now universal vilification of mass killing of bison in 19th 
century North America and the killing of the sheep in Santa Cruz, Shelton makes an 
interesting observation,
'Restorationists will argue that bison were killed by people whose interests 
were selfishly anthropocentric, whereas feral sheep and pigs are killed by 
people whose interest is the repair of damage done to the environment by 
previous generations of thoughtless humans. The goals certainly seem 
distinct, but there is a common denominator here: it is we humans who make 
the determination that a species does not 'fit in, that it has 'to go', and we 
make this determination on the basis of whether the existence of that species 
conflicts with our own interests - our interests at one time being economic 
expansion, at another time being the pleasure of visiting restored landscapes' 
(2004, p.8).
This incisive observation highlights the crux of the issue in the context of the 
practical dimensions of the themes of this chapter: that is to say, the common 
denominator between these seemingly distinct determinations in our treatment of
32 And this of course constitutes a central enquiry within this chapter. In this section I confine 
myself to the selectiveness of standardised conservation practice and the pragmatic consequences 
for those deemed to be 'non-natives'; in the next section, I address the problems of promoting the 
interests of chosen species without ignoring humane considerations about others in terms of 
notions of individuality and conflict resolution.
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(here, 'some') nonhumans, is again the underlying presumption of legitimacy of use 
(in the example above, straightforward instrumentalism in the first instance - and 
'straightforward' paternalism in the second). Both produce the same actual outcome 
for individuals of the 'target' species - usually death, swift or otherwise, at the hands 
of humans. That one determination is seen at any given point in human history to be 
motivated by 'higher' moral principles does nothing to ameliorate the pain and 
suffering of the chosen nonhuman individuals destined for eradication because of 
capricious human interests. Again, such 'principles' are in serious discord with 
biocentrism's core beliefs. 33
Selective paternalism (indeed, arguably, all forms of paternalism) is 
normatively based upon a presumptive 'model' of how the world is/should be/could 
be, and as such paternalism seeks to readdress any 'imbalance' by actively (in 
practical terms) tweaking, nudging, or decidedly pushing elements in order to 
reconstitute that model into the prescribed and desired form. However, 'nature' is not 
fixed and permanent - and thus readily lending itself to a predetermined fixed 
analysis - but is dynamic, fluid and complex to a degree (likely) beyond human 
calculation. 34 On the biocentric account developed here, within this ever-changing 
dynamism there is no applied distinction between 'natural' dimensions of an 
ecosystem and 'unnatural' ones, of'native' and 'introduced', 'indigenous' and 'exotic', 
'wild' and 'feral'. 35 Obviously, these kinds of categories are human constructs, often 
largely construed in idealised models of how nature 'should be'. The worrying aspect 
of such forms of dualism that tend to be embedded in ecological constructs of 
selective paternalism, is not that such categories are prima facie 'constructed' (after 
all, categorisation and classification are precisely what humans tend to be good at), 
but that in practice many conservationists in their 'moral' zeal, do not simply prefer 
one group over another, but dismiss whole groups (and of course the individuals
33 Taylor's core beliefs were outlined at the beginning of chapter 5.4.
34 This assertion accords with Taylor's second biocentric 'core belief that states, 'that the human 
species, along with all other species, are integral elements in a system of interdependence such 
that the survival of each living thing, as well as its chances of faring well or poorly, is determined 
not only by the physical conditions of its environment but also by its relations to other living
things'(1986, p.99).
35 Shelton makes mention of some of these sorts of categories in discussion of the historical case
(2004), p.10.
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within them) as 'valueless' - and consequently beyond any serious moral 
consideration.36
Clearly, for advocates of a biocentric and individualistic view, such selective 
summary moral dismissals are anathema. Clearly, in practical implication, biocentric 
individualists would wish to reject notions of moral negation of whole groups and 
individuals (the distinction between native and non-native in this regard), and would 
seek to advocate development of a system of values which would accommodate the 
interests of all animals - not merely those that fit with an idealised model of how 
nature should be.37 The form of weak biocentric individualism developed in this work 
is antithetical to the selective nativism embedded in paternalistic animal advocacy, 
and as such, selective distinctions between native and non-native are to be rejected. 
In workable terms, this would mean that, for example, there simply is no morally 
legitimate decision to be made between the interests of the category 'grey squirrel' 
and that of 'red squirrel'. On a weak biocentric account, individuals of each 
classification deserve equal consideration of interests - irrespective of notions of 
provenance and precedence. 38 How interest conflicts within such categories may be 
resolved, and what different factors may be prioritised in relation to one another, will 
be explored next in a critique of holism and the biocentric approach.
6.3 Holism and a biocentric approach
In chapter four, ecocentric approaches and their debatable efficacy for adequate 
animal protectionism were discussed in the light of the central contentions of this
36 See footnote 25 for the kinds of overt 'selectivism' employed by rigorous conservationist and 
preservationist groups and following note.
37 And this may include decisions as to which animals are deemed 'worthy' of conserving. Apart 
from the native/non-native selectiveness discussed here, 'rarity' may be one such criterion. Again 
however, only a very 'select' few animals under threat of extinction are chosen to be 'saved'. The 
embedded selectiveness of such human preferences (usually the cute, exotic, or dangerous 
animals are to be conserved - and not the plain, ugly, dangerous or uninteresting) regarding rarity 
is again highly selective and the very antithesis of the notion of species neutrality that is central to 
the developed biocentrism in this work. This notion was discussed previously in chapter 4.4, 'A 
species neutral approach', and will be revisited again in practical terms in 6.3.
38 This is not to say that certain differences in treatment may not legitimately take place due to 
other factors - such as for example cognitive ability or ecological impact (discussed subsequently). 
However, on the biocentric view, these are to be assessed on an individual case basis and not on a 
'crude"g'ood native, bad alien' calculus. See the next section 6.3, for exploration of this basis.
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work. Carolyn Merchant argues that these approaches can be generally 
characterised by a 'moving away' from atomistic views in favour of a holistic 
understanding of life; contending that these positions are often viewed as polar 
opposites - atomism at one end of the scale and holism at the other (1992, p.86). The 
pertinent point for our exploration in hand is that individualistic theories are generally 
stated in terms of 'properties' that an animal possesses - irrespective of membership 
of any group, whereas for holists, an animal is principally important depending on 
which group it belongs to. 39
There are of course limitations to both approaches. For example, how to 
adequately decide upon a course of action in situations where the same outcomes 
would affect individuals of two different species - one of whom belongs to a common 
species but is a higher mammal, the other a member of a highly endangered species 
but lower on the phylogenetic scale remains problematic for both views. This 
problem is compounded further if indeed the variance between the two animals is 
less obvious (two mammals for example), or a choice based upon sentience alone 
as the benchmark for moral consideration means in practice that in benefiting the 
sentient individual, the cost is eradication of an entire species (or at least perhaps 
the 'local' population). These are serious problems, and therefore some of the more 
contentious lines of reasoning in respect to the weak biocentric approach are to be 
examined in this section in exploration of the practical implications of these kinds of 
problems.
A general remark to be made at this point is that these sorts of applied ethical 
dilemmas are certainly not exclusive to a biocentrically-based individualistic view, 
and the points of intersection under discussion between theory and practice 
resemble the theory to practice difficulties that any theoretical approach has to 
confront in 'real-world' application. To be sure, the holistic account in relation to 
applied deliberation over species preservation seems equally 'out of place' when 
discerning how to adequately address questions about individual value. As Nicholas 
Agar points out, The species membership of a gorilla makes no difference to the 
pain it feels in a medical research laboratory. A butterfly possesses the same good in
39 And here I am simply observing that holists do not have the monopoly on 'environmentally 
correct' ethics, despite the presumptive claims of many environmental holists to hold the empirical 
high ground This notion is argued at length in chapter 4.2.
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terms of the biological functions of its parts, whether or not it belongs to the last 
breeding pair of its species' (1995, p. 403).
Some practical limitations of the holistic view
On an initial reading, a principle that calls for a wide expansion of moral 
consideration and recognition of the importance of every component of the inter- 
linked web of nature would seem readily analogous to the aims of an individualistic 
and biocentrically-based view - that would in like manner seek to assign moral 
standing to nonhumans. Indeed, the need for an extension of what counts as the 
moral community espoused by many holists is a cornerstone of animal ethics.40 In 
this regard, extending the moral community beyond purely human bounds 
constitutes a commonality of purpose. However, I believe that there is a key point of 
departure in pragmatic terms between holistic conceptions and biocentric notions of 
animal advocacy as presented in this work. This divergence chiefly finds place in 
practical application in the recognition that the equal importance of every component 
of the inter-linked web of nature is manifestly not the same as recognising equal 
consideration of interests of individuals. For biocentric individualists it is unlikely that 
an all-embracing holistic paradigm would form sufficient protection for individual 
nonhumans as the individual is subsumed into the 'whole' - irrespective of 
aspirations to greater egalitarianism. 41
A functional problem for approaches that seek greater species egalitarianism 
in respect of pragmatic animal protectionism (and clearly this includes biocentrism) is 
that any claim to 'respecting nature' may, as Alan Carter points out, only hold 'in
40 Typically, deep ecologists hold this view. Key theorists such as Arne IMaess, Bill Devall, George 
Sessions and Warwick Fox advance this form of egalitarianism in variant form. See Naess The 
Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects (1986), Bill Devall and George Sessions, 
Deep Ecology: Living As If Nature Mattered (1985), and Warwick Fox in A Theory of General 
Ethics: Human Relationships, Nature and the Built Environment (2006), also for a broader 
perspective see an earlier paper entitled, 'Deep Ecology: A New Philosophy of Our Time? (1984).
41 In fact, this theme constituted the central critique in chapter 3 in discussion of how an 
individualistic account may differ in pragmatic terms from a holistic view. See in particular, chapter 
3.2 'A fresh viewpoint'; 3.3 'Revaluing the individual'; and 3.4 'Re-evaluating the individual', and 
again in 'Deconstructing species' for extrapolation of the argued differences between the 
individualistic and holistic accounts.
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principle'. 42 How might for example, the boundaries of particular life forms be 
assessed under this all-embracing paradigm? In attempting to apply the principle of 
considering beings equally, in functional terms, then it may be necessary to redefine 
any 'natural' boundaries - an obvious example to be drawn (from argument within 
this work) is the differentiation between sentience/non-sentience that many animal 
advocates would certainly wish to make. Furthermore, it is unclear what exactly 
constitutes the 'things' which should be treated equally (and this is not merely a 
practical matter, but one that would also apply 'in principle'). As outlined in the 
introduction to this chapter, claims about moral equality of species must therefore at 
some point contend with theoretical and applied cases of conflicts between and 
among the interests of humans and members of other species - a now familiar and 
recurrent challenge echoed throughout this work. When we talk in terms of our 
ethical interrelationships with living beings, clearly we unavoidably talk in terms of 
the real-life and death decisions that directly affect countless beings, and as such an 
'unworkable' theoretical stance would arguably impart little more than sophisticated 
human appeasement in the form of Utopian abstractions. 43 This is of course not to 
suggest that theory cannot be 'Utopian' in scope.44
Are then ethicists, like me, who advocate a form of biocentric individualism, 
merely failing to fully recognise the 'practical nature of ethics and consequent 
impossibility of separating human concern and value from any environmental ethical 
consideration?' (Avery, 2004, p.32). Credible 'radical' environmentalists such as Arne 
Naess for example, are not ignorant of the difficulty.45 He admits that whilst it is true 
that those who forward radical protectionist agendas 'sometimes write or talk as if 
human needs, goals, or desires should under no circumstances be taken as 
privileged overriding', for Naess, 'such a norm, if followed uncritically, would, of 
course, make humans into a strange kind of proletarian and would result in their 
extinction' (1984, p.267). Nevertheless, he rejects that beings should somehow be 
'ranked' according to their relative intrinsic value - which in turn could 'justify' the 
killing of the less valuable, and suggests that 'we might agree on rules such as will
42 Cited in French (1995), p.329.
43 What may constitute basic and non-basic needs is examined further in 6.3.
44 1 altogether concede that the (current) 'majority view' of what may constitute the delimitations
of our moral obligations to nonhumans does not readily accord with the pivotal propositions
presented in this work.
45 It is to be noted here of course that Arne Naess is not a biocentric individualist.
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imply different behaviour towards different kinds of living beings' (1989, p. 167). Naess 
concludes that in the final analysis our acts must be morally guided by a 'realistic 
egalitarian attitude1 (1983, p. 176). On his account, animist cultures that allow the 
slaughter of animals for food and clothing, but as a ritual requirement the killing is 
conducted with 'reverence' and a genuine regret for the act, then this is morally 
permissible.46 This qualification is not as straightforward as its imagery suggests. 
The problem from a biocentric perspective is that in this example it is not that the 
hunter may need to kill in order to survive (and arguably an action deemed morally 
permissible in claiming a clause of 'self-defence' - in that the hunter and his family 
would otherwise demonstrably die), 47 but rather that it would be near impossible to 
ascertain if the discrete acts of killing were in fact done with 'reverence', and in 
addition introduces the problematic of determining what reverence itself actually 
embodied. 48 Likewise, how might we measure a 'genuine regret' for the act? Even if 
some morally permissible yardstick could be perceived of and applied in such an 
instance, to suggest that a certain 'attitude' to killing in some ephemeral way makes 
the killing somehow less reprehensible is a highly dubious claim at best. Moreover, 
an arrow, spear, knife or bullet is not in some magical way imbued with the 'reverent 
and regretful' attitude of its instigator; after all, the suffering and dying animal knows 
not whether it is slaughtered reverently or with malice aforethought, but merely that 
in its death throes it has been severely (mortally) harmed.
46 French cites this example that does raise the issue of cultural variances in ethical delimitations. 
Most literature on animal ethics in the main implicitly refers to our obligations to nonhumans in the 
developed world. French discusses this in the light of biospherical egalitarianism in 'Against 
Biospherical Egalitarianism' (1995), p.44.
47 And self defence is suggested as one of the primary considerations in practical application of a 
biocentric approach - discussed subsequently in 'Some further practical considerations'.
48 Paul Taylor gives a reasonable working definition of the principle of self-defence that holds that 
Vt is permissible for moral agents to protect themselves against dangerous or harmful organisms 
by destroying them', see Respect for Nature (1986), pp.264-65. A broader interpretation may be 
used in the sense of'survival', such that the native may kill an animal if no alternative is available 
in order to survive. This interpretation is debatable however, in that meat is not a necessary 
requirement of a healthy life and alternatives can with forethought almost always be found. A 
possible exception is of course those peoples living in extremely harsh conditions such as the Inuit 
of the extreme Northern hemisphere where little vegetation is to be found. Nonetheless, it may 
also be argued that living in such extreme conditions is in itself a 'decision' and the option to move 
to a more clement environment when faced with such extremity (and a restricted and therefore 
unhealthy diet) is a viable, though controversial proposition. Certainly the vast majority of peoples 
during the last ice age made the decision to move south in order to flourish (a part of which was 
partaking of a more varied diet).
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A perhaps deeper concern that any proposed biospherical egalitarianism 
presents (and again, this includes the biocentric view developed in this work), is that 
if a strict egalitarianism is rightly the 'moral ideal' in deciding upon our moral 
obligations to other-than-human animals, then on such a levelled moral landscape 
conflicts of interest could, theoretically, equally be decided upon by nothing more 
than the flipping of a coin. If in fact all is to be ranked equally on a strict egalitarian 
interpretation, then any reason (or again just flipping a coin) may be deemed 
'equally' morally valid - clearly not the intent of a biocentrically-based position.
Some further practical considerations
Regarding what may constitute the functional implications of a biocentric position, I 
suggest that any such 'framework' does not, however, need to be so inflexibly 
constructed. As biocentric individualism centres its moral concern upon individual 
life, 'similar' situations of conflicts may legitimately be dealt with differently on 
different occasions and under dissimilar conditions (and this may mean that conflicts 
arising in regard to one particular set of circumstances in one location/set of 
circumstance may be resolved differently in another - or even conflicts within the 
same group/location may for certain reasons be resolved differently). 49 This fact 
makes any overly prescriptive 'framework' unnecessary. Indeed, individuation in 
dealing with instances of conflicts of interests, is in fact a key strength of developed 
biocentric individualism. In contradistinction to a holistic view, this individuation is 
premised upon a straightforward claim that, 'the good of a biotic community can only 
be realized in the good lives of its individual members' (Taylor, 1986, p.70). I propose 
that three primary factors are of principal consideration in the practical application of 
this 'embedded individuation'. 50 These form the primary applied criteria for a
49 Essentially the 'weak' interpretation of biocentric individualism developed in this work. 
Notwithstanding, such conflict resolution is to be carried out within the core beliefs of biocentrism. 
See in particular Paul Taylor's detailed account of conflict among competing claims (1986, pp.273- 
306) for meticulous examples and extended discussion of competing claims from his biocentric 
perspective. See also Gary Varner (1998, pp.121 -38) for a more generalised account. I largely 
follow Taylor in his delimitation of some of the more pragmatic concerns in this regard. I here of 
course restrict myself to the practical implications for the arguments presented in the body of this 
work regarding welfarism, paternalism and holism.
50 By 'primary' here I infer that these principles 'stand' in all deliberation over conflicts of 
interests. 'Secondary' considerations are those that are specific to each case in dealing with 
conflict resolutions at large, and, 'secondary' considerations therefore may be determined as all of 
those that fall under these general criteria in situational practical application of individuated
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developed biocentrically-based view, and I will discuss each criterion in turn in 
regard to their practical implication for a biocentric approach:
1. Adoption of a 'hands-off' approach
2. Defining of basic and non-basic needs
3. Permitting a principle of self defence
1. The 'hands-off' approach or principle of non-interference
Adoption of a 'hands-off' approach or principle of non-interference can be seen as 
the overriding principle in functional application of the form of biocentric individualism 
developed in this work. 51 Dale Jamieson's quote that forms the epigraph for this 
chapter aptly encapsulates the spirit of this principle, The most effective way to 
promote wild nature is not by doing new things and undertaking new projects, it is 
simply to refrain from the murderous activities that are part of everyday life' (2008, 
p. 195). It is upon this principle that my central arguments throughout this work for the 
'illegitimacy of animal use' pragmatically turn. What I mean here is that my 
arguments for the illegitimacy of use have their practical force in a non-interventionist 
approach. In short, if it is 'illegitimate' to presume our use of animals as wholly 
morally defensible, then (whenever we can) it is entirely cogent that we should adopt 
a better approach. This approach in functional terms means that as 'neutral' a 
disposition as possible needs to be applied with reference to competing claims and 
conflicts of interest amongst and between species. ForTaylor (and I concur), this is a 
keeping of 'one's distance from the course of events in nature, regardless of what 
species are faring well or ill according to the fortunate or unfortunate circumstances 
of their daily lives' (1986. p.209). In practice therefore, it is clear that a biocentrically- 
based animal advocacy is principally distinct in application from the categories of 
mainstream 'proactive' interventionist advocacy critiqued throughout this work. 
Notwithstanding, in instances of 'unavoidable' conflicts of interests there is a need to
concerns (the necessary individuation inherent in the biocentric view in dealing with distinct and 
disparate instances of conflicts of interests). Many of such secondary practical implications for 
adoption of the biocentric perspective have been the subject matter of this chapter (implications of 
abolitionism in 6.1, and application of selectiveness in 6.2). These are further discussed 
subsequently with regard to the assigning of ecological value in practical application. 
51 And again, this hands-off approach was reflected in the proposed abolitionist stance in regard to 
welfarism in 6.1; the argued illegitimacy of selective forms of paternalism in 6.2; and proposed as 
a central tenet of the adoption of an individualistic approach in 6.3.
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determine the strength of competing claims and assess what may constitute basic 
and non-basic needs.
2. Basic and non-basic needs
In order to determine the strength of competing claims, there is a requirement to 
define what may constitute the 'basic and non-basic' needs of those parties in 
conflict in each case. 52 Gary Varner determines that, 'a basic interest is one that in 
the normal course of events must be satisfied if any other interests of the same 
individual are to be satisfied' (1998, p.97). In this sense, it is likely that such interests 
are in the main biological interests (in that the satisfaction of any other interest 
requires the satisfaction of this interest). 53 To have a viable account of basic needs, it 
would seem then that some needs are to be rightly classified as basic, others openly 
classified as non-basic, and likely still others remaining more or less difficult to 
classify. In chapter 5.3, in discussion of a number of criticisms of Taylor's biocentric 
view, James Sterba's 'Principle of Disproportionality' was introduced. This was 
constituted primarily as an injunction that prohibits meeting non-basic or superfluous 
needs when it is in direct conflict with satisfying the basic needs of others. The 
principle states that, 'actions which meet non-basic or luxury needs of humans are 
prohibited when they aggress against the basic needs of individual animals and 
plants, or of whole species or ecosystems' (1995, p. 199). This principle is clearly in 
accord with the received biocentric approach. That adoption of such a principle 
manifestly changes the way in which we perceive and interact in practical ways with 
other animals cannot be overstated. Notwithstanding, on the biocentric account 
developed in this work, we cannot consistently claim that as 'neutral' a disposition as 
possible needs to be applied with reference to competing claims and conflicts of
52 Although I fully acknowledge that 'interests' and 'needs' are in principle distinct in broader 
terminology, I use the terms in the context of this section interchangeably in Varner's essential 
sense of basic requirements - in that 'a basic interest is one that in the normal course of events 
must be satisfied if any other interests of the same individual are to be satisfied'. In this sense, the 
'satisfaction' of such (interpreted as 'interest' or' need') is to be viewed as a primary one.
53 Taylor attempts to outline several examples of the non-basic interests that on his account are 
intrinsically incompatible with the attitude of respect for nature, and those that will cause indirect 
harm (pp. 273-79). Whilst agreeing with the kinds of examples that Taylor 'lists', I do not wish to 
be overly prescriptive in this regard - not least, as the embedded individuation of my weak 
biocentric approach would actively seek a case by case appraisal based upon the biocentric 
principles outlined herein and the nature of the competing claims.
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interest amongst and between species, whilst at the same time aggressing against 
the basic needs of beings when this serves our non-basic or luxury needs. 54
How then might such a principle apply in practice with regard to the kinds of 
divergences between holistic approaches and individualistic positions discussed 
here? When people's basic needs are at stake, a weak biocentric account does not 
require that we have to embrace a strict holistic approach to ecosystemic 
preservation. What I mean here is that if an individual's basic needs are threatened, 
it is difficult to envisage how it may be construed to be morally objectionable for them 
to attempt to meet their needs - even if this may harm other species, ecosystems or 
even the biosphere. 55 Indeed, in this sense, an individualistic view would favour 
such action (in that it is centred upon the individual - and in this case, the human 
individual meeting its basic needs). Likewise, when people's basic needs are not in 
the balance, acting holistically to prevent serious harm to a species, ecosystem or 
the biosphere (under the weak account) is permissible (at least from a bottom-up 
perspective). 56 In this respect at least, holism and biocentrism can intersect. 57 Sterba 
sums up his take on this form of biocentrism:
'In brief, this form of equality requires that we not aggress against the basic 
needs of members of other species for the sake of the non-basic needs of 
members of our own species (the principle of Disproportionality), but it permits 
us to aggress against the basic needs of the members of other species for the 
sake of the basic needs of the members of our own species (the principle of
54 And as Sterba points out, this has parallel force in the claim that all humans are equal - and yet 
whilst claiming this we aggress against the basic needs of some humans when it conveniently 
serves our own non-basic or luxury needs (1995, p.199). The weak form of biocentrism advanced 
here can be reasonably understood by analogy with the equality of humans - just as we may claim 
that humans are equal, but treat them differently, likewise we can claim that all species are 'equal' 
but treat them differently (and indeed my biocentric account would, in practical conflict resolution, 
require such individuation).
55 This is not to ignore the interdependency of life in the wider sense, and the fact that immature 
animals are dependents during their maturation. However, my claim here is that there is in the 
normal course of events legitimacy in the meeting of individual basic need. Likewise, this is not to 
say that all harm has 'equal' disvalue. As Taylor points out, 'We cannot do harm to a species- 
population without doing harm to a great many of the organisms that make up the population; 
harming one species-population is not simply doing wrong to one moral subject. Many such 
subjects, each having the same inherent worth, will also be wronged, namely all the members of 
the population that are killed or injured' (1986, p. 285).
56 See chapter 5.4 for my interpretation of the bottom-up approach.
57 This does of course presuppose that the husbandry of domesticated animals effectively is 
abolished (chapter 6.1), and the highly selective paternalism of much conservation practice ceases 
(chapter 6.2). I talk here primarily in terms of'wild' animals and wider nature in respect to the 
intersections between holistic/individualistic views.
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human preservation), and also permits us to defend the basic and even the 
non-basic needs of members of our own species against harmful aggression
by members of other species (the principle of human defence)' (1995, pp.204- 
05).
It is to the practical dimensions of the latter principle (our third primary criterion - the 
permitting of self-defence) that we now turn.
3. The principle of self defence
The principle of self defence broadly understood as 'those actions that are 
permissible when absolutely required for maintaining the existence of moral agents' 
is an important condition for adjudging competing claims. 58 James Sterba however 
usefully suggests that the principle is better understood if divided into two principles. 
The first is:
'A Principle of Human Defence: Actions that defend oneself and other human 
beings against harmful aggression are permissible even when they 
necessitate killing or harming individual animals or plants or even destroying 
whole species or ecosystems'.
The second principle is:
'A Principle of Human Preservation: Actions that are necessary for meeting 
one's basic needs or the basic needs of other human beings are permissible 
even when they require aggressing against the basic needs of individual 
animals and plants or even of whole species or ecosystems'.
This dissection of the general principle (one that is required for 'maintaining the 
existence of moral agents'), accords with my development of a weak biocentric view 
in that it recognises the permissibility of aggressing against others in order to 
safeguard against not merely aggressive acts, but expresses some degree of 
preference for members of one's own species in cases of competing basic needs.59 
In this respect 'favouring the member's of one's own species to this extent is
58 And this is the working principle that Taylor extrapolates in his seminal work (1986, pp.264-69).
59 An important caveat needs to be mentioned here: on the biocentric account, our right to use 
force against an aggressor does not therefore imply that we have greater inherent worth than the 
aggressor. In this sense, the principle of self defence is consistent with species impartiality - as 
humans as not given advantage simply on the basis of their species. As Taylor points out in 
reference to the domain of human ethics, 'the right to use force against another human being who 
assaults us does not imply that we have greater inherent worth than the attacker. It only means 
that we can rightfully use a 'least evil' means to preserve our own existence' (1986, p.267).
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characteristic of the members of all species with which we interact - and is thereby 
legitimated' (Sterba, 1995, p. 197). As a matter of fact, if we were to take species 
egalitarianism to mean that we should consistently 'prefer' the basic needs of other 
species over our own, then this may lead to the morally dubious proposition that we 
are 'required' to bring about our own extinction.60
The permissibility of 'favouring' of our own species may of course raise an 
objection to my defence of weak biocentrism. From a strong biocentric position, the 
criterion of self defence as expounded here, may on face value seem to bring us full 
circle to the very presumptions of the illegitimacy of animal use that have formed the 
central contention throughout this work.61 In short, either the form of biocentrism 
developed here holds that it all species are equal - or it compromises this claim. If 
indeed it does, at the last call, compromise its central position then this may appear 
to again raise the spectre of straightforward anthropocentric bias. The claim needs to 
be contextualised however: firstly, the permissibility of favouring of one's species is 
only legitimate when basic needs are in direct conflict (that we not aggress against 
the basic needs of members of other species for the sake of the non-basic needs of 
members of our own species); secondly, it is to be understood in the context of the 
embedded individuation in deliberation upon competing claims that is characteristic 
of the biocentric account advanced here (that conflicts may legitimately be dealt with 
differently on different occasions and under dissimilar conditions); and thirdly, the 
biocentric account forwarded in this work fully acknowledges that in human ethics 
there are likewise diverse interpretations of equality that allow for different treatment 
of humans. In much the same manner, that we variously interpret human equality in 
ways that 'allow' us to treat humans differently, there are similarly various ways in 
which we can interpret species equality that allow us to treat species differently. 62
60 Interpreting this view as a form of 'prioritarianism'for example. 'Sterba interestingly notes that 
the principle of human preservation does not of course support 'unlimited' rights to be designated 
at our choosing - and comments that the 'theory of justice presupposed here gives priority to the 
basic needs of existing beings over the basic needs of future possible beings, and this should 
effectively limit (human) procreation' (1995, p. 198).
61 The 'strong' form of biocentrism was introduced and discussed in chapter 5.3, 'Weak and strong 
biocentrism'.
52 Sterba outlines some ways in which we do this (1995, p.204), and cites contemporary examples 
such as 'ethical egoism' (and the right to sometimes prefer ourselves to others); 'Libertarianism' 
(that there are limits on the pursuit of self interest - such as the right to 'refrain' from helping 
others in need in some circumstances); and 'Socialism' (although advancing an equal right to self- 
development, nevertheless sanctions some self-preferential actions).
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Again, this is I believe an inherent pragmatic strength of the biocentric view 
developed out of a critique of animal advocacy and the illegitimacy of overt 
interventionist policy and practice.
6.4 The challenge of theory to practice
As our previous discussion draws out, any theory (and obviously this includes 
biocentrism) must at some point confront the pragmatic 'messy business' of theory to 
practice praxis in application. Having explored some of the functional implications for 
a developed biocentric approach, I want in this concluding section to address some 
wider issues arising for animal advocacy theory in the context of the sorts of broader 
challenges that its application may present.
An embedded dualism
That human beings overlay nature with the same sorts of social constructs that our 
species have adopted as survival strategies is, from this perspective at least, 
unsurprising. Indeed, the slippery question of what in fact is meant by 'nature' is 
notoriously ambiguous in and of itself. This ambiguity, and our understanding of our 
place in nature at large, represents the first persistent broader challenge of theory to 
practice for an ethic of animal advocacy in the context of this work. The term nature 
can of course be interpreted as everything in the physical world, on the other hand 
what is determined as 'natural' can take on a more subtle connotation, expressing 
that which exists and occurs 'outside' of direct human intervention.63 The difficulty is 
adequately expressed in the equivocation between these kinds of contentions which 
have already been touched upon in specific chapter contexts within this work: 
namely, the standard sorts of 'anti-anthropocentric' assertions that (a) humans are a 
part of nature and (b) that we ought not to interfere in openly instrumental ways with 
nature. In a nutshell, if in truth we humans are as natural as anything else (a part of 
and not apart from 'nature'), then it is difficult to determine how in fact we can in this
63 Useful references that discuss at length the various meanings of'nature' are Kate Soper's What 
is Nature? Culture, Politics, and the Non-Human (1995) and from an environmentalist's 
perspective see Holmes Rolston III, 'Can and Ought We to Follow Nature?' in Philosophy Gone 
Wild- Essays in Environmental Ethics (1986).
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sense 'interfere' with it - as the 'it' is by definition whatever we (as part of nature) do. 
The obvious problem in applied terms, is that many of the things we 'do' have a 
severely detrimental effect upon the whole and/or other individuals. But, if we - and 
by extension what we do - are simply a part of nature then all human actions in this 
respect are nevertheless 'natural'. Steven Vogel succinctly summarises this 
equivocation,
Thus, on the one hand, to take seriously the anti-anthropocentric claim that 
humans are simply one species among others, continuous with the rest of 
nature, seems to require employing the term nature in a sense that makes it 
impossible for any human action, no matter how environmentally vicious, to 
be called 'unnatural'. On the other hand, if we do wish, as many do, to call 
such action violations of nature or harms to nature or something similar, that 
in turn seems to depend upon a sense of the word nature that renders every 
human action unnatural. The problem is that neither meaning allows us to 
distinguish between those human actions that 'violate' nature and those that 
are in some way in 'harmony' with it: either we violate it all the time or 
violations of it are logically impossible' (2002, p.26).
There is here then an embedded dualism: for nonanthropocentric views to remain 
consistent it would seem that nonhuman species cannot harm nature in quite the 
same manner as humans. Clearly, in the struggle for survival all animals 'harm' 
nature - as the very act of living (and thriving) must at some point be at the expense 
of other parts of nature (even the herbivore 'harms' countless plants and insects). 
This view of nature then is committed at some level to asserting that humans 
possess an ontological and moral status that is qualitatively different from other 
animals. However, this all too readily draws us back to the very assertion that 
environmentalists and animal advocates perennially wish to distance themselves 
from - that humans are fundamentally different, and therefore are a 'special' case in 
nature. 'Special' here, in anthropocentric parlance, is usually taken to mean that we 
have special dispensation to treat nature (as something 'out there' in this case)
instrumentally.
This order of problem is not merely one of interpretation of nature or what 
constitutes our place within it, but represents a serious and persistent challenge for 
development of any applied animal advocacy ethic - and arguably denotes the 
central theme of environmental ethical discourse at large. The key point from the
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perspective of the remit of this work, is that although there may be a logical dualism 
extant in the kind of ways we think about our place in the world and our treatment of 
other species, it remains the case that the human and so-called natural world are in 
practice inextricably intertwined. Indeed, intertwined to a degree that makes it 
pointless and indeed conceptually incoherent to try to distinguish them, because the 
'relation of humans to the environment is fundamentally active and transformative' 
(Vogel, 2002, p.32). So, on this account, to be a human being is to be interactive in 
the environment, and to be active is by default to transform it. Humans then are not 
separate from the world - or the world 'separated' from humans in any meaningful 
way. The pertinent question is not merely what it is we (should) do with nature, but 
also how we ourselves are 'of nature'. According to Val Plumwood, we cannot in 
neo-Cartesian manner rightly divide the world into two separate domains: an ethical, 
human realm and an animal, ecological realm, everyone and everything exists in 
both (1999). As Vogel suggests, the difficulty arising from this admittance is the 
problem of how to 'read off from nature a set of ethical maxims (2002, p.33). The 
underlying difficulty here is not the superficial acknowledgment that nature is amoral 
in and of itself (the 'amorality1 of which is a familiar enough commonplace pretext for 
human 'immorality'), but that for humans nature (however we define it) is already and 
always interpreted ethically.
Notwithstanding scientific 'facts', I believe that what this view of nature gives 
us is the opportunity to ask not what nature may require, but rather how we might 
interpret nature to make it what it 'ought' to be. In sum, I submit in the context of the 
individualistic approach advocated in this work, that it requires us to perceive of our 
(individual) place in nature not as an aggregated member of one of an innumerable 
preferred group, but that '...fundamental reality is best represented by saying that 
the earth is populated by individuals who resemble one another, and who differ from 
one another, in myriad ways, rather than by saying that the earth is populated by 
different kinds of beings' (Rachels, 1990, p. 174). An immediate qualification is 
necessitated here: this is not to entirely eschew nature (we are on this account after 
all a part of nature), or to intimate that overt anthropocentrism or blatant stewardship 
is then merely a 'restating and reinterpreting of nature', but rather to foster ways that 
may enable us to focus the kinds of ethical responses to the nonhuman (and human) 
world upon an appreciation of the profound responsibility us humans face in the light
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of our ongoing ethical interpretation. In this thesis I have argued that in the context of 
mainstream strands of animal advocacy including welfarism, conservationism and 
ecocentrism, we have largely failed.
Relevant difference or relevant similarity?
A pivotal causation for this recurrent failure, that has been alluded to in the context of 
earlier discussion upon welfarism, paternalism and holism, is the problem of 
determining what precisely constitutes 'difference' between humans and nonhumans 
(and therefore importantly what constitutes our moral obligations and designation of 
moral boundaries). It is this persistent confusion both within theoretical and applied 
animal advocacy that forms a further core challenge for any applied ethic in regard to 
our treatment and use of the other animals that share this world.
In relatively recent times this question has fomented much philosophical 
debate, biological research and behaviourally based observation. Arising from this 
ever expanding volume of work, argument both for and against the notion of 
ascribing greater moral status to nonhuman animals has been advanced. For 
example, philosophical argument has increasingly begun to reference empirical 
findings in the fields of genetics, neurology, ethnology and the behavioural 
sciences.64 For many moral philosophers, much contemporary research in these 
areas has (often without direct intent) further brought into question the once taken- 
for-granted view that human beings possess a plethora of 'unique' traits within the 
animal kingdom. The possession of reason, empathy, reciprocity, the ability to 
mourn, a sense of 'fair play' and even what has been determined as a 'moral' 
predilection have all been variously methodically observed by researchers in several
54 The empirical studies are numerous and mounting. Some useful starting references on these 
observable traits are: Alien, C., and M. Bekoff, Species of Mind (1997), Brosnan, S.F., and Frans B. 
De Waal, 'Monkeys reject unequal pay' (2005), pp.297-99., Cluton-Brock, T.H., and G.A. Parker, 
'Punishment in animal societies' (2004), pp.209-16., Douglas-Hamilton, I., S. Bhalla, G. 
Wittemyer, and F. Vollrath, 'Behavioural reactions of elephants towards a dying and deceased 
matriarch'. (2006), pp.87-102., Fehr, E., and S. Gachter, 'Fairness and retaliation: The economics 
of reciprocity' (2006), pp.159-81., Frank, S.A. Foundations of Social Evolution (1998), Katz, L.D., 
ed. Evolutionary Origins of Morality: Cross Disciplinary Perspectives (2006), Nowack, M.A., and K. 
Sigmund, 'Evolution of indirect reciprocity '(2006), pp.1291-98., Parr, LA., B.M. Waller, and J. 
Fugate, 'Emotional communication in primates: Implications for neurobiology' (2005), pp. 1-5., 
White/T.I., In Defense of Dolphins: The New Moral Frontier (2005)., Wilkinson, G. 'Reciprocal food 
sharing in vampire bats' (1984).
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nonhuman species.65 For others, the findings point to observational differences 
between human and nonhumans in evolutionary development that, although subtle, 
should not be discounted.
There is a persistent problem here for animal advocacy however. 
Notwithstanding the obvious dangers of overt anthropomorphism, there nevertheless 
remains clear mounting empirical evidence for many other species possessing what 
would, in commonplace terms, be interpreted as 'human traits'. Despite furnishing 
'hard' scientific observational and falsifiable research results to bolster the claims of 
those who would defend animal rights, the scientific 'facts' - although of significant 
scientific interest - may not necessarily prove decisive in future debate on the moral 
status of nonhumans. The ever expanding body of evidence pointing to the 
similarities between species (especially the 'higher' mammals) that emphasise 
evolutionary and behavioural parallels, may in fact fail to make a convincing moral 
claim for a radical rethink in our attitudes to nonhumans. Simply put, it seems a 
somewhat disturbing observation that despite the clear and provocative evidence for 
cognitive similarities between species, there remains a deep-seated 'belief within the 
human cultural psyche that there is a decisive and relevant difference between 
human and nonhuman animals. 66
The idea and 'fact' of difference between human and nonhumans has likewise 
been co-opted to argue for both the 'for' and 'against' positions regarding animal 
rights and nonhuman moral standing. There would seem to be an inescapable 
dualism embedded in the developing animal ethical debate: namely, in arguing for an 
emphasis on difference, we downplay the similarities; in arguing for similarity we 
downplay differences. It would seem that the moral case for a radical repositioning of 
the moral status of nonhumans is condemned to pursue either a 'similarity' approach 
(the 'fellowship' of pain and suffering as exemplified within utilitarian based animal
65 And it is to be noted that this is not to be construed as mere anthropomorphism, as these 
observations have been exhaustively observed under falsifiable, repeatable, and rigorous scientific 
study over extensive periods of time.
66 Richard Sorabji makes this point in discussion of the one-dimensionality of animal ethical theory 
in Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate (1993), p.217. 
Furthermore, one may merely cite the percentage of people (over 40% in the USA) that still 
'believe' that evolutionary theory is terminally flawed or simply wrong - despite the overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary. Likewise, given that billions continue to believe in a theistic conception of 
God regardless of the impossibility of furnishing any evidence whatsoever for such a conception, 
also bolsters my claim that evidence does not equate to a change of'belief.
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liberation theory) or a 'difference' approach (that us humans uniquely have the moral 
capacity to recognise and thus assign inherent value - typically posited by 
deontological theories of animal rights). However, if indeed both difference and 
similarity typically characterize actual physiological, psychological and behavioural 
attributes of sentient beings, the case may be made for embracing both the 
similarities (that we 'share' an undeniable commonality with other sentient beings), 
and the differences (our higher intelligence and concomitant complex moral 
responses). Difference and similarity thus include matters of factual reference and 
not merely moral inference.
In this sense it may be argued that factual reference cannot straightforwardly 
offer a robust grounding for espousing any moral theory. It can, however, help to 
provide a framework that is not bound to the solely theoretical and suffer from the 
one-dimensionality discussed in chapter two, but has within it a 'direct' appeal to 
application and practice. Herein such a notion may go some way to bridging the gap 
between ethical theory and ethical practice in its inclusion of 'real-world' factual 
reference. 67 This is of course not to infer that extant animal ethical theories ignore 
this practical dimension. Indeed, in Animal Liberation Singer devotes whole chapters 
to describing the empirical treatment of animals in scientific research and factory 
farming.68 In actual fact, it may be fairly said that for a great number of those who 
endorse ethical theories that argue for animal interests, it is the underlying disquiet 
felt in the daily treatment and use of animals that brings a singular poignancy to the 
theoretical debate at large. Bringing the mounting empirical evidence for difference 
and similarity to the animal ethics discourse is at any rate likely unavoidable.
Conclusion
Of course, theory and practice are neither mutually exclusive nor carried out in a 
vacuum. Indeed, in the case of the arguments concerning our obligations to animals
67 And the version of biocentric individualism argued for in this work fully accepts that empirical 
Tacts' are increasingly important in the 'ethical' argument. With regard to determining the moral 
status of nonhumans, the philosophical admonition to avoid extrapolating 'oughts'from what'is', is 
moot in environmental ethical terms. It is clear that what traits an animal 'is' empirically proven to 
possess must have a direct bearing upon our ethical deliberations (indeed, this is how we derive 
our understanding of ourselves). The possession of sentience for example can only be an 
'empirically' observed state.
68 See Singer, Animal Liberation (1995) and also Practical Ethics (1993).
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presented in this work, the substantive 'facts' and the rigorous theoretical argument 
ought, I think, to be viewed as mutually inclusive. Acceptance of this mutual 
inclusiveness does of course not mean that agreement on moral relevance will 
always be possible - as the subject matter of the preceding chapters readily 
illustrates. We may disagree on the moral relevance of an analogy (and animal 
ethics is littered with more than its fair share of analogous argument), but agree that 
the onus is on finding the morally relevant disanalogy. For example, we may argue 
that human use of language equates to a moral relevance, but may also argue that 
possession of syntax is not a prerequisite for experiencing a wide range of emotions 
such as fear at the slaughterhouse, or the pathological depression experienced by 
the zoo exhibit. A central point to draw out from this observation, that echoes much 
of the argument advanced thus far, is that because ethical issues are deemed 
morally important, this does not necessarily mean that they are morally relevant in a 
particular case. In this sense, when individuals fail to agree on moral relevance, and 
invoke any one extant mainstream moral theory to bolster such conclusions, there is 
an embedded presumption that the chosen worldview addresses the 'particular' 
adequately and consistently. With regard to mainstream ideas of animal advocacy, I 
have argued that there exist serious theoretical anomalies that colour wider animal 
advocacy in subtle, yet decisive ways. It is with this misgiving in mind that I have 
presented my evaluation of animal advocacy in this work.
The devil is of course in the detail. It is the efficacy (and I have argued in this 
work the non-effectiveness) of the normative theoretical groundings of 
'nonanthropocentric' ethical approaches that, I have argued, need urgent scrutiny. I 
have in this work further attempted to illustrate this point in reference to prevailing 
animal protectionist approaches. Building upon an overview of rights-based animal 
advocacy in chapter one, I argued in chapter two that the normative welfare 
approach that commits to a principle of 'killing with kindness' fails spectacularly in its 
protectionist aims towards animals in human servitude.69 Chapter three explored the 
embeddedness of similar presumptions of 'use' towards nonhuman animals in 
discussion of interspecies paternalism and its failure to address the problems of 
identifying the 'real' interests of any individual or indeed group. Chapter four
69 It 'fails' both in its aim to adequately protect the life of individual animals (its claim to 
protectionism), and in its presumption that good welfare is sufficient (it is a flawed aim).
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continued with a critique of ecocentric ethics and its questionable holistic refocusing 
to 'ecosystemic contribution' driven by the presupposition that nonhumans (but not 
humans) be valued merely to the degree of their systemic value to a greater holistic 
whole. Chapter five and six subsequently considered if a weak form of biocentric 
individualism may be grounded upon the considered arguments of the body of this 
work and explored the likely practical implications. Those arguments claimed that 
there existed an embedded illegitimacy of use arising from a failure to recognise or 
acknowledge the presumptive utilisation of nonhumans and that this was endemic to 
contemporary animal advocacy.
The problematic commonality between the normative nonanthropocentric 
ways of defining our relationship to other-than-human animals is, I believe, the 
unconsidered presumption of the moral legitimacy of animal use. Whether the 
ethical call is to equal consideration of interests, ethical husbandry or biospheric 
egalitarianism, each is characterised by a wholesale failure to consistently challenge 
the far reaching significance of the tacit assumption that humans possess the 
authority or capacity to directly adjudicate upon nonhuman life and death decisions. I 
have therefore argued throughout that it is this underlying assumption of presumptive 
utilisation that is the causal factor for the endemic failure to interrelate with the 
nonhuman world in a morally justifiable manner, I have proposed a challenge to 
these underlying assumptions in the form of a developed biocentric individualism.
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Glossary of Terms
Animal Advocacy: This titular term is to be understood in the context of this work to 
designate a general disposition of pro-animal support in matters of ethical 
deliberation. My usage does not however suggest that animal advocacy is any one 
thing, or that animal advocacy is to be viewed as a homogeneous position. Indeed, 
in considering the inclusion of nonhuman animals in ethical deliberation diverse other 
factors such as human needs or environmental integrity for instance are, on my 
account, requisite in espousing a consistent pro-advocacy position. In this sense, 
animal advocacy as used throughout this work qualitatively differs from a generalised 
empathic disposition towards nonhumans ('liking' animals) or a limited acquiescence 
to a welfare based restrictions (acknowledgment that at least some restrictions on 
our use of animals should be promoted - frequently encapsulated in the notion that 
we cannot do 'whatsoever we like 1 to sentient beings). In its usage here then, it 
rather denotes that the animal advocate, in acknowledging the vulnerability of many 
nonhumans in the face of human activity, proactively appeals for the appropriate 
inclusion of nonhumans in the broad sphere of moral consideration. It therefore 
strongly suggests a proactive posture on behalf of the advocate, and can encompass 
many activities that a person or organization undertakes on behalf of nonhuman 
animals. These measures may, for example, variously include media campaigns, 
public speaking, commissioning and publishing research, the instigation of legal 
challenges or even direct activism.
Animal Rights: It is noteworthy that the debate within and without animal ethics is 
generally termed the 'animal rights' debate. This is somewhat of a misnomer 
however, as this view encompasses diverse theoretical and practical interpretations 
such as welfarism, abolitionism and various positions juxtaposed between these - 
and not necessarily strictly 'rights-based' ascriptions. In this nominal sense, I believe 
the 'language' of rights cannot rightly be ignored entirely in a work on 'animal rights'. 
In this way, the term as used throughout this work denotes more than the standard 
dictionary definition of the 'right' of animals to be treated well. Indeed, the assertion 
of some duty of care toward animals does not adequately encapsulate the animal 
rightist viewpoint outlined here. Individuals, for example, are frequently (and often
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happily) responsible for the welfare of animals in their care, but this is not the same 
as bestowing rights on animals. A central claim of the rights position is that In 
treating a nonhuman animal merely as a means to human ends we violate the rights 
of an autonomous individual and ignore our moral duties owed to moral 'patients' 
(Regan, 2004). Much current practice and policy towards nonhumans clearly violates 
such an edict, being crucially exemplified in their legally defined status of 'property'. 
Within the scope of my usage here, I do not intend to forward a defence of the 
classical liberal interpretation of rights, and consistently argue that the nonhuman 
individual does not, and should not, readily fit the classical liberal model based 
largely upon a 'positive' rights paradigm. Animal rights understood in this way, 
therefore necessitates privileged 'third party advocates' to defend the voiceless and 
protest against perceived maltreatment. In this sense, animal rights as interpreted 
here does not seek as a primary goal a structured, literalised and legalistic pantheon 
of rights, but endeavours to readdress, redefine and reassess the moral status of, 
and our moral obligations to, nonhumans. In short, the 'right' to be considered as 
moral subjects by any person who has moral principles, regardless of what those 
moral principles may be.
Animal Rights-Based View: Following on from my definition of animal rights, I 
submit, as a central tenet of this thesis, that the primary underlying factor that is a 
cause for disconcertion for a great many individuals is the 'inescapable' radical 
underpinning of the animal rights case. Indeed, I readily concede that if the case is 
successfully made for accepting that arbitrary instrumental use of 'moral beings' is 
effectively immoral, the real-world implications are nothing short of revolutionary in 
scope. If there is any quantifiable 'intuitive' aspect to our feelings toward other 
sentient beings and our subsequent treatment of nonhuman animals, it may well 
transpire that it is, in part at least, a deep-seated apprehension within the human 
psyche to embrace the seismic changes that must ensue in our everyday treatment 
of animals. However, my persistent contention throughout this thesis is that the 
brevity of the challenge is no reason to assign this undertaking to the defeated ranks 
of'Utopian' imaginings.
Animal Welfare: Largely, dictionary definitions of welfare itself use normative ideas 
of physical and mental health and happiness as pivotal to the aims and ideals of
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welfare. 'Welfare' in its broader sense can encompass not merely desires, but 
include fulfilment of preferences and indeed interests, and take on subtle but 
importantly distinct connotations. I submit however that 'animal welfare' as used in 
this work should not be conflated in meaning and application with this broader 
(human) understanding and usage that turns in part upon notions of 'positive' rights 
and developed well-being of moral agents (as opposed to moral patients and our 
'negative' obligations to such). The term animal welfare as used in this work 
generally connotes (unless otherwise stated) the normative and eclectic view of 
animal welfare as expressed above, one that equates ideas of physical and mental 
wellbeing within a 'welfare' framework. However, I maintain that implicit in this 
framework are prescriptive limitations on our full moral duties toward other sentient 
beings. For example, viewing animal 'rights' as equating primarily to welfarist aims 
ranging from human education on the salient issues to assigning legal protection 
does not encompass the 'spirit' of what it is to be attributed rights in general. In this 
sense, the welfarist concept of 'rights' as I interpret it in this work, leaves the welfare 
of nonhuman animals 'arbitrarily' open to interpretation dependent upon politics, 
period and place. There is therefore a need to distinguish between what may 
constitute human conceptions of 'welfare', 'animal' welfare in its many forms, and the 
divergent animal rights position - both in theoretical and practical terms. This 
divergence in ways of thinking about interspecies relationships is, I argue, 
fundamental to our understanding of welfare and our treatment of other animals - 
and indeed to my thesis here.
Anthropocentrism: Throughout this work I use the term in the commonplace 
understanding that, broadly defined, constitutes the tendency for humans to regard 
themselves as the central and most significant entities in the universe and thus 
recurrently tend towards an unreflective assessment of 'reality' through a selectively 
human standpoint. There is however an important distinction to be made between 
'anthropogenic' provenance, and 'anthropocentric' bias, that is to be borne in mind 
throughout in my repeated use of the term anthropocentrism. 'Anthropogenic' as 
used in this work denotes the commonplace meaning relating primarily to the origin 
and development of modern human constructs - in essence, that which is 'created' 
by man. In this sense, our actions and subsequent impact upon the world around are
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'man-made'. Importantly however, anthropogenic provenance does not correctively 
'fix' our worldview as one delimited exclusively and necessarily by rigid and inflexible 
forms of human-centrism. Therefore caution needs to be exercised in presumptions 
of 'anthropocentrism' as being 'natural' for humans (as this presumption could 
ultimately be used to justify 'any' decision/moral perspective). In this sense 
anthropogenic ways of thinking and applying meaning are little more than our genetic 
inheritance - and thus fully embraced. Anthropocentrism (and particularly in its more 
crude assertions), on the other hand is not a 'given' - as we may as moral agents, for 
example, 'decide' to give equal consideration of interests irrespective of our 
anthropogenic provenance (just being human).
Biocentric Individualism: The term biocentric individualism as forming part of the 
title of this work reflects a key acknowledgment of the central importance of ascribing 
moral standing to individual living creatures. As such, '...to view the place of 
humans in the natural world from the perspective of the biocentric outlook is to reject 
the idea of human superiority over other living things. Humans are not thought of as 
carrying on a higher grade of existence when compared with the so-called 'lower' 
orders of life' (Taylor, 1986, p.45). The biocentric view forwarded in this thesis 
therefore posits that intrinsic value lies in the perceived 'good' of the individual 
bearers of moral standing (and on this account, living animals). This perceptible 
good may include such things as the capacity for growth and flourishing, practical 
autonomy, and chance to live as 'natural' a life as possible. As no automatic priority 
is accorded to beings that are deemed to be more sophisticated within this schema, 
the view precludes normative hierarchical ways of looking at nature at large.
Ecocentrism: For proponents of the ecocentric position, ecocentrism constitutes a 
radical challenge to normative anthropocentric ways of looking at nature in that it 
promulgates a nature-centred, as opposed to human-centred, system of values. The 
justification for ecocentrism normally consists in an ontological belief and subsequent 
ethical claim. The ontological belief denies any existential divisions between human 
and non-human nature sufficient to ground a claim that humans are either (a) the 
sole bearers of intrinsic value or (b) possess greater intrinsic value than non-human 
nature. In this work, I argue against the efficacy of the ecocentric ethical claim for
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biocentric egalitarianism arising from these premises as forming an adequate 
protectionist model for a thoroughgoing animal advocacy.
Holism: Defined as the belief that each thing is a whole which is more ontologically 
(and frequently morally) important than the parts that make it up, the idea forms the 
antithesis to an individualistic and rights-based viewpoint as presented in this thesis. 
Holism is recurrently forwarded as a perspective that is inclusive, reflects an 
empirical understanding of nature, and is both scientifically and ethically sound. 
However, I submit that this systemic view of nature at large, rather than forwarding 
an egalitarian agenda for interspecies relationships, cultivates a hierarchical 
understanding of the structure of nature. Taking a Darwinian view - that difference 
within the natural world is always a matter of degree and not of kind - it is my 
contention that the systemic view too readily conflates the complexity, 
interdependency and mutuality of the natural world with notions of hierarchy that are, 
I argue, uniquely human in provenance. Consequently, the nonhuman individual is 
'lost' in the dominant belief that hierarchy between groups forms the 'natural' order of 
nature.
Individualism: The idea that freedom of thought and action for each individual is the 
most important quality of a society, rather than shared effort and responsibility. The 
concept of animal rights, in extending moral consideration to nonhuman animals, 
expands the boundaries of the ethical community and in including nonhuman 
individuals in its ethical scope, definitions of freedom and autonomy and what that 
may signify for nonhumans is central to our understanding of moral considerability to 
other sentient beings. Implicit in the meaning of individualism in the context of this 
thesis therefore is the assertion that it is only individual living organisms that have 
interests - and not aggregate groups such as species/ecosystems/biotic 
communities. In order to properly fulfil the radical promise of an animal rights 
position, I will argue that 'doing justice' to the individualism that is pivotal to this 
stance requires an elementary re-examining of the established hierarchical view in 
order to properly locate the nonhuman individual within the moral landscape.
Paternalism: Paternalism defined as coercion of the individual for their own good 
has, I argue, particular meaning for our understanding of our dealings with
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nonhumans. The normative view has two allied, but discrete, assertions: (1) the 
paternalistic action is primarily intended to benefit the recipient, and (2) the 
recipient's consent or dissent is not a relevant consideration for the initiator. Given 
that we cannot readily and meaningfully assess what is in the interest of other 
species (without overt presumptions of 'sameness'), and that nonhuman animals 
cannot either consent or dissent through rational process, the idea of paternalism 
when directed at other-than-human animals raises new challenges to the 
commonplace conception. Paternalism towards nonhumans, in practice then, 
frequently takes on a generic quality that may well include 'legitimate' welfare based 
actions, but more often reflects attitudes of underlying human chauvinism. This 
chauvinism may take many forms ranging from selective conservation and 
preservation policy and practice, to ideas of what may constitute good welfare 
practice and prescriptive nonhuman flourishing. I argue for a redefinition of our 
commonplace understanding of paternalism in the interspecies context, advocating 
that an 'interspecies paternalism' must redefine normative ideas of stewardship and 
biodiversity and take into account the 'otherness' of the nonhuman individual if it is to 
be morally legitimate.
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